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Original Articles

Policymaking in Taiwan's Semi-Presidentialism: A Case Study of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)

  • Phased tariff reduction began on January 1, 2011. The “early harvest” list of tariff concessions covers 539 Taiwanese products and 267 mainland Chinese goods. Mainland China would also open markets in 11 service sectors such as banking, securities, insurance, hospitals and accounting, while Taiwan agreed to offer wider access in 9 areas, including banking and movies.
  • Shiou-duan Huang, “Jingwai xieding yu guohui jiandu” [Beyond the Border Agreement and Congressional Supervision] Taiwan minzhu jikan [Taiwan Journal of Democracy], Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2010): 148–150.
  • Studies strongly supporting the need of the ECFA include: Tain-jy Chen, ed., Buneng meiyou ECFA: donya quyu jingji zhenghe dui taiwan de tiaozhan [We Need ECFA: East Asian Regional Economic Integration's Challenge to Taiwan] (Taipei: Prospect Foundation, 2010). Examples of those critical of the ECFA are: Quncehui (ed) [Taiwan Advocates (ed)], ECFA de zhengjing zainan [The Political and Economic Disasters of ECFA] (Taipei: Quncehui [Taiwan Advocates], 2009); Rong-I Wu (ed), Jiegou ECFA: Taiwan de mingyun yu jihui [Dismantling ECFA: Taiwan's Desteny and Opportunity] (Taipei: Xintaiwan guoce zhiku [Taiwan Brain Trust], 2010); Chih-cheng Lo, ed., ECFA dachongji: Taiwan de weijiyu tiaozhan [Deep Impact of ECFA: Taiwan's Danger and Challenge] (Taipei: Xintaiwan guoce zhiku [Taiwan Brain Trust], 2010).
  • Tai Chuan Wang and Liu, Chia-Hua, “Liang'an jingji hezuo jiagou xieyi (ECFA) zhi xingshi jiagou yu shishi neirong” [A Formal Framework and Actual Content of the Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement (ECFA)] Yuedan faxue zazhi [The Taiwan Law Review], No. 169 (June 2009): 186–199; ds Chiu-miao Lin, “Liang'an qianding jingji hezuo jiagou xieyi (ECFA) zhi guojifa shang dingwei yu guohui jiandu zhi yanjiu” [Cross-Strait Economic Cooperation Framework Agreement: Its Status in International Law and Domestic Congressional Supervision] Faxue xinlun [Journal of New Perspectives on Law], No. 16 (November 2009): 117–151.
  • Other than Jih-wen Lin's paper mentioned in this study, Hsu Szu-chien's study (2011), which used Robert Putnam's two-level games model, is the only one that analyzed the ECFA negotiation process from a political point of view. (Szu-chien Hsu, “Advantages and Limitations of President Ma's Cross-Strait Negotiations: CECA/ECFA as an Example,” Si yu yan [Thought and Words], Vol. 49, No.3 (September 2011): 55–94.
  • Jih-wen Lin, “A Veto Player Theory of Policymaking in Semipresidential Regimes: The Case of Taiwan's Ma Ying-jeou Presidency,” Journal of East Asian Studies, vol. 11, no. 3 (September-December 2011): 407–435.
  • According to Tsebelis, veto players are individual or collective actors and the current status of policies cannot be changed without their agreement. He states that nations' success or failure in changing policies can be explained by three factors: 1) the number of veto players, 2) the ideological distance between the veto players, and 3) the cohesive force within the veto players. (George Tsebelis, Veto Players: How Political Institutions Work (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2002): 19–63).
  • Actors who present “take it or leave it” proposals to the other veto players are called “agenda setters”. The government in the parliamentary system and the parliament in the presidential system are agenda setters (Ibid., 2–3).
  • Jih-wen Lin, op.cit., 415.
  • Ibid., 423–434.
  • Matthew Soberg Shugart, “Semi-Presidential System: Dual Executive and Mixed Authority Patterns,” French Politics, Vol. 3, No. 3 (2005): 323–351.
  • Robert Elgie, “The politics of Semi-Presidentialism,” in Robert Elgie, ed., Semi-Presidentialism in Europe (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p.13.
  • Masahiko Tatebayashi, Machidori, Satoshi and Soga, Kengo, Hikaku Seiji Seido Ron [Comparative Political Institutions] (Tokyo: Yuikaku, 2008), 107.
