- C Gilligan, ‘In a Different Voice: Women's Conceptions of Self and Morality’ (1977) 47 Harvard Educational Review 481; C Gilligan, In a Different Voice (Harvard University Press, 1982).
- For instance in his most famous book, Illich advocated ‘educational webs which heighten the opportunity for each one to transform each moment of his living into one of learning, sharing, and caring’. I Illich, De-Schooling Society (Marion Boyars, 1971) i (emphasis added). He also argued that elite, technocratic professional groups had come to monopolise basic human activities: I Illich, Tools for Conviviality (Marion Boyars, 1973).
- S Benhabib, ‘The Generalized and the Concrete Other: The Kohlberg-Giligan Controversy and Feminist Theory’ in S Benhabib and D Cornell (eds), Feminism as Critique: Essays on the Politics of Gender in Late Capitalist Societies (Polity Press, 1987) 77–95.
- M Shildrick, ‘Reappraising Feminist Ethics: Developments and Debates' (2001) 2 Feminist Theory 233.
- Although Gilligan is American and most of the major ‘Difference Feminists' (as they came to be known) were from the US, the Ethic of Care assumed increasing importance in legal feminist scholarship in the UK too. See eg J Bridgeman, ‘Criminalising the One Who Really Cared’ (1998) 6(2) Feminist Legal Studies 245; R Auch-muty, ‘The Fiction of Equity’ in S Scott-Hunt and H Lim (eds), Feminist Perspectives on Equity and Trusts (Cavendish, 2001) 1, where its relevance was sharpened by the shared common law heritage.
- For so-called liberal feminists, the law's failure to live up to its promise of equality before the law was a particular concern—see eg S Atkins and B Hoggett, Women and the Law (Blackwell, 1984). The subsequent development of radical feminism critiqued law as male: C MacKinnon ‘Feminism, Marxism, Method and the State: An Agenda for Theory’ (1982) 7 SIGNS 515.
- For example, EP Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (Penguin, 1975); G Cohen, Karl Marx's Theory of History (Princetown University Press, 1980); J Holloway and S Picciotto (eds), State and Capital (Edward Arnold, 1978).
- J Derrida, ‘Force of Law: The Mystical Foundation of Authority’ in D Cornell, M Rosenfield and D Carlson (eds), Deconstruction and the Possibility of Justice (Routledge, 1992).
- See eg M Kelman, A Guide to Critical Legal Studies (Harvard University Press, 1987); also R Unger, ‘The Critical Legal Studies Movement’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 563, which describes the main foci of CLS as the formalism and objectivity of positivist law; see too Duncan Kennedy, ‘Form and Substance in Private Law Adjudication’ (1976) 89 Harvard Law Review 1685.
- See eg T Johnson, Professions and Power (Macmillan, 1972); MS Larson, The Rise of Professionalism: A Sociological Analysis (University of California Press, 1977); and Abel's application of the Neo-Weberian critique to the legal profession: R Abel, ‘Towards a Political Economy of Lawyers' (1981) 6 Wisconsin Law Review 1117.
- CP McPherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism: Hobbes to Locke (Clarendon Press, 1962).
- The rights critique was a central theme of CLS scholarship; see eg M Tushnet, ‘An Essay on Rights' (1984) 62 Texas Law Review 1361.
- These themes have been picked up and extended by a range of critical theorists from Critical Race Theory (CRT) scholars to post-modernists; see, for instance, Hutchinson's attack on the Rule of Law as a sham, in which he describes legal discourse as a stylised element of political discourse (thereby masking its political nature): A Hutchinson, Dwelling on the Threshold (Carswell, 1988) 40.
- D Cornell, ‘Post-Structuralism, the Ethical Relation and the Law’ (1987–8) 9 Cardozo Law Review 1587, 1591.
- As is illustrated by the recent call by Vischer for a relational jurisprudence and practice, reviewed in this issue: R Vischer, Martin Luther King Jr and the Morality of Legal Practice (Cambridge University Press, 2013).
