Moving beyond Mozert: Toward a democratic theory of education

Abstract

Most liberal political theorists of education argue that it is better to teach students to tolerate diversity, than to protect the potentially illiberal commitments of some members of the political communities. In fact, neither approach is wholly satisfying, yet they remain the focus of much political theorizing about education. This article suggests that this misguided focus is, in part, a consequence of a focus, by liberal political theorists of education, upon the 1987 Mozert v. Hawkins court case. Mozert raised serious questions about the nature of toleration in liberal society, but from an educational standpoint, the Mozert case led political theorists to consider what curricular content is appropriate for liberal political education, rather than on the practices that democratic citizens must cultivate. I turn to Hannah Arendt to offer a critical account of the liberal responses to Mozert and then call for a theory of democratic education that fosters practices of democratic decision-making and has, as its aim, not merely to foster respect for diversity, but to allow future citizens to practice critical engagement with diversity.

Keywords:

• liberalism
• democratic education
• Mozert v. Hawkins
• Arendt

Notes

1. This is the root of Arendt’s critique of school desegregation efforts in the 1950s in the US South. In her controversial essay ‘Reflections on Little Rock’ (1959), Arendt describes a now-famous photograph of a young African-American student in sunglasses walking past a vicious crowd of white American protesters in order to attend her school. Arendt writes: ‘The picture looked to me like a fantastic caricature of progressive education which, by abolishing the authority of adults, implicitly denies their responsibility for the world into which they have borne their children and refuses the duty of guiding them into it. Have we now come to the point where it is the children who are being asked to change or improve the world? And do we intend to have our political battles fought out in the school yards?’ (50).

2. Kenneth Strike warns: ‘We should also remember that court cases focus attention on the most extreme cases and on people whose views may not well represent those of their own group or their own theological traditions. We should not allow the Mozert parents or the Amish to represent all religious conservatives let alone all religious people’ (2004, p. 326). The details of the case shape the theorizing around them (e.g. see Bull, 2008).

3. Coleman makes a similar observation about the influence of the details of the case itself on liberal theorizing on education (1998, p. 755).

4. We already understand Arendt’s rationale about indoctrinating education. Her critique of progressive education rests on three assumptions that, she believes, contribute to the crisis of education: (1) that children are autonomous and should be left to behave autonomously with just a little bit of guidance from adults, (2) that the ‘science of teaching’ has divorced teaching from material, and (3) that contemporary theories of education substitute doing for learning (‘Crisis’ 180–183).

5. Subsequently, some liberals have aimed to provide more content to liberal education. Levinson (1999) has made such efforts. She describes an education that requires students: (1) to know and respect their rights and constitutions, (2) to favor liberal democracy and to understand their obligations as democratic citizens, including ‘develop[ing] democratic habits such as paying attention to public issues, voting, and exercising their rights as citizens,’ (3) to evaluate arguments, and (4) ‘to learn to tolerate and respect other citizens and their differences’ (43–44). Galston also argues that students can learn shared ‘political virtues,’ such as patriotism, independence, and respect for others’ rights (1989, p. 93). These recommendations provide more content to liberal education theory, but each focuses still on curricular content, rather than on practical capacity. Each identifies what information students should have, rather than what practices they should develop. Consequently, neither resolves the problem posed by Mozert and neither proves to be much of a basis for democratic education.

6. Shyman (2011) describes Dewey’s approach to democratic education in similar terms: ‘For Dewey … curricular experiences are not merely intellectual exercises, and schools note merely venues in which they are to occur, but are themselves viable communities in which social duty, critical awareness, and democratic ideals and activity are to be exercised’ (1038).

7. For example, students can engage collectively in thinking, communicating, and acting and argues that each of these activities can be—and often are—undertaken solitarily. What distinguishes democratic education from other kinds of education is that these activities must be practiced collectively (Kessel, 2009).