US–China Rivalry and ‘Thucydides’ Trap’: Why this is a misleading account

Introduction (Michael A. Peters)

In Book 2 of The Peloponnesian War, the ancient Greek historian Thucydides describes the Plague of Athens which killed an estimated 75,000 people in 430 BC, the second year of the war. Thucydides is highly regarded as the first ‘scientific’ historian and it is easy to appreciate why given the extensive detail he provides of the plague’s deadly symptoms:

there was no ostensible cause; but people in good health were all of a sudden attacked by violent heats in the head, and redness and inflammation in the eyes, the inward parts, such as the throat or tongue, becoming bloody and emitting an unnatural and fetid breath. These symptoms were followed by sneezing and hoarseness, after which the pain soon reached the chest, and produced a hard cough. When it fixed in the stomach, it upset it; and discharges of bile of every kind named by physicians ensued, accompanied by very great distress. In most cases also an ineffectual retching followed, producing violent spasms, which in some cases ceased soon after, in others much later. Externally the body was not very hot to the touch, nor pale in its appearance, but reddish, livid, and breaking out into small pustules and ulcers. But internally it burned so that the patient could not bear to have on him clothing or linen even of the very lightest description; or indeed to be otherwise than stark naked. (p. 49, Bk 2, without notes) http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0200%3Abook%3D2%3Achapter%3D49

Reading Thucydides’ account of the Plague of Athens, even though he was not present, one can understand the label of ‘scientific history’ and why Thucydides is regarded by some as one the greatest historians of all time, alongside Herodotus. Thucydides’ work and a particular historical interpretation of the Peloponnesian War has become the basis for a framework assessing whether the US and China are destined for war at exactly the time of another great plague, COVID-19 a major global pandemic in 2019–2020. The stakes are very high as President Trump, deflecting responsibility for the ineptitude of his administration in managing the crisis, blames China and talks of cutting all ties with China, while China retaliates by indicating if that happened they would take Taiwan by force.¹ This latest escalation of tensions represents a new low-point in US–China relations and seems to verify the notion of ‘Thucydides Trap’ as a probably outcome for an escalating crisis that in its current form first emerged with Trump’s anti-China election rhetoric.

Graham Allison, a political scientist at John F. Kennedy School of Government coined the term ‘Thucydides Trap’ in his book Destined for War (2017). Writing for The Atlantic Allison (2015), taking his cue from The Peloponnesian War, asks the question ‘The Thucydides Trap: Are the US and China Headed for War?’ suggesting ‘In 12 of 16 past cases in which a rising power has confronted a ruling power, the result has been bloodshed.’² For Allison ‘The defining question about global order for this generation is whether China and the United States can escape Thucydides’ Trap.’ He makes this conclusion after examining the historical record.³ And sets up the debate in the following terms:

If Hollywood were producing a movie about China and the US on a path to war, central casting could find no better American lead than Donald Trump. His insistence on ‘blaming China first’ portends a blockbuster finale. Will Washington and Beijing follow in the tragic footsteps of Britain and Germany a century ago? Or will they find a way to avoid war as effectively as the US did in crafting a Cold War strategy to meet the challenge posed by the Soviet Union?

Allison also demonstrates the deficit of ‘scientific history’ with its political realist assumptions when he suggests ‘war is not inevitable’ (at least in four examples of the 16). The problem with the depiction and the methodology is that Thucydides’ Trap is couched exclusively in Western strategic military terms that shows little sensitivity to how China and the Chinese might frame the question and whether in fact there is any evidence of China’s viewing the future in these exclusive binary terms. This is the first criticism: ‘scientific history’ is a dominant Western historical method that assumes an objectivity in framing the question—without reference to other frames of cultural history or, indeed, accounts of world history. Second: the terms of reference are drawn up in terms of binary logic that assumes one can learn from history in battles between superpowers as a kind of extended scientific hypothesis (rather than thought experiment). The trouble is that history is not an evenly distributed set of events that imitate one another, especially in the age of globalization when new interconnectivities and synergies are clearly not simple linear cases of causation but rather ‘butterfly’ effects of emergent complexity. ‘Events’ are now embedded in dynamic world historical systems where it cannot be assumed that history, even Western history, will assume the same flow, source and direction.

Allison continues to outline his case in the following terms:

What Xi Jinping calls the ‘China Dream’ expresses the deepest aspirations of hundreds of millions of Chinese, who wish to be not only rich but also powerful. At the core of China’s civilizational creed is the belief—or conceit—that China is the center of the universe.

And he concludes:

The rise of a 5,000-year-old civilization with 1.3 billion people is not a problem to be fixed. It is a condition—a chronic condition that will have to be managed over a generation (our italics).