- See, for instance, the link which Glendon makes with ‘Rights Talk’ and the corrosion of community (M Glendon, Rights Talk: The Impoverishment of Political Discourse (Free Press, 1991)). Many of her points are echoed by the UK Conservative Party's communitarian ideologue, Philip Blond, who argued for a Big Society; the Coalition embraced this idea, arguing that the cure for Britain's ‘atomised’ and ‘broken society’ rests with the individual citizen and the community.
- B Fisher and J Tronto, ‘Toward a Feminist Theory of Caring’ in E Abel and M Nelson (eds), Circles of Care: Work and Identity in Women's Lives (University of New York Press, 1990) 35, 40.
- N Fraser, ‘Rethinking Recognition’ (2000) 3 New Left Review 1.
- S Douglas-Scott, Law after Modernity (Hart Publishing, 2013) 22–23.
- Since this is my primary focus, I may appear to have neglected some later manifestations of Difference Feminism and other relational perspectives which engage with the fction of law's claimed formalism. To an extent, therefore, I could be charged with producing a ‘straw person’ in order to make the argument for a more nuanced understanding of law.
- M Weber, ‘Rationality and Formalism in Law’ in Wolf Heydebrand (ed), Sociological Writings (Continuum, 1994) 204; see too MacCormick, who notes the tensions between law's argumentative character and the fact that the doctrine of the law seeks to promote ‘legal certainty’.
- One of the most forceful objections to Difference Feminism was its essentialist conceptualisation of women; and more recent understandings of subjectivity as fuid have underscored its weakness; however, as numerous commentators—such as Spivak—have pointed out, it may be necessary for political reasons to refer to women.
- L Kohlberg, ‘Moral Stages and Moralization: The Cognitive-Developmental Approach’ in T Lickona (ed), Moral Development and Behavior: Theory, Research and Social Issues (Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1976) 12.
- J Piaget, The Moral Judgement of the Child (Free Press, 1965).
- See L Kohlberg and R Krammer, ‘Continuities and Discontinuities in Childhood and Adult Moral Development’ (1969) 12(2) Human Development 93.
- N Chodorow, The Reproduction of Mothering: Psychoanalysis and the Sociology of Gender (University of California Press, 1978).
- R West, ‘Jurisprudence and Gender’ (1988) 55 University of Chicago Law Review 1, 61. Like West, Gilligan argued that ‘care is grounded in the assumption that self and other are interdependent... seen as responsive, the self is by definition connected to others'. C Gilligan, ‘Moral Orientation and Moral Development’ in E Feder Kittay and DT Meyers (eds), Women and Moral Theory (Rowman and Littlefield, 1987) 24; and see N Noddings, Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education (University of California Press, 1984).
- S Freud, ‘Femininity’ in New Introductory Lectures on Psychoanalysis (WW Norton, 1933) 184.
- A generic term for those cases such as Bebb v The Law Society LT, 109, 36 which established whether the ‘persons' in statutes such as the Solicitors Act 1843 included women.
- L Henderson, ‘Legality and Empathy’ (1987) 85(7) Michigan Law Review 1574, 1575.
- L Bender, ‘Changing the Values in Tort Law’ (1990) 25 Tulsa Law Journal 759, 907.
- Henderson (n 30) 1575.
- C Farina, ‘Getting from Here to There’ [1991] Duke Law Journal 689, 689.
- Ibid, 707.
- L Finley, ‘Breaking Women's Silence in Law: The Dilemma of the Gendered Nature of Legal Reasoning’ (1989) 64 Notre Dame Law Review 886.
- West (n 27) 18.
- R West, ‘The Difference in Women's Hedonic Lives: A Phenomenological Critique of Feminist Legal Theory’ in N Sweet Thomadsen and MA Fineman (eds), At the Boundaries of Law: Feminism and Legal Theory (Routledge, 1991) 115, 132.
- J Rifkin, ‘Toward a Theory of Law and Patriarchy’ (1984) 3 Harvard Women's Law Journal 83.
