Doctrine and Defence Transformation in Norway and Sweden

ABSTRACT

In this article we analyse to what degree the three functions of doctrine proposed by Harald Høiback – doctrine as a tool of operations, a tool of education, and a tool of change – have driven defence transformation in two Scandinavian states, Norway and Sweden. We conclude that doctrine, both allied and national, has had some impact on defence transformation in both countries: through the operations in Afghanistan, through education both at the branch level and joint level, and through organizational adaption to (first) the US ‘RMA paradigm’ and (later) to the subsequent ‘COIN paradigm’. However, other factors, such as threat perception and defence spending, have also played an important role. It also remains to be seen whether the changes are ephemeral or of a more permanent nature.

KEY WORDS:

• Scandinavia
• Defence Transformation
• Doctrine
• Military
• Norway
• Sweden

Acknowledgements

The authors want to thank Conrad Crane, Antulio Echevarria, Kersti Larsdotter, and the JSS anonymous reviewer for comments on earlier versions of this article.

Notes

¹ See also Harald Høiback, ‘What is Doctrine’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 34/6 (2011) 879–900; and Harald Høiback, Understanding Military Doctrine: A Multidisciplinary Approach (London: Routledge, 2013).

² Elinor Sloan, Military Transformation and Modern Warfare: A Reference Handbook (Westport, CT: Praeger, 2008).

³ Sloan, Military Transformation and Modern Warfare.

⁴ Sloan, Military Transformation and Modern Warfare; Ian Roxborough, ‘From Revolution to Transformation: The State of the Field’, Joint Forces Quarterly 32/2 (Autumn 2002); Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, ‘Military transformation in NATO’, in Terry Terriff, Frans Osinga and Theo Farrell, A Transformation Gap? American Innovations and European Military Change (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2010).

⁵ Farrell and Terriff, ‘Military transformation in NATO’, 3; Derrick J. Neal, ‘Do We Really Understand What is Meant by Transformational Change for Defence?’, Defence Studies 6/1 (2006), 78.

⁶ Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff, ‘Introduction’, in Theo Farrell and Terry Terriff (eds), The Sources of Military Change: Culture, Politics, Technology (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2002), 7–13.

⁷ Neal, ‘Do We Really Understand What is Meant by Transformational Change for Defence?’

⁸ Bertel Heurlin, ‘Forsvar og sikkerhed i Norden: Ligheder og forskelle hos de nordiske lande’ [Defence and Security in the Nordic Countries: Differences and Similarities in the Nordic Countries], in Bertel Heurlin (ed), Nationen eller Verden? De nordiske landes forsvar i dag [The Nation or the World? The Defence Forces of the Nordic Countries Today] (Copenhagen: Jurist- og Økonomforbundets Forlag, 2007), 65-70. See also Magnus Petersson, ‘Defense Transformation and Legitimacy in Scandinavia after the Cold War: Theoretical and Practical Implications’, Armed Forces & Society 37/4 (2011), 701–24; Magnus Petersson and Håkon Lunde Saxi, ‘Shifted Roles: Explaining Danish and Norwegian Alliance Strategy 1949–2009’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 36/6 (2013), 761–88.

⁹ Bernard Loo (ed.) Military Transformation and Strategy: Revolutions in Military Affairs and Small States (New York and London: Routledge, 2009).

¹⁰ Petersson, ‘Defense Transformation and Legitimacy in Scandinavia after the Cold War; Magnus Petersson, ‘NATO and the EU ˮNeutralsˮ – Instrumental or Value Oriented Utility?’, in Håkan Edström, Janne Haaland Matlary and Magnus Petersson (eds) NATO: The Power of Partnerships (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2011) 112–30; Magnus Petersson, ‘NATO’s “Neutral” Partners Post ISAF. Back to the Future?’, in Johann Frank and Walter Matyas (eds) Strategie und Sicherheit 2013. Chancen und Grenzen europäischer militärischer Integration (Wien, Köln Weimar: Böhlau Verlag, 2013).

¹¹ Høiback, ‘What is doctrine?’, 890.

¹² Høiback, ‘What is doctrine?’, 890–92.

¹³ Høiback, ‘What is doctrine?’, 892.

¹⁴ Høiback, ‘What is doctrine?’, 893.

¹⁵ Wilhelm Agrell, Fredens illusioner: Det svenska nationella försvarets nedgång och fall [Peace illusions: The decline and fall of the Swedish national defence] (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2010); Carl Björeman, Försvarets förfall: Konsten att lägga ned försvaret utan att någon bryr sig [The degeneration of the Swedish defence: The art of abolishing the Swedish defence without anyone caring.] (Stockholm: Santérus, 2011).

¹⁶ See for example Barry R. Posen, The Sources of Military Doctrine: France, Britain, and Germany between the World Wars (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1984), and Elizabeth Kier, Imagining War: French and British Military Doctrine between the Wars (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1997).

¹⁷ Chris Argyris and Donald A. Schön, Organizational Learning II: Theory, Method, and Practice (New York: Addison-Wesley, 1996), pp. 20–25.

¹⁸ Theo Farrell and Sten Rynning, ‘NATO’s Transformation Gaps: Transatlantic Differences and the War in Afghanistan’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 33/5 (October 2010), 673–99.

¹⁹ Jens Ringsmose, ‘Conducting Counterinsurgency by Alliance: Wave of the Future or Strategic End?’, in Karl Erik Haug and Ole Jørgen Maaø (eds), Conceptualising Modern War: A Critical Inquiry (London: C. Hurst & Co, 2011), 164.

²⁰ Ringsmose, ‘Conducting Counterinsurgency by Alliance’, 180.

²¹ This, of course, assumes that the doctrine is adequate in the first place. If allies use the same dysfunctional doctrine, the result is not likely to be successful even though unity of effort is achieved.

