Actors, concepts, controversies: the conceptual politics of European integration

ABSTRACT

The paper is a contribution to research methodology. It proposes a useful methodological import into the range of interpretative approaches in Political Science – the study of Conceptual Politics. Drawing on methodology and categories developed in Conceptual History, Conceptual Politics is understood as the political and rhetorical moves, strategies, debates and their actors, that coin, shape or reflect political concepts in both institutional and social reality and its perception, and with regard to their past and present meanings, understandings and practices. The main methodological premise and also the distinguishing trait with regard to other interpretative approaches is this analytical focus on concepts: A concept is a word or a cluster of words that functions as a nodal point in a political controversy. Concepts are socially constructed factors and indicators of the reality they describe, interpret and modify. Concepts have different layers of meaning that are studied in their temporality and historicity. The different, past and present, layers require the researcher´s prior knowledge and an interpretative approach. The article presents the theoretical and methodological backgrounds and premises of the approach of Conceptual Politics, its added value, the heuristic and analytical tools for analysing it, and the empirical application of the tools proposed. It is argued that the approach is especially beneficial in analysing European integration.

KEYWORDS:

• Concepts
• conceptual politics
• conceptual history
• European integration

Introduction

The aim of this paper, in a broader sense, is to highlight how interpretative methodologies, heuristics and categories can be applied across disciplines. More concretely, I propose a useful methodological import from the neighbouring discipline of History into the range of interpretative approaches in Political Science and EU Studies: I suggest to apply methodology and heuristics developed in Conceptual History (see in detail section 2 below) in researching concepts as nodal points of political controversies, histories, and social and institutional changes. In this article, I will line out the theoretical and methodological background, the analytical toolkit and the added value of the approach. This also means to reflect on how theoretical and methodological assumptions and perspectives shape interpretative research. The following is hence a contribution to research methodology – that is, it explains the methodological and theoretical perspective and analytical lenses of Conceptual History and their application in Political Science.

The main methodological premise and also the distinguishing trait of Conceptual History is the focus on concepts as analytical lenses. A concept is a word or a cluster of words that functions as nodal point in a political controversy. This leads to a clear distinction of the approach from other language or discourse-oriented approaches: The object of analysis is a different one. A concept is a smaller unit of analysis than a discourse or a speech-act (each consists of several sentences). Concepts are regarded and studied in their historicity, regarding past and present meanings associated with them, and in their function as nodal points of political controversies and social and institutional changes. Research accordingly concentrates on how concepts are shaped, interpreted, practiced, contested and understood, and on the changes, disputes and diverse interpretations, meanings, usages and practices of concepts in their historicity (Palonen 1997, 45).

Two key points make the conceptual-historical perspective on concepts a contribution to and a challenge for interpretative approaches: first, a focus is set on the different layers of meaning of a concept and second, these layers and different meanings are studied in their temporality and historicity. The different layers of meaning associated with concepts in past and present and in different circumstances constitute the researcher’s prior knowledge, derived e.g. from a study of sources. To detect them in concepts and their usage and practice, as well as to structure the ensuing analyses, is interpretative work that cannot be carried out by software, but depends on the researcher’s bringing together his or her knowledge of previous and present meanings and current practices and usages of concepts (see the contribution by Wiesner in this collection).

On this basis, I suggest to study conceptual politics. As discussed below in detail, conceptual politics means the political and rhetorical moves, strategies, debates and their actors, that coin, shape or reflect political concepts in institutional and social reality and its perception, as well as over time. As was just said, the approach, methodology and toolbox are interpretative, as they focus on the past and present, and also the contested meanings that were or are associated with concepts and the ways they are transported by those very concepts. This requires an interpretative analysis in which the researcher’s knowledge on different layers of meaning, past and present, is used in analysing past and present usages of concepts in political controversies, or then, past and present practices. Again similar to discourse analysis, there is no clear-cut canon of methods and techniques associated with these research goals. These may vary, and there are links to various interpretative methodologies, namely, language-, practice and action-based interpretative approaches such as speech act theory, discourse analysis, qualitative interpretative document analysis, or rhetorical analysis (for a detailed discussion see Wiesner, Haapala, and Palonen 2017). As was just said, a key distinction is that the approach of conceptual politics requires interpretative work by the researcher (see Wiesner in this collection) and relies on the researcher’s knowledge on past and present meanings of concepts as a tool for analysis, meaning that analyses cannot be carried out only or mainly by software. The most obviously related approaches and their distinction markers will be discussed below.¹

I further argue that the focus on concepts in their historicity and as nodal points of political controversies and social and institutional changes is especially beneficial in analysing European integration. To associate meaning to a newly developing polity such as the EU and its predecessors is inherently linked to specific innovations, usages and understandings, and practices of political key concepts such as democracy, parliament, representation, freedom or citizenship (Koselleck 1996).

The paper is structured as follows: the next section (1) presents a definition of the key terms concepts, politics and conceptual politics. Then (2), the field of conceptual history will be lined out. After that, the theoretical and methodological premises of the approach of conceptual politics will be described, as well as the heuristic and analytical tools for analysing it. The next part (3) discusses the added value of applying the approach in EU studies. Part (4) sketches an example case of analysis.

Concepts, politics and conceptual politics

In the following, I will explicate my understanding of the key terms – politics, concepts and conceptual politics. The understanding of politics that I apply is one that regards politics as action and activity (see in detail Kauppi, Palonen, and Wiesner 2016; Palonen 2003a; Wiesner 2021; Wiesner, Haapala, and Palonen 2017), rather than as a sphere or a field, or simply "the political system". This idea builds on Kari Palonen’s disctinction of four sub-dimensions of politics—Politics, polity, politicisation and politicking (Palonen 2003a, 171). In this classification, politics is the activity, polity is the institutionalised arena or form politics relates to (this can be the political system, but also another institutional form), policy refers to the regulating aspect of politics, politicking means the doing of politics, and politicisation is understood as the act of marking, or naming, something as political.

I understand politics as action (this builds on Palonen’s typology, but it is my definition) like this: Political action is each action that refers to one or several of the four dimensions of Politics, polity, politicisation and politicking. Concretely this means any action that marks an issue as political, drives political processes, builds or changes or acts within a polity (e.g. the political system and its institutions), or shapes policies.

Then, what is a concept? In the most common understanding in political science, a concept is taken as an analytical category or an analytical tool (see, e.g. Sartori 1970): concepts are tools for describing, analysing, explaining and understanding its research objects. When concepts are used as analytical categories, they structure the world, or more precisely: the analytical take on this world, for the researcher. But this does not explain what a concept actually is – and this is neither answered by the seminal text of Sartori on concept (mis)formation. The reader can derive it implicitly, as Sartori explains his usage of the term, discussing conceptualisations and concept formation as the basis of measurement (Sartori 1970).

