Zhuangzi and perspectival humility

Abstract

I propose and argue for an account of humility in Zhuangzi, which I call perspectival humility. In the opening of the article, I will present a view of humility found in pre-Qin Confucian texts; then, I will explain the idea of Zhuangist humility, which provides a contrast to Confucian humility. Zhuang Zhou does not think that any ideas of right and wrong can be absolutely correct. People must see that their beliefs may not be absolutely correct, and should always consider alternative perspectives. Those who recognise the limitations of their perspective are led to perspectival humility. Moreover, perspectival humility encourages people to learn extensively and to harmonise the differences between other perspectives. The Zhuangist approach takes various perspectives into account and is an inclusive notion of humility that prompts people to appreciate different ways of life, engages in harmonious social relationships, and preserves cultural diversity.

Keywords:

• Chinese philosophy
• humility
• perspectives
• Zhuangzi

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1 For convenience, the italicised ‘Zhuangzi’ refers to the book and ‘Zhuang Zhou’ refers to the author of Zhuangzi.

2 All citations from Zhuangzi refer to Watson’s The Complete Works of Zhuangzi (Zhuangzi, 2013). They are in the form of chapter/page number, so 2/8 refers to chapter 2, page 8.

3 A reviewer of this article would like to know whether Zhuangzi’s openness to perspectives relates to honesty instead of humility. This question highlights the resemblance between perspectival humility and honesty. My response to this question is that perspectival humility differs from honesty in one pivotal aspect: deflation of one’s perspective. This component is not connected with telling the truth. Rather, it encourages people to be humble about the correctness of their perspective. While honesty requires people not to distort the fact, perspectival humility motivates people to attenuate the importance of their perspectives (see Shun, 2021; Wilson, 2018). This component distinguishes between two concepts.

4 All translations of the Analects are from Lau’s Confucius: The Analects (Confucius, 1992); all translations of the Xunzi are from and Hutton’s Xunzi: The Complete Text (Xunzi, 2014). The format of the former is chapter/section, the latter is chapter/line number.

5 This shi 失 (lost) differs from another shi 實 (having something) in the previous paragraph, although their pronunciation is similar in Mandarin.

6 Cf. Nietzsche: ‘There is only a perspectival seeing, only a perspectival “knowing”; the more affects we are able to put into words about a thing, the more eyes, various eyes we are able to use for the same thing, the more complete will be our “concept” of the thing, our “objectivity”’ (Nietzsche, 2006, p. 87). Moreover, a similar but different name of perspective is ‘stance.’ For the detail, see Ma and van Brakel (2019, pp. 219–234).

7 Two of these arguments concern the infinite regress of justification and the wholeness of the world as the Dao. These arguments belong to theories of knowledge and metaphysic, so I do not address them here. For a discussion of these arguments, see Fraser (2009, pp. 446–453) and Liu (2020, pp. 189–193).

8 Someone might argue that aesthetic judgements might be inadequate to show the incompatibility of conflicting truths since they are by nature different (e.g. Kant, 2000, p. 7). Zhuangists can have two responses. The first response is contextual. In the pre-Qin period, both Mohists and Confucians proposed to establish a set of uniform standards to guide human judgements and conduct, including morality and aesthetics (see Fraser, 2016, chapter 2). Therefore, Zhuang Zhou presents a criticism against this proposal (e.g. Zhuangzi 2/10, 11/77). Second, Zhuang Zhou uses the conflicting aesthetic judgements as a therapeutic device to stimulate people to think more about the relevant topic (e.g. the incompatibility of values in general) (Wong, 2005, pp. 99). He aims at leading people to understand that ‘the rules of benevolence and righteousness and the paths of right and wrong all are hopelessly snarled and jumbled’ (Zhuangzi 2/15). Aesthetics, morality and even perspective are the products of habituation, and hence should not be regarded as absolutely correct (see also Fraser, 2009, pp. 450–451). Therefore, the aesthetic judgements in Zhuangzi are a valuable tool to encourage reflections on the incompatibility of values in general.

