Settling it on the multi-level parliamentary field? A fields approach to interparliamentary cooperation in foreign and security policy

Abstract

Interparliamentary cooperation in EU foreign and security policy, once the paradigmatic example of competitive relations between parliamentary levels, has recently evolved towards more cooperative dynamics. This evolution provides an interesting context in which to examine the conditions that facilitate or hinder cooperation in the EU multi-level parliamentary field. This article takes inspiration from Fligstein and McAdam’s sociological theory of fields, arguing that certain field conditions (power, preferences, field environment, and social skill) can influence patterns of cooperation in a parliamentary field. The theoretical argument is assessed using two empirical cases: institutionalised cooperation in the Interparliamentary Conference on foreign policy, security and defence; and policy-specific cooperation during negotiations over the controversial European Defence Fund. The findings indicate that a relative ‘settlement’ of the parliamentary field does not necessarily translate into mutually reinforcing parliamentarism. On the contrary, certain properties in the field continue to impair the quality of democratic oversight in this burgeoning domain.

Keywords:

• Multi-level parliamentary field
• interparliamentary cooperation
• foreign and security policy
• theory of fields
• European Defence Fund

A recent European Parliament report (European Parliament 2020: 8) praised the growing interactions between parliaments in the EU and remarked that, during the COVID-19 crisis, ‘cooperation between the European Parliament and national Parliaments will be more important than ever’. This statement captures the enduring demand for transnational and cross-level contacts among EU legislatures, particularly in domains where European and national responsibilities are closely interwoven, like the COVID-19 Economic Recovery Plan. However, the recent interparliamentary blossoming has also exposed the difficulties and limitations of interparliamentary cooperation, as well as frequent disagreements and competitive dynamics between the European Parliament (EP) and National Parliaments (NPs) (e.g. Cooper 2016; Fromage 2016; Herranz-Surrallés 2014; Ruiz de Garibay 2013; Wouters and Raube 2012).

At the same time, the evolution of interparliamentary relations following the Lisbon Treaty shows that competition is not constant or inevitable. The Interparliamentary Conference for the Common Foreign and Security Policy and the Common Security and Defence Policy (IPC CFSP/CSDP) is particularly noteworthy. Once the paradigmatic example of competitive relations between parliamentary levels, this interparliamentary conference has recently stabilised, leaving behind many tensions that marked its creation in 2012 (see Peters 2019; Raube and Fonck 2018). This evolution contrasts with the Interparliamentary Conference on Stability, Economic Coordination, and Governance (Article 13 conference), where issues including the undefined size and composition of delegations continued to hinder institutionalisation well after its creation in 2013 (Rozenberg 2017: 48); or the long and troublesome process to establish the Joint Parliamentary Scrutiny Group on Europol (JPSG) in 2017 (Kreilinger 2017). This raises the following question: what factors explain the presence or absence of competitive dynamics in a multi-level parliamentary field? Or, alternatively, under what conditions is a parliamentary field more likely to generate closer cooperative relations?

Instead of focusing on the rationales for cooperation offered by individual parliaments or parliamentarians, this article turns to the ‘systemic properties’ of the ‘multi-level parliamentary field’ (Crum and Fossum 2009: 359). It revisits sociological understandings of the concept of ‘field’, identifying structural conditions that may affect the degree of cooperation within a given social space. Building on the ‘theory of fields’ advanced by Fligstein and McAdam (2012), the present study infers four conditions for interparliamentary cooperation/competition in the multi-level parliamentary field: power, preferences, field environment, and social skill.

This article assesses the analytical leverage of these field conditions in the context of interparliamentary cooperation in the CFSP/CSDP; its apparent evolution from a highly unsettled to a relatively settled parliamentary field allows for a within-case comparison to explore the conditions that facilitate cooperation/competition. For a nuanced analysis, this empirical investigation focuses on two dimensions of interparliamentary cooperation: institutionalised cooperation within the IPC CFSP/CSDP; and policy-specific cooperation in relation to the controversial design of the European Defence Fund (EDF). This two-tier analysis aims to de-centre the discussion of interparliamentary cooperation from its formal institutional architecture, and consider also how parliamentarians interact, often informally, in specific policy dossiers.

The study draws on documentary analysis, nine interviews with parliamentarians and parliamentary staff, as well as background talks held as observer at two IPCs CFSP/CSDP (Rome, November 2014 and Vienna, October 2018) and a high-level seminar on ‘The Parliamentary Dimension of CSDP’, organised to prepare for the IPC CFSP/CSDP during the Dutch Presidency of the EU Council (Amsterdam, March 2016). The article concludes by placing these findings within the context of the wider discussion about the role of interparliamentary cooperation in strengthening the EU’s democratic architecture.

Theorising the systemic properties of the multi-level parliamentary field

By framing the debate on parliamentary democracy in Europe as a ‘multi-level parliamentary field’, Crum and Fossum (2009) argued that the role played by parliaments in EU affairs could only be fully appreciated in aggregate terms. Given the dispersed authority that characterises EU policy making, parliamentary democracy must be enacted by multiple parliamentary institutions operating side by side and complementing each other (Crum and Fossum 2013: 11). The concept of ‘field’ thus captures the overall dynamics (interaction, complementarities, and power relations) of these multiple streams of parliamentary activity, which together create a new configuration that exceeds the sum of its parts. In the words of Crum and Fossum (2009: 259), ‘parliamentary relations within the EU have taken on certain systemic properties’ and hence require an ‘integral assessment’. Recent studies have greatly advanced our ability to map interparliamentary relations, understand parliamentarians’ motives for engaging in transnational contacts, and explain the degree of activism in the ways that some parliaments use the scrutiny mechanisms provided by the Treaty of Lisbon (see contributions in Auel and Christiansen 2015; Crum and Fossum 2013; Fasone and Lupo 2016; Jancic 2017). However, few scholars have investigated or theorised how parliamentary fields themselves evolve, what their ‘systemic properties’ are, or how these features condition the overall dynamics of cooperation (or competition).