- C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Portia in a Different Voice: Speculations on a Women's Lawyering Process' (1985) 1(1) Berkeley Women's Law Journal 39, 57; see too ‘Contributions to Discussion’ in EC Dubois et al, ‘Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the Law—A Conversation’ (1985) 34 Buffalo Law Review 11.
- J McCahery, ‘Modernist and Postmodernist Perspectives on Public Law in British Critical Legal Studies' (1993) 2 Social and Legal Studies 397.
- Kelman (n 9) 3; Kennedy (n 9).
- See eg K Klare, ‘Law Making as Praxis' (1979) 40 Telos 123; however, CLS scholarship was not immune to the ‘postmodern turn’, leading (some) to a de-emphasis of its former political agenda and a shift to deconstruction and focus on the cultural (see eg D Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Harvard University Press, 1997)).
- See eg R Hale, ‘Bargaining, Duress and Economic Liberty’ (1943) 43 Columbia Law Review 603.
- For instance, A Norrie, Crime, Reason and History (Butterworths, 1993); A Podgorecki, Law as an Instrument of Good and Effcient Government (Institute of Applied Social Sciences, Warsaw, 1999); E Jackson, ‘Contradictions and Coherence in Feminist Responses to Law’ (1993) 20 Journal of Law and Society 398; M Detmold, ‘The Common Law as Embodiment’ in N Naffine and R Owens (eds), Sexing the Subject of the Law (Sweet & Maxwell, 1997).
- R Dworkin, Law's Empire (Fontana, 1986); DN MacCormick, HLA Hart (Edward Arnold, 1981).
- D Beatty, The Ultimate Rule of Law (Oxford University Press, 2004). This is not to deny the persistence of legal positivism, which continued to cast law as an autonomous, discrete discipline See eg Joseph Raz, The Authority of Law (Clarendon Press, 1979).
- M Woolstonecraft, A Vindication of the Rights of Men and a Vindication of the Rights of Women (Cambridge University Press, 1995).
- R Rorty, Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature (Blackwell, 1979) 136–7.
- This is not to suggest that this dualism was specific to capitalism: see Bourdieu's account of the male/female binary, which he describes as the most fundamental of the social divisions (P Bourdieu, Masculine Domination (Polity Press, 2001)). The separate but symbiotic gendered public and private spheres which characterised Ancient Greek society are exemplary.
- C Pateman, The Sexual Contract (Polity Press, 1988) 232.
- B Brown, ‘Contracting Out/Contracting In: Some Feminist Considerations' in A Bottomley (ed), Feminist Perspectives on the Foundational Subjects of Law (Cavendish, 1996) 5, 6; and see A Jaggar, ‘Political Philosophies of Women's Liberation’ in M Vetterling-Braggin, F Ellston and J English (eds), Feminism and Philosophy (Little-field, Adams & Co, 1977) 10. The Difference Feminist association of women with ‘thick, personal relations' is paralleled in the common law representation of women as guardians of the family hearth and vessels of emotion, the binary opposites of male rationality. Further, there is little empirical evidence to support this construction of female identity; as Epstein has argued, ‘the more one goes into the field to do actual research on women's behavior the more one finds that the concepts we call male and female comprise multiple realities for the individual and for society.... [They] are a vehicle for making assignments to various instrumental and emotional tasks in society... a control apparatus.’
- Of course this generalised assertion begs the question of what we understand by the state and is to an extent contradicted by the discussion below of 18th-century law.
- McPherson (n 11) 275.
- Hence the critique of Difference Feminism that the morality it describes should be viewed not so much as gender specific but rather as deriving from (non-capitalist) social arrangements characterised by the norms of reciprocity: S Harding, ‘The Curious Coincidence of Feminine and African Moralities: Challenges for Feminist Theory’ in E Feder Kittay and DT Meyers (eds), Women and Moral Theory (Rowman and Littlefield, 1987); J Tronto, ‘Beyond Gender Difference to a Theory of Care’ (1987) 12(4) SIGNS 644. Or to put it another way, as I argue in this paper, Difference Feminist analysis was undermined by its neglect of the imperatives of the capitalist order.