  • Shugart, op cit.
  • Mitsutoyo Matsumoto, “Presidential Strength and Party Leadership in Taiwan,” Yuko Kasuya, ed., Presidents, Assemblies and Policy-Making in Asia (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2013.)
  • Masahiro Wakabayashi, Taiwan no seiji: chukaminkoku taiwanka no seijishi [Politics in Taiwan: The Political History of Taiwanization of the Republic of China] (Tokyo: University of Tokyo Press, 2008), 238–239.
  • The president can dissolve the Legislative Yuan, after advising the Speaker of Legislative Yuan, within 10 days after the passage of a no-confidence motion toward the premier.
  • Matsumoto, op. sit., 87; Jung-Hsiang Tsai and Chen, Hong-ming, “Zongtongguohuizhi de yizhizhengfu yu xianzheng yunzuo: yi Ma Ying-jeou zongtong diyirerenqi weili” [Unified Government and Constitutional Operation in President-Parliamentarism During the First Term of President Ma, Ying-jeou in Taiwan] Dongwu zhengzhi xuebao [Soochow Journal of Political Science], Vol. 30, No. 4 (January 2012): 145.
  • Matsumoto, op. sit., 87–88.
  • For example, the premier, Tang Fei, who served during the Chen Shui-bian administration, stated such an understanding in his book (Fei Tang, Taibei heping zhi chun: gekui Tang Fei 140 tian quanjilu [The Spring of Peace in Taipei: Documentation of 140 days as the premier] (Taipei: Tianxia wenhua [Commonwealth Publishing], 2011): 150–151.
  • Hong-ming Chen, “Banzongtongzhi zhi xia zongtong de faan tuidong yu lifa yingxiangli: Ma Ying-jeou zongtong zhizheng shiqi de yanjiu” [The President's Position Taking of Bills and His Influence on Legislation under Semi-presidentialism: the Experience of President Ma Ying-jeou] Dongwu zhengzhi xuebao [Soochow Journal of Political Science], Vol. 30, No. 4 (July 2012): 35–50.
  • Mitsutoyo Matsumoto, “Soto wo meguru riso to genjitsu: taiwan ni genzon suru minshushugi to shimin” [Ideal and Reality for the President: Democracy in Taiwan and its Civic], in Toru Oga, ed., Hokuto Asia no Shimin Shakai: Toki to Chutai [Civil Society in Northeast Asia] (Tokyo: Kokusai Shoin, 2013,): 49–82.
  • Tzu-chiao Su, “Taiwan xianzhengtizhi de bianqian guiji (1991–2010): lishizhidulun de fenxi” [The Transition Course of Taiwan's Constitutional System (1991–2010): A Perspective of Historical Institutionalis] in Yu-Chung Shen and Wu, Yu-shan, eds., Quanli zai nali? Cong duoge jiaodu kan banzongtongzhi [Where is the power?: Semi-Presidentialism Analyzed from Multi Perspective] (Taipei: Wunan chuban gongsi [Wunan Book], 2012): 329; Tsai and Chen, op. cit., 145–151.
  • Constitutional law and political science scholars have differing opinions concerning whether or not the state president can dismiss the premier; however, political science academics generally agree that Taiwan's semi-presidentialism is a presidential-parliamentary system. Please refer to: Matsumoto,”Presidential Strength and Party Leadership in Taiwan,” 86–92.
  • Ibid., 86–92.
  • Article 12, Section 1 of the Constitution of France stipulates that the President of the Republic may, after consulting with the prime minister and the presidents of the assemblies, declare the national assembly dissolved. (Masanori Shiyake and Tsujimura, Miyoko, Shin Kaisetsu Sekai Kenposhu Dai Ni Han [The New Handbook of the Constitutions in the World] (Tokyo: Sanseido, 2010): 241.
  • Matsumoto, “Presidential Strength and Party Leadership in Taiwan,” 86–92.
  • Lee Teng-hui also served as the chairman of the KMT after becoming the popularly-elected president. Chen Shui-bian was not involved in DPP business when he was inaugurated as the state president, but became the DPP chairman two years later. Similarly, Ma Ying-jeou was not the KMT chairman, but later took the position while he was still the president.