A good starting point is the theory of fields advanced by Neil Fligstein and Doug McAdam (2012), which combines a Bourdieu-inspired notion of the field as a ‘social order’, in which actors share an understanding of purposes, established hierarchies, and the rules of the game, with (by contrast) a conception of actors as reflexive agents who can think beyond their own narrow interests to secure the cooperation of others. Combining these two elements offers a useful way of conceptualising fields, highlighting their dynamic character. Fields are constantly moving along a continuum that ranges from consensual to unsettled. Following Fligstein and McAdam (2012: 12), the main characteristic of an unsettled field is the absence of consensus on the participants’ relative positions, which leads to a ‘good deal of jockeying for advantage’. Institutional settlement implies a return to order or ‘consensus’ about these positions. Thus, the theory of fields aims to understand how actors contribute to maintaining order or transform it through cooperation and competition.

In the parliamentary domain, the fields’ approach can be used to further conceptualise systemic conditions for institutional (un)settlement, while establishing likely patterns of interparliamentary interaction, on a continuum ranging from cooperation to conflict (see Meissner and Crum 2019) (see Table 1). While interparliamentary cooperation, in the broad sense, can take many forms, the proposed framework focuses on vertical interactions (between NPs and the EP) and ‘triangular’ relations (‘among parliaments across levels’) (Fossum and Rosén 2019: 21), since it is the cross-level dimension that substantiates the idea of a multi-level parliamentary field.

Table 1. Ideal-typical relations between parliamentary field conditions and cooperation patterns.

Type of field	Field conditions				Most-likely cooperation pattern
	Power	Preferences	Field environment	Social skill
Unsettled	Equalising powers perceived as distorting the constitutional order	Vertical cleavages (e.g. EP more pro-integrationist than NPs) in highly sensitive matters	Parliaments focus on increasing their own prerogatives vis-à-vis the executive	Parliamentarians in leadership positions perceived as advancing institutional patriotism	Conflict (actions that challenge or undermine the authority of other parliaments)
Mostly unsettled	Equalising powers mostly perceived as in line with treaty prerogatives	Vertical cleavages, but on less salient topics	Parliaments focus on maintaining their own prerogatives vis-à-vis the executive	MEPs and NPs perceived as belonging to different parliamentary cultures	Low-intensity competition (deliberate avoidance of interaction)
Mostly settled	Consensual distribution of powers, but limited interdependencies	Transnational party cleavages, but limited salience	Parliaments acquiesce to existing executive–legislative (im)balances	Limited initiative/leadership in either the EP or NPs	Low-intensity cooperation (low-key dialogue, co-existence)
Settled	Consensual distribution of powers and strong interdependencies	Transnational party cleavages and high salience	Parliaments concerned with strengthening overall democratic scrutiny in the EU	Entrepreneurship by parliaments/parliamentarians in relevant positions	Co-scrutiny (actions that mutually empower EP/NPs, multi-level alliances)

Source: author’s own work.

The first condition is the distribution of power in the field. Within the concept of a multi-level parliamentary field, the role of power relations is somewhat ambiguous. On the one hand, one distinctive trait of the multi-level parliamentary field approach is the idea that it is neither possible nor desirable to establish a clear hierarchy between parliaments (Crum and Fossum 2009: 261). On the other hand, the authors acknowledge that power relations play a crucial role in field dynamics (Crum and Fossum 2009: 264). Following a ‘Bourdieusian’ tradition, the distribution of power is a key element of the fields approach, the assumption being that competition is more likely to emerge when the relative power between participants tends towards equalisation (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 12) because the ascendant actors will seek recognition of their newly gained roles, while incumbents may try to retain or re-establish the previous order. Translated into the EU parliamentary context, competitive dynamics generally emerge when there is a (perceived) equalisation of powers between parliamentary levels, leading to unclear or overlapping oversight tasks (see Herranz-Surrallés 2014). If this process is perceived as upsetting the constitutional order, the situation may easily devolve into ‘conflict’. However, highly asymmetrical powers (for example, where one parliamentary level has a central role while the other is marginal), even if consensual, may generate few incentives to cooperate, as there is limited interdependence in relation to information, resources, or channels of influence (Groen 2020). For this reason, parliamentary fields are more likely to encourage ‘co-scrutiny’ when there is some degree of resource dependence between parliamentary levels, without this stirring constitutional jealousy. The distribution of power in the EU multi-level parliamentary field can be assessed primarily by examining parliaments’ formal attribution of competences in a given policy domain. However, as often highlighted in the literature on executive–legislative relations in the EU, the standing of parliaments is also determined by their informal powers, acquired through effective use of organisational resources and expertise (e.g. Auel and Christiansen 2015; Rosén and Raube 2018).