In a broader philosophical and linguistic tradition, concepts can be seen as mental representations, as Fregean senses and as abilities. There are word-sized concepts or lexical concepts (Margolis and Laurence 2005). Concepts, thus, are not simply analytical categories, but they also have a meaning.

The understanding of Conceptual History or Begriffsgeschichte is even broader. As said above, political concepts and the controversies around them are regarded as nodal points, or, as Koselleck put it: pivots, or factors, and indicators (Koselleck 1996, 65) for key controversies, conflicts and changes under way in the material, social and political reality. Political key concepts like parliament, citizenship, democracy or state are always controversial in their meaning, understanding, and in their empirical practice, rather than stable and clearly defined.

These reflections lead to the following understanding of concepts and their function (see Wiesner 2019, 46): A concept is a word, or a cluster of words,² that is marked by its discursive function and especially its potential for controversiality. Concepts are linked to and transport meanings, and these meanings have a decisive function in ordering the world around us. But the meanings associated with concepts are potentially changing and contested – a concept is always subject to change, debate and controversy, explicitly or implicitly. Concepts have different meanings, and also different layers of meanings that change over time, be it years or centuries. Concepts, once more, function as nodal points of political controversies and social and institutional changes. Namely, a concept is characterised by the fact that it is central to a discourse, a nodal point that meanings are associated with and that is controversial. It is precisely because of their function as nodal points that key concepts become controversial, and hence, a key concept can be distinguished by how controversial it is (Palonen 2002, 2010). Political interests, strategies and processes, or just politics, are reflected in the usage, controversies, changes and politics of concepts (Koselleck 1996, 61).

Conceptual politics, accordingly, I understand as the political and rhetorical moves, strategies, debates and their actors, that coin, shape or reflect political concepts in both institutional and social reality and its perception, and in their historicity. Conceptual politics, as will be discussed throughout this article, has two main dimensions: (a) the institutional and political inventions and (b) the controversies linked so specific usages and practices of concepts.

The research field of conceptual history and its methodological toolbox

I will now further illustrate the intellectual background and main dimensions of the methodology of Conceptual History that I suggest to import. Conceptual History developed in different strands of thought in political theory and history. The interdisciplinary research field (see Fernandez Sebastian 2011 for an overview) today reaches out into History, Political Science, Sociology, Language Studies, Law and other related subfields. As said above, its main methodological premise – and also the decisive marker of distinction from other interpretative approaches – is the focus on concepts as key analytical lenses and as nodal points of social and political controversies and changes over time. The focus is put on the controversial meanings associated to concepts and their different layers, and the ways these meanings are constructed and disputed and changing over time.

In the research field of Conceptual History, on one hand, there is a macro-oriented, temporal approach to mid-term and long-term conceptual changes. Temporal studies of conceptual change can extend over decades or even centuries. The question is then how understandings and practices of a concept such as democracy have developed over these long time spans. This strand is associated with Reinhart Koselleck and the other editors of the first major work of conceptual history, Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe (GG, Basic Concepts in History), a huge lexicon in eight volumes that discusses 122 key concepts in more than 9000 pages. The editors of Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe wanted to grasp the interrelations of institutional, political and social changes and the meanings attributed to key concepts with regard to the development towards a modern nation state and the first steps of democratization in Germany between 1750 and 1850, famously termed ‘Sattelzeit’ (saddle period; Koselleck 1967, 82). The old world broke down and a new world developed – and the GG approach aimed at grasping the mental and linguistic conceptualisation of this new space (Koselleck 1967, 81). The key idea of the temporal strand is that changed meanings of key concepts over time both reflect and push forward institutional, political and social change and the perception of a new reality. This is why political concepts are regarded as nodal points, or as pivots and indicators, for key controversies, conflicts and changes under way in social and political life in the material world: Concepts are situated at the intersections of empirical changes and changes of meaning over time (Koselleck 1996, 65; see also Palonen 1997, 64). It will be discussed in section 3 below why this focus is especially beneficial in the EU context.

On the other hand, a rhetorical perspective on conceptual change is rather micro-oriented, as it often concentrates on short-term processes, rhetorical and contextual studies, as well as the role of key actors. Related studies cover rather shorter time spans, beginning with one single debate. The rhetorical perspective on conceptual change (Palonen 2003b; Skinner 2002d, 179, 182) developed around Quentin Skinner, John Pocock and other authors who were or are mostly based at Cambridge (this lead to the labelling of Cambridge school). It traditionally focuses on intellectual history.

The methodological base here has similarities to speech act theory. Skinner highlights that language always has two dimensions that must be researched: meaning and linguistic action (Skinner 2002a, 3), and that therefore it is important to analyse ‘[…] not only what people are saying but also what they are doing in saying it’ (Skinner 2002b, 82). He directly relates this to the usage of concepts in political theory, which he regards as tools in political debates. Theorists, then, always take part in political controversies with their texts and hence have to refer to the background of the value systems, beliefs and dominant ideas of their time (Skinner 2002c). Skinner particularly underlines that the meaning associated with key concepts often has an evaluative or normative connotation, and hence specific usages of concepts attribute, change or challenge these normative aspects (Skinner 2002e, 173). ‘Innovating ideologists’ are actors that coin new concepts or use and interpret concepts in a new or specific way (Skinner 2002c, 148).

Rhetorical and temporal perspectives open up a broad horizon of interpretation and analysis of conceptual change. Both perspectives are complementary (Palonen 2004, 13–16, 2005; Richter 1995). A number of useful analytical tools can be derived from both perspectives, as well as the following methodological premises. All of them require an interpretative approach, since the researcher´s prior knowledge on past and present meanings and practices of concepts is essential for the analyses and the heuristics.

First, as mentioned above: concepts are nodal points, they are pivots, and they are factors and indicators of social, institutional and political changes under way. Key concepts link meaning to the legitimacy of ideas and institutions (Skinner 1999, 66–67), and their change signals or engenders changes of meaning and legitimacy over time, as well as changes in value and belief systems (Skinner 1999, 66–67; see also Koselleck 1967). Concepts both trigger and express change (Koselleck 1996, 61, 65), influencing the changes in question before they occur and legitimising them afterwards (Koselleck 1967; Skinner 2002e). Concepts are, consequently, an object of politics, and the analysis of conceptual politics is an interpretative analysis of these politics.

Second, concepts therefore should be analysed with an emphasis on their reflexivity and their social constructedness. There is no clear dichotomy between concepts and facts, but they are related. Not only facts and reality, institutions and norms are to be regarded as socially constructed, but also the concepts we use to interpret them: when we interpret the reality by using concepts, we create meaning for them (Koselleck 1967; Skinner 2002c).

Third, as said above, it is crucial that concepts have a temporal dimension, i.e. their meanings and understandings change over time. Concepts are historically embedded, they have past meanings that are intertwined with present ones in empirical as well as in academic practice. The history of a concept includes not only the changes in meaning of a word, but the changes of all meanings that have ever been associated with it (Koselleck 1967, 85, 94, 1996, 61, 2006a, 120). Within single debates and even in one and the same text we can distinguish different historical layers of political concepts to be analysed (Koselleck 2000).

