References
- For comments on earlier versions of this paper, I thank Sam Black, Bernard Gert, Mark LeBar, Michael McKenna, Derek Parfit, Douglas Portmore, and David Sobel. I would also especially like to thank David Copp for extensive written comments and a very useful discussion. Thanks also to Sam Black and Evan Tiffany for inviting me to contribute to the present volume.
- Scanlon , T. M. “Contractualism and Utilitarianism,” in ” . In Utilitarianism and Beyond Edited by: Sen , Amartya and Williams , Bernard . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . 1982), 103–128; Bernard Williams, “Internal and External Reasons,” in his Moral Luck (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 101–13; Joseph Raz, Practical Reason and Norms (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).
- The reference to sacrifice here does not imply that reasons are exclusively self-interested; certainly one can be rationally justified in sacrificing a good deal by the prospect of sparing other people— even complete strangers— from comparable harms. I make use of the notion of sacrifice because when one is specifying strength values all that is required is some fixed standard for making comparative judgments, and sacrifice provides one such standard. A good analogy here is with literal weight, and the fact that we can specify weight in ounces, grams, or stone.
- 2004 . On What Matters , Although the justifying/requiring distinction is a relatively recent arrival on the philosophical scene, there are a fair number of views in which it figures, either explicitly or implicitly. Besides my own view and that of my father, Derek Parfit's talk of the rough comparability of personal and impartial reasons not only yields a distinction between the justifying and requiring strength of reasons, but even yields the substantive conclusion that altruistic reasons have considerable justifying strength, but little requiring strength. See Derek Parfit, (forthcoming). For discussion, see my “Reply to Tenenbaum,” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 37 (2007): 463–76. Patricia Greenspan's distinction between positive and negative reasons also entails a robust justifying/requiring distinction, as does Jonathan Dancy's substantive distinction between favouring one option and disfavouring the only alternative option. See Patricia Greenspan, “Asymmetrical Practical Reasons,” in Experience and Analysis: Proceedings of the 27 th International Wittgenstein Symposium, ed. J. C. Marek and M. E. Reicher (Vienna: Öbv & Hpt, 2005), 387–94, and Jonathan Dancy, Ethics Without Principles (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 93.
- Ethics Without Principles. See, e.g., Dancy
- Dancy himself makes liberal use of phrases such as “more reason to do this or that” and “most reason to do some third thing.” He also seems committed to the idea that “the value of the whole is identical to the sum of the values of the contributing parts” (ibid., 181). Given the very strong link he maintains between values and reasons, this suggests a fairly literal interpretation ought to be given to “most reason.”
- 2007 . Philosophical Review , 116 : 109 – 39 . Joshua Gert, “Normative Strength and the Balance of Reasons,”: 533–62, section 5. For a very similar point, see Selim Berker, “Particular Reasons,” Ethics 18 (2007):
- Thus, though I know he would disagree, I think that David Copp's claims to be talking about something distinct from rationality are not obviously true. I think the best interpretation of his “makes sense,” in his contribution to this volume, is equivalent to my “is rationally permissible.”
- Scanlon , T. M. 1998 . What We Owe to Each Other 29 – 31 . Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press . See
- Because of the relevance of even unknown facts, there is some slight awkwardness in the use of the term “rational” in the labels for these statuses. Rationality is often thought of as a matter of the mental functioning of the agent. Elsewhere I use the phrase “subjective rationality” to pick out this more psychological notion, and “objective rationality” to pick out a domain determined by facts. In what follows I will always assume that agents are aware of all the relevant reasons, so that there will generally be no need to distinguish subjective rationality as a separate status. But it should be kept in mind that I am thinking of the more objective status.
- 1983 . Impartial Reason Ithaca , NY : Cornell University Press . Stephen Darwall, 215–16; Thomas Nagel, The Possibility of Altruism (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1970), 1–9; Allan Gibbard, Wise Choices, Apt Feelings (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1990), esp. p. 49.
