Catching Up? Consolidating Liberal Democracy in Bulgaria and Romania after EU Accession

Abstract

This article investigates the most important determinants of domestic institutional change in combating corruption and reforming the judiciary in Bulgaria and Romania since EU accession in 2007. It explores how EU and domestic incentives trigger domestic institutional change, and how the two interact with one another. It argues that political leaders and parties will only continue and deepen reforms in response to the twin forces of EU and domestic influence. The EU incentives that shape elite choices stem primarily from public monitoring by the European Commission of government performance and the possibility of sanctions by the EU. The domestic incentives centre on winning elections and holding power, with substantial variation explained in part by diverging sources of domestic support.

Acknowledgements

We would like to thank two anonymous referees, Tanja A. Börzel, Tim Haughton and Thomas Risse for their very helpful comments. We also thank Inés Valdez for research assistance, and several officials of the European Commission and the Council for their insights. Our research was supported by a grant from the European Commission to the European Union Center of Excellence at UNC – Chapel Hill.

Notes

1. The reports are available at http://ec.europa.eu/dgs/secretariat_general/cvm/progress_reports_en.htm

2. On Daniel Morar and his star reputation in Brussels, see ‘Beacon of Hope,’ Europeanvoice.com, 11 December 2008.

3. The Diplomat Online, Bucharest, October 2010, available at http://www.thediplomat.ro/articol.php?id=1440

4. Available at http://blogs.ft.com/brusselsblog/2010/12/france-and-germany-vs-bulgaria-and-romania/