Signaling theories of religion: models and explanation

References

• Alcorta, C. (2017). Religion, social signaling, and health: A psychoneuroimmunological approach. Religion, Brain & Behavior, 7(3), 243–246. doi: 10.1080/2153599X.2016.1156559
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Alcorta, C. S., & Sosis, R. (2005). Ritual, emotion, and sacred symbols : The evolution of religion as an adaptive complex. Human Nature, 16(4), 323–359. doi: 10.1007/s12110-005-1014-3
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Alexander, R. D. (1987). The biology of moral systems. Hawthorne, NY: A. de Gruyter.
   Google Scholar
• Axelrod, R. M. (1984). The evolution of cooperation. New York: Basic Books.
   Google Scholar
• Ayasse, M., Schiestl, F. P., Paulus, H. F., Ibarra, F., & Francke, W. (2003). Pollinator attraction in a sexually deceptive orchid by means of unconventional chemicals. Proceedings of the Royal Society of London B: Biological Sciences, 270(1514), 517–522. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2002.2271
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bandes, S. A. (2016). Remorse and criminal justice. Emotion Review, 8(1), 14–19. doi: 10.1177/1754073915601222
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Biernaskie, J. M., Perry, J. C., & Grafen, A. (2018). A general model of biological signals, from cues to handicaps. Evolution Letters, 2(3), 201–209. doi: 10.1002/evl3.57
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Birch, J. (2017). The philosophy of social evolution. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bourrat, P. (2015). Origins and evolution of religion from a Darwinian point of view: Synthesis of different theories. In T. Heams, P. Huneman, G. Lecointre, & M. Silberstein (Eds.), Handbook of evolutionary thinking in the sciences (pp. 761–780). Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands.
   Google Scholar
• Bowles, S., & Gintis, H. (2011). A cooperative species: Human reciprocity and its evolution. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Bruner, J. P. (2015). Disclosure and information transfer in signaling games. Philosophy of Science, 82(4), 649–666. doi: 10.1086/683016
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bruner, J. P., Brusse, C., & Kalkman, D. (2017). Cost, expenditure and vulnerability. Biology & Philosophy, 32(3), 357–375. doi: 10.1007/s10539-017-9563-5
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Brusse, C., & Bruner, J. (2017). Responsiveness and Robustness in the David Lewis signaling game. Philosophy of Science, 84(5), 1068–1079. doi: 10.1086/694156
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bulbulia, J. (2004a). Religious costs as adaptations that signal altruistic intention. Evolution and Cognition, 10(1), 19–38.
   Google Scholar
• Bulbulia, J. (2004b). The cognitive and evolutionary psychology of religion. Biology and Philosophy, 19(5), 655–686. doi: 10.1007/s10539-005-5568-6
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bulbulia, J. (2010). Charismatic signalling. Journal for the Study of Religion, Nature and Culture, 3(4). doi: 10.1558/jsrnc.v3i4.518
   Google Scholar
• Bulbulia, J. (2013). Why “costly signalling” models of religion require cognitive psychology. In A. W. Geertz (Ed.), Origins of religion, cognition and culture (pp. 71–81). Durham: Acumen Publishing.
   Google Scholar
• Bulbulia, J., Fraser, G., Watts, J., Shaver, J. H., & Gray, R. (2017). Can honest signaling theory clarify religion’s role in the evolution of social inequality? Religion, Brain & Behavior, 7(4), 285–288. doi: 10.1080/2153599X.2016.1249914
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Bulbulia, J., & Sosis, R. (2011). Signalling theory and the evolution of religious cooperation. Religion, 41(3), 363–388. doi: 10.1080/0048721X.2011.604508
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cronk, L. (1994). Evolutionary theories of morality and the manipulative use of signals. Zygon®, 29(1), 81–101. doi: 10.1111/j.1467-9744.1994.tb00651.x
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Cronk, L. (2005). The application of animal signaling theory to human phenomena: Some thoughts and clarifications. Social Science Information, 44(4), 603–620. doi: 10.1177/0539018405058203
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dawkins, R., & Krebs, J. R. (1978). Animal signals: Information or manipulation? In J. R. Krebs, & N. B. Davies (Eds.), Behavioural ecology: An evolutionary approach (pp. 282–309). Oxford: Blackwell Scientific.
