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ABSTRACT
Recent US advances in counterinsurgency doctrine have been adopted by developing country armed forces. Nevertheless, no systematic study has examined the barriers they face to implementing highly involved counterinsurgency strategy. Tracing the evolution of Peruvian doctrine demonstrates that Peru was able to quickly improve the unity of effort, intelligence capacity, and military basing to meet the demands of a population-centric hearts-and-minds approach to counterinsurgency. Nevertheless, the limited tactical initiative and flexibility of Peruvian forces remains a challenge. The Peruvian experience is instructive for other militaries undergoing similar transitions. However, given the diversity of insurgent conflicts, this doctrine is not universally appropriate.
Acknowledgements
This research was made possible by two grants from the Horowitz Foundation for Social Policy and a third from the George Washington University.
Notes
1 Miguel García Guindo, “El concepto de insurgencia a debate: una aproximación teórica,” Revista de Investigaciones Políticas y Sociológicas 12/1 (2013), 212.
2 Note that UCDP/PRIO’s coding lists the US as the primary belligerent (assisted by the governments of Afghanistan and Pakistan) against al-Qaeda in 2014.
3 Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg, and Harvard Strand, “Armed Conflict 1946–2001: A New Dataset,” Journal of Peace Research 39/5 (2002, 615–37); Therése Pettersson and Peter Wallensteen, “Armed Conflicts, 1946–2014,” Journal of Peace Research 52/4 (2015), 536–50.
4 David Kilcullen, “Two Schools of Classical Counterinsurgency,” Small Wars Journal Blog, 27 January 2007, 420–44 http://<smallwarsjournal.com/blog/two-schools-of-classical-counterinsurgency>.
5 Mao Tse-tung, On Guerrilla Warfare, trans. Samuel B. Griffith (Westport CT: Praeger Publishing 1961), 92–93.
6 Alexander B. Downes, “Draining the Sea by Filling the Graves: Investigating the Effectiveness of Indiscriminate Violence as a Counterinsurgency Strategy,” Civil Wars 9/4 (2007), 420–44.
7 Alexis De Tocqueville, Democracy in America, vol. 2, Influence of Democracy on Progress of Opinion in the United States (Cirencester: Echo Library Paperback Shop 2006), 501.
8 Amartya Sen, On Economic Inequality (New York: Oxford University Press 1997), 1.
9 US Army and Marine Corps, Counterinsurgency Field Manual, US Army Field Manual No. 3-24, Marine Corps Warfighting Publication No. 3-33.5 (Chicago: University of Chicago Press 2007) 2.
10 Ibid.
11 Bernard B. Fall, “The Theory and Practice of Insurgency and Counterinsurgency,” Naval War College Review (April 1965), quoted in David Kilcullen, Counterinsurgency (New York: Oxford University Press 2010), 149.
12 Mike Mullen, brunch event attended by Barnett S. Koven, Washington, 20 January 2013.
13 Andrew P. Betson, “A Case Study: Tactics in Counterinsurgency and a Company during COIN Operations,” Armor Magazine (September–October 2010), 31; US Army, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, US Army Field Manual No. 3-24.2 (Washington: Department of the Army Citation2009).
14 US Army, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, ix.
15 Ibid.
16 Leonardo Jóse Longa López in discussion with Barnett S. Koven, 21 September 2015; colonel, Peruvian Army in discussion with Barnett S. Koven, 27 September 2015; colonel, Peruvian Army in discussion with Barnett S. Koven, 15 October 2015.
17 Leonardo Jóse Longa López, Narcoterrorismo en el Perú: Reflexiones de un soldado (Lima, Peru: Impresión Creativos Perú 2014).
18 Gina Harkins, “Marines prep Peruvians to combat insurgents, drug cartels,” Marine Corps Times, December 13, 2014 http://<www.marinecorpstimes.com/story/military/2014/12/13/marines-prep-peruvians-combat-insurgents-drug-cartels/20355663/>.
19 Arlene B. Tickner, “Colombia, the United States, and Security Cooperation by Proxy,” report for the Washington Office on Latin America, March 2014, Washington.
20 Cynthia McClintock, Revolutionary Movements in Latin America: El Salvador’s FMLN and Peru’s Shining Path (Washington: United States Institute for Peace Press 1998), 73.
21 Richard Webb and Graciela Fernández Baca, Perú en Números 1994 (Lima: Instituto Cuánto 1994), 345.
22 Comisión de la Verdad y Reconciliación, Reportaje, vol. 2 (Lima, Peru 2003), 53, 162.
23 Korena Marie Zucha, “Incomplete Developmental Counterinsurgency: The Case of the Shining Path of Peru,” master’s thesis, Texas State University–San Marcos, 2007, 56–59.
24 Barnett S. Koven, “El resurgimiento de Sendero Luminoso (SL),” Air & Space Power Journal en Español (Segundo Trimestre 2010), 26.