The second condition is the constellation of preferences in the field. Although Fligstein and McAdam (2012) do not use this term specifically, every field requires some minimal convergence of preferences, in the sense of a shared understanding of the purpose of the field. The constellation of preferences also influences the emergence of ‘political coalitions’ between groups, which are needed to keep the field together (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 15). Alliances and cooperation are possible when ‘rooted in a combination of shared interests and common collective identity’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 15). The constellation of preferences and resulting political coalitions is thus an important condition for field stability and cooperation intensity. In a multi-level parliamentary field, as Crum and Fossum (2009: 260) have explained, actors are united by the same ‘habitus’ or role conception as representatives of the people’s interests in the EU. At the same time, the EP and NPs have a distinct democratic mandate, namely to represent the European people or their national constituencies, respectively. This structural difference can be a point of friction in areas where the EP holds a persistently distinct (typically more pro-integrationist) position than most NPs. In analysing the controversial Seasonal Workers Directive, which triggered a ‘yellow card’ procedure by NPs, Cooper (2013: 63) refers to such a vertical cleavage: while a significant number of NPs mobilised over concerns about subsidiarity and proportionality, the EP passed a highly consensual report that pushed to make EU-level legislation even more stringent. Where a parliamentary field is regularly marked by such vertical rifts in policy preferences, competitive dynamics will take centre stage, particularly when a substantive disagreement involves highly salient issues. Conversely, in line with previous research, this article assumes that co-scrutiny and interparliamentary alliances are more likely when politicisation occurs along transnational party lines (e.g. left–right), cutting across the European and national parliaments (see Crum 2016; Meissner and Rosén 2021).

The third condition is the broader field environment. A central aspect of Fligstein and McAdam’s (2012) theory of fields is that fields are embedded in complex webs of other fields. Changes in one field can affect the stability of other proximate fields, particularly when there is high interdependence (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 59). In addition, changes within a field (e.g. the balance of power) are often caused by factors outside the field (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 85). Given the centrality of parliaments in the wider political field, there are many potentially relevant proximate fields, including sectoral policy communities. One of the most relevant proximate fields is the relationship between parliaments and their executives (see Fasone and Lupo 2016: 10). For this reason, national and European executive–legislative dynamics can influence the shape of the parliamentary field. For example, according to Ruiz de Garibay (2013: 102), the development of interparliamentary cooperation in justice and home affairs was hindered by the fact that it coincided with a moment when the EP was immersed in increasing its own parliamentary control over Europol; interparliamentary solutions were thus perceived as threatening those efforts. A contrasting historical account provided by Haroche (2018) shows that NPs were key actors, pressuring their executives to empower the EP as a precondition for approving reforms to the EU budget and Single European Act in the 1970s and 1980s. In that case, national executive–legislative dynamics fostered an interparliamentary alliance; NPs focused on strengthening overall democratic scrutiny within the EU polity, rather than their own powers vis-à-vis national executives. Midway between these two positions, parliaments that feel satisfied with the existing legislative–executive balance (or imbalance) tend to perform scrutiny-related tasks separately, lacking any incentive to coordinate their positions.

The final condition is social skill. Despite the centrality of power struggles, the field is a space governed by shared rules and inhabited by actors, who can sometimes ‘get outside of their own heads, take the role of the other, and work to fashion shared worlds and identities’ (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 17). It is a defining trait of individuals or collective actors with high social skill that they keep their goals ‘open-ended’ and focus on ‘evolving collective ends’ rather than fixed interests (Fligstein and McAdam 2012: 47). Skilled actors are thus more likely to elicit cooperative dynamics. The literature on interparliamentary cooperation in EU affairs has also discussed the importance of framing and communicative action on the participants’ side. For example, collective action among parliaments committed to the Early Warning System (EWS) largely depends on the ability of some parliamentary actors to mobilise the others (Cooper 2015). Similarly, Crum (2016: 16) notes that the leadership of parliaments in a prominent position (usually the EP or the ‘presidency parliament’) is a condition for successful cooperation. In sum, cooperation/competition also depends on leadership qualities, including the empathetic and communicative skills of central actors in the field.

While the ‘theory of fields’ cannot claim to predict or fully explain patterns of cooperation in the parliamentary field, it can serve as a heuristic device, diagnosing the structural conditions that facilitate or inhibit cooperation. The model expects some degree of matching (and co-variation) between the field conditions and the resulting interaction patterns. A proper ‘test’ of those conditions would require a large set of cases across various domains. However, the apparent evolution of the parliamentary field in EU foreign and security policy – from a highly unsettled field to a relatively settled one – makes this an interesting case study for probing the plausibility of the model.

Since the parliamentary field of EU external relations is extremely heterogenous (see Fossum and Rosén 2019; Raube and Wouters 2017), this empirical investigation covers two sub-cases, which capture different dimensions of interparliamentary cooperation and distribution of policy competences. The first sub-case examines institutionalised cooperation in the framework of the IPC CFSP/CSDP, a formally intergovernmental domain. The second dimension involves policy-driven interparliamentary interactions (formal and informal) in negotiations over the EDF, a supranational financial instrument. The field conditions for each case are examined separately, acknowledging that the distribution of powers and preferences across parliaments, relevant participants, and proximate fields can change from one sub-case to another.

In addition to documentary analysis and first-hand insights derived from direct observation of three interparliamentary conferences and events, this article draws on nine in-depth (30–90-minute) semi-structured interviews with: three national parliamentarians from different member states (all delegation heads and/or chairpersons of foreign affairs and defence committees); three European parliamentary officials who support the Committee of Foreign Affairs (AFET), the Subcommittee on Defence (SEDE), or the Directorate for Relations with NPs; and three political advisors of European parliamentary groups. Interviewing parliamentary officials and political advisors was particularly relevant given their continuity (e.g. all had attended 3–10 IPCs). The choice of national parliamentarians and political advisors also captures varied party-political views (interviewees represented four different party families).

