Deductivism as an Interpretive Strategy: A Reply to Groarke's Recent Defense of Reconstructive Deductivism

Abstract

Deductivism has been presented variously as an evaluative thesis and as an interpretive one. I argue that deductivism fails as a universal evaluative thesis, and that its value as an interpretive thesis must be supported on other grounds. As a reconstructive strategy, deductivism is justified only on the grounds that an arguer is, or ought to be, aiming at the deductive standard of evidence. As such, the reconstruction of an argument as deductive must be supported by contextual and situational factors including facts about the arguer. Further, the plausibility of deductivism as a normative thesis is not tied to its plausibility as a descriptive or interpretive thesis.

Key words:

• deductivism
• argument reconstruction
• argument evaluation
• standards of evidence
• commitment