Coalitions of Reasons and Reasons To Be Moral

References

• I would like to thank David Copp, Mark Migotti, Christine Tappolet, Keith Lehrer, David Hunter, Colin Macleod, Lindsey bat Joseph, Simon Pollon, Roger Checkley, and audiences at the Canadian Philosophy Association, and the Westem Canadian Philosophy Association meetings. I owe a special debt to Evan Tiffany for multiple suggestions on this paper, as well as for many philosophical insights on matters related to it over the years.
   Google Scholar
• MacAdam , Jim , ed. 1912 . Moral Writings Oxford : Clarendon Press . “Manuscript on Morals,” 118, rep. in H.A. Prichard, 2002). The question he claims cannot be answered in his earlier essay, “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, is less crisply formulated. All references to Prichard are to the MacAdam volume, except for “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”, Mind 21: 21–37. While this essay is reprinted in MacAdam, I rely on pagination in the original since it is conveniently available in electronic form at http://www.ditext.com/prichard/mistake.html.
   Google Scholar
• 142 – 43 . Prichard rejects utilitarianism as a theory of what constitutes actions as right. He does not claim, however, that the falsity of utilitarianism is obvious or proved. Nor does he claim that it is a mistake to raise questions about what constitutes actions as right. For Prichard's views on utilitarianism as a constitution theory, see “Does Moral Philosophy.”, 25; “What is the Basis of Moral Obligation?”, 2–4; and “Manuscript on Morals,” 122
   Google Scholar
• “Does Moral Philosophy.”, 24. Compare “Moral Obligation,” 224–25; “Manuscript on Morals,” 152.
   Google Scholar
• The extended discussion of Green is found in “Duty and Interest.” Sidgwick is discussed in “Moral Obligation,” 188. The remaining figures are singled out in “Does Moral Philosophy.”.
   Google Scholar
• “Does Moral Philosophy.”, 23 (italics in original).
   Google Scholar
• 142 – 43 . Prichard clearly anticipated that a teleological theory could be developed in this way and claims it is defective nonetheless. See “Moral Obligation,” 188, and also “Manuscript on Morals,”
   Google Scholar
• “Manuscript on Morals,” 128, 144, 166; “Moral Obligation,” 188.
   Google Scholar
• 2005 . Journal of Ethics and Social Philosophy , 1 : 229 – 63 . Proponents of the myth view include: Joseph Raz, “The Myth of Instrumental Rationality,”: 2–28; Troy Jollimore, “Why is Instrumental Rationality Rational?” Canadian Journal of Philosophy 35 (2005): 289–308; Niko Kolodny, “How Does Coherence Matter?” Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society 107, part 3 (2007):
   Google Scholar
• For a more comprehensive discussion of Prichard's views on the authority question, see the Introduction to this volume. My views on Prichard have been shaped by collaboration with Evan Tiffany.
   Google Scholar
• 2007 . The Second Person Standpoint , : 511 – 22 . Contemporary philosophers who attribute that view to Prichard include Stephen Darwall and T.M. Scanlon. See Darwall's (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2006), 17, note 33; and T.M. Scanlon, What We Owe to Each Other (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1998), 150. For more general analysis of the concept of a “reason of the wrong kind,” see Pamela Hieronymi, “The Wrong Kind of Reasons,” Journal of Philosophy 102 (2005): 437–57; Jonas Olson, “Buck-Passing and the Wrong Kind of Reasons,” Philosophical Quarterly 54 (2004): 295–300; Wlodek Rabinowicz and Toni Ronnow-Rasmussen, “The Strike of the Demon: On Fitting Pro-Attitudes and Value,” Ethics 114 (2004): 391–423; and Sven Danielson, Jonas Olson, “Brentano and the Buck-Passers,” Mind 116:
   Google Scholar
• 2006 . Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision-Making See his (Routledge, 183.
   Google Scholar
• 1982 . The Rejection of Consequentialism Oxford : Clarendon . The notion of volatility described in the text is admittedly imprecise. Some philosophers defend substantive conceptions of morality that may appear to be in tension with the proposed non-volatility of the moral point of view. They deny that moral duties take exceptionless priority over non-moral considerations. See Samuel Scheffler's discussion of agent-centred prerogatives in. Scheffler's prerogatives do not, however, lead to extremes of volatility in the moral standpoint, since they only provide a permission to favour personal concerns at the expense of neutral concerns according to a fixed proportion. They thereby concede overall authority or dominance to an agent-neutral standpoint.