Institutionalised cooperation in the IPC CFSP/CSDP

The goal of strengthening interparliamentary cooperation on CFSP/CSDP was enshrined in Protocol 1 of the Lisbon Treaty, following a decade of discussions on how best to improve democratic oversight of this fast-growing domain. The hybrid nature of the CFSP/CSDP, which combines intergovernmental decision-making rules and strong transnational (and even supranational) dynamics, challenged both NPs and the EP, making interparliamentary cooperation particularly pertinent. However, the post-Lisbon Treaty debate surrounding the creation of the IPC CFSP/CSDP (2009–2012) and the first two years of the conference (2013–2014) exemplified conflictual relations; the EP and NPs were at loggerheads over the composition, format, and rules of procedure for the new conference. In line with the theory of fields, this contentious episode can be explained as a combination of changing power balances in the field, different understandings of parliamentary scrutiny, the wider institutional context, and the role of personalities (see Herranz-Surrallés 2014; Wouters and Raube 2012). The following section examines the extent to which the parliamentary field has settled in recent years and whether this change in the field conditions has translated into more cooperative patterns within the IPC CFSP/CSDP.

Field conditions

Since the start of the eighth European legislature in 2014, the tendency towards equalisation of powers between the EP and NPs observed in the previous parliamentary terms has slowed down. Although the share of formal competences has not changed, the period since 2014 has been characterised by relative stagnation in the EP’s ‘parliamentary capital’ (see Herranz-Surrallés 2019). Most of the largely informal changes designed to strengthen the EP’s role in foreign and security policy were implemented during the two previous parliamentary terms (2004–2014). This includes, for instance, the setting up of new internal structures, such as SEDE, improvements to budgetary procedures, and access to classified information through new Interinstitutional Agreements (Herranz-Surrallés 2019; Rosén and Raube 2018). Conversely, since 2014, the EP’s resources and assertiveness have diminished, particularly in the field of security and defence. Observers and interviewees agreed that SEDE lost both initiative and expertise (Intervention under Chatham House rules, Amsterdam, 14 March 2016) under the chairmanship of Anna Fotyga, a Polish MEP from the European Conservatives and Reformists (ECR), a group traditionally opposed to increasing the role of supranational institutions in CFSP/CSDP (Interviews A, E, F). Given this deceleration in EP empowerment in an area that symbolises the intergovernmentalist core of EU foreign policy, NPs might have grown less likely to perceive it as challenge to their own authority.

The constellation of preferences in the field has also changed. If, in previous years, the EP generally adopted a stronger integrationist position on defence matters than most NPs, from 2014 onwards this vertical cleavage became blurrier. Within the EP, support for defence integration has markedly decreased over the past three parliamentary terms. During the sixth and seventh parliamentary terms (2004–2009 and 2009–2014), defence-related reports were highly consensual, with average support at 82% and 76%, respectively. During the eighth term (2014–2019), support fell to 67% (Herranz-Surrallés 2019: 35–36). Since 2015, CSDP annual reports have been approved by a low margin, a trend that continued in the ninth parliamentary term, when the 2020 report passed with 51% of the votes in plenary. Although the resolutions adopted by the EP still favour defence integration, its pro-integrationist stance as a collective actor has been undermined by a growing number of dissenting voices. Therefore, the field can now be said to have grown more favourable to political coalitions emerging between parliamentary levels.

With gradual institutional consolidation post-Lisbon, the field environment has also become more propitious for settled interparliamentary relations, in contrast to the immediate post-Lisbon years, when the EP strove to assert its role in the new EU foreign policy system (Raube 2012). In a recent report on relations with NPs, the EP seemed to recognise the impact of the EU reform process on interparliamentary cooperation, noting that ‘any “constitutional jealousy” that may have existed between the European Parliament and national parliaments has faded post-Lisbon’ (European Parliament 2018a: 5). Moreover, the EP’s post-Lisbon ‘battles’ have shifted to other fields, in which executive–legislative relations are disputed; these include economic governance, where the growing role of intergovernmental institutions (European Council and Eurogroup) and agreements outside EU treaties have raised democratic concerns (Crum 2018). In external relations, the EP has focused on consolidating its new trade policy and treaty-making powers (Meissner and Rosén 2021).

The role of social skill is less clear-cut, given that that AFET’s leadership remained with Elmar Brok until 2017. With four decades of European parliamentary service behind him and known for his federalist positions, Brok chaired AFET for almost 15 years (1997–2007 and 2012–2017) and was a driving force of the EP’s growing role in foreign policy. During debates on the creation of the IPC, Brok sought the recognition of the EP and NPs as equal players (Brok and Gualtieri 2010), an approach that found very little resonance among NPs (Herranz-Surrallés 2014: 970). Although Brok’s successor, David McAllister, represents the same country (Germany) and party family (European People's Party), his recent condition of MEP (since 2014) and long national political career (including as prime minister of Lower Saxony) may have helped him connect with national parliamentarians. One interviewee noted that politicians who transition from NPs to the EP and back play a positive role in interparliamentary cooperation (Interview G). McAllister’s more flexible and empathetic interactions with NPs are exemplified in the organisation of Interparliamentary Committee Meetings (ICMs) – the standard practice for EP committees to invite their national counterparts to Brussels. As ICMs are unilaterally organised by the EP’s large committees, they can reinforce a perception of ‘power divide’ and discourage NPs from attending (Wouters et al. 2014: 28–30). During Brok’s mandate, the ICMs were fixed (generally twice a year) and attended by three or four times more MEPs than national parliamentarians. Under McAllister, ICMs have been held on specific topics where an exchange of views was deemed particularly valuable (Interview D, F). Moreover, a careful balance has been maintained between the national and European delegations. In December 2019, there were actually more national parliamentarians than European ones. Thus, the new AFET leadership appears to be paying more attention to the symbolic aspects of interparliamentary interactions.