- Max Weber, The Protestant Ethic and the Spirit of Capitalism (Penguin, 2002).
- Emile Durkheim, The Division of Labour in Society (Free Press, 1964).
- Brown (n 51) 15.
- Pateman (n 50); D Rhode, Justice and Gender: Sex Discrimination and the Law (Harvard University Press, 1989); B Mazlich, ‘Invisible Ties: From Patronage to Networks' (2000) 17(2) Theory Culture and Society 1; see too M Thornton, Public and Private: Feminist Legal Debates (Oxford University Press, 1995). Moreover, if we consider contemporary society, there has long existed a degree of state intervention in, including areas of law specifically concerned with, the private sphere; see F Olsen, ‘The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and Legal Reform’ (1983) 96 Harvard Law Review 1497.
- J Liddington and J Norris, One Hand Tied Behind Us: The Rise of the Women's Suffrage Movement (Virago, 1984); S Fredman, Women and the Law (Clarendon Press, 1997) 17.
- H Sommerlad and P Sanderson, Gender, Choice and Commitment: Women Solicitors in England and Wales and the Struggle for Equal Status (Ashgate, 1998); Mazlich (n 58).
- See Sugarman's discussion of the conscious construction of the ‘black letter tradition’ within legal education in the second half of the 19th century, a development congruent with the ideology of liberalism and paralleled in other academic disciplines, which centred on the attempt to create a single and singular voice and objective knowledge: D Sugarman, ‘“A Hatred of Disorder”: Legal Science, Liberalism and Imperialism’ in P Fitzpatrick (ed), Dangerous Supplements: Resistance and Renewal in Jurisprudence (Pluto Press, 1991) 34.
- Buckland (1890), in D Sugarman, ‘The Making of the Text Book Tradition’ in W Twining (ed), Legal Theory and Common Law (Blackwell, 1986) 26, 53.
- The law itself therefore encapsulates these contradictory tendencies; see Cotterrell's discussion of the ‘character of common law thought’: R Cotterrell, The Politics of Jurisprudence: A Critical Introduction to Legal Philosophy (LexisNexis, 2003).
- Thus Sir John Davies wrote in 1615 that ‘though this law be the peculiar invention of this nation, and delivered over from age to age by Tradition, yet may we truly say that no human law, written or unwritten, hath more certainty in the rules and maxims, more coherence in the parts thereof, or more harmony of reason in it; nay we may confidently aver that it doth excell all other laws and is the most excellent form of government; it is so framed and ftted to the nature of this people, as we may properly say that it is connaturall to the Nation’ (cited in P Goodrich and Y Hachamovitch, ‘Time Out of Mind: An Introduction to the Semiotics of the Common Law’ in Fitzpatrick (n 61) 182).
- Cotterrell (n 63) 24–26; see eg Entick v Carrington 1765 St Tr 1030.
- Pateman (n 50) 154–88.
- GJ Postema, Bentham and the Common Law Tradition (Oxford University Press, 1986) 32.
- Of course, one of the paradoxes surrounding Kant was that he combined his commitment to rationalism with romanticism; see A Carty, ‘English Constitutional Law from a Post-Modernist Perspective’ in Fitzpatrick (n 61) 182.
- Weber loosely characterised legal systems according to the degree of systemic rationality they exhibited, and the fact that the common law's classifcatory system lay in forms of action clearly placed towards the unsystematic, irrational end of the spectrum. M Weber, On Law in Economy and Society (Harvard University Press, 1954) 62.
- Detmold (n 44) 111.
- D Greer, ‘Antonio Gramsci and Legal Hegemony’ in D Kairys (ed), The Politics of Law: A Progressive Critique (Pantheon Books, 1982) 306.
- Kennedy (n 9). He subsequently described this tension as a fundamental contradiction rooted in the binary opposition between the individual and community, which was the ‘very essence of every problem’: D Kennedy, ‘The Structure of Blackstone's Commentaries' (1979) 28 Buffalo Law Review 205.
