- A Lowenfeld, International Economic Law (Oxford University Press, 2nd edn 2008), 608.
- “Communiqué of the International Monetary and Financial Committee of the Board of Governors of the International Monetary Fund”, press release no 09/139. 2009d (Washington, International Monetary Fund).
- JM Boughton, “Silent Revolution – The International Monetary Fund 1979–1989” (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 2001).
- Conditionality is a particularly sensitive issue, especially in the wake of the Argentina financial crisis (2001) in which the IMF was severely criticised for imposing unacceptable and unnecessary levels of austerity on borrowing countries.
- IMF Fact Sheet, “IMF Surveillance”, 18 April 2012, www.imf.org/external/np/exr/facts/surv.htm (accessed 1 June 2012).
- “External Evaluation of IMF Surveillance. Report by a Group of Independent Experts” (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 2003), 21–22.
- R Moghadam and S Hagan, Modernizing the Surveillance Mandate and Modalities. The Strategy, Policy Review and Legal Department of the IMF, 26 March 2010.
- EM Truman (ed), Reforming the IMF for the 21st Century, Special Report 19 (Washington, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2006), 7.
- PB Kenen, The International Financial Architecture: What's New? What's Missing? (Washington, Peterson Institute for International Economics, 2001).
- Group of Seven, “Review of the International Financial Institutions”, G-7 Halifax Summit 1995.
- “Mexico – Report on Fund Surveillance, 1993–94. Summing Up by the Chairman” (Washington, International Monetary Fund).
- “Biennial Review of the Implementation of the Fund's Surveillance over Members' Exchange Rate Policies, and of the 1977 Surveillance Decision” (Washington, International Monetary Fund), 29.
- V Sundararajan and TJT Baliño, “Banking Crises: Cases and Issues” (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1991).
- “Review of Members' Policies in the Context of Surveillance – Lessons for Surveillance from the Asian Crisis” (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1998), 3.
- Supra n 13, 4.
- The “Core Principles for Effective Banking Supervision” by the BCBS (1997), 34. Since 1997, the IMF has sought to judiciously incorporate BCSB benchmark standards on financial stability into its surveillance mandate. Indeed, the IMF appears to have developed a close relationship of trust with the BCBS as it sees the latter's work as both valid and reliable.
- “Toward a Framework for Sound Banking. Summing Up by the Chairman” (the “Crow Report”) (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 1999).
- Supra n 17, 37.
- Supra n 14, 40.
- Supra n 14, 13.
- B Bossone, “Integrating Macroeconomic and Financial Sector Analyses within IMF Surveillance: A Case Study on IMF Governance”, Independent Evaluation Office Background Paper 08/11, 2008.
- The IMF has recognised 12 areas and associated standards as useful for the operational work of the Fund and the World Bank. These comprise accounting; auditing; anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism (AML/CFT); banking supervision; corporate governance; data dissemination; fiscal transparency; insolvency and creditor rights; insurance supervision; monetary and financial policy transparency; payments systems; and securities regulation.
- “2008 Triennial Surveillance Review – Thematic Findings Paper” (Washington, International Monetary Fund), 80.
- “Financial Sector Assessment Program – Review, Lessons, and Issues Going Forward” (Washington, International Monetary Fund, 2005), 4.
Law and Financial Markets Review
Volume 6, 2012 - Issue 4