   Google Scholar
• 1984 . On Virtue Ethics , : 493 – 506 . For proposals that attempt to reconcile duty and interest by appealing to indirect decision-making, see: Rosalind Hursthouse, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), 172–73; and Mark Carl Overvold, “Morality, Self-interest, and Reasons to be Moral,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 44:
   Google Scholar
• Gauthier , David . 1996 . “Assure and Threaten,” . Ethics , 104 : 105 – 128 . See: (1994): 690–721; Steven Kuhn, “Agreement Keeping and Indirect Moral Theory,” Journal of Philosophy 93:
   Google Scholar
• Vallentyne , Peter , ed. 1991 . Morals by Agreement 15 – 30 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . For a deflationary proposal of that kind, see David Gauthier's, 1986), and his “Why Contractarianism?”, in Contractarianism and Rational Choice (New York: Cambridge University Press,)
   Google Scholar
• Raz , Joseph . 2007 . “Incommensurability and Agency,” in ” . In Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason Edited by: Chang , Ruth . Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press . See 1997): 110–28 (at 111). Compare his Value, Respect, and Attachment (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 3–5. Both Raz and Michael Bratman have done much to emphasize the centrality of evaluative indeterminacy for decision-making. In addition to incommensurability, Bratman maintains that value uncertainty and value equality are other important sources of indeterminacy. See Bratman's “A Desire of One's Own”; “Three Theories of Self-Governance” (at 235–40); and “Planning Agency, Autonomous Agency” (at 205–6), all reprinted in his Structures of Agency (Oxford: Oxford University Press,.
   Google Scholar
• “Incommensurability and Agency,”] 127.
   Google Scholar
• Chang , Ruth , ed. 1999 . Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press . My sense of what is psychologically possible evidently differs from that of David Wiggins. See his “Incommensurability: Four Proposals,” in 1997): 52–66 (at 64), where Wiggins mentions duty in the form of ‘justice’ as being potentially incommensurable with other non-moral values from which a person may choose. Focussing on uncertainty also avoids having to address the complaint that the very idea of incommensurable values is misguided, as John Skorupski charges. The core of Skorupski's argument is that reasons are subject to what he calls a “convergence requirement” such that if I believe that I have a reason to x, then I must believe that a similarly situated person has reason to x. Skorupski is explicit, however, that the convergence requirement applies only to flat out evaluative beliefs, and not to propositional attitudes that fall short of belief. See John Skorupski, Ethical Explorations (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 35, 73.
   Google Scholar
• For defence of the claim that moral reasons fail to commensurate with other kinds of practical reason, see David Copp, “The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question,” this volume; Evan Tiffany, “Deflationary Normative Pluralism,” this volume.
   Google Scholar
• Holton , Richard . 2009 . “Partial Belief, Partial Intention,” . Mind , 117 : 75 – 96 . (2008): 27–58 (at 39). See also Keith Frankish, “Partial Belief and Flat-out Belief,” in Degrees of Belief: An Anthology, ed. F. Huber and C. Schmidt-Petri (No City Given: Springer
   Google Scholar
• Audi , Robert . 1991 . “Faith, Belief, and Rationality,” . Philosophical Perspectives , 5 See,: 213–39 (215–19). See also Louis P. Pojman, “Faith, Hope and Doubt,” in Philosophy of Religion, ed. L. Pojman (Wadsworth, 2003): 436–46 (at 438). In a related discussion, Alvin Plantinga describes “semi-beliefs” held with a probability of less than 1/2 and claims that these can form part of an agent's noetic structure. See Alvin Plantinga, Warrant: The Current Debate (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993), 139. Plantinga's semi-beliefs are, however, ambiguous between flat out beliefs assigned a low probability and partial beliefs.
   Google Scholar
• Adams , R. M. 1999 . “Moral Faith,” reprinted in his ” . In Finite and Infinite Goods 373 – 89 . Oxford : Oxford University Press . (at 373).