Therefore, an analytical category can never be entirely separated from how the concept is and has been understood, debated and contested (Koselleck 1996, 59–60, 2006b, 375; Palonen 2004, 2005; Palonen 2012; Richter 1995). This means that it is especially useful for the usage of concepts as analytical categories to systematically trace their genealogy (see, e.g. Skinner 2009 on the concept of the state), as such genealogies can indicate recurrent problems in defining a concept as an analytical category (Wiesner and Harfst 2019, 2022).

Furthermore, not only definitions and interpretations of concepts in theory, but also the respective practices have developed and changed decisively over the last centuries. This goes for several core concepts in the social sciences: states developed from person-states to the nation-states we have today (Skinner 2009), citizenship used to mean and include many different rights, duties and groups of person (Marshall 1950; Pocock 1998); and political representation only became associated to the concept of democracy quite recently, namely in the 17th and 18th centuries (Manin 1997; Pitkin 2009; Urbinati 2006).

Fourth, and accordingly, there are no self-evident interpretations of concepts, and there is not one ‘correct’ meaning of a concept, but always a range of historical and present meanings and possible interpretations that can be subject to an interpretative analysis. Established meanings of a concept like ‘the state’ thus should not be taken for granted, but regarded as current interpretations of a certain concept or a certain practice to which alternatives exist.

Fifth, the approach offers a number of useful heuristic tools. In particular, Reinhart Koselleck suggested a taxonomy that allows to grasp and categorise these different patterns of conceptual politics and their temporality more exactly. Koselleck underlines that changes in meaning and empirical reality are interrelated in different ways (see typology below), since ‘[…] the history of language, the history of society, and the history of politics do not change at the same rate of speed’ (Koselleck 1996, 66). He distinguished four possible interrelations between institutional and conceptual changes (Koselleck 2006c, 62). Before presenting the scheme, four remarks are important: First, the scheme does not imply a causal relation between institutional change and conceptual change, but mainly a temporal relation: it allows to distinguish whether a concept was first invented or changed, or institutions changed first and the conceptualisation followed. Second, the interrelations between conceptual and institutional change can be of different characters: (a) they can be direct, when a concept is invented and then put into practice (like ‘Citizenship of the Union’, see Wiesner 2019), (b) they can be mediated, when concepts are factors of change or influence institutional change and (c) they can be indirect, when conceptual change indicates institutional changes. Third, regarding conceptual change, the conceptual historical tools and their application in qualitative and interpretative techniques of analysis provide the means to study dominant interpretations as well as changes in the institutional practice. In order to analyse to what extent a conceptual change is, e.g. supported by the citizens, it would be necessary to use microdata (see Zvereva 2014 for an exemplary study). Fourth, in addition to the types of temporal interrelations between institutional and conceptual change, different directions of the interrelations can be distinguished, as is discussed below (top-down, bottom-up and sideways).

The adapted Koselleck scheme now is as follows:

1. Both political, institutional and social reality and the meaning of the respective concepts stay the same

2. There is change of political, institutional and social reality before conceptual change: This does not mean that conceptual change has to follow: it can also mean that reality and the established meaning of a concept may diverge.

3. There is conceptual change before change of political, institutional and social reality: This case mainly occurs when concepts are invented with the purpose to transport a certain meaning, or to create legitimacy. Conceptual innovation is often shaped by ‘innovating ideologists’ (Skinner 2002c, 148) aiming to create positive expectations with regard to future developments (Vorgriffe, Koselleck 1997).

4. Political, institutional and social reality and concepts can go in opposite directions: This can be the case when (a) new concepts are invented that are not yet related to and (b) reality changes, old concepts no longer fit and new concepts are not yet developed.

Researching conceptual politics: perspectives, approaches and methods

As repeatedly emphasised, the approach of conceptual politics is distinguished by its methodological focus on concepts as analytical objects. The related methodology and toolbox focuses on the analysis of the meanings that are associated with concepts, their historical layers, and the ways they are transported by those very concepts, the debates, conflicts and differences in the interpretations and practices of key concepts that occur in processes of institutional and conceptual changes, and the ways they are driven by the respective actors and their interests, using specific arguments and rhetorical moves (Koselleck 1996; Palonen 1997; Skinner 2002b). To analyse conceptual changes therefore requires an interpretative approach, because it means to analyse meanings, contestations, debates and controversies related to concepts in their historicity:

‘No political action, no social behaviour can occur without some minimum stock of basic concepts that have persisted over long periods; have suddenly appeared, disappeared, reappeared; or have been transformed, either rapidly or slowly. Such concepts must be interpreted in order to sort out their multiple meanings, internal contradictions, and varying applications in different social strata.’ (Koselleck 1996, 64–65)

The particular goal of the approach of conceptual politics, as stated above, is to study the political and rhetorical moves, strategies, debates and their actors, that coin, shape or reflect political concepts in both institutional and social reality and its perception, and the way these change over time. The actions and practices at stake in conceptual politics often are textual and legal. They relate to political debates and political actions around the interpretation and the practices of key concepts, and the ways these are laid down in written protocols, texts, or legal documents. These are then subject to interpretative analyses (see in detail Wiesner, Haapala, and Palonen 2017).

As discussed elsewhere in detail (Wiesner 2022b; Wiesner, Haapala, and Palonen 2017), to study conceptual politics means to study the ‘traces, elements and dimensions of political activity embedded in a text, or related to a text’ (Wiesner, Haapala, and Palonen 2017, 60). And this entails various interpretative steps: first, ‘the ones involved in the basic steps of an interpretative or qualitative study […]’, and second, importantly,

[…] such a study does not stop when it has found out the ‘what’ of a text, that is, the utterances, arguments, topoi or concepts that are used in it. On the contrary: when those are clear, the main work begins, and the researcher asks herself about the ‘how’ and the ‘why’ behind the ‘what’. (Wiesner, Haapala, and Palonen 2017, 60)

Concretely the analysis of conceptual politics requires the researcher to study the ‘why’ or the reasons for an utterance (such as the actor’s interests or strategic aims, the social background, previous events and the political context), and also the ‘how’: how are things expressed, which arguments, terms and associations are used or played with? How do they relate to specific narratives, fears and positive or negative connotations? (Wiesner 2022b, 2–3; Wiesner, Haapala, and Palonen 2017, 60).

