Implementing Reforms in Bolivia: Too Much to Handle?

References

• Montes , C. Results-based Public Management in Bolivia , London : Overseas Development Institute . Overseas Development Institute Working Paper 202. February 2003
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• World Bank . 1999 . Bolivia Institutional Reform Project Appraisal Document , 5 Washington, DC : World Bank .
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• World Bank . 1999 . Bolivia Institutional Reform Project Appraisal Document. , 2 Washington, DC : World Bank .
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• 4. An example is a World Bank health sector project approved in 1999. This project followed a results-based framework, providing for some operational flexibility and setting and monitoring 8 performance indicators. The second phase of the project was made conditional on reaching at least 5 of the 8 target indicators.
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• 5. The education sector strategic plan for the 1999–2002 period included 4 strategic and 14 specific objectives. Since 1998, government and donors have established a common set of targets and indicators that are used in joint donor assessments in education.
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• 6. In 2002, a system of “continuous assessment” of the education program by donors was introduced to replace monitoring missions. Nickson, A. Bolivia Case Study. OECD-funded Study of Harmonisation of Donor Reporting and Monitoring Systems; Paris: OECD, 2002.
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• 7. For example, the health sector issues in the PRSP are based on the preexisting “Plan Estrategico de Salud de Lucha contra la Pobreza: 1997– 2002.”
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• 8. This is also a conclusion of a donor supervision mission. Aide Memoire “la mission recomendo reorientar las funciones de la UT de generadora de ARIs a un esfuerzo mayor de apoyo y seguimiento a la implementacion de los mismos,” date unknown; 3. The mission recommended reorienting the Technical Unit functions from generating ARIs to supporting and monitoring of their implementation. ARI conditionality is mostly linked to the management of the IRP project than to the strategic reform of the pilot sectors or the definition of clear performance benchmarks.
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• 9. Sector targets and performance have not been made public; only data on the 12 month President Plan and Prefecturas have been published.
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• 10. World Bank. Bolivia: From Patronage to Professional State. Bolivia Institutional and Governance Review, Volume 2, August 2000; 16.
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• 11. World Bank. Bolivia: From Patronage to Professional State. Bolivia Institutional and Governance Review, Volume 1, August 2000; vii.
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• 12. A severe problem of contradictions of mandates and roles existed between the IRP, SNAP, and SCS, and is discussed in Villoria, M. Diagnostico Institucional del Sistema de Servicio Civil de Bolivia. Background paper prepared for Inter American Development Bank, unpublished, June 2002; 43.
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• 13. Although this raises some sustainability issues. The Education Sector Reform, which began in 1994, followed a similar approach and the Treasury was not able to replace donor funding. The financial sustainability of the IRP is fragile, as discussed. The donor contribution of personnel costs in the IRP was projected to decline in 5 years (80, 80, 60, 60, and 30 percent). Cuevas, Javier. Actualización sostenibilidad financiera del Proyecto de Reforma Institucional, Unpublished paper, July 2002.
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• 14. The Superintendency noted that private companies were initially unable to adapt to the requirements of the public sector. In some cases, “uni-per-sonal” consultants are now being used (e.g., SNC, National Service of Internal Taxes). These are perceived by IRP management to have been more effective in Bolivia. However, large consultancy teams are being used in other ministries (e.g., Health, Justice, etc.).
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• 15. Information on physical and financial execution is estimated and reported monthly to the SISIS system of the Vice-Ministry of Public Investment and Foreign Financing.
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• 16. A difference of 10–25% exists between the SIE and the SIMECAL estimates.
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• 17. In 2001, 37 Evaluations of the Internal Audit Units were produced, as well as 49 monitoring of implementations, 58 financial audits, 58 operational audits (of which 47 on the SAFCO laws), 273 special audits (of which 116 found civil responsibility for about 11 million USD), 5 environmental audits, 43 evaluation of legal units, 347 of monitoring units, and 10 on information units.
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• 18. Report on the Health ministry is IX/UP09/A02 U1 published on 19/06/ 2002; report on education ministry is IX/UP21/Y02 U1 published on 12/ 07/2002. See www.cgr.gov.bo/
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• 19. The head of the CGR is elected by two thirds of the members of the Congress for 10 years.
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• 20. An example of strategic reorientation: The IRP supported the implementation of the declaration of assets by all public employees. Previously, the requirement was applied to senior officials only. The declaration of assets for some employees could be found on the web, including that of the previous president, Jorge Quiroga Ramirez) (www.cgr.gov.bo/). However, the information appears incomplete, particularly, in ministries such as health and education.
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• World Bank . “ Bolivia: From Patronage to Professional State ” . In Bolivia Institutional and Governance Review, Volume 2 30 August 2000
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• 22. Audit systems do not exist and donors often provide support to Congress without sufficient accountability controls.
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• 23. Mayors produced reports in 58% of the cases (67 replies of 116 requests) while council presidents produced reports on only 16% of the cases (18 replies of 115 requests). (Data for 2000/01 fiscal year.)
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• 24. The Project Coordinating Unit was to report to the CNI which was “chaired by the Vice-President and include in addition to key government ministers, representatives from the Senate, a delegate of the House of Representatives, a delegate from the Supreme Court, the Comptroller General of the Republic, the Attorney General, and representative of the Judicial Counsel.” World Bank. Bolivia Institutional Reform Project Appraisal Document. World Bank: Washington, DC, 1999; 13. The Committee (CNI) was “expected to play a key role in critical policy decision relating to IRP implementation, review and approval of ARI’s, and oversight of implementation of horizontal project components. It will serve as a focal point for state reform, ensuring that other programs and projects under the supervision of the government support the policy guidelines of the NIP.”
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