References
- I would like to thank: Tristram McPhersan, Bruno Guindon, Nick Smyth, Lindsey bat Joseph, Roger Checkley, and Simon Pollon; and especially David Copp and Donald Hubin. I owe a special debt to Sam Black for the insights, criticisms, and clever examples (some of which I have borrowed for this paper) he has provided over the past several years.
- 1994 . Oil the Genealogy of Morals Cambridge : Cambridge University Press . trans. Carol Diethe 8.
- 1912 . Mind , 21 “Does Moral Philosophy Rest on a Mistake?”,: 21–37 (at 21).
- 1995 . Rational Choice and Moral Agency 63 – 95 . Princeton : Princeton University Press . E.g., David Schmidtz, chap. 6; revised version reprinted in this volume, “Because It's Right,” this volume
- Darwall , S. , Gibbard , A. and Railton , P. , eds. Moral Discourse and Practice: Some Philosophical Approaches New York : Oxford University Press . “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” in ed. 1996), 313–22; quotation taken from the 1977 postscript included as endnote 15, p. 320.
- 2004 . Ethics Without Principles 15 New York : Oxford University Press .
- Seinfeld Dialogue adapted from the script for the episode “The Dinner Party”; http://www.seinfeldscripts.com/TheDinnerParty.html; accessed Dec., 2008.
- “Morality as a System of Hypothetical Imperatives,” 315.
- 1979 . The Possibility of Altruism Princeton , NJ : Princeton University Press . In Nagel's terminology, it is a “motivated desire”; see
- 1977 . Ethics: Inventing Right and Wrong London : Penguin . though for Mackie institutions only provide reasons for those who endorse the institution (see 77–82).
- 1997 . Mind , 106 “Foundationalism and Practical Reason,“: 451–73 (at 467).
- One might argue that we should interpret their debate as regarding the content of the relevant social norms, rather than the authority of those norms. However, it is more consistent with George's character that he be interpreted as denying the authority of social norms.
- “Foundationalism and Practical Reason.” 467.
- 2006 . Ethics Without Principles; , : 331 – 60 . As defended by, e.g., Jonathan Dancy, and Luke Robinson, “Moral Holism, Moral Generalism, and Moral Dispositionalism,” Mind 115:
- This is not the same as the claim that there is no property common to all contributory reasons. It is possible that any normative relation must have the right kind of direction of fit between norm and domain covered by norm. But there are other properties of any particular instance of the favouring relation— e.g., whether it favours holistically or atomistically or whether it favours with overriding strength. My claim is that the properties of any particular favouring relation are determined by its corresponding normative domain.
- 2006 . Practical Reasoning and Ethical Decision 183 New York : Routledge .
- 1992 . Wise Choices, Apt Feelings Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press . Cf., among many others, Allan Gibbard: “. what it is rational to do settles what to do,” 49; and Joshua Gert: “For me. rationality is the fundamental normative notion applying to action. Once one has shown someone that her act is irrational, that should be the end of the matter, as far as argument goes,” “Moral Reasons and Rational Status,” this volume, 171–196, at 178, original emphasis.
- 1997 . À la , : 86 – 106 . Donald Hubin, “The Groundless Normativity of Instrumental Rationality,” Journal of Philosophy 98 (2001): 445–68; and David Copp, “The Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” Social Philosophy and Policy 22 (2005): 165–203. The following terminology of “Reason as such” is taken from Copp, “The Ring of Gyges: Overridingness and the Unity of Reason,” Social Philosophy and Policy 14:
- Chang , Ruth , ed. 1997 . Incommensurability, Incomparability, and Practical Reason 110 – 28 . Cambridge , MA : Harvard University Press . I use the term “override” loosely here to mean that he ultimately decides to ψI do not want to rule out the possibility that consideration (3) entitles the agent in question to ψ without thereby entailing that he has more reason to ψ than to ø. I leave open the possibility that the agent could correctly think that he would be both morally and rationally justified to either ø or ψ. That is, the claim I am making here does not presuppose the view Joseph Raz labels “rationalism” (111) in his “Incommensurability and Agency,” in ed.