This is the allegedly true description of scientific history that smuggles under cover of ‘scientific history’ a form of history: The rise of China is ‘a condition to be managed’. Allison’s blog and Huff Post articles addresses issues of ‘coronavirus’, ‘opening the economy while protecting the most vulnerable’ and ‘the blame game’. When asked ‘Has the black swan of the coronavirus brought China–US competition to its highest level? How will the pandemic reshape China–US relations?’ Allison responds by employing the interpretive framework of ‘Thucydides’ Trap’:⁴

We have to recognize that this coronavirus threat is layered on top of deep, inescapable structural realities. China is a meteoric rising power that really is threatening to displace the US from positions we have come to believe that are our natural positions at the top of every pecking order. In short, this is a classic Thucydidean rivalry - with all that implies. (including the genuine risk of a catastrophic war neither nation wants)

Allison adds,

To complicate the picture further, each country's successes and failures in its own ‘war’ against this enemy will inescapably become a significant feature in this rivalry. If China succeeds in not just flattening, but bending the curve of new infections toward zero - as they seem to have done - while the US flounders, no amount of rhetoric will be able to disguise this bottom line. The consequences for the overall competition, for judgments about the relative merits of democracy versus autocracy, and for America's standing in the world will be profound.

This is an ominous-sounding and threatening scenario. But can Allison really take aim at Trump’s China beat-up and latest Wuhan Lab conspiracy? Could he mount the same thesis, for instance, actually proceeding from a set of Chinese historical premises? To be fair, as he says, he has spent the last three years examining ways of escaping the trap and the possibility of a full-scale nuclear war. ‘Nuclear war’ is surely only one possible form of war alongside many other possibilities including wars based on trade and technology?

The problem is that ‘world history’ seems to be squeezed into the next five months or so leading up to the forthcoming US elections on Tuesday, 3rd November. Chinese thinking is also governed by this timetable, at least in terms of whether they will be dealing with Trump or Biden in the ongoing phases of the ‘trade wars’ and the COVID-19 conspiracies.

There are arguments both ways in Beijing: Trump and Biden, both are seemingly anti-Chinese, but for different reasons. Trump is anti-Chinese principally because it resonates with his supporters’ ‘anti-communist’ and racial prejudices. He could equally change to being pro-China if there’s political capital in it. Biden’s anti-Chinese is the same as Hilary Clinton’s and the Democratic Party, basically an internationalist human rights violation, freedom and anti-authoritarian, anti-Chinese bias that makes room for trade and development but needs to be fought for in the battle for international institutions and the (old) western alliance.

Why would an episode from an ancient Greek historical period of war between Athens and Sparta have relevance to Sino–US relations today? It there really a kind of invariable logic of history that might be applied in this case or universally? The idea has been debunked by various scholars East and West. Arthur Waldron (2017), for instance, argues there is no Thucydides Trap, observing that the two greatest classicists Donald Kagan and Ernest Badian suggest that no such thing exists as the ‘Thucydides Trap’, at least in the actual Greek text of the great History of the Peloponnesian War.⁵ Here, we consider why such a historical episode is misleading in terms of a series of arguments.

Excising a malignant tumour in US Political Discourse: The Thucydides Trap (Benjamin Green)

To be quite clear, this US election cycle is haunted by the spectre of another racist, xenophobic, nationalist, insular and (perhaps worst of all) internationally disinterested four-year Trump presidential term. In the run-up to the US presidential elections in November (barring a Covid-19-based postponement-cum-despotic executive overreach by Trump), the international community will tune-in to watch the unfolding saga/surrealist carnival that is US politics. Undoubtedly, there will remain a proportion of the international viewing audience (to put it in a Trumpian ratings paradigm) who will be watching and waiting to see how next the US will manage to shoot itself in the foot, with some detractors relishing the idea of watching the much-awaited fall of an empire, the spectacularly self-inflicted end of Pax Americana. While some will rejoice, for many, their complex and mercurial feelings towards a US that, for better or worse, has always been at the forefront of global leadership, will galvanize into a singularly unprecedented emotion—that of pure, unadulterated pity (O’Toole, 2020).

