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GENERAL & APPLIED ECONOMICS

On the use of intertemporal models to analyse how post-loss and post no-loss insurance demands differ

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Article: 2035493 | Received 03 Aug 2021, Accepted 22 Jan 2022, Published online: 18 Feb 2022

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