25 Américo Zambrano, “VRAEM: la emboscada,” Caretas, 15 August 2013, 16; Edgar Concha Loaiza, “An Analysis of the Doctrinal Changes that the Peruvian Army Implemented Fighting Counterinsurgency Operations against the Sendero Luminoso Insurgency since 2001,” master’s thesis, US Army Command and General Staff College, 2014, 40–45.
26 Frank Bajak and Carla Salazar, “Peru rebel brothers lead retooled Shining Path,” Associated Press, 29 May 2012; Gustavo Gorriti, “Entrevista a Artemio en el Huallaga,” IDL Reporteros, 6 December 2011 http://<idl-reporteros.pe/entrevista-a-artemio-en-el-huallaga/>; Diego Ore and Terry Wade, “Interview-Peru: Shining Path expands role in cocaine trade,” Reuters: AlertNet, 12 December 2008 http://<mg.co.za/article/2008-12-13-shining-path-expands-role-in-cocaine-trade>.
27 Edgar Malone, “The Shining Path of Peru: Defeated or Alive?” master’s thesis, Georgetown University, 2010, 74.
28 Ibid.
29 Ibid.
30 Gordon H. McCormick, The Shining Path and the Future of Peru (Santa Monica, CA: RAND 1990), 31–22.
31 Longa López, Nacroterrorismo en el Perú, 42.
32 Jorge Aguilar, “El VRAE: Alan García’s Failed Domestic Policy,” report for the Council on Hemispheric Affairs, 27 October 2009, Washington; Maiah Jaskoski, Military Politics and Democracy in the Andes (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press 2013), chapter 4.
33 Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times, “Foncodes invests $4.2 million in VRAE development projects in 2009,” 3 March 2010.
34 Gino Costa, “Security Challenges in Peru,” Americas Quarterly (Fall 2010), 43.
35 ConsultAndes, “Peru Key Indicators,” 25 May to 1 June 2014, Lima, 2; The Guardian, “Peru’s President puts plans to forcibly eradicate coca fields on hold,” 2 June 2014; Mimi Yagoub, “Peru Anti Drug Chief Fired in Coca Eradication Policy U-Turn,” report for InSightCrime – Organized Crime in the Americas), 29 May 2014, Medellín, Colombia; Coletta A. Youngers, “Peru sends mixed signals on drug policy,” World Politics Review (16 June 2014).
36 Ibid.
37 Andina: Agencia Peruana de Noticias, “Peru: govt. sets aside funds for the development of VRAEM area,” 14 June 2015; The Guardian, “Peru’s President puts plans to forcibly eradicate coca fields on hold;” Hillary Ojeda, “Peru: gov’t allocates US$ 512 million to VRAEM development,” Peru This Week, 21 April 2015 http://<www.peruthisweek.com/news-peru-govt-allocates-us-512-million-to-vraem-development-105957>.
38 Presidencia del Consejo de Ministros, Oficina de Prensa e Imagen Institucional, Working Paper: 2012 VRAEM Intervention Program (Summary), 30 June 2012, Lima.
39 Ibid.
40 Longa López in discussion with Barnett S. Koven.
41 Longa López, Narcoterrorismo en el Perú, 9.
42 Carmen Masías Claux in discussion with Barnett S. Koven, 26 August 2015.
43 US Army, Tactics in Counterinsurgency, ix.
44 Ibid.
45 James D. Hood, “NATO Strategic Airlift: Capability or Continued US Reliance?” master’s thesis, Air University, 2009, 1.
46 Concha Loaiza, “An Analysis of the Doctrinal Changes,” 54–55; “Las Fuerzas Armadas forman Comando Especial del VRAE,” Fuerzas Armadas del Perú, http://<ffaaperu.blogspot.pe/2008/04/las-fuerzas-armadas-forman-comando.html>; Info Región: Agencia de Prensa Ambiental, “Fuerzas Armadas forman Comando Especial del VRAE para dirigir lucha contra remanente senderistas,” 13 April 2008.
47 Ibid.
48 Concha Loaiza, “An Analysis of the Doctrinal Changes,” 55.
49 Ibid., 56, 59–60.
50 Longa López in discussion with Barnett S. Koven.
51 Ibid.
52 Ibid.
53 Office of Inspector General, Audit of USAID/Iraq’s Community Stabilization Program, Audit Report No. E-267-08-001-P, Baghdad, 18 March 2008, 8–9.
54 Zambrano, “VRAEM: La emboscada,” 17.
55 Ángel Páez, “VRAE: Buscan combatir a Sendero al estilo ‘Colombia,’” La República, 12 August 2011 http://<larepublica.pe/12-08-2011/vrae-buscan-combatir-sendero-al-estilo-colombia>.
56 Jeremy McDermott, “Peru’s Shining Path Leaders Expected Party Not Ambush,” report for InSightCrime – Organized Crime in the Americas, 16 August 2013, Medellin, Colombia.