To be certain, future post-mortem analyses will highlight a multitude of mitigating factors which led to the untimely demise of the US democratic system such as, entrenched racism, class warfare, defunding of the education system and the rise of postdigital authoritarian technics of misinformation to name a few. However, standing at this critical juncture in history, a peri-mortem of sorts may yet excise a cancerous tool of nationalistic political discourse—a false narrative which bolsters the foundation of Trump’s brand of post-truth fear-based anti-globalism. While risking the hackneyed overuse of medical analogy, the current stark reality of over 125,000 Covid-19-related deaths in the US seems an appropriate warrant of such ‘grim’ rhetoric. Thus, this argument holds that the US must divest itself from a particularly malignant form of scholarly escapism, one which adheres to an othering that falsely credits globalism for its current state of negligent political turpitude. Specifically, the US must come to terms with its inherent failings, pulling itself up from its bootstraps, rather than China-bashing and sabre-rattling its way into the self-prophetic Thucydides Trap or zero-sum brinksmanship proliferated by hawkish scholars like Graham Allison.

As highlighted by his recent interview with Global Times, where he incredulously frames Covid-19 as yet another flashpoint for US–China aggression—Allison (2020) continues to revel in his role as harbinger of the impending ‘US–China apocalypse’ (Kouskouvelis, 2017; Waldron, 2017). Meanwhile, counter-narratives like Parag Khanna’s (2019) vision of global balanced multi-polarity and peaceful coexistence are overwhelmingly ignored. Moreover, as the US continues to bury its head in the sand, absolving itself of an ever-increasing number of hard-fought global leadership roles, China has eagerly stepped-in to fill the void. Specifically, as the US retreats further into isolationism, Chinese Internationalism has begun to offer up an increasingly feasible alternative to a currently flagging liberal international order (Green, 2020). While this may offer credence to those like Allison who assume that China’s rise is a constant threat to US interests, it must be stated clearly, and unequivocally, that despite the attractively villainous portrayal of the rise of China as a global power, none have threatened US interests more than the US herself. Lastly, in highlighting a form of cock-eyed optimism that remains one of the US’ most endearing qualities, many of us will refrain from calling the time of US demise just yet—hoping that come November, the US will re-emerge, somewhat the worse for wear, but adaptable, wiser and ready to engage openly with a changing international order.

‘Thucydides’ Trap, an ethnocentric misunderstanding of China (Mou Chunxiao)

The history of international relations reflects an ethnocentrism that often exhibits a flawed misunderstanding of China’s cultural context and the ‘Thucydides ’Trap’ fails to represent a significantly useful tool as concerns the depiction of the future trajectory of China US relations. Currently, even Allison is calling for a revisiting of Sino–US relationships, specifically the trope which depicts China and the US as ‘ruthless rivals and intense partners at the same time’ (Allison & Li, 2020). The attainment of a more complete picture of Sino–US relationship requires a more concerted effort on the part of ‘China’ scholars to ‘think outside the box’ of ethnocentric historical analysis. This notion is especially true today, as Covid-19 has highlighted the urgent need for an unprecedented level of global understanding and cooperation.

The ‘Thucydides’ Trap’, as a tool for geopolitical analysis, is deficient because it refers to a history which primarily examines the growth of Western powers. In this context, western history shows that a rising country will inordinately use force to establish or retain its international status. Nevertheless, this premise does not match China’s remarkably different historical traditions. For example, unlike the so-called ‘conflict and confrontation’ style of ‘Western’ thinking, the Chinese philosophical model of ‘Yin and Yang Dialectics’ (Ling & Lv, 2018; Yaqing, 2010) explains why China, both historically and in today’s context, has chosen to ‘rise peacefully’. Actually, the traditional notion of a peaceful rise dates back to the Song Dynasty (AD 960–AD 1279):

Historically, stress on military preparedness had once dominated political thought from the Qin Dynasty (221B.C.-207B.C.) on. However, a marked shift occurred in the Song Dynasty when its dominant ideology was ‘exalting the civil at the expense of the military’. Since then, the strategy aimed at stopping war and resolving border conflicts through peace talks is the main stream of diplomatic philosophy (Feng, 2009).

Within ethnocentric historical perspectives, historians, politicians, diplomats and stakeholders in education systems tend to omit what they feel is irrelevant or simply uninteresting. However, it does not mean that far-flung histories—which bear little resemblance to their given socio-cultural frame of reference, do not exist. Thus, ‘Thucydides’ Trap’ stands as a Eurocentric, and therefore, impractical analytical tool, which does little towards providing a meaningful examination of China’s tradition of peaceful diplomacy.

