Hypnotic Involuntariness and the Automaticity of Everyday Life

Abstract

We present a new theory of hypnotic involuntariness based on an integration and extension of recent social and cognitive theories on the automaticity of mundane, intentional behavior. According to this model, experiences of volition and involuntariness — in and out of hypnosis — are constructions or interpretations made possible by the high degree of automaticity that is a characteristic of all complex behavior, including novel behavior. Suggested nonvolitional behaviors are intentional acts that are triggered automatically by situational cues (suggestions) and cue-related sensations. The triggering of both the behaviors and the sensations are enabled by the formation of a generalized response expectancy, which is a cognitive set to respond appropriately to suggestions. Response expectancies are functionally equivalent to implementation intentions taking the form, “emit response x when situation y is encountered.” The classification of a response set as either an expectancy or an intention and the experience of the response as volitional or nonvolitional depend on interpretations derived from instructional cues and prior beliefs.