- R Grosse and LG Goldberg, “Foreign Bank Activity in the United States: An Analysis by Country of Origin” (1991) 15 Journal of Banking & Finance 1092.
- S Claessens, R Herring and D Schoenmaker, “A Safer World Financial System: Improving the Resolution of Systemic Institutions”, 12th Geneva Report on the World Economy (London, CEPR, 2010).
- F Allen, T Beck, E Carletti, P Lane, D Schoenmaker and W Wagner, “Cross-Border Banking in Europe: Implications for Financial Stability and Macroeconomic Policies”, CEPR Report (London, 2011).
- D Schoenmaker, “The Financial Trilemma” (2011) 111 Economics Letters 57.
- Claessens et al, supra n 2.
- See eg B Marzinotto, A Sapir and G Wolff, “What Kind of Fiscal Union?”, Bruegel Policy Brief, Issue 2011/06 (Bruegel, Brussels, 2011). C Goodhart and D Schoenmaker, “The Political Endgame for the Euro-Crisis“, DSF Policy Brief No 9 (Amsterdam, Duisenberg School of Finance, 2011).
- R Herring, “Confl icts between Home and Host Country Prudential Supervisors”, in D Evanoff, J Raymond LaBrosse and G Kaufman (eds), International Financial Instability: Global Banking & National Regulation (World Scientifi c, 2007), 201.
- D Schoenmaker and S Oosterloo, “Financial Supervision in Europe: A Proposal for a New Architecture”, in L Jonung, C Walkner and M Watson (eds), Building the Financial Foundations of the Euro – Experiences and Challenges (Routledge, 2008), 337.
- Eg X Freixas, “Crisis Management in Europe”, in J Kremers, D Schoenmaker and P Wierts (eds), Financial Supervision in Europe (Edward Elgar, 2003), 102; Schoenmaker, supra n 4.
- See Herring, supra n 7, for a full discussion of different kinds of national interests.
- Claessens et al, supra n 2.
- V Acharya, D Schoenmaker and S Steffen, “How Much Capital Do European Banks Need? Some Estimates”, DSF Policy Brief No 6 (Amsterdam, Duisenberg School of Finance, 2011).
- Schoenmaker, supra n 4.
- On the costs of ring-fencing, see E Cerutti, A. Ilyina, Y Makarova and C Schmieder, “Bankers Without Borders? Implications of Ring-Fencing for European Cross-Border Banks”, IMF Working Paper No 10/247 (Washington DC, 2010).
- Claessens et al, supra n 2.
- Financial Stability Board, “Key Attributes of Effective Resolution Regimes for Financial Institutions” (Basel, 2011), see Annex 1.
- C Goodhart, The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision: A History of the Early Years 1974–1997 (Cambridge University Press, 2011).
- C Goodhart and D Schoenmaker, “Burden Sharing in a Banking Crisis in Europe” [2006] Sveriges Riksbank Economic Review no 2, 34.
- The main requirement for a merger having a Community dimension is that the combined aggregate worldwide turnover of the merging companies is over €5bn and that the aggregate Community-wide turnover of each of at least two of the undertakings concerned is more than €250m.
- N Veron, “Banking Federalism is Key to Eurozone's Survival” [2011] Emerging Markets – G20 Edition 3 November.
- Schoenmaker and Oosterloo, supra n 8.
- See Schoenmaker and Oosterloo, supra n 8 for a full discussion.
- See D Hardy, “A European Mandate for Financial Sector Supervisors in the EU”, IMF Working Paper No 09/05 (Washington DC, 2009) on a European mandate for national supervisors. A European mandate would give EU convergence and co-operation an operational dimension at the national level. It could also enhance the functioning of the new ESAs.
- T Padoa-Schioppa, “EMU and Banking Supervision”, Lecture at the London School of Economics, Financial Markets Group, 24 February 1999.
- D Schoenmaker, “Burden Sharing: From Theory to Practice”, DSF Policy Paper No 6 (Amsterdam, Duisenberg School of Finance, 2010).
- A Posen and N Veron, “A Solution for Europe's Banking Problem”, Policy Brief 09–13 (Washington DC, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2009).
- M Nieto and L Wall, “Preconditions for a Successful Implementation of Supervisors' Prompt Corrective Action: Is There a Case for a Banking Standard in the European Union?” (2006) 7 Journal of Banking Regulation 191.
- Financial Stability Board, supra n 16.
- E Avgouleas, C Goodhart and D Schoenmaker, “Bank Resolution Plans as a Catalyst for Global Financial Reform” (2012) 8 Journal of Financial Stability, forthcoming.
- The European Commission is currently working on a European template for national resolution regimes, which would be ideally compatible. Implementation in national legislation is likely to lead to partial compatibility and may thus hamper effective cross-border resolution.
- A Boot, “European Lessons on Consolidation in Banking” (1999) 23 Journal of Banking and Finance 609.
- By contrast, the FDIC provides deposit insurance for nationally chartered banks (the equivalent of European EBA banks) as well as state chartered banks (the equivalent of European national banks).
- C Goodhart and D Schoenmaker, “Fiscal Burden Sharing in Cross-Border Banking Crises” (2009) 5 International Journal of Central Banking 141.
- Marzinotto et al, supra n 6.
- Goodhart and Schoenmaker, supra n 6.
- J McCahery, G Hertig and R Lee, “Empowering the ECB to Supervise Banks: A Choice-based Approach” (2010) 7 European Company and Financial Law Review 171.
- J De Haan, S Oosterloo and D Schoenmaker, Financial Markets and Institutions: A European Text (Cambridge University Press, 2nd edn, forthcoming).
- European Commission, “Consultation on Technical Details of a Possible EU Framework for Bank Recovery and Resolution” (Brussels, 2011).
- See Marzinotto et al, supra n 6 and Goodhart and Schoenmaker, supra n 6 for a full discussion of political and fi scal union.
- European Council, “Statement by the Euro Area Heads of State or Government”, 9 December (Brussels 2011).
- Veron, supra n 20.
- Goodhart and Schoenmaker, supra n 6.
- M Obstfeld, “International Liquidity: The Fiscal Dimension”, NBER Working Paper No 17379 (2011).
- Goodhart and Schoenmaker, supra n 33.
- Allen et al, supra n 3.
Law and Financial Markets Review
Volume 6, 2012 - Issue 1