Overall, the evolution of the four field conditions points towards a more consensual parliamentary field, close to mostly settled field although far from fully settled. Therefore, we should expect such gradual field settlement to translate into more cooperative dynamics in the IPC CFSP/CSDP, somewhere near low-intensity cooperation. This would mean moving away from previous disagreements on the composition and goals of the IPC CFSP/CSDP (conflict or low-intensity competition), towards a smoother-running but low-key conference. For more intense forms of cooperation (co-scrutiny), we should see a thickening of the oversight practices (e.g. joint scrutiny of documents, developing common positions, hearings with executive actors) and use of the conference for party-political or cross-level coordination.

Cooperation patterns

In line with the expectations, 2014 seems to have marked a shift towards more stable and cooperative dynamics in the IPC CFSP/CSDP. The IPC in Rome (November 2014) made a significant step in that direction by finally adopting the Rules of Procedure (RoP) of the conference. The EP and Italian ‘presidency parliament’ made the pragmatic move of adopting a minimal RoP, but continued collecting proposals on the organisation of the conference in a separate document of ‘best practices’. However, compared to ambitious proposals made by some delegations, in the direction of setting political groups or the possibility to vote on an annual report by High Representative/Vice-President of the Commission (HR/VP) (Amendments, 2013), the IPC CFSP/CSDP settled on a lighter conference format with limited chances of co-scrutiny. The evolution of the IPC practices also points to a pattern of low-intensity cooperation.

The first indicator of low-intensity cooperation is the limited political character of the IPC CFSP/CSDP. In fact, between 2017 and 2019 the conference did not even adopt conclusions. In late 2017, the Estonian ‘presidency parliament’ introduced a change of practice to prevent episodes of tough negotiations on amendments, as previously happened (Interview C), with some delegations declaring that they wanted to opt out of final conclusions (Interview F). The elimination of conclusions has remained a divisive issue. The new practice was welcomed by delegates from the Baltic and Nordic countries, who argued that the IPC was not an assembly and should function like a ‘Munich security conference’, a venue for informal debate (Interview C). By contrast, delegates from Southern European countries complained about the lack of conclusions, arguing that the IPC was becoming a ‘technocratic’ body (Interview B).

Reflecting on the changed dynamics, one interviewee observed that interactions have become less intense, as the practice of adopting conclusions used to generate informal consultations among delegates (Interview F). Another interviewee said that that the IPC CFSP/CSDP was not perceived as a venue for ‘get[ting] things done’, compared to the NATO Parliamentary Assembly, where the possibility to work on opinions, reports, and conduct hearings helps in aligning positions and seeing the direct consequences of the discussions (Interview E). The dialogue with the HR/VP also lost some prominence; at the 2018 and 2019 IPCs (Vienna, Bucharest, and Helsinki), Federica Mogherini joined via videoconference and in 2020 (Zagreb), the newly elected HR/VP, Josep Borrell, cancelled his participation because of other duties.

The issue of adopting conclusions is still unresolved. In the March 2020 IPC, the EP and Croatian parliament decided to reintroduce the conclusions. Some delegations criticised this move, complaining that the process of voting on amendments was unclear and the conclusions were too ‘political’, thus placing dissenting parliamentarians in a difficult situation (Interview I). Due to the COVID-19 pandemic, the IPC in Berlin (September 2020) took place via videoconference in a shortened format; it remains to be seen whether other presidency parliaments will reintroduce conclusions and find a formula that does not raise procedural concerns.

Another indicator of low-intensity cooperation is the limited transnational component of the IPC CFSP/CSDP. Although it has become customary to reserve space for political group meetings at the beginning of the conference, this is done intermittently, particularly by smaller political families. Only the European People's Party (EPP) and the Progressive Alliance of Socialists and Democrats (S&D) have dedicated staff to prepare these meetings and maintain a network of parliamentarians, which also serves as an information channel between IPCs (Interview G). However, these meetings are short (30 minutes to 1 hour), dedicated to general political issues rather than in-depth discussions of agenda topics, and sometimes poorly attended (Interviews E, G). The limited representation of political diversity in national parliamentary delegations is also an obstacle to transnational networking in smaller political groups (Interviews H, I). Although each delegation can send six members, the median attendance has remained around three (Peters 2019: 166). For example, in the 2019 IPC in Bucharest, only three (out of 100) parliamentarians belonged to Green parties, including one from the UK. However, examples of party-political coordination do exist. For instance, during the 2019 IPC in Helsinki, the Left party delegates (one MEP and four national parliamentarians) used the meeting time for political groups to draft a joint statement on EU security and defence (Interview H; GUE/NGL 2019).