Can China rise peacefully? The question is an alluring one, not easily answered via a Western historical lens. Notwithstanding, in terms of diplomatic theory, philosophical tenets, and observable actions, China has throughout history proved itself to be a lover of peace. By contrast, continued provocations by the US are making the question a problem. Donald Kagan (1969) and Kouskouvelis (2017) argued that the only real trap people could deal with was wrong decision making. They are not alone in this conclusion. Sima Qian (145 BC–86 BC), a Chinese historian considered the father of Chinese historiography for his Records of the Grand Historian, remarked that ‘six kingdoms decided to bribe Qin with their land, which was ‘like fighting fire with woods’. Only when the woods were burnt out, would the fire go out’. It was six kingdoms’ wrong decision that weakened themselves. Obviously, the same conclusion that people could avoid wrong decisions to save themselves was drawn by scholars from both West and East for the enlightenment of future generations. However, in the battle against Covid-19, despite China’s appeals for cooperation, president Trump’s insistence on calling the pathogen the ‘Chinese virus’ while ‘ducking responsibility’ for his administration’s failures (Allison & Li, 2020) are clearly bad decisions. Specifically, these actions can neither contribute to tackling the world-wide epidemic nor the building of Sino–US peace. If the US’ next president also holds a perspective based on ethnocentrism and refuses to cooperate with others, there is a possibility that he would fall into the trap of wrong-headed decision-making again, being his own worst enemy.

Two dreams and the Thucydides Trap (Stephanie Hollings)

While differing in their respective approaches, China and the US clearly share a propensity for nationalistic rhetoric. The US has created and propagated the religious and social political ideology of ‘moral exceptionalism’ (Lipset, 1997), envisioning themselves as a force for global good (Kristol & Kagan, 2000),whilst adhering to a moralist framework which guides their progressive international policies. Meanwhile, China, paralleling the globalism of the US during the twentieth century, as evidenced by the Belt and Road Initiative (BRI), is aiming to establish a truly global ‘community of common destiny’ (CCD) (Jiang & Shi, 2019). In order to understand the rhetorical foundations of these two discrete forms of state-centric global engagement, one needs look no further than their respective ‘dream’ narratives. The ‘American Dream’ is based off of the constant pursuit of upward mobility, and the belief that with hard work, anyone can achieve their own version of success. While the ‘Chinese Dream’ is based off a combination of national rejuvenation, biding adieu to a modern history mired in multiple international humiliations, and a desire to develop themselves into a strong ‘great power’ nation with a harmonious and content population (Peters, 2019; Welch, 2015). So, while Trump is busy ‘making America great again’, Beijing is focused on securing their own peaceful rise and national rejuvenation (Zhang & Pu, 2019).

These two countries are undoubtedly the most influential and powerful in the world, as a result, scholars like Allison will be tempted to position China’s rise as a potential threat to US global hegemony. Specifically, in what he has labelled ‘Thucydides Trap’, Allison utilizes the possibly mistranslated text—‘the growth of the power of Athens, and the alarm which this inspired in Sparta, made war inevitable’ (Thucydides, 1998), to create a parallel between contemporary US–China relations. In his Thucydides Trap analogy the US seems to be playing the part of Sparta, while China portrays a modern-day Athens. However, can China really be seen as a growingly imperialistic Greek city state, aspiring to achieve global hegemony? Moreover, is realism the appropriate lens in which to perceive China’s current rise, or is another lens more appropriate. Specifically, might cosmopolitanism—which also has a legacy dating back to Ancient Greece (Zhang & Pu, 2019), be more appropriate?

Returning to the idea of national rhetoric, Chinese’s narratives seem to encapsulate the very essence of cosmopolitanism. Case in point, the BRI has been promoted as a fresh style of international relations, one that is focused on cooperation, conversation, partnership and creating win–win situations (Mastro, 2019). The globalist narrative of the CCD is the epitome of cosmopolitanism, highlighting the need to see oneself as a transnational rather than national citizen. The CCD is about creating a multipolar world, not the perpetuation of a US–China dichotomy stuck within a bipolar system.

The US must recognize that to ‘make America great again’ requires providing opportunities to everyday American citizens that will allow them to secure their own slice of the American Dream, as well as an understanding that a return to ‘greatness’ will not stem from a zero-sum attempt to disallow China’s attainment of their respective Chinese Dream. For the Thucydides Trap between the US and China to occur, at least one of those countries, most likely the US, would have to see a war as within their mutual interest and that the goals of both countries are incompatible. Are they though? Are they not tied together through economic interdependence, the promotion of globalization, the pursuit of transnational global citizenship, and the eventual attainment of global peace (Mastro, 2019)? Can America be a force for good in the world without cooperating with China as they strive for a CCD? Thus, the USA must come to see themselves, not as excluded, but rather as an important actor within the CCD. This cosmopolitan repositioning, in its renewed globalist stance, would not only allow for the flourishing of American or Chinese dreams, it would also signify a long-awaited US commitment to securing the bourgeoning national dreams of many developing countries as well. If America can embrace cosmopolitanism, realizing that their dream is intertwined—rather than at odds with the rest of the world, the Greek tragedy cum Sino–US war alluded to in Allison’s Thucydides Trap will constitute nothing more than the vestigial hawkish rhetoric of a bygone age.

