References
- Aggarwal, R., Klapper, L., & Wysocki, P. D. (2005). Portfolio preferences of foreign institutional investors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 29(12), 2919–17. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0378426604002559
- Bennett, J. A., Sias, R. W., & Starks, L. T. (2003). Greener pastures and the impact of dynamic institutional preferences. The Review of Financial Studies, 16(4), 1203–1238. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhg040
- Bhagat, S., & Black, B. (2002). The non-correlation between board independence and long-term firm performance. Journal of Corporation Law, 27(2), 231.
- Birkinshaw, J., Nobel, R., & Ridderstråle, J. (2002). Knowledge as a contingency variable: Do the characteristics of knowledge predict organization structure? Organization Science, 13(3), 274–289. https://doi.org/10.1287/orsc.13.3.274.2778
- Black, B. S., & Khanna, V. S. (2007). Can corporate governance reforms increase firm market values? Event study evidence from india. Journal of Empirical Legal Studies, 4(4), 749–796. https://doi.org/10.1111/jels.2007.4.issue-4
- Bowman, R. G., & Min, B. (2012, March). The positive impact of corporate governance on foreign equity ownership: Evidence from Korea. In 2012 financial markets & corporate governance conference. https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2026036
- Bushee, B. J., Carter, M. E., & Gerakos, J. (2013). Institutional investor preferences for corporate governance mechanisms. Journal of Management Accounting Research, 26(2), 123–149. https://doi.org/10.2308/jmar-50550
- Chan, K., Covrig, V., & Ng, L. (2005). What determines the domestic bias and foreign bias? Evidence from mutual fund equity allocations worldwide. The Journal of Finance, 60(3), 1495–1534. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.2005.768_1.x
- Chidambaran, N. K., Kedia, S., & Prabhala, N. R. (2012). CEO-director connections and corporate fraud, fordham University school of business research paper. 96(5). https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1787500, https://doi.org/10.1094/PDIS-11-11-0999-PDN
- Chou, H. I., Chung, H., & Yin, X. (2013). Attendance of board meetings and company performance: Evidence from Taiwan. Journal of Banking & Finance, 37(11), 4157–4171. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2013.07.028
- Cohen, L., Frazzini, A., & Malloy, C. J. (2012). Hiring cheerleaders: Board appointments of “Independent” directors. Management Science, 58(6), 1039–1058. https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.1110.1483
- Dixit, B. K. (2015). Board characteristics, ownership structure and the market for corporate control in India. India finance conference, IIM.
- Duchin, R., Matsusaka, J. G., & Ozbas, O. (2010). When are outside directors effective? Journal of Financial Economics, 96(2), 195–214. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2009.12.004
- Eisenberg, T., Sundgren, S., & Wells, M. T. (1998). Larger board size and decreasing firm value in small firms. Journal of Financial Economics, 48(1), 35–54. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(98)00003-8
- Fama, E. F., & Jensen, M. C. (1983). Agency problems and residual claims. The Journal of Law and Economics, 26(2), 327–349. https://doi.org/10.1086/467038
- Ferreira, M. A., Matos, P., Pereira, J. P., & Pires, P. (2017). Do locals know better? A comparison of the performance of local and foreign institutional investors. Journal of Banking & Finance, 82, 151–164. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jbankfin.2017.06.002
- Fich, E. M. (2005). Are some outside directors better than others? Evidence from director appointments by fortune 1000 firms. The Journal of Business, 78(5). https://doi.org/10.1086/431448
- Finkelstein, S., & D’aveni, R. A. (1994). CEO duality as a double-edged sword: How boards of directors balance entrenchment avoidance and unity of command. Academy of Management Journal, 37(5), 1079–1108.
- Forbes, D. P., & Milliken, F. J. (1999). Cognition and corporate governance: Understanding boards of directors as strategic decision-making groups. Academy of Management Review, 24(3), 489–505. https://doi.org/10.5465/amr.1999.2202133
- Gillan, S. L., & Starks, L. T. (2000). Corporate governance proposals and shareholder activism: The role of institutional investors. Journal of Financial Economics, 57(2), 275–305. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(00)00058-1
- Gompers, P. A., & Metrick, A. (2001). Institutional investors and equity . The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 116(1), 229–259. https://doi.org/10.1162/003355301556392
- Goodstein, J., Gautam, K., & Boeker, W. (1994). The effects of board size and diversity on strategic change. Strategic Management Journal, 15(3), 241–250. https://doi.org/10.1002/()1097-0266
- Helland, E., & Sykuta, M. (2005). Who’s monitoring the monitor? Do outside directors protect shareholders’ interests? Financial Review, 40(2), 155–172. https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.2005.40.issue-2
- Jensen, M. (1993). The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems. The Journal of Finance, 48(3), 831–880. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1993.tb04022.x
- Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305–360. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(76)90026-X
- Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. (1995). Specific and general knowledge and organizational structure. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 8(2), 4–18. https://doi.org/10.1111/jacf.1995.8.issue-2
- Kang, J. K. (1997). Why is there a home bias? An analysis of foreign portfolio equity ownership in Japan. Journal of Financial Economics, 46(1), 3–28. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0304-405X(97)00023-8
- Lakonishok, J., Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1992). The impact of institutional trading on stock prices. Journal of Financial Economics, 32(1), 23–43. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(92)90023-Q
- Leuz, C., Lins, K. V., & Warnock, F. E. (2010). Do foreigners invest less in poorly governed firms? Review of Financial Studies, 23(3), 3245–3285. https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn089.ra
- Lipton, M., & Lorsch, J. W. (1992). A modest proposal for improved corporate governance. The Business Lawyer, 59–77. American Bar Association. https://www.jstor.org/stable/40687360?seq=1
- Liu, C., Low, A., Masulis, R. W., & Zhang, L. (2017). Monitoring the monitor: Distracted institutional investors and board governance. European Corporate Governance Institute (ECGI)-Finance Working Paper, (531).
- Mak, Y. T., & Kusnadi, Y. (2005). Size really matters: Further evidence on the negative relationship between board size and firm value. Pacific-Basin Finance Journal, 13(3), 301–318. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.pacfin.2004.09.002
- Rosenstein, S., & Wyatt, J. G. (1990). Outside directors, board independence, and shareholder wealth. Journal of Financial Economics, 26(2), 175–191. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(90)90002-H
- Shleifer, A., & Vishny, R. W. (1997). A survey of corporate governance. The Journal of Finance, 52(2), 737–783. https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-6261.1997.tb04820.x
- Sias, R. W. (2007). Reconcilable differences: momentum trading by institutions. Financial Review, 42(1), 1–22. https://doi.org/10.1111/fire.2007.42.issue-1
- Yang, T., & Zhao, S. (2014). CEO duality and firm performance: Evidence from an exogenous shock to the competitive environment. Journal of Banking & Finance, 49, 534–552. https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/abs/pii/S0378426614001344
- Yermack, D. (1996). Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors. Journal of Financial Economics, 40(2), 185–211. https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-405X(95)00844-5
- Yermack, D. (1998). Companies’ modest claims about the value of CEO stock option awards. Review of Quantitative Finance and Accounting, 10(2), 207–226. https://doi.org/10.1023/A:1008299824396
- Zona, F., Zattoni, A., & Minichilli, A. (2013). A contingency model of boards of directors and firm innovation: The moderating role of firm size. British Journal of Management, 24(3), 299–315. https://doi.org/10.1111/bjom.2013.24.issue-3