  • Chau Yang, “Zhengdangluntihou lifayuan dangtuanzuzhi yunzuo zhi yanjiu: yi zhong-guoguomindang weili” [The Operations of Party Organization within The Legislative Yuan since 2000: The Case of the Kuomintang] (MA Dissertation, National Chengchi Univercity, 2008); 54–57.
  • The Constitution of the R.O.C. stipulates a separation of powers between the executive, legislative, judicial, examination (e.g., conducting recruitment exams, and appointment and management of government employees), and control (e.g., impeaching government employees, auditing accounting) branches. The presidents of the five Yuans are those of the Executive Yuan, the Legislative Yuan, the Judicial Yuan, the Examination Yuan, and the Control Yuan, all of which have equal status.
  • Unless otherwise specified, this section is based on the following literature: Mitsutoyo Matsumoto, “Taiwan banzongtongzhi de zhidu sheji yu qiyunzuo: Ma Ying-jeou zhengfu de gean fenxi” [The institutional design and its actual operation of Taiwan's Semi-Presidentialism: A Case Study of Ma Ying-jeou Administration] in Yasuhiro Matsuda, and Tsai, Zheng-jia, eds., Taiwan minzhuhuaxia de liang'an guanxi yu tairiguanxi [The Cross-Strait Relations and Taiwan-Japan Relations under Taiwan's Democratization] (Taipei: Center for Modern Japan Studies, National Chengchi University, 2013): 48–54.
  • The legislative seats of the KMT in the Legislative Yuan were 51.83% in the third Legislative Yuan in December 1995 before Lee became the popularly-elected president, and 54.67% in the fourth Legislative Yuan in December 1998 after he became the president. It reached 71.68% in the seventh Legislative Yuan in January 2008, before Ma became the president.
  • Shing-yuan Sheng, “Lifajiguan yu xingzhengjiguan zai lifaguochengzhong de yingxiangli: yizhizhengfu yu fenlizhengfu de bijiao” [The Influence of the Legislative Branch and the Executive Branch in the Process of Lawmaking: A Comparison of the Unified and Divided Governments] Taiwan zhengzhi xuekan [The Taiwanese Political Science Review], Vol. 7, No. 2 (December 2003): 51–105.
  • On July 26, 2009, when Chairman Wu Po-hsiung's term was going to end, KMT chairman election was held. Ma was the only candidate who ran in the election, and he won with 93.87% of the vote. On October 17, Ma became the KMT chairman in the KMT's 18th National Congress.
  • Chen, op. cit., 35–50. Lee Feng-yu also showed similar results. Her study covers the first through fifth term of the Seventh Legislative Yuan by examining the deliberation of government bills and legislators' bills in each term (Feng-yu Lee, “Zongtong yu qi zhengdang de guanxi: faguo yu taiwan de bijiao” [The Relationship between the President and His Party: A Comparison between France and Taiwan] in Shiow-duan Huang et al., Dangzheng guanxi yu guohui yunzuo [The Relationship between the Party and the Government and the Parliamentary Operation] (Taipei: Wunan Chuban gongsi [Wunan Book], 2011): 206–207.
  • Yeh-Lih Wamg, Bijiao xuanju zhidu (Zuixinban) [Comparative Electoral Institutions: Sixth edition] (Taipei: Wunan Chuban Gongsi [Wu-Nan Book], 2012): 149–160.
  • Mitsutoyo Matsumoto, “Shosenkyoku hireidaihyo heiritsusei niyoru gikai senkyo to daitoryo senkyo: taiwan, kankoku” [The Parliamentary Elections under Single-Member District and Proportional Representation and the Presidential Elections: Taiwan and Korea], in Masahiro Iwasaki, ed., Senkyo to Minshu Shugi [Election and Democracy] (Tokyo: Yoshida Shoten, 2013): 241.
  • Tatebayashi, Machidori, and Soga, op. cit., 91.
  • Pippa Norris, “Choosing Electoral Systems: Proportional, Majoritarian and Mixed Systems,” International Political Science Review, Vol. 18, No. 3 (July 1997): 308.
  • Lin, op. cit., 413.
  • Ibid.
  • This refers to the case when Ma nominated members of the Control Yuan and asked for approval from the Legislative Yuan. Some of his nominations were rejected, including the appointment of Shen Fu-hsiung, who used to be a DPP member.