   Google Scholar
• Deem, M. J., & Ramsey, G. (2016). Guilt by association? Philosophical Psychology, 29(4), 570–585. doi: 10.1080/09515089.2015.1126706
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dunbar, R. I. M. (1998). The social brain hypothesis. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, 6(5), 178–190. doi:10.1002/(SICI)1520-6505(1998)6:5<178::AID-EVAN5>3.0.CO;2-8
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Dunbar, R. I. M. (2009). The social brain hypothesis and its implications for social evolution. Annals of Human Biology, 36(5), 562–572. doi: 10.1080/03014460902960289
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Durkheim, E. C. (1912). The elementary forms of the religious life (K. Fields, Trans). New York: Free Press.
   Google Scholar
• Frank, R. H. (1988). Passions within reason: The strategic role of emotions. New York: W W Norton & Co Inc.
   Google Scholar
• Fraser, B. (2011). Costly signalling theories: Beyond the handicap principle. Biology & Philosophy, 27(2), 263–278. doi: 10.1007/s10539-011-9297-8
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Grafen, A. (1990). Biological signals as handicaps. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 144(4), 517–546. doi: 10.1016/S0022-5193(05)80088-8
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Grose, J. (2011). Modelling and the fall and rise of the handicap principle. Biology & Philosophy, 26(5), 677–696. doi: 10.1007/s10539-011-9275-1
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Harrison, V. S. (2006). The pragmatics of defining religion in a multi-cultural world. International Journal for Philosophy of Religion, 59(3), 133–152. doi: 10.1007/s11153-006-6961-z
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hebets, E. A., Barron, A. B., Balakrishnan, C. N., Hauber, M. E., Mason, P. H., & Hoke, K. L. (2016). A systems approach to animal communication. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 283(1826), 20152889. doi: 10.1098/rspb.2015.2889
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hebets, E. A., & Papaj, D. R. (2005). Complex signal function: Developing a framework of testable hypotheses. Behavioral Ecology and Sociobiology, 57(3), 197–214. doi: 10.1007/s00265-004-0865-7
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Henrich, J. (2009). The evolution of costly displays, cooperation and religion. Evolution and Human Behavior, 30(4), 244–260. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2009.03.005
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Hurd, P. L., & Enquist, M. (2005). A strategic taxonomy of biological communication. Animal Behaviour, 70(5), 1155–1170. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2005.02.014
   Google Scholar
• Huttegger, S. M., Bruner, J. P., & Zollman, K. J. S. (2015). The handicap principle is an artifact. Philosophy of Science, 82(5), 997–1009. doi: 10.1086/683435
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Huttegger, S. M., & Zollman, K. J. S. (2013). Methodology in biological game theory. The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, 64(3), 637–658. doi: 10.1093/bjps/axs035
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Iannaccone, L. R. (1992). Sacrifice and stigma: Reducing free-riding in cults, communes, and other collectives. Journal of Political Economy, 100(2), 271–291.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Iannaccone, L. R. (1994). Why strict churches are strong. American Journal of Sociology, 99(5), 1180–1211. doi: 10.1086/230409
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Irons, W. (1996). Morality, religion, and human nature. In W. M. Richardson & W. J. Wildman (Eds.), Religion and science: History, method, and dialogue (pp. 375–399). New York: Routledge.
   Google Scholar
• Irons, W. (2001). Religion as a hard-to-fake sign of commitment. In R. Nesse (Ed.), Evolution and the capacity for commitment (pp. 292–309). New York: Russell Sage Foundation.
   Google Scholar
• Johnstone, R. A. (1997). The evolution of animal signals. In J. R. Krebs, & N. B. Davies (Eds.), Behavioural ecology: An evolutionary approach (pp. 155–178). Oxford: Blackwell.