Finally, coordination within the conference often takes place along national rather than transnational lines. In recent years, there have been meetings of the self-defined ‘Group Med’ or ‘Southern Parliaments’, gathering delegates from Italy, France, Spain, Portugal, Greece, and Cyprus to discuss issues of common interest, including migration (Interview B). Other groupings have included delegations from the Viségrad countries and a group that focuses on the Western Balkans, though they have held fewer meetings (Interview B). While these are interesting examples of horizontal interparliamentary cooperation, the ‘triangular’ element of relations in a multi-level parliamentary field is lacking. Moreover, national-oriented parliamentary coalitions can sometimes undermine cooperation. For example, in the 2018 IPC in Vienna, the Spanish and Cypriot delegations abandoned the conference to protest the presence of an observer parliamentary delegation from Kosovo.

Overall, the multi-level parliamentary field has gradually settled, but in a way that is not conducive to co-scrutiny. The question remains whether a more stable and consensual field can generate episodes of more intensive coordination when the political agenda so requires. This question will be explored in the next section.

Policy-specific interparliamentary cooperation on the European Defence Fund

The EDF is the supranational dimension of the so-called ‘CSDP triangle’, which began developing following the EU Defence Package of 2016 (Council of the EU 2016). Once in place in 2021, the EDF will support (for the first time from the EU budget), the capability-development efforts outlined in the other two (intergovernmental) dimensions: the Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) setting binding defence cooperation targets; and the Coordinated Annual Review on Defence (CARD), an institutionalised system for monitoring the defence spending of member states. Given the mix of intergovernmental and supranational instruments, the governance of the CSDP triangle creates significant challenges for parliamentary scrutiny (see Fiott 2019: 9). Several aspects of the Commission’s legislative proposal raised concerns in that regard. First, the EDF’s implementation would be established through implementing, rather than delegated acts, limiting the EP’s oversight role – only in the latter can the EP express objections or revoke the delegation (Brzozowski 2019). Secondly, there was no guarantee that the EP or NPs would be considered relevant stakeholders of the Committee managing the Fund. Additionally, the initial Commission proposal suggested delegating EDF implementation to the European Defence Agency (EDA), an intergovernmental agency that reports only to the Council. The following section examines whether EDF negotiations between 2017 and 2019 fostered cross-level interparliamentary alliances to address these challenges.

Field conditions

The field conditions offer a mixed assessment. On the one hand, some aspects of the preferences and distribution of power point towards a highly settled field. In terms of power, there is both a consensual distribution of competences and high interdependence. As the EDF is a financial instrument enacted through a regulation, the EP has a clear and prominent role as co-legislator with the Council. In turn, NPs are the main loci for scrutinising government decisions on PESCO and CARD. As the three instruments (EDF, PESCO, and CARD) are strongly interlinked, no parliamentary level can have full overview of the CSDP triangle. For this reason, parliaments depend on each other to adequately scrutinise EU defence policies and to advance their priorities and red lines.

Similarly, when it comes to preferences, the situation could be considered propitious for strong interparliamentary alliances, given the salience and party-political polarisation surrounding this new instrument. The EDF has been criticised by peace-research institutes and NGOs. For example, the European Network Against Arms Trade organised the ‘NoEUmoney4arms’ campaign as well as the ‘Researchersforpeace.eu’ initiative, with an online manifesto signed by more than 1000 scientists (Scientists for Global Responsibility 2019). In the political arena, contestation followed a left–right cleavage, with Green, Left, and some Socialist representatives strongly opposing the EDF. The split vote on the legislative resolution of the EDF in April 2019, which passed by a meagre 56% of the vote, exemplifies this polarisation.

However, other field conditions point to a less smooth-running parliamentary field. First, the dynamics in proximate fields (executive–legislative relations and, in this case, also the defence-policy community) are likely to have militated against strong parliamentary activism. With the momentum of a strong consensus in the Council, which led to the approval of CARD in 2017 and PESCO in 2018, there was significant pressure to adopt the EDF regulation before the end of the EP’s legislative term in April 2019. In addition, the EDF was a landmark initiative of the Jean-Claude Juncker’s Commission, increasing the pressure for its speedy adoption. The critical security environment, in which tensions with Russia and Turkey were escalating and the US commitment to NATO was uncertain, added urgency to this policy dossier. In this way, the combination of a strong executive consensus and ‘emergency politics’ (White 2015) tends to exacerbate existing executive dominance.

Secondly, the role of social skill points towards a rather limited leadership by central actors in the field. On the EP side, one of the main reasons for this is the controversial allocation of the EDF file to the Committee on Industry, Research, and Energy (ITRE) instead of AFET. Although this choice was in line with the usual procedure of assigning dossiers in accordance with their legal basis, some sectors of the Parliament regretted this decision. The lack of AFET’s leadership over the file was deemed a hindrance for the EP to develop internal expertise and a coherent view on the defence policy (Interview A), as well as a ‘limitation’ and ‘source of frustration’ for MEPs in AFET/SEDE (Interview E). This ‘committee war’ (Interview E) also made it harder for AFET/SEDE members to act as counterparts to the NPs, given that the EDF file was scrutinised mainly in the national foreign affairs and defence committees (Fiott 2019: 24). Moreover, EP rapporteurship of the EDF file was assigned to Zdzisław Krasnodębski, a Polish MEP from the ECR, a group that has traditionally shown limited concern for European parliamentary oversight of this policy domain.

Overall, the evolution of the four field conditions points to a range between mostly and fully settled. We should therefore expect a cooperation pattern between low-intensity cooperation and co-scrutiny. At this policy-specific level, low-intensity cooperation would mean occasional information exchanges, whereas co-scrutiny would imply joint mobilisation or alliances to defend policy priorities and an adequate level of parliamentary scrutiny of the EDF.