- Smith , Michael . 1994 . The Moral Problem 505 – 32 . Cambridge : Blackwell . 184. See also Alan H. Goldman, “Reason Intemalism,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 71 (2005):
- 1996 . The Sources of Normativity New York : Cambridge University Press . See Cohen's “Reason, Humanity, and the Moral Law,” in Christine Korsgaard, 167–88 (at 173). See also the passage from Michael Smith in the text below.
- Jay , R. , Wallace , Philip , Pettit , Samuel Scheffler and Smith , Michael , eds. 2004 . Reason and Value: Themes from the Moral Philosophy of Joseph Raz Oxford : Clarendon . John Broome seems to endorse the existence of such reasons. See his “Reasons,” in ed. 28–55 (at 53). Scanlon is less clear on this issue, but he does seem to hold that wrongness generates reasons that contribute to determining what we have most reason to do. See Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 148, and also T.M. Scanlon, “Wrongness and Reasons,” Oxford Studies in Metaethics, vol. 2 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2007), 5–20. See also Roger Crisp, Reason and the Good (Oxford: Clarendon, 2006), 1–2, for an explanation of this understanding of “moral reason” and a denial that there are any such reasons.
- 2005 . Morality: Its Nature and Justification Oxford : Oxford University Press . Bernard Gert, 341ff. See also Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other, 151, for mention of a similar strategy. And see Crisp, Reason and the Good, 14, for an openness to basic altruistic reasons that is compatible with the denial of basic moral reasons.
- Smith , Michael . 2002 . “Bernard Gert's Complex Hybrid Conception of Rationality,” in ” . In Rationality, Rules, and Ideals: Critical Essays on Bernard Gert's Moral Theory Edited by: Audi , Robert and Sinnott-Armstrong , Walter . 109 – 23 . Lanham , MD : Rowman and Littlefield . (at 121).
- Here “harm” and “benefit” stand in for lists of consequences that can be specified in non-normative terms.
- Again, particularists can be expected to bridle at these claims. This is not the place to enter into arguments against particularism, but I would like to register my strong suspicion that the plausibility of particularism about practical reasons stems almost entirely from the following two tendencies: (a) fixing on non-basic reasons as the candidates for reasons with constant weights, and noting that context changes the impact of these considerations on overall rational status, and (b) fixing on good candidates for basic generic reasons, and then switching from a focus on rational status to a focus on moral status.
- Hume , David . 1975 . Enquiries Concerning Human Understanding and Concerning the Principles of Morals, , 3rd ed. Edited by: Selby-Bigge , L. A. and Nidditch , P. H. Oxford : Clarendon . sec. ix, p. 294.
- Johnston , Mark . 1989 . “Dispositional Theories of Value,” . Aristotelian Society Supplement , 63 See, e.g.:: 139–74; John McDowell, “Values and Secondary Qualities,” in Morality and Objectivity, ed. Ted Honderich (London: Routledge and Kegan Paul, 1985); and David Wiggins, “A Sensible Subjectivism,” in his Needs, Values, Truth, 3rd ed. (New York: Oxford University Press, 1998), 185–214.
- Gert , Joshua . 2009 . “Response-Dependence and Normative Bedrock,” . Philosophy and Phenomenological Research , 79 : 718 – 742 .
- Davidson , Donald . 1984 . “Thought and Talk,” in his ” . In Inquiries into Truth and Interpretation 159 – 60 . Oxford : Clarendon . esp.
- 2006 . Oxford Studies in Metaethics New York : Oxford University Press . Pekka Väyrynen, in his “Resisting the Buck-Passing Account of Value,” vol. 1 295–324, briefly mentions a number of ways in which reason-determined statuses can themselves provide reasons. But while he seems to regard such reasons as derivative, the present suggestion is that they can be somewhat more independent.
- 2003 . On What Matters , Parfit, sec. 54. See also Derek Parfit, “Justifiability to Each Person,” Ratio 16: 368–90 (esp. 368–70).
- On What Matters Parfit, sec. 49.
- What We Owe to Each Other Scanlon, 220.
- Ridge , Michael . 2001 . “Saving Scanlon: Contractualism and Agent-Relativity,” . Journal of Political Philosophy , 9 : 472 – 81 . See:
- What We Owe to Each Other Scanlon, 214.
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