To analyse the ‘how’ and ‘why’ in texts therefore concretely requires to take into account factors that are external to the texts studied, and the researcher to set these in conjunction with the findings of the qualitative analysis, in order to make up for a plausible picture. These interpretative steps require the researcher’s interpretation and imagination. They cannot be carried out by automated or quantitative tools alone. Especially, quantitative analyses cannot give the researcher complete answers to her ‘how’ and ‘why’ questions, since the quantities of a ‘what’ do not explain a ‘why’ or a ‘how’. This outcome of the interpretative analysis, importantly, will be plausible and well argued, but it will still always be an interpretative one. This means it must be justified and explained, but it is still subject to, and result of, the researcher’s interpretative steps (Wiesner 2022b; Wiesner, Haapala, and Palonen 2017, 97). Concretely, in the interpretative analysis of conceptual politics the researcher needs to apply his or her prior knowledge on past and present layers of meanings of a concept in order to structure the study.

Importantly, there is no clear-cut or predefined methods canon associated to these research goals. Approaches can vary, and there are links to different interpretative methodologies in various disciplines, namely, language-, practice and action-based interpretative approaches such as speech act theory, discourse analysis, qualitative interpretative document analysis, or rhetorical analysis, as well as practice-theoretical approaches (for a detailed discussion see Wiesner, Haapala, and Palonen 2017). A discussion of similar approaches and the distinction markers of the approach of conceptual politics will follow.

Value added: why study the conceptual politics of European integration?

As emphasised throughout this article, the main distinction and benefit of the approach of conceptual politics is the methodological focus on concepts as nodal points of political controversies and social and institutional changes. So, why should researchers apply the approach in interpretative analyses of EU integration?

EU integration as conceptual politics

The process of European integration, understood as the successive steps of integration after World War II and up until today that led to developing a supranational polity from the European Community of Coal and Steel to today’s EU, represents the development of a new polity and the related conceptual innovations and practices as it is described in Geschichtliche Grundbegriffe. To create visions and goals for the developing European polity, and to shape the new institutions themselves, was and is linked to inventing, interpreting and practising political key concepts such as democracy, parliament, representation, freedom or citizenship. But such concepts are essentially contested (Gallie 1955; Koselleck 1996; see in detail Wiesner 2019): political agents interpret them differently because they have different interests, and moreover, concepts change over time.

In the process of European integration since World War II, conceptions of European unification that had been developed since centuries were applied in concrete steps. Creative and innovative actors and thinkers, politicians and activists – ranging from Dante Alighieri over Immanuel Kant, Aristide Briant and Count Koudenhove-Kalergi to the Federalists like Altiero Spinelli and leading European Politicians like Winston Churchill (see in detail Wiesner 2019, 85–96) – had long prepared European integration via their books and pamphlets, by their speeches and campaigns, and last but not least by their struggles, their grassroots work, and also their opposition to fascism and national socialism. Especially the activities of the two movements of the European Federalists (with activists such as Altiero Spinelli) and the European Unionists (with politicians such as Winston Churchill) led to realising what for a long time had been a utopia, the unification of Europe. Thinkers, politicians and activists addressing these matters mutually influenced each other (see the contribution by Katja Mäkinen, in this Collection, as well as Wiesner 2019, 85–96). These historical layers of meaning of European integration shape the EU until today (Wiesner 2014b).

The Western European integration process properly started with the six founding member states of the European Community of Coal and Steel (ECSC) and the Euratom Community, France, Italy, Germany, Netherlands, Belgium and Luxemburg. Western European integration continued with the well-known steps of founding the European Economic Community in 1957, and several waves of enlargement in the 1970s, 1980s, 1990s and 2000s. A series of Treaty changes began with the Single European Act (SEA) in 1987. In the course of this process, the developing polity became the European Union with the Maastricht treaty reform in 1992, the Treaties took on more and more a constitutional character, the supranational institutions were strengthened (Tömmel 2014), as well as the classical elements of representative democratic parliamentarism, i.e. the European Parliament became the first chamber of legislation (Tiilikainen and Wiesner 2016; Wiesner 2019, 185–98). The EU, in short, is marked by its historicity - past steps and moves shaped today´s EU.

As said above, in the course of the integration process, several conceptual innovations were gradually transformed into practice and led to building the EU as a new polity with new institutions. Other conceptual innovations were not successful, which is for instance the case of the European Political Community Treaty (Europäische Politische Gemeinschaft 1953). In 1953, it already foresaw a European Parliament and an EU Constitution, but it was not ratified in the French National Assembly.

This underlines that the question of how to conceptualise a unified Europe has been ever contested. Accordingly, the processes of inventing and building the EU have been marked by decisive controversies regarding the character and the shape that the unified Europe should have (Wiesner 2019).

To analyse and understand the conceptual politics of EU integration (a) enables to analyse actors, processes and success factors of this historical processes and controversies, and to also see which interpretations of concepts finally were put into practice and hence institutionalised. Moreover, (b) the process of European integration is seen in its temporality. To include the temporality and historicity of the EU also means (c) to analyse the process of European integration as shaped by histories, not as one history. Long-term conceptual controversies in these histories do not disappear, but re-emerge and continue to have an impact. There is no teleology of European integration (see also Walker 2007), but it is a historical and political process, marked by conflicts, controversies and contingencies, and changing institutional realities and practices over time (Tömmel 2014). Studying conceptual politics thus also means to focus (d) on the contingencies and pitfalls of inventing and shaping the EU system – rather than searching for a straight path of history and clear definitions. Contingency in this context refers to the fact that all human action depends on chances and contingencies, underlining that actors can never exactly predict what the outcomes of their actions will be (Palonen 1998). All this is only understandable using a temporal perspective and an interpretative approach, in which previous and present meanings of concepts help structure the analysis and interpret the findings.

In sum, conceptual politics are both symbolical for the process of European integration in its temporality and the state of the EU as such (they are closely related to the hybrid character of the EU which makes it difficult to find clear-cut definitions) and part of the interpretative and symbolic struggles over integration. This is why they should be taken as a resource and a lense of analysing the dynamics of EU integration. The purpose of studying the conceptual politics of EU integration is therefore to study the nature of a changing object – the EU – by way of studying the conceptual politics, innovations and controversies about its conceptualisation over time. While this has not been the focus of EU Studies so much, the role of concepts has been taken up by contributions to International Relations (for overviews see Berenskoetter 2016; Ish-Shalom 2021).

The distinguishing methodological trait: the perspective on concepts

The approach of conceptual politics differs from other language- or discourse-oriented approaches in the main respect that it focuses on concepts as analytical lenses (again, just as Discourse Analysis focuses on discourses). A concept, as explained above, is a word or a cluster of words that functions as a nodal point in a political controversy. It has different layers of meaning, it has historicity, and to analyse these requires the researcher’s prior knowledge and an interpretative approach. As said above, this methodological focus on concepts is the distinction marker of the approach with regard to others.