Cooperation patterns

In accordance with the expectation of co-scrutiny, generated by the favourable distribution of competences and transnational party cleavages, there were a few instances of coordination between parliamentary levels. For example, the EDF was the motivation for early contacts between NPs and the EP. Some NPs, including the Italian lower chamber and the Czech upper chamber, adopted positions as early as 2017 and sent their resolutions to AFET/SEDE (Interview A). More importantly, the messages and demands of European and national parliamentarians who opposed the EDF bore a strong resemblance to each other, suggesting some form of coordination. For example, left-leaning parliamentarians at various levels criticised the legal basis of the EDF. Although the EDF proposal had a stated goal of preserving ‘the EU’s strategic autonomy and meet[ing] its current and future security needs’ (European Commission 2018: 2), the legal basis chosen for this instrument was EU industrial and research competence. This was denounced by Left parties as a strategy designed to circumvent the constitutional limitations established to ensure that military expenditures would not be charged to the EU budget (Fischer-Lescano 2018).

This procedural concern tied in with more principled opposition to any allocation of EU taxpayers’ money to the military industry. Echoing these concerns, the Dutch upper chamber sent a letter to the European Commission with a list of highly critical questions from the Socialist Party (Eerste Kamer 2017). The German upper chamber used the political dialogue framework to address a resolution to the European Commission asking for a clear separation between military and civilian research (Bundesrat 2018). MEPs from the Green, Left, and S&D parties presented similar amendments to the EP’s legislative report on the EDF (European Parliament 2018b).

When it came to future parliamentary oversight of the EDF, Green European and national parliamentarians were also very active. Most notably, the German Green party used both the German Parliament and the EP to press for stronger provisions on parliamentary scrutiny in regulating the EDF. One parliamentary enquiry submitted in the lower chamber explicitly questioned the government about whether (and if so why) it supported the idea of limiting the powers of the EP in the EDF (Bundestag 2018). Another interesting case of cross-level interparliamentary alliance was a resolution proposed by the Belgian lower chamber, which argued that SEDE should become a full-fledged committee with adequate scrutiny competences (Chambre des Répresentants de Belgique 2017: 19).

However, despite some isolated examples of mutually supportive relations, the EP and NPs cannot be said to have engaged in co-scrutiny, in the sense of joining forces to defend a form of EDF governance that would guarantee a high level of parliamentary oversight. For example, in a rather unusual case of surrendering its rights, the EP finally agreed on the operation of the EDF by implementing acts. The backdoor intergovernmentalisation of EU funds also remains a concern, given the still-unresolved question over the role of the EDA in implementing the EDF. Moreover, most mobilisation against these aspects of EDF governance occurred within the EP, with limited interest or support from NPs.

This low-intensity cooperation should not be entirely unexpected, given the rather adverse field environment and social skill. First, the EP’s role in negotiating the EDF reflects the limitations imposed by an unfavourable field environment. The pressure to fast-track the EDF regulation was strongly criticised by the Green group, which sent a letter to the EP president, Antonio Tajani, to complain about the ‘unnecessary rush’ that had led to ‘sacrificing the EP’s strongest demands’. The Green group asked the president to postpone the vote on the EDF until the following legislative session (Lambert and Bütikofer 2019). However, evidence from internal letters confirms that a majority in the EP, consisting of the EPP, the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE), and ECR, accepted the Council’s proposal, including the controversial implementing acts, on grounds that ‘it would be extremely damaging to the interests of the Union if this significant political breakthrough should be postponed to the next mandate’ and that the outcome was justified given the ‘specific and sensitive nature and the specific prerogatives of sovereignty of Member States’ in defence policy (letter from MEPs Krasnodȩbski, Grossetête and Riquet, quoted in Lambert and Bütikofer 2019). Overall, therefore, considerations of urgency and acquiescence to the principle of executive prerogative in defence issues may help to explain the limited mobilisation of NPs (and part of the EP) to ensure strong parliamentary oversight of the EDF.

Secondly, although meetings of the IPC CFSP/CSDP featured a debate about the CSDP triangle after October 2018 in Vienna, as well as debates in two COSAC meetings (November 2017 in Tallinn and November 2018 in Vienna), these venues were not used to coordinate positions within or across political families. The NPs’ limited entrepreneurship also suggests that transnational party cleavages were weaker than they seemed at first sight. The lack of S&D mobilisation is particularly understandable, given its strong divisions over the file. As shown by its pattern of voting on EDF regulation in April 2019, the Socialist group was split down the middle (68 in favour, 67 against). The tension between government and opposition roles may also help to explain why it was so difficult to seek strong transnational party mobilisation in the GUE, given that Left parties in power (in Greece and Spain) adopted more accommodative stances in defence cooperation (Interview H).

In conclusion, although some field conditions (power and preferences) suggest a case for co-scrutiny, interparliamentary cooperation in the EDF points more towards a low-intensity cooperation pattern. Political mobilisation took place mostly within the EP, with limited vertical/transnational coordination to ensure a high level of parliamentary scrutiny of the EDF.

Conclusion

One decade after the Lisbon Treaty, interparliamentary relations in the EU have become denser and more institutionalised. However, as Fossum and Rosén (2019: 24) remind us, ‘there is no assurance that this process will foster consensus; increased proximity may raise conflict as well as collaboration’. The aim of this article has been precisely to investigate the conditions that facilitate the emergence of cooperation and competition patterns in the parliamentary field, using the CFSP/CSDP as a relevant case of relative settlement after a period of overt competitive dynamics.