  • According to a poll by the major cable station TVBS, “satisfaction rate” (similar to the approval rating) for Ma was 52% on April 29, 2008, right before his inauguration. The rate decreased to 41% on June 17, a month after the start of the administration. After the “88 Flood” on August 2009, the administration's delayed response in the relief effort and Ma's judgment were increasingly criticized. The poll on August 16 showed a decrease in the satisfaction rate to 16%. Until May 19, 2011, the third year of Ma's administration, the rate was hovering around 30–40%, and the number of those who responded “not satisfied” continued to exceed the number who said “satisfied.” TVBS Poll Center, “Ma Ying-jeou zongtong jiuzhi zan zhounian” [Public Opinion Survey on the Third Anniversary of the President Ma Ying-jeou], at <http://www1.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/PCH/201107/iracgo82xm.pdf> (searched date: 28 March 2012).
  • Yeh-Lih Wang, “dangtuan xieshang qineng bugai” [Why Does Not Party Caucuses' Negotiations reform] National Policy Foundation Website, at <http://www.npf.org.tw/post/1/3689> (searched date: 20 September 2014); Yu-jen Chou, “Lifayuan yishi touminghua zaixian shuguang” [There is a Prospect of Enhancing the Transparency of the Legislative Process Again] National Policy Foundation Website, at <http://www.npf.org.tw/post/1/4570> (searched date: 20 September 2014).
  • Lin, op. cit., 410.
  • When the Act Governing the Legislative Yuan's Powers was enacted on January 12, 1999, the party caucuses' negotiation system was instituted, and Wang Jin-pyng became the Speaker of the Legislative Yuan on February 1.
  • In the Legislative Yuan, bills are deliberated and voted on over three Readings: the First, Second, and Third Reading.
  • As of April 2015, Taiwan has diplomatic relations with only 22 countries.
  • J. Y. Interpretation No.329, Website of the Justices of the Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan, R.O.C., at <http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=329> (searched date: 30 August 2014).
  • J. Y. Interpretation No.520 was shown after the Executive Yuan declared the suspension of construction of a fourth nuclear power plant in October 2000.
  • J. Y. Interpretation No.520, Website of the Justices of the Constitutional Court, Judicial Yuan, R.O.C., at <http://www.judicial.gov.tw/constitutionalcourt/p03_01.asp?expno=520> (searched date: 30 August 2014).
  • Da-Chi Liao and Lee, Cheng Hsun, “Gouhui jiandu liang'an shiwu: Huaquan xiutui huo zhenqiangshidan” [Congressional Supervision over the Cross-Strait Affairs] Taiwan minzhu jikan [Taiwan Democracy Quarterly], Vol. 7, No. 1 (March 2010): 135.
  • The Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan yi'anguanxiwenshu [The Documents of Bills Presented to The Legislative Yuan] (Taipei: The LegislativeYuan, The R.O.C., 15 March 1999): 1–6.
  • The Legislative Yuan, Lifayuan gongbao [The Official Gazette of the Legislative Yuan, the R.O.C.], Vol. 88, No.27, the first volume (March 1999): 3.
  • The Speaker of the Legislative Yuan is the chairman, and the vice president is the vice-chairman. The other 23 members are sent from each party caucuses, except for one position for a legislator who does not belong to any caucuses. (Ching-fu Yang, “Lifayuan zai liang'anguanxi juece de dingwei: lifayuan liang'anshiwu yinyingduice xiaozu zhi yanjiu” [The Position of Legislative Yuan in the Decision Making on Cross-Strait Relations: The Research of Legislative Yuan's Cross-Strait Affairs Responding Group], (MA Dissertation, National Taiwan University, 2007): 116–117.
  • Ibid., 85–87.
  • Ibid., 88.
  • Wei-Jhu Huang, “To Avoid legislation supervision in signing ECFA, Ma plays the 'two no'strategy,” Ziyou Shibao [Liberty Times] (17 August 2010).
  • Zhongyangshe [Central News Agency], “Wang, Jin-Pyng: SEF-ARATS Agreement should be sent to Legislative Yuan for future reference,” Zhongshidianzibao liang'an lianghui futan Jiang-Chen hui zhuanji [Chinatimes Cross-Strait SEF-ARATS meeting restarts, the special collection of JIANG-Chen meeting], at <http://forums.chinatimes.com/report/Beijingmeeting/suggest/97061601.htm> (searched date: 28 August 2014).