   Google Scholar
• Jovanovic, B. (1982). Truthful disclosure of information. The Bell Journal of Economics, 13(1), 36. doi: 10.2307/3003428
   Google Scholar
• Kane, P., & Zollman, K. J. S. (2015). An evolutionary comparison of the handicap principle and hybrid equilibrium theories of signaling. Plos One, 10(9), e0137271. doi: 10.1371/journal.pone.0137271
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Kotiaho, J. S. (2001). Costs of sexual traits: A mismatch between theoretical considerations and empirical evidence. Biological Reviews, 76(3), 365–376.
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Krebs, J. R., & Dawkins, R. (1984). Animal signals: Mind-reading and manipulation. In J. R. Krebs & N. B. Davies (Eds.), Behavioural ecology: An evolutionary approach (2nd ed., pp. 380–402). Oxford: Blackwell Scientific.
   Google Scholar
• Lachmann, M., Számadó, S., & Bergstrom, C. T. (2001). Cost and conflict in animal signals and human language. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, 98(23), 13189–13194. doi: 10.1073/pnas.231216498
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Lewis, D. K. (1969). Convention: A philosophical study. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Maynard Smith, J. (1991). Honest signalling: The Philip Sidney game. Animal Behaviour, 42(6), 1034–1035. doi: 10.1016/S0003-3472(05)80161-7
   Google Scholar
• Maynard-Smith, J., & Harper, D. (2003). Animal signals (1st ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Murray, M., & Moore, L. (2009). Costly signaling and the origin of religion. Journal of Cognition and Culture, 9(3), 225–245. doi: 10.1163/156770909X12489459066264
   Google Scholar
• Norenzayan, A. (2013). Big gods: How religion transformed cooperation and conflict (1st ed.). Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Norenzayan, A., Shariff, A. F., Gervais, W. M., Willard, A. K., McNamara, R. A., Slingerland, E., & Henrich, J. (2016). The cultural evolution of prosocial religions. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 39, doi: 10.1017/S0140525X14001356
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• O’Connor, C. (2016). The evolution of guilt: A model-based approach. Philosophy of Science, 83(5), 897–908. doi: 10.1086/687873
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Owren, M. J., Rendall, D., & Ryan, M. J. (2010). Redefining animal signaling: Influence versus information in communication. Biology & Philosophy, 25(5), 755–780. doi: 10.1007/s10539-010-9224-4
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Piff, P. K., Stancato, D. M., Côté, S., Mendoza-Denton, R., & Keltner, D. (2012). Higher social class predicts increased unethical behavior. Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences, 109(11), 4086–4091. doi: 10.1073/pnas.1118373109
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Power, E. A. (2017). Discerning devotion: Testing the signaling theory of religion. Evolution and Human Behavior, 38(1), 82–91. doi: 10.1016/j.evolhumbehav.2016.07.003
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Riley, J. G. (2001). Silver signals: Twenty-five years of screening and signaling. Journal of Economic Literature, 39(2), 432–478. doi: 10.1257/jel.39.2.432
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Rosenstock, S., & O’Connor, C. (2018). When it’s good to feel bad: An evolutionary model of guilt and apology. Frontiers in Robotics and AI, 5. Westport.
   Google Scholar
• Searcy, W. A., & Nowicki, S. (2005). The evolution of animal communication: Reliability and deception in signaling systems. Princeton: Princeton University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Shaver, J. H., & Bulbulia, J. A. (2016). Signaling theory and religion. In J. J. Kripal, & N. K. Clements (Eds.), Religion: Mental religion (pp. 101–117). Farmington Hills: Macmillan Reference USA.
   Google Scholar
• Shaver, J. H., Fraser, G., & Bulbulia, J. A. (2016). Charismatic signaling: How religion stabilizes cooperation and entrenches inequality. In T. K. Shackelford, & J. R. Liddle (Eds.), The Oxford handbook of evolutionary psychology and religion. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Skyrms, B. (2010). Signals: Evolution, learning, & information. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Sosis, R. (2000). Religion and intragroup cooperation: Preliminary results of a comparative analysis of Utopian communities, religion and intragroup cooperation: Preliminary results of a comparative analysis of Utopian communities. Cross-Cultural Research, 34(1), 70–87. doi: 10.1177/106939710003400105
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sosis, R. (2003). Why aren’t we all hutterites? Human Nature, 14(2), 91–127. doi: 10.1007/s12110-003-1000-6
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sosis, R. (2004). The adaptive value of religious ritual: Rituals promote group cohesion by requiring members to engage in behavior that is too costly to fake. American Scientist, 92(2), 166–172.