- W Simon, ‘Visions of Practice in Legal Thought’ (1984) 36 Stanford Law Review 469, 471; cf the Hart–Devlin debate: HLA Hart, Law, Liberty and Morality (Oxford University Press, 1963); P Devlin, The Enforcement of Morals (Oxford University Press, 1965).
- N Elias, The Civilizing Process (Blackwell, 1978). Cf the distinction in philosophy between two polar aspects of life and ethics/morality, in which ethics is concerned with relations which are ‘thick’, local, personal and morality, and those which are general, abstract and detached: A Margalit, The Ethics of Memory (Harvard University Press, 2002).
- J Shotter, Conversational Realities: Constructing Life through Language (Sage, 1993) 8.
- B Donabedian, ‘The Natural Realm of Social Law’ (2003) 21(2) Sociological Theory 175.
- S Bandes, ‘Empathy, Narrative and Victim Impact Statements' (1996) 63(2) University of Chicago Law Review 361; see too S Bandes (ed), The Passions of Law (New York University Press, 2000).
- B de Sousa Santos, ‘Law and Community: The Changing Nature of State Power in Late Capitalism’ in R Abel (ed), The Politics of Informal Justice (Academic Press, 1982) 249; see too B de Sousa Santos, Toward a New Legal Common Sense: Law, Globalization, and Emancipation (Butterworths LexisNexis, 2002).
- R Bernstein, Beyond Objectivism and Relativism (Blackwell, 1983).
- See eg P Griffths, What Emotions Really Are: The Problem of Psychological Categories (University of Chicago Press, 1997); A Damasio, The Feeling of What Happens (Heinemann, 2000).
- B Hindess, Discourses of Power from Hobbes to Foucault (Blackwell, 1996).
- Mossman refers particularly to Bradwell v Illinois, 83 US (16 Wall) 130 (1873); see too Jex-Blake v Senatus of Edinburgh University (1873) 11 M 784 and Bebb v Law Society (1913) 109 LT Rep 36 (MJ Mossman, ‘Feminism and Legal Method: The Difference it Makes' in Sweet Thomadsen and Fineman (n 37) 283, 287). The following exemplifes these judgments: ‘The law of nature destines and qualifes the female sex for the bearing and nurture of children and the custody of our homes and their maintenance in love and honour... Nature has tempered woman as little for the judicial conficts of the court room as for the physical conficts of the battle field... It would be revolting to all female sense of the innocence and sanctity of their sex, shocking to man's reverence for womanhood... on which hinge all the better affections and humanities of life, that woman should be permitted to mix professionally in all the nastiness of the world which finds its way into courts of justice’ (Re Goodell, 39 Wisc 232 (1875)).
- JAG Griffths, The Politics of the Judiciary (Fontana, 1977).
- Public law has long been an arena of struggle between attempts to scientise it and the Romantic commitment to a supposedly ancient constitution and the ‘anti-rationalist common law method’ (T Loughlin, Public Law and Political Theory (Oxford University Press, 1992) 47)—that is, between the needs of a modern polity and the interests of reactionary forces which have deployed emotive and populist iconography to retain great discretionary power for both the executive and the judiciary. The UK coalition government's ‘reform’ of judicial review, in the course of which several of these conventions have been transgressed, offers a recent example of the exploitation of this open-textured quality.
- EP Thompson, Whigs and Hunters: The Origin of the Black Act (Penguin, 1975); D Hay, ‘Property, Authority and the Criminal Law’ in D Hay, P Linebaugh, J Rule, EP Thompson and C Winslow (eds), Albion's Fatal Tree: Crime and Society in Eighteenth Century England (Penguin, 1975).
- Revealed, for instance, in judicial power to individualise sentencing; see N Lacey, C Wells and O Quick, Reconstructing Criminal Law (LexisNexis, 2003).
- N Lacey, C Wells and D Meure, Reconstructing Criminal Law (Butterworths, 1990) 6.
- N Lacey, Unspeakable Subjects: Feminist Essays in Legal and Social Theory (Hart Publishing, 1998) 199; Greer (n 71).