   Google Scholar
• 1982 . Thinking about Acting: Logical Decisions for Rational Decision Making , : 361 – 86 . I claim that the attitude of partial belief helps elucidate the admittedly controversial distinction between choice under uncertainty and choice under risk. Some decision theories collapse the two by treating all probabilities as subjective, coupled with the claim that decision-makers assign subjective probabilities over all states of affairs. For recent criticism of decision theories that eliminate uncertainty in this way, see John Pollock, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 81–99; and Peter Gardensfors and Nils-Eric Sahlin, “Unreliable Probabilities, Risk Taking, and Decision Making,” Synthese 53:
   Google Scholar
• Joyce , James M. 2005 . “How Probabilities Reflect Evidence,” . Philosophical Perspectives , 19 See: 153–78 (at 154–57).
   Google Scholar
• Structures of Agency , 209 My account of doxastic commitment to a practical ideal has benefitted from Michael Bratman's discussion of self-governing policies. According to Bratman, while value judgments are subject to intersubjective constraints, self-governing policies are not. A person who endorses a self-governing policy needn't believe that an identically situated person with a different self-governing policy is unreasonable. See, 239–10. Commitments to practical ideals similarly defy a convergence requirement. But practical ideals differ from policies. Ideals are normally criterial for policies, and also have a content that is not exhausted by the policies a person has adopted. If you adopt justice as your practical ideal, your policies will normally be consistent with that ideal. But that ideal can also entail choices in circumstances for which you lack policies.
   Google Scholar
• Horgan , T. and Timmons , M. , eds. 2000 . Ethics and the A Priori Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . For other recent discussions of the normative considerations governing evaluative choice under uncertainty, see: Michael Smith, “Evaluation, Uncertainty, Motivation,” in 2004), 343–58; “Moore on the Right, the Good, and Uncertainty,” in Metaethics After Moore (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2006), 133–48. Ted Lockhart deals mainly with uncertainty about morality's content rather than its authority in Moral Uncertainty and Its Consequences (Oxford: Oxford University Press,. But see the discussion on p. 8, regarding skepticism about the overriding character of moral reasons as a ground for uncertainty.
   Google Scholar
• Morris , C. and Ripstein , A. , eds. 2001 . Practical Rationality and Preference: Essays for David Gauthier Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . For a proposal of that kind, see John Broome, “Are Intentions Reasons?” in 98–120. Broome notes that the resulting widescope requirements are both synchronic and diachronic.
   Google Scholar
• Timmerman , Jens , eds. 2009 . Spheres of Reason On derivative justifications for pro tatito reasons to adopt the means to one's ends, see Michael Bratman's suggestive discussion of what he calls the “Strawsonian strategy,” in “Intention, Belief, Practical, Theoretical,” forthcoming in (Oxford: Oxford University Press), 35–38, and Bratman's account of the ideal of “self-governance” in, “Intention, Practical Rationality, and Self-Governance,” Ethics 119: 411–43 (at 429).
   Google Scholar
• 2007 . Ethics , 117 : 649 – 73 . For an argument that appeals to heteronomous ends against the claim that the principle of instrumental reason is a practical requirement, see Kieran Setiya, “Cognitivism about Instrumental Reason,”:
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Copp , David . 2005 . “The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” . In Social Philosophy and Policy See: 165–203 (at 166). For an example of a modest account of personal autonomy that is externalist and historical, see Alfred Mele, Autonomous Agents (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995), 171. Bratman claims that his account of agential authority can be supplemented with an external and historical condition. See Structures of Agency, 138, note 3, and 199.
   Google Scholar
• 2003 . Moral Realism: A Defence Oxford : Clarendon . For recent defences of ethical intuitionism that exploit these strategies, see Russell Schafer-Landau, 210; and Robert Audi, The Good in the Right.
   Google Scholar
• Zimmerman , David . 2003 . “Why Richard Brandt Does not Need Cognitive Psychotherapy, and Other Glad News about Idealized Preference Theories in Meta-Ethics,” . Journal of Value Inquiry , 37 : 373 – 94 . See:
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• 2007 . Believing by Faith Oxford : Clarendon . William James provides the classic Statement. For a recent and sophisticated defence of fideism, see John Bishop
   Google Scholar
• Second Person Standpoint See 17, note 33.
   Google Scholar
• Second Person Standpoint 16
   Google Scholar
• 2008 . Philosophical Studies , 138 : 17 – 27 . For a recent defence of pragmatism, see Andrew Reisner, “Weighing pragmatic and evidential reasons for belief,”:
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Feldman , Richard . 2004 . “The Ethics of Belief,” in Earl Conee and Richard Feldman ” . In Evidentialism: Essays in Epistemology 166 – 96 . Oxford : Clarendon . See
   Google Scholar