  • Bei-Lin Wang, and Ciou, Yan-Ling, “Wang, Jin-Pyng urge the Executive Yuan to send the Cross-Strait Agreement Supervisory Act to the Executive Yuan,” Ziyou Shibao [Liberty Times] (25 February 2009).
  • Siao-Guang Yi, and Huang, Wei-Jhu, “Wang, Jin-Pyng proposes Cross-Strait council in the Legislative Yuan but KMT caucus rejects,” Ziyou Shibao [Liberty Times](10 August 2008).
  • This was a statement in the KMT Central Standing Committee on February 10, 2010 (Yi-Ling Liou, “Lun liyuan yingfou chengli liang'an xiaozu” [A discussion of whether the Legislative Yuan should establish the Cross-Strait Group] (23 February 2010), National Policy Foundation Website, at <http://www.npf.org.tw/post/1/7098> (searched date: 28 August 2013).
  • Ibid.
  • Takayuki Takeuchi, “Chugoku tono kankei kaizen to taiwan no kokusai shakai eno sanka” [The Improvement of the Cross-Strait Relationship and Taiwan's International Affairs] in Yoshiyuki Ogasawara and Sato, Yukihito, eds., Ba Eikyu Saisen: 2012 nen Taiwan Soto Senkyo no Kekka to Sono Eikyo [Ma Ying-jiou Reelected: The Result of Taiwan s 2012 Presidential Election and its Influence] (Institute of Developing Economies, 2010,): 104.
  • Luo-Wei Chen, “ECFA arrived in Legislative Yuan. President Ma set the tone for treating it as a treaty,” Lianhebao [The United Daily](30 June 2010),; Guang-Yi Li, and Cheng, Jia- Wun, “Wang, Jin-Pyng: it's an agreement not a treaty,” Lianhebao [The United Daily] (30 June 2010).
  • Ibid.
  • Jia-Wun Cheng, and Lin, He-Ming, “DPP cooperate with Wang against Ma? Wang: 'Pure nonsense!’,” Lianhebao [The United Daily] (3 Jury 2010).
  • Jia-Han Gao, and Wang, Bei-Lin “ECFA sent to the Legislative Yuan, Wang, Jin-Pyng: the storm is coming’,” Ziyou Shibao [The Liberty Times] (2 Jury 2010).
  • Jia-Wun Cheng, and Lin, He-Ming, op. cit.; Sin-Huei Lin, and Lin, Jheng-Jhong, “Ma-Wang hot line Dispose the detonator of hearty cord,” Lianhebao [The United Daily] (3 Jury 2010, 5 Jury 2010).
  • Lin, op. cit., 424.
  • Yan-Ling Ciou, Peng, Sian-Jyun, and Li, Sin-Fang, “Wang, Jin-Pyng proposes a compromised version yet the dilemma remains unsettled,” Ziyou Shibao [The Liberty Times] (7 Jury 2010),; He-Ming Lin, Yang, Siang-Jyun, Chen, Luo-Wei, and Li, Guang-Yi, “Reviewing the Blue's compromised proposal, Green rejects,” Lianhebao [The United Daily] (7 Jury 2010).
  • The interview group of parliament by United Daily, “Reiewing ECFA spills blood. Today fight for proceeding to the Second Reading,” Lianhebao [The United Daily] (9 June 2010).
  • Tsai and Chen, op. cit., 136–144.
  • Xiru Tian, “Ekefa? Zhengke ‘zaoshou qingdan’ de gongkai” [ECFA? Disclosing the “early harvest list” of the Politicians], Caixun [Wealth Magazine], No. 343 (1 April 2010): 106–107.’
  • TVBS Poll Center, “ECFA gongmin toupiao” [Public Opinion Survey on the Referendum for the ECFA] (31 May 2010), at http://www1.tvbs.com.tw/FILE_DB/DL_DB/doshouldo/201006/doshouldo-20100601201132.pdf (searched date: 25 September 2014).
  • Huei-Yuan Cin, Jhang, Li-Syun, Chen, Wun-Sin, and Lyu, Jhao-Long “Wang, Jin-Pyng won't run for the legislator, the end of speaker?” Zhongguo Shibao [The China Times] (4 Jury 2010).

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