The Thucydides Trap, Sino–US Relations and prognosis of the eventuality of historical fallacious analogy (Moses Oladele Ogunniran)

Objectivity was once touted as the most significant hallmark of the professional historian. However, Graham Ward (2000) argues, history can only be made meaningful through the historian’s subjective interpretation, rendering the attainment of objective historical fact an altogether impossible task. Moreover, it has become quite clear that political interest and involvement can never truly be detached from historical perspective (Snell, 2015). This understanding then presents as an ethical dilemma for historians charged with uncovering and presenting an adequate depiction of the past, one which suffers from neither a myopic essentialism nor a fractious subjectivism. Turning now towards the historian Thucydides, in setting out to accurately depict the great war between Athens and Sparta, we need a resulting theory of conflict whose analysis not only helps to clarify events of the war but also highlights fundamental truths about human conflict which still resonate today (Murray, 2013).

However, American Scholar Graham Allison (2012) neologized the term ‘Thucydides Trap’—an analogy to describe the potential trends of Sino–US relations. This analogy was later amplified in his book titled, Destined for War: Can America and China Escape Thucydides’ Trap (Allison, 2017). Within, Allison develops, more fully the assertion that ‘when a rising power threatens to displace a ruling power alarm bells should sound ‘extreme danger ahead’—generally bad things happen’ (Kouskouvelis, 2017). Since then, the concept has been often used in the interpretation of Sino–US relations in the twenty-first century and has triggered much discussion within various social circles (Ling & Lv, 2018). This being one of the reasons for the continued use of ‘Thucydides’ Trap’ as an unnecessary comparison which promotes the existence of a US–China rivalry.

While, as Kouskouvelis (2017) argues, it is difficult to falsify or argue against anyone’s predictions or future projections, the historic analogy used by Allison clearly misses the historical mark on several counts. Firstly, as mentioned above, it has been clearly established that ‘there is no such thing in Thucydides’ text as a trap determining outcomes. If there is a trap, this is related to wrong decision making’ (Kouskouvelis, 2017). Hence, as has clearly been noted by Princeton scholar Katherine Kjellström Elgin (2019), the Thucydides Trap, as an analogy for US–China relations, is a fallacious misdiagnosis of both historical and contemporary geopolitical contexts. This misunderstanding is made clearer by Kouskouvelis (2017):

Therefore, the analogy between Athens-Sparta and U.S.-China made by Allison is wrong. China is not Athens and the U.S. is not Sparta. If one wants to find historic analogies of hegemonic contenders in Ancient Greece, they should consult the history of the fourth century BCE: first, the rise of Thebes against Sparta, and, then, the rise of Macedonia against Thebes and Athens… China is a rising and revisionist power, trying to position itself in the international system. But then, if one searched for a theoretical basis to examine and analyze the ruling/rising power contest and the possible risks of war, there is no need to use Thucydides.

This view is also supported by numerous career diplomats and scholars such as Henry Kissinger (2011) who asserts that there is no ‘Thucydides Trap’ between China and the United States unless people make it a ‘self-fulfilled prophesy’. Before the outbreak of the global pandemic (COVID-19), both President Xi and President Trump had reaffirmed cooperation between the two countries, vowing to work together on the economy, military affairs, and people-to-people exchanges, aiming to create a platform for the effective management of differences (Meng, 2017; Xi, 2015; Xi & Trump, 2017). Notwithstanding, contentious geopolitical issues continue to provide rationale for the unnecessary use of ‘Thucydides’ Trap’ and its connotative vision of a US–China Rivalry. Specifically, factors like cultural differences, cyber-attacks, economic competition, the South China Sea disputes, the Korean Peninsula crises, the Taiwan issue, and the COVID-19 (with related conspiracy theories emanating from the West) present enormous challenges to the of future Sino–US relations. These issues notwithstanding, any eventual war will be a result of poor decision making, the mismanagement of differences, and a continued form of zero-sum competition between the two countries. Thus, if China and the US manage to steer clear of these wholly avoidable premises, they will undoubtedly highlight the Thucydidean understanding that wars result from the wrong-headed actions of political and military leaders, rather than from any preordained historical precedent.

