Intelligence and operational warning: lessons from Ukraine

ABSTRACT

This paper examines the challenges of operational analysis as displayed in the Russia-Ukraine conflict. Despite the tremendous success of strategic warning, analysts grossly over-estimated conventional Russian military capabilities and under-estimated the Ukrainians’ capability and will. Even after observing Russia’s operational capabilities and tactics, analysts again over-estimated Russia’s ability to secure Eastern Ukraine. This study finds that poor understanding of military campaigns is the result of six contributing factors. One, risk management requires tradeoffs based on competing priorities and finite resources inevitably creating blind spots. Two, there can be insufficient collection for operational details due to a focus on strategic requirements or tactical intelligence. Three, an insufficient number of analysts required to cover a breadth of topics leaving them susceptible to challenges like mirror-imaging or single source bias, culminates in poor analysis. Four, Russian and Western external and internal strategic narratives were filled with deception. Fifth, despite ‘need to share’ policies, information stovepipes continue to plague Western intelligence agencies. Finally, a lack of professional wargaming can lead to an analysis-centric view that ignores the valuable expertise of operators and logisticians. Each of these factors contributed to analysts’ poor understanding of the operational level of war in the Russia-Ukraine conflict.

KEYWORDS:

• Intelligence analysis
• warning
• strategy
• operational
• wargaming

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s). This is the work of the author and does not necessarily reflect the opinion of the US Air Force Academy. PA#: USAFA-DF-2023-357.

Notes

1 Over time, declassified sources might show that some analysis was correct but not made public.

2 With a direct line to the Secretary of Defense and subordinate joint task force commanders, US combatant commands frequently need both strategic and operational intelligence.

3 The US Air Force considers the targeting of war-related industry a ‘strategic attack’ – these tactical missions are intended to have strategic effects. This muddling of the levels of war convinces some that strategic intelligence should focus on war-related industry. See Kries, 1996, p. 2.

4 The psychology term for this is ‘projection’.