Toward a Critical-Sentimental Orientation in Human Rights Education

Abstract

This paper addresses one of the challenges in human rights education (HRE) concerning the conceptualization of a pedagogical orientation that avoids both the pitfalls of a purely juridical address and a ‘cheap sentimental’ approach. The paper uses as its point of departure Richard Rorty’s key intervention on human rights discourse and argues that a more critical orientation of Rorty’s proposal on ‘sentimental education’ has important implications for HRE. This orientation is not limited to perspectives such as Rorty’s voyeuristic approach to sentimentality, but rather focuses explicitly on the emotional and political consequences of various manifestations of sentimentality. Such an orientation in HRE will not only encourage learners to become more sympathetic to the living realities of those who suffer, but it will also interrogate the conditions of hearing narratives of suffering so that possibilities for cheap sentimentality are minimized as much as possible.

Keywords:

• sentimentality
• sentimental education
• human rights education

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. Keet coined this term to refer to ‘the almost dogmatic belief that all human rights truths are generated and consummated within human rights instruments such as declarations, conventions and covenants’ (2012, p. 22).