The affective politics of sovereignty: reflecting on the 2010 conflict in Kyrgyzstan

Abstract

This article examines the concept of sovereignty in elite and popular affection during the violent and turbulent events from April to October 2010 in the Kyrgyz Republic. Nationalist leaders promoted Kyrgyz ethnic values and ideals as the center of sovereignty held by some to be under threat. These events exemplify what we describe as the affective politics of sovereignty. We explore how emotion, in particular, serves as an important component of the constitution of sovereignty as both an international and popular institution. We explore how Kyrgyz identity has become intertwined with the sovereignty of Kyrgyzstan and clashes with Western multi-ethnic conceptions and practices.

Keywords:

• affective politics
• sovereignty
• ethnogenesis
• ethnicity
• conflict
• Kyrgyzstan
• Kyrgyz

Acknowledgments

The authors are grateful for comments made on earlier versions of the paper delivered at conferences in Bishkek, Kyrgyzstan, and Uppsala, Sweden. The authors also, thank Elmira Kuchumkulova, Duishon Shamatov, David Trilling, three anonymous reviewers, and others who provided helpful comments and insights during the aforementioned conferences. John Heathershaw's work on this article was supported by a research grant from the Economic and Social Research Council of the United Kingdom (ES/J013056/1).

Notes

1. Throughout this article we use Kyrgyz Republic (the official name of the state) and Kyrgyzstan (the popular name) interchangeably. However, the name of the state has become an object of political dispute with nationalists often favoring Kyrgyz Republic (for its clear denotation of the ethnic character of the state) while many who are hostile to modern political nationalism prefer Kyrgyzstan (sometimes using the Russian ‘Kyrgyzstankii’ to denote the people of the country of all and any ethnicity). Others counter that the suffix –stan has negative connotations of conflict and extremism and therefore seek to defer its popular usage. Normatively and descriptively, we prefer the ambiguity which is present in the interchangeable use of the two names.

2. See Gullette (2010b) for an overview of social challenges that sparked protests that resulted in the ousting of President Bakiev.

3. Uzbeks had played a small role in state administration bodies, but the issues that contributed to their limited involvement are beyond the scope of this paper. For more information, see Liu (2012).

4. There have been three national commissions, an international commission, and two reports by international organizations into the June Events. In mid-January 2011, the Ombudsman Akun (2011) published his account of the events. The National Commission, which was convened by the President, presented its findings later the same month (AKIpress 2011a). Then in May 2011, a parliamentary commission presented its findings. Three reports were prepared by Tokon Mamytov, Ismail Isakov, and Jyldyzkan Joldosheva (AKIpress 2011b). Also in May, the Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (2011) presented its findings on the June events, which was criticized by the Government of Kyrgyzstan (2011). In addition, Human Rights Watch (2010), International Crisis Group (2010) and Freedom House, Memorial Human Rights Center and Norwegian Helsinki Committee (2012) have presented findings on the June events.

5. In its most recent strategy for school curricula until 2020, the Ministry of Education and Science is reducing the number of course hours, which includes reductions in Russian and Uzbek language tuition. The Minister argued that this was necessary to help minority ethnic group schoolchildren to improve their Kyrgyz language skills so that they may enter university and find employment after graduation.

6. Some scholars of the Marxist tradition criticized this simplistic and misleading historical account, arguing that the principle of state sovereignty emerged over a much longer period as an organizing tenet of the capitalist economy. Nevertheless, these scholars agree with the realist position that the principal is frequently violated by the instrumental actions of states (representing bourgeois commercial interests).

7. As Holy (1996, 125) notes, “A historical memory is not something a nation has because it has a history; it is something created through a nation's reminding itself that it has a history.”

8. See Reeves’ (2006) discussion of this. The phrase biz el menen was often used in 2005 and 2010 by business people to demonstrate support for the popular movement in order to avoid attacks on their assets.

9. The Ata Jurt (Fatherland) party under the leadership of the outspoken Kamchybek Tashiev and Akhmet Keldibekov became the largest nationalist party in parliament.

10. Gullette's office was across the street from the main OSCE office in Bishkek, allowing him to observe events.

11. The banners were written in English, Kyrgyz, and Russian. In the order above, these were written: “Politsiia OBSE – eto opasnost’ izvne!,” “Kyrgyzstandy bölüp jaruuga jol berbeybiz!,” The banner referring to Kosovo was written in English.

12. According to AKIpress (2010), a news agency in Kyrgyzstan, there were three youth groups in Bishkek demonstrating: Youth Association “Akshumkar-kut” (“The Blessing of the White Falcon”), Movement of Youth Architects, and the People's Youth Movement “Kyraandar” (“Brave Men”). These may have been the youth wings of some political parties.

13. The Kazakh-domain web address was: http://murl.kz/ahl (accessed 22 July 2010). Murl is a service which shortens web addresses. This web address is no longer active.

14. It is in this context that the slaughter of sheep in April 2011 to rid Parliament of “evil spirits,” or those that seek to destabilize the state, can be understood (Parfitt 2011).