Postscript

In confronting the historicity of Allison’s ‘Thucydides Trap’, the contributors have touched upon the limitations inherent to historicist analytical frameworks which utilize essentialist Western truths to address infinitely more complex global geopolitical issues. In particular, this experiment in collective intelligence has identified how Allison’s ‘scientific history’ approach to contemporary US–China relations, perpetuates an ethnocentric, antagonistic political narrative rooted in both a flawed misreading of Thucydides’ text, as well as a critical misunderstanding of China’s continued desire for a peaceful rise. Moreover, within this compositional space, the authors have provided clear paths towards redressing a pervasive nationalism within contemporary US–China discourse, challenging the insularity of an economy of knowledge which has allowed Allison’s Thucydides Trap to hold such unwarranted theoretical-philosophical sway. Among these paths are references to cosmopolitanism, and the need for an increasingly subjective understanding of modernity, one which allows for the American and Chinese Dreams to cohabitate within multiple and overlapping realities/dreams of the future. Thusly, the authors reject the predominant notion that the interests, aspirations, and strategic aims of the US and China are inherently at odds with one another. Rather, in seeking to dismantle the nationalist, anti-globalist discourse embedded within Allison’s ethno-political (anti-China) apocalyptic narrative, the authors make a call for a politically engaged form of scholarship which incorporates a more dynamic understanding of our increasingly relational multipolar geopolitical landscape.

The Unlikelihood of the Thucydides Trap

Fazal Rizvi, The University of Melbourne (Open Review)

Over the past six months, tensions between the United States and China have grown markedly, leading many to wonder if a war between the two powers is inevitable. This speculation has generated a sense of anxiety not only in China and United States but also in many other parts of the world. Within this context of uncertainty, an examination of historical precedents is perfectly understandable, as indeed is an exploration of various theoretical accounts of the causes of war. And hence the importance of a critical examination of Graham Allison’s warnings and the emerging Sino–US relations based on his analysis of the Thucydides Trap. According to Allison, a major confrontation between US and China cannot be ruled out, as both Xi Jinping and Donald Trump promise to make their countries ‘great again’.

Each of Green, Chunxiao Mou, Hollings and Ogunniran does not deny this possibility, but converge in their view that the idea of the ‘Thucydides Trap’ is at best misleading, if not historically flawed. Hot-headed decisions and miscalculations can of course always give rise to a war, but as Green points out, China is unlikely to pursue the so-called ‘conflict and confrontation’ style of ‘Western’ thinking, since is leaders are much more cautious and strategic in accomplishing its international relations. And as Hollings argues, for the Thucydides Trap to occur, at least one of these countries would have to see a war as being the only option in exercising its international power or in managing domestic political tensions.

Under the current circumstances, the United States is more likely to view war as a feasible option than China, which has adopted a much more pragmatic route to recover its national prestige, in an effort to develop into a strong ‘great power’ with a harmonious and content domestic population. China's approach involves a less bellicose form of diplomacy for securing its rise and national rejuvenation than America under Trump in particular. China also appears to show a greater awareness of the fact that the interests, aspirations, and strategic aims of the US and China are not inherently at odds with one another. There is no talk in China of 'decoupling', since its and the US economies are now inextricably intertwined. Accordingly in a war the prospect of neither country coming on top appears fated.

Globalisation has clearly transformed the world of inter-state relations. The states are no longer discrete containers of power, but are shaped by their relations with others. The idea of the Thucydides Trap is based instead on the assumptions of a world system that arguably no longer exists. In a highly networked global order, moreover, states are not the only entities that have a say, the interests of the globally powerful large corporations cannot be overlooked. They have the capacity to steer states away from decisions that undermine their commercial interests in maintaining the global supply chains that have now become central to global capitalism. And, although, in recent years, the regional and inter-governmental organisations have lost some of their power, they still have the ability to influence the dynamics of national decision making.

As the authors in this collection note, Allison’s analysis of the ‘Thucydides Trap’ is clearly based on a Euro-centric way of thinking about international relations, which rests on an ethnocentric, antagonistic political narrative rooted in a mistaken understanding of China’s historical traditions and its current political interests. Furthermore it needs to be noted that for more than a century, the United States has fought wars in consort with its key allies. In a globally interconnected, The US may not find it easy to persuade these allies to engage in a war that might undermine their own self-interests in maintaining good trade links with China. Nor indeed can China afford to fight on a number of fronts simultaneously, from China–India border to the South China Sea. This new set of global conditions makes an analogy with the Thucydides Trap largely unhelpful.