Namely, this focus leads to a clear distinction from language or discourse-oriented approaches: The object of analysis simply is a different one, and analysis not only concentrates on present meanings and contributions in current discourses or speech acts, but it includes past meanings. This leads to a number of distinguishing traits: First, compared to a discourse or a speech-act, a concept is a much smaller unit of analysis. It is a word or a cluster of words, whereas a speech act consists of several words and a discourse even of several speech acts. As such, a concept can therefore be used in discourses and arguments, and formed via speech acts. When it comes to distinguishing the conceptual politics approach from other interpretative approaches, the analytical focus on concepts is the first crucial distinction. Second, it is decisive that conceptual politics explicitly focuses on the interrelations of conceptual controversies and social and institutional changes, which are especially virulent in European integration. This brings about a number of differences from other approaches in EU Studies that focus on institutional changes, linguistic actions, discourses and ideas (see below). Third, concepts are studied in their historicity, and fourth with regard to different historical and current layers of meaning. This, fifth, requires an interpretative approach and cannot be subject to software analysis alone. The different historical and current layers of meaning of concepts are usually derived from a study of sources. Knowledge about them constitutes the researcher’s prior knowledge. In analyses of conceptual politics the researcher brings together his or her knowledge of previous and present meanings and current practices and usages of concepts (see the contribution by Wiesner in this collection). They can be used as heuristic tools for analysis.

In the following, I will line out these similarities and differences in more detail.

The approach goes beyond the mainstream approaches in EU Studies because of its reflexive and historical perspective. As argued by Niilo Kauppi (Kauppi 2010; see also Kauppi 2018), the ontology of the mainstream approaches in EU studies, i.e. liberal intergovernmentalism and neo-functionalism, is based on an exclusive framework reproducing dualisms (objective–subjective, individual–institution, socialization–calculation, interest–norm, supranational–national and so on), which prevent research from elaborating a more complex, ‘thick’ empirical description of EU integration. (Liberal) intergovernmentalism and (neo)functionalism, indeed, were originally theories of integration, coined at a time when one wanted to predict the future course of integration. When used as analytical frameworks, intergovernmentalism traditionally focuses on ‘big men doing big politics’, seeing states and governments as main actors, and neofunctionalism focuses on incremental dynamics of the integration process. This would, in principle, allow to focus on concepts, speech acts, patterns of meaning, or the political actions, practices and micropolitics shaping integration (see the contribution by Ahrens and Elomäki, in this collection). But so far (liberal) intergovernmentalism and (neo)functionalism rely largely on a positivist paradigm, often studying cause–effect and testing hypotheses (for a critical discussion of such approaches see Mearsheimer and Walt 2013) – this tends to leave out decisive facets of the complexity of EU integration, as well as its historicity and temporality (see the contribution by Mäkinen, in this collection).

A number of neo-institutionalist and constructivist approaches to EU integration therefore propose alternative perspectives that present similarities with the approach of conceptual politics. Niilo Kauppi (Kauppi 2010) suggests an inclusive and reflexive framework and a relational approach that takes into account the interactive character of institutions and the individuals and groups inhabiting them. The linkages between political controversies and institutional changes have been in the focus of neo-institutional approaches (Aspinwall and Schneider 2000; Hall and Taylor 1996), without these approaches explicitly focusing on concepts. The constructivist turn in EU Studies (Christiansen, Jorgensen, and Wiener 2001), as well as in Political Science more generally (Finnemore and Sikkink 2001) underlines the social constructedness and the interrelations of ideas and institutions, a perspective that is shared by conceptual politics. The approach of conceptual politics moreover has theoretical and methodological similarities to several other approaches that highlight, for instance, the role of ideas and interests (rather than concepts) in shaping the EU (Christiansen, Falkner, and JØrgensen 2002). One classical question in this respect is how major member states such as France and Germany have been driving integration according to their strategic interests (see e.g. Krotz and Schild 2015). Conceptual politics also studies bottom-up and sideways dynamics (Kreppel 2010) and can be used to analyse interinstitutional power relations and struggles (Farrell and Héritier 2007). It also has similarities with approaches that concentrate on practices (Adler-Nissen 2016, on practice-theoretical approaches in general see Büger and Gadinger 2018) in EU politics.

As emphasised above, the focus on the historicity of concepts and the historical perspective on European integration is another added value of the conceptual politics approach. In that, it shows similarities to approaches that study the different phases, actors and their moves that have shaped the process of integration (see e.g. Tömmel 2014, 34). The history of ideas behind integration has also been studied, both in the longer run (see, e.g. Triandafyllidou and Gropas 2015; Wiesner and Schmidt-Gleim 2014) and in more recent times (see e.g. Lacroix and Nicolaïdis 2010; Wintle and Spiering 2003, see also the contribution by Mäkinen, in this collection).

Thus far, none of the approaches discussed shares the methodological focus on concepts as nodal points, and neither do they focus on concepts in their historicity and their various layers of meaning. This is neither the case for the following approaches that study how ideas (Jachtenfuchs 2002; Parsons 2003; Sternberg 2013) or discourses (Schmidt 2006, 2008, 2010) are linked to the ongoing integration process itself. Again, the decisive distinction from the conceptual politics approach is that these works do not focus on concepts, but on discourses and ideas. Second, these approaches do not use a multifaceted framework of analysis that includes sideways dynamics, but study how EU integration is or was conceptualised and legitimised by politicians. In that, they each have a very specific approach and analytical perspective. Third, while historical debates are referred to, this it not the case for the historical layers of meaning of concepts.

Discoursive Institutionalism (Schmidt 2006), its further developments such as discoursive postfunctionalism (Wendler 2019; Wendler and Hurrelmann 2022) and the approach of Schrag-Sternberg (Sternberg 2013) emphasise top-down processes beginning with governments and political elites and in which patterns of meaning are used by governments in order to legitimise integration in the eyes of their citizens or to shape integration. They hence concentrate on EU and/or national political elites and study two different possible paths: Schmidt and Schrag Sternberg study the top-down path, that is, how national elites or EU elites and governments interpret and legitimise EU integration vis-à-vis the citizens. Schrag Sternberg (Sternberg 2013) focuses on EU thinkers and politicians and hence also on the top-down path. She explains how ideas for democratising the EU were part of an overall legitimising discourse on the EU and how they worked, as well as when and by whom they were issued. She shows how ideas that had been in the drawers of innovating ideologists for some time finally were put into practice. Jachtenfuchs (Jachtenfuchs 2002) and Parsons (Parsons 2003) are rather concerned with a bottom-up path: Jachtenfuchs focuses on constitutional ideas and their influence on EU treaty negotiations and changes, studying national traditions and ideas, their party origins, and how elites use them in polity-related decisions. In that, he more strongly looks at bottom-up processes and even includes differences in national parties’ positions, but tends to leave the top-down paths of influence aside. Parsons focuses on the ways certain integration ideas coined in one state (France) succeeded or not. The approach of Discourse Network Analysis (Leifeld 2016, 2020) concentrates on analysing discourses as networks and concepts as one dimension in them, but does not aim to grasp them in their historicity and with regard to the past and present meanings. This approach is moreover concentrating on software-based network analyses rather than interpretative techniques and prior knowledge of the researcher.