- 1982 . The Rejection of Consequentialism Oxford : Clarendon .
- “Moral Reasons and Rational Status,” 171 (at 1). Strictly speaking, though, I think it more accurate to read Gert as concerned with a different question. Given that Gert believes “rationality is the fundamental normative notion applying to action” (ibid., 178), I think it is more accurate to characterize the quoted question as asking about permissibility from the standpoint of “Reason-as-such.” This, I think, is why Copp does not agree with Gert that “the best interpretation of [Copp's] ‘makes sense’, in his contribution to this volume, is equivalent to my ‘is rationally permissible'” (ibid., 177n8). As a normative pluralist, Copp denies that there is a fundamental normative notion, thus he denies that we can coherently ask whether, according to the fundamental normative standpoint, it is permissible to act morally. That said, I argue in section 4 that Copp's notion of “makes sense” attempts to occupy an unstable middle ground.
- What I am calling “agential choice” is equivalent to Sartrean “radical choice,” insofar as I understand Sartre.
- 1994 . The Gay Science Nietzsche, quoted in Michael Tanner, Nietzsche, Past Masters Series (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 38.
- Williams . 1981 . “Moral Luck,” in his ” . In Moral Luck: Philosophical Papers 1973–1980 20 – 39 . Cambridge : Cambridge University Press .
- Ibid., 22.
- Ibid.
- Feist , G. J. 1995 . “The Influence of Personality on Artistic Creativity,” in ” . In Handbook of Creativity Edited by: Sternberg , R. J. New York : Cambridge University Press . 1999), 273–96; H.J. Eysenck, Genius: The Natural History of Creativity (New York: Cambridge University Press,; N.C. Andreasen, “Creativity And Mental Illness: Prevalence Rates In Writers And Their First-Degree Relatives,” American Journal of Psychiatry 144 (1987): 1288–1292. Nick Smyth, who directed me to this research, argues in “Necessary Evil: Morality and Creativity in Conflict” (MA project, Simon Fraser University) that the immorality of creative geniuses is ultimately justified because (a) there is what he calls a “necessary negative covariation” between morality and a creative genius's pursuit of her project, and (b) as a society, we place tremendous value on the works produced by creative geniuses.
- Brink , David . “Kantian Rationalism: Inescapability, Authority, and Supremacy,” in ” . In Ethics and Practical Reason Edited by: Cullity , G. and Gaut , B. Oxford : Oxford University Press . Cf. ed. 1997), 255–91. Brink distinguishes “norms” from “reasons” and argues, contra Foot, that standpoints like etiquette may generate norms (indeed, categorical norms), but they fail to generate practical reasons.
- Darwall , S. , Gibbard , A. and Railton , P. , eds. Moral Discourse and Practice 305 – 12 . E.g., Darwall: “It does not follow [from the fact the etiquette requires one to act in a certain way]. that there is a reason with genuine deliberative weight for so acting” (”Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality: An Introduction,” in ed. at 306).
- Monty Python's Flying Circus The reference is to a skit from in which John Cleese turns down a grant applicant on the grounds that his gait is insufficiently silly.
- 1996 . Creating the Kingdom of Ends New York : Cambridge University Press . “Aristotle and Kant on the Source of Value,” in her 225–48, at 227 (emphasis added).
- One notable exception is David Brink's “dualism of practical reason” in his “Kantian Rationalism.” I read Brink as advocating a kind of foundationalist view, but as recognizing two foundations rather than just one. As Brink puts it: “I am essentially not just a rational agent but also a particular rational agent, numerically distinct from other agents” (287). Thus, Brink recognizes two foundational sources for reasons, viz. rational agency as such and one's particular rational agency; the former roughly corresponds to moral reasons and the latter to prudential reasons. Both have ultimate authority, but neither has supremacy over the other.