China–US relations: Apologies to Thucydides

Sharon Rider, Uppsala University (Open Review)

One might consider the Thucydides Trap in light of Marshall Sahlins’ brilliant analysis in The Western Illusion of Human Nature, where he argues that equality or equilibrium (isonomia), on the one hand, and hierarchical structure, on the other, have been seen since antiquity as metaphysically and politically the only way of dealing with ‘nature’, human or cosmic origins, understood as the ever-present threat of chaos and anarchy. Sahlins cites, inter alia, John Adam’s hope that the counterbalancing of interests, passions and powers will stave off the perpetual threat of violent conflict, rage and excess such as was exhibited in the Peloponnesian War, most especially the stasis of Corcyra. Importantly, Sahlins emphasizes the role of ‘paradiastole’, the tendency of descriptive terms to carry normative claims when used in certain contexts. For the oligarchs, for instance, ‘democracy’ was a term designating mob rule. Similarly, one could use the term ‘manliness’ to describe lack of moderation, or ‘cowardice’ for what others would regard as prudent hesitation, and so on. Now Sahlins’ main point in the Tanner Lecture at the University of Michigan on 4 November 2005, which was the basis for the book, was that this ‘natural’ state of egoism, cupidity, covetousness, brutality, and strife is and has always been white mythology, a specifically Western cultural product through and through.

But reflecting on the idea that equality and hierarchy or, politically speaking, popular and monarchical sovereignty, as forms of cultural order, are the only way to achieve collective peace and therewith longevity, prosperity and virtue for a people, we might better understand the problem with the developing confrontation with China. The Athenian ‘democracy’ and the Spartan ‘oligarchy’, as Sahlins notes, first appeared as ideological causes (ideas to fight and die for) in conjunction with Thucydides’ description of their respective interventions in the stasis at Corcyra. So, following the remarks about language above, one could say that isonomia, or democratic equality (equality before the law) represented by Athens, functioned as a war slogan for what was essentially an imperialist escapade (which isn’t to say that the precept wasn’t genuinely embraced by the Athenians).

The Chinese ideal of organic kinship expressed in a thoroughly socialised individual and manifest in the sovereignty of the state and its leaders, even within a capitalist scheme, is conceptually difficult given the Hobbesian assumptions undergirding most political thinking in the West. While Confucianism mirrors European philosophy in having schools bickering over the extent to which human beings are at bottom good or at least capable of being good or just fundamentally base, the idea that human nature is thoroughly and irrevocably depraved and corrupt and as such something that can only be harnessed by poising irrational desires and selfish interests against similarly irrational desires and other selfish interests such that fear and envy of one another yields stability seems to be a fixture ingrained in specifically European thought, for which the idea that other advanced societies might think otherwise is almost incomprehensible, without chalking it up to oppression, delusion or coercion. And while this description might serve certain political interests, it may stand in the way of understanding what is actually happening, and what is at stake.

US–China relationships and the War of Words

Rob Tierney, University of Sydney (Open Review)

The collection of commentaries under the umbrella of the title ‘US–China Rivalry and ‘Thucydides’ Trap’: Why this is a misleading account?’ offers a vehicle for the discussion of the trajectory of US–China relationships. Befittingly, the discussion offers the commentators something akin to a ‘Trojan horse’ that enters the world (the thesis and arguments) of Graham Allison (2017) in his book Destined for war: Can America and China escape and in Allison and Li (2020) War against Coronavirus: China is Foe or Friend?.

Allison’s argument is that the current conditions befit the circumstances dating back to classical Greek times when a pandemic preceded the inevitability of war between two superpowers equivalent to the US and China. In the current article, the commentators share their disagreements with the thesis of Allison and in so doing engage in far ranging considerations of the form and character of US–China relationships along with matters pertaining to the nature and role of science of global matters within and across countries and across time. The commentaries make visible how ideologies act as filters that may override a thoughtful and compassionate regard of developments and how all narratives represent distortions and oversimplifications when a fuller range of perspectives and certain complexities involving interconnectivities, noncausal linkages and nonlinearities. The commentators unmask the problems with applying this classic Greek tale. Indeed, they present circumstances that argue for situating China and the US relations as being subject to change across time, space, events and the players (i.e. political leaders and the broader public). The commentaries refute the narrative of selected political and historical projections as the ongoing construction of others by others. They suggest an ignorance and dismissal of the marked differences in the ambitions, values and positioning of China and the US. It is notable that the commenters do so timidly as they appear to struggle to reconcile their own worldly filters. The commentators discount revelations that might count as cultural certainty without the shared lived cultural underpinnings of others.