To conclude, different from all of the approaches discussed above, conceptual politics not only puts concepts (not ideas or discourses) into the centre of attention, but it also opens up a more complex framework. It analyses top-down, bottom-up, sideways and backward (in terms of history) dynamics and various different interconnections, i.e. it aims at a spider web of conceptualisations and the related practices, and it includes their historical dimensions and various layers of meaning, too. The conceptual politics of European Integration are analysed as political actions taking place in this dynamic and temporal spider web where paths and connections of conceptualisations by different kinds of agents and their activities spin into different directions, times, and historical and present layers of meaning. The lense of studying this web of conceptual politics and institutional changes are key concepts as nodal points.

To sum up the advantages of using the approach of conceptual politics, it allows to

1. Re-think concepts as analytical categories

2. Understand conceptual controversies as political controversies (e.g. 2005 Constitutional Treaty)

3. Study linkages between institutional, social and conceptual changes

4. Use an approach that has been developed for studying new political spaces

5. Take into account their historicity and different past and present meanings of concepts

6. Analyse conceptual changes over time

7. Focus on the debates, conflicts and differences in these processes

8. Discuss and analyse a conceptualisation spider web

9. Study a taxonomy of changes

The conceptual politics of the EP’s right to investiture

The following presents a short example of an interpretative study of conceptual politics. It serves at explicating how the methodological toolbox explained above can be applied. The following builds on the premise that concepts are ever-contested and that they are part of broader clusters of meaning. Key concepts such as parliamentarism have been historically contested (see Ihalainen, Ilie, and Palonen 2016), and the various meanings that have been associated with them over time form a tacit pool of meanings that intuitively and traditionally have been associated with parliamentarism, and hence they also can be activated. The analysis is based on the categories of the classical historical key elements of parliamentarism as explicated by Kari Palonen (Palonen 2016a). The example focuses on the concept of parliamentarism and in particular on one of its decisive historical dimensions, namely, the right to investiture, in the EU and by MEPs (see in detail Wiesner 2018b, 2019). Analysis thus includes past and present interpretations of parliamentarism in the EP’s political practice and controversies. Whereas the EP practised only part of the classical dimensions of parliamentarism when it was first founded, its competencies grew over the years (Tiilikainen and Wiesner 2016). One key aspect pushing this development is the EP’s conceptual politics and the ways it practised classical historical dimensions of parliamentarism such as, in this case, the right to investiture.

The following studies a period of the EP’s conceptual politics and the development of the concept of parliamentarism in the EU in its historicity. The focus is put on the actors, processes and controversies around the concepts of parliamentarism and the right to investiture, and the ways they have been put into practice. The guiding question is how the concept of parliamentarism and the right to investiture have been defined, practised and finally been fixed by laying them down in legal documents over a time span of altogether seven years. In doing so, the Koselleckian taxonomy is used, since the example is a case of type 2 – change of institutional and social before conceptual change. The focus of analysis is set upon short-term conceptual controversies that revolve around political debates and the means of political rhetoric. The interpretative analysis indicates how previous meanings and practices of parliamentarism become activated in the EP’s actions – in this case, the right to investiture.

The study focuses on two crucial cases that led to increasing the EP’s powers in Commission investiture and scrutiny, namely, the events preceding the votes of approval for the Prodi and Barroso Commissions in 1999 and 2004 (see a lso in detail Wiesner 2018b). Analysis is based on two types of sources that represent a crucial distinction. First, in order to reconstruct the events and the proceeding of the political controversy, a material sample of quality press articles³ was used. Second, in order to analyse how the concept of parliamentarism was defined as a result of these political processes, the legal outcome documents were consulted, i.e. the two resulting Interinstitutional Agreements between the European Parliament and the Commission that fixed the EP’s newly obtained rights.

On this basis, the interpretative analysis had three distinct dimensions. The press articles were analysed with the sole purpose the reconstruct the course of events. They have been subject to a coding procedure that assembled information explaining who, why and with which result was pushing forward a political controversy. Second, I as the researcher interpreted this course of events with regard to moves, strategies and practices of conceptual politics that they indicate. The legal texts, third, then were subject to the complementary part of the interpretative analysis, as they indicate the understandings of the concept of parliamentarism and the right to investiture that succeeded in the conceptual politics.

The fall of the Santer Commission

The first case is the fall of the Santer Commission and the nomination of Prodi Commission in 1999 (see also Wiesner 2018b).

1. Events of conceptual politics and their interpretation

Three phases can be distinguished here:

Phase 1 (December 1998–March 1999): Practising parliamentary powers

The underlying political conflict dates back to a report that scandalised intransparent activities in the Commission in 1998. The EP then first refused to vote upon approval of the Commissions’ actions and voted on no-confidence later. This means it played on its institutional and symbolical competences, practising the concept of government scrutiny and voting on no confidence. Even if there was no majority for the no-confidence vote, the Santer Commission resigned. So in sum, the EP forced the Commission to publicly take on the political responsibility for the mismanagement, which finally led to its resignation.

Phase 2 (March 1999–May 1999): Negotiating conceptual innovations

The EP then urged the Council to prepare a new Commission, which the Council did, starting by nominating Romano Prodi as Commission president. This meant the EP would have to vote upon approval of the new Commission. MEPs mandated a negotiation committee and agreed with designed Commission president Romano Prodi to have individual hearings of further Commissioners before the EP.

Phase 3 (June 1999–September 1999): Fixing a broadened concept of EP parliamentarism

Related to the hearings, the EP successfully negotiated and established new rules as a condition for a vote of approval. Prodi promised he would seriously take into account claims for demission of a Commissioner issued by MEPs, and also the EPs ideas when drafting law initiatives. MEPs thus had negotiated a series of compromises with Prodi that concretise the EPs parliamentary rights and created a new practice for the EPs parliamentarism, following Koselleck’s case 2 scheme (change of institutional and social before conceptual change).

(b)	Results of conceptual politics

These compromises, hence, established an interpretation of parliamentarism and a right to investiture that was broader than before, and hence activated a classical dimension of parliamentarism (Palonen 2016a ) that had not been practised by the EP before: the move considerably strengthened the EP’s investiture powers. They were later formalised in an Interinstitutional Agreement (IIA) between EP and Commission that was published in Summer 2000, i.e. a legal document. It fixes the core of an EP right to investiture, stating, among other points in its ‘General principles’, that

4. The Commission shall take account of any requests […] by the European Parliament […] to submit legislative proposals, and undertakes to provide a prompt and sufficiently detailed reply to any such request […].

9. Without prejudice to the principle of Commission collegiality, each Member of the Commission shall take political responsibility for action in the field of which he or she is in charge.