   Google Scholar
• Sosis, R. (2005). Does religion promote trust?: The role of signaling, reputation, and punishment. Interdisciplinary Journal of Research on Religion, 1, 1–30.
   Google Scholar
• Sosis, R. (2006). Religious behaviors, badges, and bans: Signaling theory and the evolution of religion. In P. McNamara (Ed.), Where god and science meet: How brain and evolutionary studies alter our understanding of religion (Vol. 1, pp. 61–86). Westport, CT: Praeger Publishers.
   Google Scholar
• Sosis, R., & Alcorta, C. (2003). Signaling, solidarity, and the sacred: The evolution of religious behavior. Evolutionary Anthropology: Issues, News, and Reviews, 12(6), 264–274. doi: 10.1002/evan.10120
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sosis, R., & Bressler, E. R. (2003). Cooperation and commune longevity: A test of the costly signaling theory of religion. Cross-Cultural Research, 37(2), 211–239. doi: 10.1177/1069397103037002003
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Spence, M. (1973). Job market signaling. The Quarterly Journal of Economics, 87(3), 355–374.
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Spence, M. (2002). Signaling in retrospect and the informational structure of markets. American Economic Review, 92(3), 434–459. doi: 10.1257/00028280260136200
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Sterelny, K. (2012). The evolved apprentice: How evolution made humans unique. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
   Google Scholar
• Számadó, S. (2011). The cost of honesty and the fallacy of the handicap principle. Animal Behaviour, 81(1), 3–10. doi: 10.1016/j.anbehav.2010.08.022
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Trivers, R. L. (1971). The evolution of reciprocal altruism. The Quarterly Review of Biology, 46(1), 35–57. doi: 10.1086/406755
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Watson-Jones, R. E., & Legare, C. H. (2016). The social functions of group rituals. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 25(1), 42–46. doi: 10.1177/0963721415618486
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• White, C. (2018). What does the cognitive science of religion explain? In H. van Eyghen, R. Peels, & G. van den Brink (Eds.), New developments in the cognitive science of religion: The rationality of religious belief (pp. 35–49). Cham: Springer International Publishing. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-90239-5_3
   Google Scholar
• Whitehouse, H., & Lanman, J. A. (2014). The ties that bind us: Ritual, fusion, and identification. Current Anthropology, 55(6), 674–695. doi: 10.1086/678698
   Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Wilkins, J. S. (2018). Why do believers believe silly things? Costly signaling and the function of denialism. In H. van Eyghen, R. Peels, & G. van den Brink (Eds.), New developments in the cognitive science of religion: The rationality of religious belief (pp. 109–129). Cham: Springer International Publishing. doi: 10.1007/978-3-319-90239-5_7
   Google Scholar
• Xygalatas, D., Mitkidis, P., Fischer, R., Reddish, P., Skewes, J., Geertz, A. W., … Bulbulia, J. (2013). Extreme rituals promote prosociality. Psychological Science, 24(8), 1602–1605. doi: 10.1177/0956797612472910
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zahavi, A. (1975). Mate selection—a selection for a handicap. Journal of Theoretical Biology, 53(1), 205–214. doi: 10.1016/0022-5193(75)90111-3
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar
• Zahavi, A., & Zahavi, A. (1997). The handicap principle: A missing piece of Darwin’s puzzle. New York: Oxford University Press.
   Google Scholar
• Zollman, K. J. S. (2013). Finding alternatives to handicap theory. Biological Theory, 8(2), 127–132. doi: 10.1007/s13752-013-0107-1
   Google Scholar
• Zollman, K. J. S., Bergstrom, C. T., & Huttegger, S. M. (2013). Between cheap and costly signals: The evolution of partially honest communication. Proceedings of the Royal Society B: Biological Sciences, 280(1750), doi: 10.1098/rspb.2012.1878
   PubMed Web of Science ®Google Scholar