- K Daly, ‘Criminal Justice Ideologies and Practices in Different Voices: Some Feminist Questions about Justice’ (1989) 7 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 1, 2 (emphasis in original).
- Ibid, 11.
- Ibid, 2; see also Lacey (n 88) 203.
- Benhabib terms the process of repeated engagement with the law by ‘outsiders', leading to progressive normative and legal change, ‘jurisgenerative’ politics: S Benhabib, Another Cosmopolitanism: Hospitality, Sovereignty and Democratic Iterations (Oxford University Press, 2000).
- Although it should be noted that even contract law, the arena most associated with the Kantian model, has been construed as fundamentally relational and contextualised: S Macaulay, ‘Non-Contractual Relations in Business: A Preliminary Study’ (1963) 28 American Society Review 55; IR Macneil, The New Social Contract: An Inquiry into Modern Contractual Relations (Yale University Press, 1980). Unger has written that ‘the freedom to choose a contract partner will not be allowed to work in ways that subvert the communal aspects of social life’: Unger (n 9) 61.
- J Eekelaar, M Maclean and S Beinart, Family Lawyers: The Divorce Work of Solicitors (Hart Publishing, 2000).
- A Sarat and W Felstiner, Divorce Lawyers and their Clients: Power and Meaning in the Legal Process (Oxford University Press, 1995) 151.
- Ibid.
- Ibid.
- See eg L White, ‘Seeking... “The Faces of Otherness... “: A Response to Professors Sarat, Felstiner and Cahn’ (1992) 77 Cornell Law Review 1499.
- The Solicitors Family Law Association (SFLA) guidelines, laid down in 1982 to reform the (allegedly) adversarial ethos of family law practice in England and Wales, stressed negotiation and conciliation.
- A Hochschild, The Managed Heart: Commercialisations of Human Feeling (University of California Press, 1983).
- Eekelaar, Maclean and Beinart (n 94) 63; see also G Davis, Partisans and Mediators: The Resolution of Divorce Disputes (Clarendon Press, 1988).
- C Menkel-Meadow, ‘Feminisation of the Legal Profession: The Comparative Sociology of Women Lawyers' in R Abel and P Lewis (eds), Lawyers in Society: Comparative Theories (University of California Press, 1989) 77.
- Fraser (n 18).
- M Weber, Economy and Society (University of California Press, 1978) 905.
- See R Hunter, ‘Judicial Diversity and the “New” Judge’ in H Sommerlad, S Harris-Short, S Vaughan and R Young (eds), The Futures of the Legal Profession and Legal Education (Hart Publishing, forthcoming).
- See D Harvey, Brief History of Neoliberalism (Oxford University Press, 2005); L Wacquant, Punishing the Poor: The Neoliberal Government of Social Insecurity (Duke University Press, 2009).
- J Clarke and J Newman, ‘The Alchemy of Austerity’ (2012) 32(3) Critical Social Policy 299, 303.
- P Hillyard and D Gordon, ‘Arresting Statistics: The Drift to Informal Justice in England and Wales' (1999) 26 Journal of Law and Society 521.
- Bandes, ‘Empathy, Narrative and Victim Impact Statements' (n 77); see too I Brownlee, ‘New Labour—New Penology? Punitive Rhetoric and the Limits of Managerialism in Criminal Justice Policy’ (1998) 25(3) Journal of Law and Society 315.
- Endicott notes that the rule of law requires certainty—while uncertainty is also integral to its operation: T Endicott, ‘The Impossibility of the Rule of Law’ (1999) 19 Journal of Legal Studies 1.
- The government moved mediation centre stage in the mid-1990s; see Lord Chancellor's Department, Looking to the Future—Mediation and the Ground for Divorce (Cmd 2799, 1995).
- Michael King and C Piper, Non-Adversarial Justice (Federation Press, 2009).
- Eekelaar, Maclean and Beinart (n 94) 28–29.
- Begun under the Thatcher government and carried forward by New Labour, the coalition government has deployed the financial crisis to further the dismantlement of welfarism.
