https://orcid.org/0000-0003-4529-2441
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Abstract
Hong Kong, Thailand, and Myanmar experienced waves of pro-democracy movements from 2019–2021. Similar political trajectories and democratic aspirations bound the three territories together under what some called the Milk Tea Alliance. Alongside street protests, pro-democracy citizens in the three territories engaged in politics-driven consumption. The economic strategy turned the market into a resistance site and sustained defiance. In Hong Kong and Thailand, boycotts and buycotts co-existed in the movements with the consumer activism of the former more widespread than for the latter. In Myanmar, anti-military regime citizens primarily adopted the boycott tactic. With a similar objective of politics-driven consumerism, what explains the variations in the adoption of boycotts and buycotts in Hong Kong, Thailand, and Myanmar? Based on in-depth interviews and secondary information from the three territories, this comparative study finds that politics-driven consumerism interacts with political environments. In a closed political system, for instance Myanmar, political consumers can only engage in covert resistance. In hybrid regimes, such as Hong Kong and Thailand, political consumers can leverage both boycotts and buycotts as overt resistance, with the level of political consumer engagement varying according to the availability of alternative political avenues.
Acknowledgements
The author is grateful to the editor-in-chief and anonymous reviewers for their detailed and constructive comments. Thank also to all the interviewees who participated in this research. Special thanks go to Sutthida Malikaew for her assistance in the early stage of the research.
Notes
1 In the Milk Tea Alliance, netizens resonated with the hashtag movement on social media due to their pushback against what they perceived as China’s expansionism in Asia. Soon after the network was formed, netizens also started using the platform to raise international awareness of their domestic political movements and express solidarity with overseas movements. The network includes not only netizens and activists from Hong Kong, Myanmar, Taiwan, and Thailand but also India, the Philippines, and other countries (see Schaffar and Praphakorn Citation2021; Wang and Rauchfleisch n.Citationd.).
2 Examples of tweets with the hashtag #MilkTeaAlliance included: the enforced disappearance of Thai activist, Wanchalearm Satsaksit in June 2020; the arrest of 12 Hong Kong protesters who attempted to flee to Taiwan in August 2020; and the brutal crackdown on anti-coup protesters in Myanmar in 2021 (see Wang and Rauchfleisch n.Citationd.; Schaffar and Praphakorn Citation2021).
3 The Lennon wall, which originated in Prague, is a symbol of peaceful resistance. During the 2019 Hong Kong protests, participants share their opinions and convey solidarity on Lennon walls (see Li and Whitworth Citation2023).
4 A politically closed regime lacks institutions for political competition and tolerance of dissenting opinion that exist in open regimes. Hybrid regimes accommodate democratic and authoritarian elements in governance. For the variety of hybrid regimes, see Diamond (Citation2002).
5 The emergence of the yellow economy in Hong Kong has attracted an expansion of discussion about political consumption for domestic political purposes (see Chan and Pun Citation2020; Poon and Tse Citation2022; Tang and Cheng Citation2022; Lee and Fong Citation2021).
6 Hollander and Einwohner (Citation2004, 544–547) conceptualise different forms of resistance by reference to two dimensions: intent and recognition. Resistance can be intentional or unintentional, as well as observed and unobservable.
7 Thailand had a reasonably competitive parliamentary election in May 2023. However, by early July 2023, the result had yet to be confirmed and no new government was in place.
8 Hong Kong citizens had high levels of confidence in the rule of law in the city before 2019. With ELAB, the public feared that the right to fair trial, including a defendant’s right to access and challenge prosecution evidence, right to legal representation of one’s choice, and right to public hearing, could not be safeguarded if a suspect was extradited to Mainland China. Cases where politicians and political dissidents were prosecuted for commercial crimes or corruption in closed-door trials in China exacerbated these worries (see Chan Citation2019, 434–440).
9 District councillors who won the 2019 district council election assumed office in January 2020. Under a new law passed in the second half of 2021, they were required to swear allegiance to the Hong Kong government. Rumours from the pro-Beijing sources signalled that if district councillors’ oaths of allegiance could be determined as “invalid” by the Secretary of Home Affairs due to their political views, they would be disqualified and would need to return salaries and allowances they had already received (Nikkei Asia, July 13, 2021).
10 Puangchon (Citation2020, Ch. 2) argues that such donations are used at the king’s discretion.
11 Such state-capitalist arrangements were also a feature of Thaksin’s administration (see Veerayooth, Trin, and Bank Citation2021).
12 In the 2019 election, the rules were rigged allowing military-backed parties to form a coalition government. In 2017, the military junta – the National Council for Peace and Order – had also managed the passage of a new constitution that allowed it to appoint 250 senators. The constitution required that the prime minister be selected and approved by senators sitting with the 500 elected members of parliament. A new election was held in May 2023, with the electorate soundly rejecting the military-backed parties. By early July 2023, however, no new government had been appointed, with senators opposed to the popular choice, and Prayuth continuing as caretaker prime minister.
13 In 2016, with Bhumibol’s death, the crown went to the widely distrusted King Vajiralongkorn who, with the support of the Prayuth regime, aggregated considerable power to the monarchy, including direct control of several military and police units. It is reasonable to believe that the country’s authoritarianism reflected a “fear-based royal governance” (Pavin Citation2022, 359).
14 The yellow and blue colour codes that represent the pro-democracy and pro-government camps were first adopted in the 2014 Umbrella Movement.
15 Businesses were labelled as pro-democracy or yellow owing to their explicit political stance or material assistance to the anti-ELAB movement. After the enactment of the NSL, many yellow businesses stayed low-profile to avoid risks. The mobile applications used also hid why they labelled the businesses as yellow. By May 2022, there were over 5,700 yellow businesses (Hong Kong Free Press, June 12, 2022).
16 In July 2020, 47 democrats were charged with conspiracy to commit subversion under the NSL due to their involvement in the unofficial legislative primary election. Most of the defendants, including Jeremy Tam, have been denied bail since their arrest in February 2021 (see Hong Kong Free Press, February 28, 2022). In early February 2023, the trial of these 47 democrats began (Hong Kong Free Press, February 5, 2023).
17 AbouThai’s owner, Mike Lam, was charged under the NSL in the same case as Jeremy Tam. However, Lam was granted bail in early March 2021. In March 2023, AbouThai severed ties with the yellow economy and promised to “contribute to Hong Kong and China in the future” (The Standard, March 23, 2023).
18 The No Salim Shopping List can be found on Twitter (https://twitter.com/nosalimlist).
19 Way Way Nay is a Burmese phrase that can be translated as stay away.