10. The Commission accepts that, where the European Parliament expresses lack of confidence in a Member of the Commission […] the President of the Commission will consider seriously whether he should request that Member to resign. […]

12. […] In all fields where the European Parliament acts in a legislative capacity, or as a branch of the budgetary authority, it shall be informed, on a par with the Council, at every stage of the legislative and budgetary process. (European Union 2001, 3)

This interinstitutional agreement fixed the broadened interpretation of parliamentarism in the EP legally. It is a concrete and tangible result of the process of conceptual politics that is related to the political controversy around the resignation of the Santer commission and the appointment of the Prodi Commussion.

The newly fixed rules had a huge practical impact. First, the EP had increased its influence in nominating a new Commission by the new informal right to reject individual candidates. Second, MEPs obtained a right to claim individual Commissioners to resign. Third, the EP obtained a right that comes close to a legislative initiative power, and fourth, especially in the crisis, the EP directly interacted with the Council, thus underlining its weight in the Commission investiture. Fourth, it showed that the hearings are both a means of pressure in the interinstitutional struggle with the designated Commission president and represent an intervention into the Commission selection procedure and hence into the Council’s domain.

The approval of the second Prodi Commission

The EP used the new powers laid down in the 2000 IIA in the second case, before the Barroso Commission was approved in 2004. There was a power struggle between the designated Commission president, the Council and especially some of its members, and the MEPs. The EP again followed a strategy of practical conceptual change before a formal change of the concept.

1. Events of conceptual politics and their interpretation

The conflict between the three institutions again had three phases.

Phase 1 (Spring 2004–October 2004): practicing parliamentarism – refusing a majority

In spring 2004, the Council had nominated Barroso as designated Commission president. He was approved by the EP in June, negotiated his Commission with the Council members and announced his proposal for a new Commission in August 2004. But before the candidates were even able to have their hearings in the EP, it became evident that doubts about some of them were so serious that a clear majority in favour of approval of the Commission was not assured. The criticism focused on the designated Commissioner for Justice, Rocco Buttiglione. In interviews he had openly criticised homosexuals and single mothers which was met with indignation by several MEPs, in particular as he was designed Commissioner for justice and anti-discrimination matters. Most fractions claimed changes in the proposed Commission, and it became evident there would not be a majority. Barroso refused changes as long as possible until the EP majority finally shifted in favour of a No vote.

Phase 2 (October/November 2004): Practising a right to investiture

Barroso drew back his proposal for a new Commission, and the Prodi Commission stayed in office longer than originally planned. The designated Commission president renegotiated candidates with the Council. Berlusconi offered a withdrawal of Buttiglione, but required that Italy be not the only country to accept an exchange of Commissioner. In consequence, the Council put pressure on the Italian and Latvian government, and, ultimately, the Italian and the Latvian candidates were exchanged.

Phase 3 (November 2004): Broadening the right to commission investiture and scrutiny

Barroso presented the new Commission to the EP and it received a high approval score in the voting.

(b)	Results of conceptual politics

The vote of approval was coupled with the vote on a motion that laid down the new negotiation results on interinstitutional relations and hence built the ground for a new IIA (European Parliament 2009, 190; Moury 2007; Wiesner 2018b) that was concluded in 2005:

2. Each Member of the Commission shall take political responsibility for action in the field of which he or she is in charge, without prejudice to the principle of Commission collegiality. […]

3. If Parliament decides to express lack of confidence in a Member of the Commission, the President of the Commission, having given serious consideration to that decision, shall either request that Member to resign, or explain his or her decisions to Parliament. (European Parliament 2005, 5–6)

Again, at the end of the conflict, the EP had succeeded in obtaining once more an even broader right to investiture. The right to control the Commission, as well as individual Commissioners, had been strengthened in comparison to the 2001 IIA. The same goes for the right to scrutinise the Commission and its actions by the parliament. The terms quoted above have been retained in the most recent IIA, concluded in 2010 (European Union 2010).

Summary of the findings of the exemplary study and added value of the approach

The cases underline that and how MEPs managed to enlarge their right to Commission investiture and scrutiny via conceptual politics, first practising a broad interpretation of the concept of parliamentarism and its dimension of the right to investiture, and then fixing the changed practices in legal documents. The examples sketched also underline a number of the benefits of analysing conceptual politics in the EU:

1. A concept such as parliamentarism has different dimensions and historical layers of meaning that can be activated and subject to changes. The above shows how the EP’s right to investiture was interpreted and fixed in conceptual politics. An analysis that shifts the focus on the ways and means of practising a concept (here: parliamentarism) and its dimensions (here: the parliamentary right to investiture and scrutiny) opens up a detail perspective on how different dimensions of a concept and its established meanings and practices have been shaped.

2. The taxonomy is a useful tool. In successful conceptual politics that followed Koselleck’s type 2, MEPs changed the political and institutional practices of the right to investiture and thus practically changed it before its formal, i.e. the legal change.

As said above, the example just discussed is one of short-term conceptual change and rhetorics-dominated conceptual politics over a time span of seven years. The approach of conceptual politics also allows for long-term analysis of changes of conceptual practices. Gradual changes over time can then be analysed in detail by studying how concepts and their sub-dimensions have been practiced over decades or centuries – for instance by analysing how the practices and formal conditions of the different historical and contemporary dimensions of the concept of parliamentarism by the EP have been changing. This allows to distinguish how the EP gradually broadened the range of dimensions of parliamentarism it formally possessed. Such an analysis allows to depict the power gains in more detail (see in detail Tiilikainen and Wiesner 2016; Wiesner 2019). Other possible cases relate to the other types of the taxonomy, as will be discussed in the conclusion.

(3)

Explaining the how and why of conceptual politics: In the abovementioned cases, an analysis of events via press articles, the interpretation of events by the researcher, and the analysis of the results of conceptual politics as they were laid down in legal texts was combined. Results show how and why MEPs broadened the EP’s right to investiture by practising it and using it as a tool and lever. In both cases, MEPs used what competences they had, i.e. the right to vote upon approval of a new Commission as according to the Treaties. In the second case and in addition they used an instrument that had been created before the first Santer Commission was approved of: the hearings procedure, which had been laid down in the European Parliament’s rules of procedure. Concretely, by practising the elements of the right to investiture the EP already possessed, it obtained a closer scrutiny of the Commission, more detailed responsibility of the Commission towards the EP, as well as a considerable competence to nominate and scrutinise individual Commission members. In consequence, the EP today possesses a broad right to investiture.

While these findings complement the ones in the literature (Hix and Lord 1996; Kietz and Maurer 2007; Moury 2007; Poptcheva 2014), the approach of conceptual politics shifts the focus on (a) the dimensions of the concept of parliamentarism (here: the right to investiture) and the ways they are (b) practiced and (c) legally fixed. It is (d) the how and why of conceptual politics that has been studied, rather than the what in the sense of outcomes (Doty 1993; Wiesner 2022b). All this is an outcome of the interpretative approach that uses the classical historical dimensions of the concept of parliamentarism as a lense. The historical layers of meaning of the concept of parliamentarism, such as the right to investiture as in the case studied, have concrete interpretative and analytical value.