- 1996 . The Sources of Normativity New York : Cambridge University Press . Not so much in the previously cited “Aristotle and Kant” paper, but in, e.g.
- 1979 . A Theory of the Good and the Right New York : Oxford University Press . E.g., Richard Brandt,; Peter Railton, “Facts and Values,” Philosophical Topics 24 (1986): 5–31; Connie Rosati, “Internalism and the Good for a Person,” Ethics 106 (1996): 297–326. I am not claiming that these, or the following, authors in fact see their views as versions of foundationalist monism, just that the views could plausibly be read that way.
- 2003 . Ethics , 113 : 651 – 77 . E.g., Donald Regan, “How to be a Moorean,”:
- Altham , J. E.J. and Harrison , R. , eds. 1995 . World, Mind, and Ethics: Essays on the Ethical Philosophy of Bernard Williams 110 – 29 . New York : Cambridge University Press . E.g., John McDowell, “Might There Be External Reasons,” in ed. 68–85— although McDowell uses the language of “having been properly brought up” rather than that of “practical wisdom.” See also his “Values and Secondary Qualities,” in Morality and Objectivity, ed. T. Honderich (London: Routledge & Kegan Paul, 1985)
- 1994 . The Moral Problem 109 – 31 . Cambridge , MA : Blackwell . E.g., Michael Smith, and “Internal Reasons,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 55 (1995):
- “Groundless Normativity.”
- Ibid., 464.
- Ibid., 466.
- Ibid., 467.
- Ibid., 466.
- 467 – 68 . Ibid.
- Schaber , Peter , ed. 2004 . Normativity and Naturalism 21 – 37 . Frankfurt : Ontos . “Ring of Gyges”; “Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason”; “The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?” this volume, 97–130; “Moral Naturalism and Three Grades of Normativity,” in ed. 7–45; “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” Philosophical Issues 19 Metaethics (2009):
- 86 – 87 . “Ring of Gyges,“
- “Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” 198.
- Ibid., 195.
- Ibid., 196. (emphasis added).
- “The Wrong Answer to an Improper Question?” 110.
- I should note that I find Copp's view not only extremely rich and interesting, but complex and subtle. Despite Copp's best efforts through correspondence and conversation, I am not sure I fully understand the overall position. For this reason, I rely on quoted passages to do more of the expository work than is customary or ideal.
- “Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason,” 197.
- Ibid. 197(emphasis added).
- Ibid. 199.
- Ibid.
- Ibid. 196.
- “Toward a Pluralist and Teleological Theory of Normativity,” 22.
- 2001 . Morality, Normativity, and Society; , Cf. Copp, Copp, “Realist-Expressivism: A Neglected Option for Moral Realism,” Social Philosophy and Policy 18: 1–43. Although Copp is not a deflationist, he is a normative pluralist (See Copp, “Ring of Gyges,” op. cit., “Normativity of Self-Grounded Reason”).
- 1986 . Southern Journal of Philosophy, Supplement , 24 For example, the kind of “externalist realism” defended by David Brink (”Externalist Moral Realism,” []: 23–42)- i.e., that which accepts what Darwall (”Reasons, Motives, and the Demands of Morality”) has labelled “judgment externalism”— would fall short of the kind of normative realism under discussion here.
- 2003 . Moral Realism: A Defense 203 – 209 . New York : Clarendon Press . Shafer-Landau, at Oxford
- Ibid., 206.
- Nelkin , Dana . 2000 . “Two Standpoints and the Belief in Freedom,” . Journal of Philosophy , 97 : 524 – 46 . See: 564–76, for a critique of neo-Kantian standpoint-arguments. Elsewhere I have argued that prominent Kantian constructivist arguments for the authority of morality depend on an assumption of transcendental freedom: “How Kantian Must Kantian Constructivists Be?” Inquiry 49 (2006):
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