In analytical terms, the findings illustrate the plausibility of the fields approach. In the institutional case, the gradual stabilisation, yet low-intensity cooperation dynamics, observed in the IPC CFSP/CSDP confirms the expectations of the field conditions, all of which have evolved towards a mostly settled field. The policy-specific case is also a sober reminder of how difficult it can be to forge intensive cooperative dynamics, even when the field is relatively settled. As the EDF case suggests, strong interdependencies and propitious constellations of preferences between parliamentary levels do not seem to be enough to foster co-scrutiny. Instead, other conditions, including a challenging field environment and weak social skill seem to have prevailed. Further research on a larger number of cases could better determine the relative weight of each field condition or constellation of conditions in facilitating interparliamentary cooperation or conflict.

On a more normative level, one question remains: What does the evolution of the parliamentary field mean for the democratic quality of EU governance; does it matter whether the parliamentary field is settled or unsettled? While conflict can hardly be considered desirable, since it causes parliaments to disempower each other and battle over institutional issues rather than policy substance, there is nothing wrong, in principle, with the middle of the spectrum (low-intensity competition or cooperation). Where competences are clear and matters are not publicly salient, there may be good reasons to avoid duplicating and spending scarce parliamentary resources on interparliamentary activities. However, it is in areas like CFSP/CSDP, which sit uncomfortably between intergovernmental and supranational decision-making, where parliamentary coordination across levels has the greatest added value, both as a democratic expression of shared responsibilities and a corrective to the executive–legislative imbalance that characterises these policy domains (see Cooper 2019: 146; Lord 2019: 105). Therefore, the partial settlement and resulting low-intensity cooperation discussed in this article are, at best, a mixed blessing.

At the institutional level, the papering over of differences on the composition and respective roles of the EP and NPs in the IPC CFSP/CSDP has certainly allowed interparliamentary meetings to focus at last on substantive discussions and exchanges of views. In that regard, the IPC CFSP/CSDP now fulfils its ‘polemological function’ (Wagner 2019) better by reducing uncertainty and building trust in a sensitive policy domain. On the critical side, however, the analysis presented here suggests that part of the reason for the more settled relations in the field is the moderation of the EP’s ambition and ability to scrutinise security and defence issues. Due to the growing polarisation of positions among MEPs and inter-committee rivalries, the EP is a weaker actor in the inter-institutional game and hence less able to use the strong integrationist winds in this field to increase its involvement. Moreover, unlike other conferences that work with specific documents or moments in the policy cycle (e.g. the Europol annual programme in the JPSG or the different stages of the European Semester in the Article 13 conference), the IPC CFSP/CSDP does not have a clear political mission. The low transnational dynamics and absence of a scrutiny purpose seems to indicate that foreign and security policy is still largely the preserve of executives.

Interparliamentary cooperation in the EDF can, with less reservation, be characterised as a missed opportunity, with negative long-term consequences for the democratic quality of EU decision-making. The EDF has set a precedent for ‘communitarised’ defence-related action, although with limited chances for political or monitoring scrutiny by parliaments (see Fiott 2019), as well as the possibility that its implementation will be delegated to an intergovernmental agency. With mounting pressure to introduce some form of Qualified Majority Voting in the CFSP/CSDP and advance towards a Defence Union, the hybridisation of this policy domain is set to continue, and with it the challenges to democratic scrutiny.

However, while there are strong conditions in the multi-level parliamentary field that work against intense forms of cooperation, this analysis also suggests that such conditions are unstable and may be acted upon through social skill. Therefore, the fields’ approach to interparliamentary cooperation, despite its emphasis on the resilience of sovereignty, hierarchies, and contextual constraints, also devises ways in which parliaments can continue to settle their relations on the field.

List of interviewees

Interview A, EP parliamentary staff, Brussels, 10.03.2018.

Interview B, Member of NP, Vienna, 11.10.2018.

Interview C, Member of NP, Vienna, 12.10.2018.

Interview D, EP parliamentary staff, telephone interview, 15.10.2018.

Interview E, European political group staff, Brussels, 20.01.2020.

Interview F, EP parliamentary staff, Brussels, 20.01.2020.

Interview G, European political group staff, Brussels, 23.01.2020.

Interview H, European political group staff, Brussels, 23.01.2020.

Interview I, Member of NP, The Hague, 22.09.2020.

Acknowledgements

Earlier versions of this paper were presented at the workshops ‘Competitors or Allies? The Relations between the European Parliament and National Parliaments across EU Policies’ (Institute for European Integration Research, Vienna, October 2018), ‘Inter-parliamentary Relations in the Post-Lisbon European Union’ (University of Luxembourg, October 2019) and the Colloquium of the Research Group ‘Politics and Culture in Europe’ (Maastricht University, January 2020). I am very grateful to the participants in these events, and in particular to Katharina Meissner, Ben Crum, Anna-Lena Högenauer, Peter Slominski, Michal Natorski, as well as three anonymous referees for their very detailed and helpful comments and suggestions. Last but not least, I express my gratitude to all the interviewees who generously agreed to share their time and expertise.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Additional information

Notes on contributors

Anna Herranz-Surrallés

Anna Herranz-Surrallés is Associate Professor of International Relations at Maastricht University. She has co-edited three volumes on the parliamentary dimension of EU (external) policies and her work has appeared, amongst others, in the Journal of Common Market Studies, Journal of European Public Policy, Journal of European Integration and Cooperation & Conflict. [[email protected]].