²² Allied Joint Doctrine for Counterinsurgency (COIN) – AJP-3.4.4 (Brussels: NATO, February 2011).

²³ The single most important doctrinal publication was the Army and Marine Corps 2006 COIN doctrine. Its Army designation is FM (Field Manual) 3-24, and the Marine Corps designation is MCWP (Marine Corps Warfighting Publication) 3-33.5. For the sake of simplicity, we will refer to the document as FM 3-24, Counterinsurgency (Washington, DC: Department of the Army, February 2006). Regarding the doctrine see, for instance, Olof Kronvall: Finally Eating Soup with a Knife? A Historical Perspective on the US Army’s 2006 Counterinsurgency Doctrine, Oslo Files No. 5 (Oslo: Norwegian Institute for Defence Studies, 2007), Antulio J. Echevarria II: ‘War’s Second Grammar’ (Carlisle, PA: US Army War College, Strategic Studies Institute: Op-Ed, October 2009); and David Ucko: The New Counterinsurgency Era: Transforming the U.S. Military for Modern Wars (Washington, DC: Georgetown University Press, 2009), chapter 6. On the crafting of FM 3-24, see Conrad Crane: ‘United States’, in Thomas Rid and Thomas Keany (eds): Understanding Counterinsurgency: Doctrine, Operations, and Challenges (London and New York: Routledge, 2010), 59–72.

²⁴ Benjamin Schreer, ‘The Evolution of NATO’s Strategy in Afghanistan’, in Håkan Edström and Dennis Gyllensporre (eds), Pursuing Strategy: NATO Operations from the Gulf War to Gaddafi (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan 2012), 139–56; Hew Strachan, ‘Strategy or Alibi: Obama, McChrystal, and the Operational Level of War’, Survival 52/5 (October November 2010), 157–82.

²⁵ Olof Kronvall and Magnus Petersson, ‘US and NATO COIN Doctrine – Logic, Contents and Implications’, Paper presented at the Annual ISA Convention in Montreal, 2011.

²⁶ See, for example, Peter Viggo Jakobsen and Peter Dahl Thruelsen, ‘Clear, Hold, Train: Denmark’s Military Operations in Helmand 2006–2010’, in Nanna Hvidt and Hans Mouritzen (eds), Danish Foreign Policy Yearbook 2011 (Copenhagen: DIIS, 2011), 78–100.

²⁷ Jan Angstrom and Jan Willem Honig, ‘Regaining Strategy: Small Powers, Strategic Culture, and Escalation in Afghanistan’, The Journal of Strategic Studies 35/5 (October 2012), 663–87. See also Ida Maria Oma, Small States and Burden-sharing in Allied Operations Abroad: The Case of Norway in ISAF (Oslo: University of Oslo, 2015).

²⁸ Wilhelm Agrell, Ett krig här och nu: Från svensk fredsoperation till upprorsbekämpning i Afghanistan 2001–2014 [A war here and now: From Swedish peace operation to counterinsurgency in Afghanistan, 2001–2014] (Stockholm: Atlantis, 2013).

²⁹ Morten Line Andersen, Norsk tillnærming til opprørsbekjempning: Illusjon eller realitet? [The Norwegian approach to counterinsurgency: Illusion or reality?], MA Thesis (Oslo: The Norwegian Defence University College, 2013).

³⁰ Kjell Inge Bjerga and Torunn Laugen Haaland, ‘Development of Military Doctrine: The Particular Case of Small States’, The Journal of Strategic Studies, 33/4 (August 2010), 505–33; Erlend Bekkestad, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine – anvendelig verktøy eller støvsamler? [The Norwegian joint doctrine – useful tool or dust collector?], MA Thesis (Oslo: The Norwegian Defence University College, 2012); Håkan Edström and Magnus Petersson, ‘Akademisering på avvägar? Utbildning och forskning i krigsvetenskap på Försvarshögskolan’ [Failed academization? The War Studies research and education at the Swedish National Defence College], Kungl. Krigsvetenskapsakademiens Handlingar och Tidskrift 2 (April/June 2013), 37–46; Niklas Bergman, Syfte och mening inom svensk doktrinutveckling [The purpose and meaning of Swedish doctrine development], BA Thesis (Stockholm: Swedish National Defence College, 2014).

³¹ Kjell Inge Bjerga, ‘Militær tenkning mellom teori og praksis’ [Military thinking between theory and praxis], in Tormod Heier (ed.), Nytt landskap – nytt forsvar [New landscape – new defence force] (Oslo: Abstrakt, 2011), 164–211.

³² Bekkestad, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine, 37–38.

³³ Bekkestad, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine, 28–31, 36–40.

³⁴ Edström and Petersson, ‘Akademisering på avvägar?’.

³⁵ Bjerga, ‘Militær tenkning mellom teori og praksis’.

³⁶ Bjerga and Haaland, ‘Development of Military Doctrine’, 517–18 (quote 518).

³⁷ Bjerga and Haaland, ‘Development of Military Doctrine’, 520. See also Bekkestad, Forsvarets fellesoperative doktrine, 28–35.

³⁸ Bjerga and Haaland, ‘Development of Military Doctrine’, 528–31. See also Bjerga, ‘Militær tenkning mellom teori og praksis’.

³⁹ Petersson, Defense transformation and legitimacy in Scandinavia after the Cold War’, 710.

⁴⁰ Ett användbart försvar [A useful defence], Prop. 2008/09:140 (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2009).

⁴¹ Försvarspolitisk inriktning – Sveriges försvar 2016–2020 [Sweden’s Defence Policy 2016–2020] (Stockholm: Försvarsdepartementet, 2015).