57 Américo Zambrano, “El Libro Negro de Sendero,” Caretas, 11 April 2013, 24–25; Zambrano, “VRAEM: La emboscada,” 16–17.
58 Otto Napoleón Guibovich Arteaga in discussion with Barnett S. Koven, 21 January 2016.
59 Andean Air Mail & Peruvian Times, “Peru to build this year 10 new counter-terroism bases in VRAEM;” Diálogo Revista Militar Digital, “Perú inaugara su primera base military para combater el narcotrafico en VRAEM,” 18 February 2015; InSight Crime – Organized Crime in the Americas, “Peru to Install Military Bases in Region Held by Shining Path,” 16 October 2012.
60 Diálogo Revista Militar Digital, “Peru remodels military bases in the VRAEM,” 3 May 2013.
61 James Bargent, “Peru to Build Military Base in Drug, Guerrilla Heartland,” report for InSightCrime – Organized Crime in the Americas, 13 February 2013, Medellin, Colombia.
62 US Army, The Operations Process, US Army Field Manual No. 5-0 (Washington: Department of the Army Citation2010), 2.
63 Colonel, Peruvian Army in discussion with Barnett S. Koven, 15 October 2015.
64 Frank Bajak, “The Peruvian military is letting planes filled with cocaine fly right under their noses,” Business Insider, 14 October 2015 http://<www.businessinsider.com/peruvian-military-is-letting-planes-filled-with-cocaine-fly-2015-10>.
65 Longa López in discussion with Barnett S. Koven.
66 Quoted in Bajak, “The Peruvian military is letting planes filled with cocaine fly right under their noses.”
67 Bajak, “The Peruvian military is letting planes filled with cocaine fly right under their noses;” Masías Claux in discussion with Barnett S. Koven.
68 Jaime Antesana in discussion with Barnett S. Koven, 2 October 2015.
69 Bajak, “The Peruvian military is letting planes filled with cocaine fly right under their noses.”
70 Longa López in discussion with Barnett S. Koven.
71 Colonel, Peruvian Army in discussion with Barnett S. Koven, 15 October 2015.
72 Luis Giampietri Rojas in discussion with Barnett S. Koven, 24 October 2015.
73 Jo-Marie Burt, “The Paradoxes of Accountability,” in Steve J. Stern and Scott Straus (eds), The Human Rights Paradox: Universality and Its Discontents (Madison: University of Wisconsin Press 2014), 168.
74 Luis Giampietri Rojas, Rehén por siempre: Operación Chavín de Huántar (Lima: Fondo Editorial del Congreso de la República 2011).
75 Colonel, Peruvian Army in discussion with Barnett S. Koven, 15 October 2015.
76 Hannah Stone, “Peru Military Still Selling Arms to FARC: Congressman,” report for InSightCrime – Organized Crime in the Americas, 9 February 2011, Medellin, Colombia.
77 Enrique Obando, “Fujimori and the Military,” North American Congress on Latin America Report on the Americas 30/1 (1996).
78 Barnett S. Koven’s translation of Daniel Masterson, Fuerza armada y sociedad en el Perú moderno: Un estudio sobre relaciones civiles militares 1930 – 2000 (Lima: Instituto de Estudios Poíticos y Estratégicos 2001), 451.
79 Concha Loaiza, “An Analysis of the Doctrinal Changes,” 65.
80 Masterson, Fuerza armada y sociedad en el Perú moderno, 448–51.
81 Concha Loaiza, “An Analysis of the Doctrinal Changes,” 55–56.
82 Stephen Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon,” Foreign Affairs (March/April 2006), 2–14; Gian P. Gentile, “Freeing the Army from the Counterinsurgency Straightjacket,” Joint Forces Quarterly 58/3 (2010), 122; Frank G. Hoffman, “Neo-classical Counterinsurgency?” Parameters 27/2 (2007), 71.
83 Biddle, “Seeing Baghdad, Thinking Saigon.”
84 Steven Alexander Baker, “The Revision of FM 3-24 Is Overdue: Rethinking Classical Counterinsurgency to Defeat Contemporary Insurgents,” master’s thesis, Joint Forces Staff College, 2011, 13–16. See also David Kilcullen, “Countering Global Insurgency,” Journal of Strategic Studies 28/4 (2005), 614.
85 Barnett S. Koven and Cynthia McClintock, “The Evolution of Peru’s Shining Path and the New Security Priorities in the Hemisphere,” in Bruce M. Bagley, Hanna Kassab, and Jonathan Rosen (eds), Reconceptualizing Security in the Western Hemisphere in the 21st Century (Lanham MD: Lexington Books 2015).
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Barnett S. Koven
Barnett S. Koven is a PhD candidate in the Department of Political Science at the George Washington University and a visiting researcher at the Instituto del Perú at the Universidad de San Martín de Porres. He received an MA and MPhil in political science and a BA in international affairs and Latin American and hemispheric studies from the George Washington University. He also holds a Certificate in Conflict Analysis from the US Institute for Peace and a Certificate in Advanced Security in the Field from the United Nations System Staff College. Koven’s dissertation examines how the unequal distribution of development aid provokes anger and ultimately support for insurgents in disadvantaged areas.