- For full discussion of the push to mediation see M Maclean, ‘Delivering Family Justice: New Ways of Working for Lawyers in Divorce and Separation’ in Sommerlad, Harris-Short, Vaughan and Young (n 105).
- J Scott and S Dex, ‘Paid and Unpaid Work: Can Policy Improve Gender Inequalities in Relationships?’ in J Miles and R Probert (eds), Sharing Lives, Dividing Assets (Hart Publishing, 1990); Equality and Human Rights Commission (EHRC), How Fair is Britain? (2010), www.equalityhumanrights.com/publication/how-fair-britain.
- Evidently this increase in discretion has intensifed the need for specialist legally aided advice and assistance on rights, just at the point when the possibility of obtaining such advice has been dramatically reduced; see D Morris, ‘Charities and the Big Society: A Doomed Coalition?’ (2012) 32(1) Legal Studies 132.
- Key US neo-conservatives were amongst the most prominent proponents of these discourses; see for instance L Mead, Beyond Entitlement: The Social Obligations of Citizenship (Free Press, 1986).
- W Brown, ‘American Nightmare: Neoliberalism, Neoconservatism, and De-Democratization’ (2006) 34 Political Theory 690; see Harvey (n 106) and Wacquant (n 106).
- Thompson (n 85) 265.
- White (n 98); see too F Olsen, ‘Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis' (1984) 63(3) Texas Law Review 387, 430; and S Merry, Getting Justice and Getting Even: Legal Consciousness among Working Class Americans (University of Chicago Press, 1990) ch 8.
- Bandes, ‘Empathy, Narrative and Victim Impact Statements' (n 77) 382.
- Fraser (n 18) 3.
- S Moller Okin, Women in Western Political Thought (Princeton University Press, 1979); E Fegan, ‘Ideology after Discourse: A Reconceptualisation for Feminist Analyses of the Law’ (1996) 17(2) Journal of Law and Society 173.
- Other commentators have also stressed the possibilities the Enlightenment held for oppressed groups. Nussbaum (cited in J Conaghan, ‘Tort Law and the Feminist Critique of Reason’ in A Bottomley (ed), Feminist Perspectives on the Foundational Subjects of Law (Cavendish Publishing, 1996) 47, 62) warned against the abandonment of the Kantian ideal of universal principles to guide conduct; see too P Williams, ‘Alchemical Notes: Reconstructed Ideals from Deconstructed Rights' (1987) 22 Harvard Civil Rights–Civil Liberties Law Review 401; E Kingdom, What's Wrong with Rights? Problems for Feminist Politics of Law (Edinburgh University Press, 1991); E Schneider, ‘The Dialectic of Rights and Politics: Perspectives from the Women's Movement’ in Sweet Thomadsen and Fineman (n 37) 301.
- P Williams (1991), cited in Douglas-Scott (n 19) 255.
- H Sommerlad and D Wall, Legally Aided Clients and their Solicitors: Qualitative Perspectives on Quality and Legal Aid (Law Society, Research Study No 34, 1999); H Sommerlad, ‘English Perspectives on Quality: The Client Led Model of Quality—A Third Way?’ (2000) 33 University of British Columbia Law Review 491.
- L Mather, ‘“The New Yuppie Female Lawyer”: The Impact of Women on Divorce Law Practice’ [1998] New Hampshire Bar Journal 46; see too L Mather, C McEwen and R Maiman, Divorce Lawyers at Work: Varieties of Professionalism in Practice (Oxford University Press, 2001).
- See eg B Neale and C Smart, ‘”Good” and “Bad” Lawyers? Struggling in the Shadow of the New Law’ (1997) 19(4) Journal of Social Welfare and Family Law 377.
- See T Grillo, ‘The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women’ (1991) 100(8) Yale Law Journal 1545.
- Exemplifed by the recent proposals by Chris Grayling, UK Justice Secretary, to ‘reform’ judicial review (Sedley, 2014).
- Brown (n 119); Wacquant (n 106); P Hardt and A Negri, Empire (Harvard University Press, 2000).
Legal Ethics
Volume 17, 2014 - Issue 2