In a search for understanding the gravity of and possible traction of war or peace or alternatively coordinated efforts or competition, negotiation and positioning, they discuss the US–China relationships across moments in time. They struggle with the range of global considerations with local and global dimensions—e.g. the pandemic, defence alliances, religious freedom, authoritarianism. What they reference is the need to disaggregate the views of the US and Chinese public and politicians over time including the ways they interface with national concerns such as elections, internal governance matters, global alliance makings or deep-seated fears that exist or may be provoked in terms of each countries global ambitions and views of society emerging especially when attacks of one another appear to rally support among large numbers of the US electorate.

Despite the initial premise of the likelihood of war between the US and a rising China, the commentaries are educative in terms of bringing to the fore the interdependent nature of developments in each country as well as the nature of core values that supersede ethnocentrism and many of the perceived differences that could cultivate the conditions that lead to aggression whether they be militaristic, economic, knowledge-based or digital infrastructure. The commentators recognize the current circumstances—the allusion of an attack with a war of words accentuated by President Donald Trump as he vies for the support of an electoral base polled as having predominately negative views of China. In the case of the US, President Trump’s selective attacks on China seem to have a better fit with swaying followers at his rallies than global diplomacy between world powers. Unfortunately, they suggest the US approach is out of sync with the global reality of interdependency. They suggest that the US is giving weight to views aligned with denominationalism, protectionism and nationalism versus ecumenism, eclecticism and multilateralism. The commentators recognize that Allison is not alone in his views. Indeed, echoing Allison’s thesis, two journalists for the New York Times argue that US and China relations seem in a ‘free fall’. As the journalists noted:

Now, lines are being drawn and relations are in free fall, laying the foundation for a confrontation that will have many of the characteristics of the Cold War — and the dangers. As the two superpowers clash over technology, territory and clout, they face the same risk of small disputes escalating into military conflict…. The relationship is increasingly imbued with deep distrust and animosity, as well as the fraught tensions that come with two powers jockeying for primacy. (Meyers & Mozur, 2020)

The journalists offer a more sanguine view suggesting that the US election coupled with the Covid-19 pandemic are catalysts that have spurred more a war of sorts. They quote Zhao Kejin, a professor of international relations at Tsinghua University, who wrote in a recent paper. It is not difficult to see that under the impact of the coronavirus in this US election year various powers in the US are focused on China…The China–US relationship faces the most serious moment since the establishment of diplomatic relations…. The new reality is China–US relations are not entering ‘a new Cold War’ but sliding into a ‘soft war’.

The statements by Chinese officials suggest that the Chinese leadership are more intent on fending off attacks by counters (often equivalent to ‘tit for tat’). More significantly, China seems focused primarily on building alliances and enlisting the support of global agencies in ways that might thwart US attacks on China. While they might offer counters to US attacks, they seem to view the US rhetoric as banter tied to US competitive ambitions amidst the dire circumstances of the pandemic concerns of dwindling support going into an election. Accordingly, based upon Chinese press releases, it is conjectured that China holds a long view and the pursuit of global revelations that are multi-perspectival respecting diversity, reciprocity and reflexivity (Cao, 2019). Chinese espoused interests are touted as being aligned with the pursuit of dialogue based upon respect and recognition and pursuit of peaceful coexistence not confrontation. As President Xi suggested in his keynote at the Asia Pacific Economic Cooperation Summit in Papua New Guinea in 2018, China would prefer a global world view that whereby countries exist ‘intertwined’ as ‘links in global chain of cooperation: increasingly we are becoming one and the same community with shared interests and a shared future’ (Xi, 2018). I would surmise that Chinese leadership is adroit in its responses as it stays committed to how China might capitalize upon and pursue the circumstances that align with the world that modern China imagines.

Michael A. Peters
Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University, PR China
[email protected] http://orcid.org/0000-0002-1482-2975

Benjamin Green
Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University, PR China
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7810-908X

Chunxiao Mou
Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University, PR China

Stephanie Hollings
Faculty of Education, Beijing Normal University, PR China

Moses Oladele Ogunniran
Mahatma Ghandi Institute of Education for Peace and Sustainable Development, UNESCO
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-9615-2775

Fazal Rizvi
Global Studies of Education, University of Melbourne, Australia
http://orcid.org/0000-0002-0769-7635

Sharon Rider
Philosophy Department, Uppsala University, Sweden
http://orcid.org/0000-0001-7820-5098

Robert J. Tierney
School of Education and Social Work, University of Sydney, Australia

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.

Notes

1 https://www.ft.com/content/cfbba6bf-3de5-458d-92d1-a62fb958a354

2 https://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2015/09/united-states-china-war-thucydides-trap/406756/

3 https://www.belfercenter.org/thucydides-trap/overview-thucydides-trap

4 https://www.globaltimes.cn/content/1184964.shtml

5 https://supchina.com/2017/06/12/no-thucydides-trap/