9 Some readers infer that the Zhuangzi only provides arguments for relativism and not for humility. Some contemporary critics, such as Hansen (2010), and Kjellberg and Ivanhoe (1996), characterise the arguments of the Zhuangzi as presenting a relativist stance. For them, the arguments and the fables in the Zhuangzi do not necessarily manifest humility. They regard these arguments and fables as being more focused on criticising Confucianism and Mohism by prompting people to view issues from multiple perspectives or seek spiritual freedom (see Hansen, 2010; Wong, 2006; Yearley, 1996), thus relating more to relativism rather than to humility. I concur with the aforementioned view that the Zhuangzi promotes relativism. Moreover, Zhuang Zhou’s relativism encourages people to cultivate the perspectival thinking and to seek spiritual freedom. However, the arguments and the fables in the Zhuangzi also manifest perspectival humility in two respects. First, I suggested that Zhuangzi’s relativism is a theoretical stance about the status of different shi-fei claims (Fraser, 2009, pp. 448–449). It opens the possibility of plural sets of shi-fei that are simultaneously correct yet mutually exclusive. It can be used to challenge Confucianism and Mohism (Zhuangzi 2/10). Nonetheless, relativism therein does not indicate how people should cope with such diversity even if it enlightens an individual to this plurality (see Baghramian, 2019; Driver, 2001; Hansen, 2010). It only serves as the theoretical basis for Zhuang Zhou’s view. In other words, relativism does not directly provide guidance on how to cultivate the perspectival thinking and the road to spiritual freedom. Therefore, people need a practical virtue to guide their actions when encountering difficulties. According to my reading, perspectival humility is one such practical virtue. In the Zhuangzi, this practical virtue characterises ways of engaging with others by being shan, yi and yishi (Zhuangzi 2/11). Second, promoting the perspectival thinking and spiritual freedom relate to the practice of perspectival humility. To attain those suggested states of mind, Zhuangists need humility. By appreciating of different perspectives can lead people to realise that rival perspectives might be justified in ways that are not initially apparent; therefore, people can learn from them. People then gradually develop the dispositions for viewing issues from multiple perspectives. Furthermore, spiritual freedom can be attained if people know why and how to get rid of unnecessary confrontation between different perspectives. Even if the states of mind are based on relativism, people will need perspectival humility to form the relevant dispositions. In short, the arguments and the fables in the Zhuangzi present both the status of different shi-fei claims (relativism) and the practical way to handle the difficulty (perspectival humility). For Zhuang Zhou, relativism and perspectival humility are the two sides of the same coin and do not mutually exclude each other. His view could be labelled as a combination of both.

10 Some readers might argue that Zhuang Zhou does not employ the story to show how to coexist with people holding different perspectives. Instead, its messages refer to encouraging people to respect personal liberty and prevent one’s interference with another’s spontaneity. Therefore, it would be inappropriate to connect it with the discussion about perspectival humility. In my view, the moral of the story depends on interpretations. My reading of the story does not exclude the importance of respecting the liberty to choose one’s own way of life and avoiding coercive conduct used to alter peoples’ spontaneity. Nevertheless, they are not exhaustive accounts of the underlying meaning of the story. Depending on the context, there is another message that is reflected by the story (Zhuangzi 18/143). As I have discussed on page 18, the marquis aims to keep the seabird with him during the ceremony. Therefore, given the difference, the marquis needs to consider how to attain his goal by finding a fitting way for both. By appreciating the seabird’s yang, one solution is that the marquis can endeavour to maintaining a dual way of life (niaoyang and jiyang) without interrupting each way of that life (Fraser, 2021, p. 251). Doing so would prolong the bird’s stay by pleasing the bird, therefore achieving the goal. As I understand, this message relates to Zhuang Zhou’s view on humility and how to address different perspectives and maintain coexistence with others.

11 Although Zhuangists claim that there is no absolute perspective, they argue that some perspectives show ‘a better understanding of the world’ (Sturgeon, 2015, p. 893). This is the reason for using pluralistic instead of relativistic. For detail, see Sturgeon (2015) and Fraser (2021).

12 A reviewer concerns that the discussion seems to equate differences in values with differences in perspectives. However, I do not propose to establish the equation. As I have argued, perspectives consist of the standards for evaluating choices and making judgements. Values play fundamental roles in setting the standards. Therefore, conflicts in perspectives stem from conflicts in their underlying values (Fraser, 2009, p. 446). They are interrelated but not identical. In the case of female circumcision, the war in perspectives is the product of the disagreement between their underlying values, such as the disagreement between religious and non-religious values (Wong, 2003, pp. 412–413). We can see how the two differences are related but not equated. See also Sturgeon (2015, p. 908).

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Sun Tik Wong

Sun Tik Wong is an MPhil student in Chinese philosophy at the School of Chinese, the University of Hong Kong. He received a master’s degree in philosophy and public policy from the London School of Economics and Political Science. His research interests lie primarily in the areas of pre-Qin and Han Chinese philosophy.