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FINANCIAL ECONOMICS

Financial contracting and misreporting with limited enforcement, firm financing and growth

| (Reviewing editor)
Article: 1723826 | Received 15 Dec 2018, Accepted 18 Jan 2020, Published online: 12 Feb 2020

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