Analysis and results link to various other approaches and findings on parliamentarism as well as the EP and give useful hints to future analyses (see in detail Wiesner 2018b). First, parliaments are arenas of politics and deliberation (Palonen 2016a), and hence should be studied as such (Bächtiger 2014; Geddes and Rhodes 2018; Palonen 2016b; Palonen 2018). Second, the results show that the EP itself has played a major role in obtaining its new powers (European Parliament 2009; Héritier, Moury, and Schoeller 2017; Meissner and Schoeller 2019; Moury 2007; Rittberger 2005; Servent 2011), and that this relates to the EPs political practice of the concept of parliamentarism (Tiilikainen and Wiesner 2016; Wiesner 2019). The EP has a long history of thus practising its role as a parliament. Even in the areas where it had no co-decision competencies, the EP took position, debated and influenced the political process (European Parliament 2009). Third, the EP is not a unitary actor, but consists of different MEPs that not only belong to different political camps, but also take initiative and become politically active—both as individuals and in their existence as a collective body of MEPs. They interact on a day-to-day level in what I suggest to term interinstitutional micro-politics (Wiesner 2018b). These micropolitics take place both within the EP (see Ahrens, in this collection) and with regard to other institutions, such as the Commission and its members.

Conclusion and research outlook

The above, including the example study, has underlined why it is useful to apply the methodological tools and lenses of conceptual politics in the analysis of European integration. In the following, I will elaborate further on the points just mentioned and indicate avenues and other cases for application of the approach of conceptual politics.

First, it is useful to apply this approach to the EU because the EU is not finished, but a polity in the making. This work-in-progress character has been emphasised since the first days of integration theories (see e.g. Schmitter 1969) and is still emphasised in current accounts on the EU (see, e.g. Tömmel 2014), and namely in recent analyses of the EU and its crisis dynamics (Jones, Kelemen, and Meunier 2016; Schlosser 2019). Conceptual history offers a methodology for studying the consequences of the establishment of new political spaces over time, but it never has systematically been applied to the EU. To take into account a long-term perspective on conceptual change helps understanding the historical development of the EU as a polity and the long-term dynamics of current crises. One case in point for analysis are the long-term conceptual controversies of integration that keep reappearing, namely the conflict between a normative, democratic, supranationalist EU and a utilitarian, output-oriented market integration in a balance-of-power setting (Wiesner 2019).

Second, the taxonomy is a useful tool and indicates other research fields. In particular, as said above, European integration was pushed forward by conceptual innovations that offer ample material for studies of conceptual politics: In some cases, new concepts are or were invented on paper first and then enacted and implemented, and hence put into political and institutional practice (e.g. ‘the area of freedom, Security and Justice’, ‘Union Citizenship’, or ‘Gender Mainstreaming’, see the discussion in the paper by Ahrens and Elomäki). Analyses of conceptual politics in these cases refer to Koselleck’s type 3: conceptual change before political change.

In these cases, EU politicians and civil servants aim at forging a new conceptual lexicon for the EU. These attempts mainly come from EU institutions like the Commission, but also from national politicians, both acting as ‘innovating ideologists’ (Skinner 2002c, 148), trying to carry out an expectancy to future developments (Koselleck 1997). Such strategies can be successful sooner or later. One case in point is Union Citizenship: the concept was coined in 1992 along with the drafting of the Maastricht treaty, and it existed at first on paper. What followed was a process of filling this new concept with meaning, a process that was marked by repeated political controversies relating to the concrete practice of Union Citizenship (Wiener 1998; Wiesner 2007, 2018a).

The conceptual innovations also can fail to be put into institutional practice, as was the case of the concept of ‘Constitutional Treaty’, which explicitly gave rise to strong criticism (Wiesner 2014a; 2023). Conceptualised in a deliberative process by a Convention led by former French President Giscard, the Treaty met with protests in a number of member states and was not ratified after the French and the Dutch voters had voted against it. Such conceptual controversies around EU integration mostly relate to apparent conflicts to existing political and social situations and/or dominant interpretations in national political cultures (for instance the French intensively discussed the role of the French concept of services publiques versus the notion of free market economy in the French debate around the Constitutional Treaty in 2005, see Wiesner 2014a, 2023).

Fourth, European integration decisively affects key concepts as analytical and theoretical categories since it brings about changes to the political practices they refer to (see in detail Wiesner 2019, 185–98). These tendencies have been subject to study, albeit not yet with a methodological focus on concepts: Parliaments, citizens, governments and states increasingly become part of a multilevel regime (see, e.g. Papadopoulos 2010; Piattoni 2010): national parliaments lose competencies and develop new institutional working routines, while the European Parliament has gained more and more formal and informal influence. Citizenship has evolved into multi-level citizenship (see, e.g. Besson and Utzinger 2008; Kostakopoulou 2007), spread between the member states and the EU. National governments are becoming part of a multi-level EU regime (see, e.g. Papadopoulos 2010; Piattoni 2010) where governmental institutions have developed on the EU level as well. The EU member states since a long time are not fully sovereign as in the classical concept of state sovereignty (see in detail Peterson 1997). The do not fully control a territory, as the EU also partly regulates access to the territories of their member states, they do not fully control their members, as EU citizenship is an additional level of political membership, and they do not fully control their monopoly of violence, as they are subject to EU rulings. In the developing multi-level EU regime, nation states no longer are the only reference frame for parliamentarism, citizenship or government – even if nation states may still be central, the EU and sometimes sub-national entities have become other reference frames. The conceptual-historical perspective provides the heuristic tools and techniques to classify, structure and analyse these conceptual changes. A case in point would be the governance setting that developed regarding the financial crisis: a whole set of crisis-management institutions and techniques led to undermining key powers of national legislatives (Wiesner 2022a).

All in all, using concepts, their historicity, their different layers of meaning, and their changes as a lense and using the methodological toolbox of conceptual history in an interpretative approach allows detailed analyses of short-term, mid-term and long-term time frames. In Political Science and EU Studies the classical key concepts of representative democracy will be of particular interest (see in detail Wiesner 2019), but the approach is by no means limited to them. Since analyses can cover both long-term time spans and micro-controversies, there is a vast range of possible fields and cases that can be studied by the approach of conceptual politics.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 A comprehensive discussion of all possible neighbouring interpretative approaches is, however, neither the goal of this article, nor is it possible to do this within the scope of this paper.

2 The notion of cluster here refers to the fact that conceptual controversies are not linked to single keywords but build broader clusters of interconnected concepts, which allow variation of emphasis both within and between the clusters. Conceptual clusters are clusters of terms that share a similar meaning and functions.

3 Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung and Süddeutsche Zeitung for the periods in question, i.e. 1998–1999 and 2004–2005. The press articles were only used for recollecing the course of events. A national bias, even if it existed, would thus not have affected the results. Therefore a sample consisting of two national quality newspapers was sufficient.