Notes
- For an authoritative account of the Six-Day War, including Jordan's conduct before and during the fighting, see Michael B. Oren, Six Days of War: June 1967 and the Making of the Modern Middle East (New York, 2002).
- Jordan's role in the Yom Kippur War is succinctly recounted in Chaim Herzog, The War of Atonement: October, 1973 (Boston, 1975), pp. 139–142 and Abraham Rabinovich, The Yom Kippur War: The Epic Encounter that Transformed the Middle East (New York, 2004), pp. 433–434.
- Rabinovich, op. cit., pp. 433–434.
- Ibid., p. 434.
- For a concise account of Israel's role in defeating Palestinian-Syrian forces, see Paul K. Huth, Extended Deterrence and the Prevention of War (New Haven, 1988), pp. 86–97.
- The substance of two of these meetings is recorded in Nina Howland and Craig Daigle (eds.), Foreign Relations of the United States, 1969–1976, Volume XXV, Arab-Israeli Crisis and War, 1973 (Washington, DC, 2011), documents 12 and 64 (henceforth FRUS, Vol. XXV, followed by the document number(s). The electronic edition of this volume can be found at www.state.gov.) For the Israeli-Jordanian meetings, see also Aryeh Shalev, Israel's Intelligence Assessment before the Yom Kippur War: Disentangling Deception and Distraction (Portland, 2010), pp. 78–88 and 262. The precise dates of some of the meetings are in dispute, but when exactly they took place is not important in the context of this article.
- The substance of this meeting is described in Shalev, op. cit., pp. 78–88. On the meeting, see also Uri Bar-Joseph, The Watchman Fell Asleep: The Surprise of Yom Kippur and Its Sources (Albany, 2005).
- FRUS, Vol. XXV, 128 and 131.
- Ibid., 135, 136, and 142.
- Ibid., 150 and 155.
- Ibid., 152.
- Ibid., 136 and 147.
- For the existence of a direct Israeli-Jordanian communications channel, see ibid., 158 and 166.
- Ibid., 128, 147, 150, and 152.
- Ibid., 128 and 136.
- Ibid., 128, 135, 136, and 152.
- Ibid., 128 and 136.
- Ibid., 147.
- Ibid., 147, 150, and 155.
- Ibid., 157, 158, and 159.
- Ibid., 163, 171, and 179. Incidentally, Hussein also gave permission for Saudi Arabian troops in Jordan to move into Syria at the same time.
- Ibid., 188.
- For descriptions of these encounters, see Herzog, op. cit., pp. 139–142 and Rabinovich, op. cit., pp. 433–434.
- FRUS, Vol. XXV, 208. Emblematic of Arab disorganization is the fact that Saudi Arabian forces moving out of Jordan got lost on their way to the Golan front, prompting the dispatch of Jordanian scouts to find them and then to lead them “out of the wilderness” to the battlefield.
- Ibid., 224.
- Ibid., 233. The Iraqis, always the most militant foes of the Jewish State, had indicated that they would not abide by any cease-fire agreement, and they were pushing the Syrians incessantly to reject it.