Subject knowledge: the ‘knowledge-rich’ agenda, Buber and the importance of the knowing subject in Religious Education

ABSTRACT

Knowledge is a key concern at the moment in schools. Advocates of so-called ‘knowledge-rich’ schooling claim that constructivist models of mind, and a focus on skills education has meant that students are leaving school without core knowledge. Extending this to Religious Education (RE), there are some that have defined the need for a robust knowledge-base as the defining challenge for its future. This way of talking about knowledge, namely in the sense of a ‘body of knowledge’, is common in educational circles. When used in this sense, knowledge is conceived of as exterior to the knowing subject, and prior to any subject coming to know it. Yet, this is not how knowledge is spoken of in the field of epistemology, where even the most minimally defined position concerns what is known and the knowing subject. I argue that the knowing subject is key to the knowledge acquired in RE, that knowledge of religion cannot be easily conceived of without taking the knowing subject into account. Employing Buber's notion of the I–Thou relation, I characterise knowledge in RE as the result of an engagement with the other.

KEYWORDS:

• Knowledge
• Buber
• dialogue
• powerful knowledge

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.

Notes

1. I have chosen the word ‘devotee’ here as opposed to ‘religious believer’ as a way of capturing a broader characterisation of religion than ascribing to certain propositions.

2. When I talk about the knowledge ‘of a subject’ I mean pertaining to a person that knows. In this discussion, this might be confusing, since we might also in this area talk of ‘subject knowledge’ to mean something closer to ‘knowledge as content’. Because of this, I avoid the term ‘subject knowledge’ in the sense of ‘a body of knowledge pertaining to a certain curriculum area’.

3. Though some could be excluded.

4. Of course, there is an established tradition in phenomenology that treats the metaphysical and epistemological as being not quite so distinct as the picture painted here, but advocates of a core knowledge curriculum seem not even to recognise that the domains of things that should be known, and knowing are different.

5. When I use the word ‘objective’ I am not intending to import with that metaphysical baggage about whether there is an objective world, the relation of mind to world, or other such questions, beyond what I say in the final section.

6. Kueh might well object to my application of Buber’s I–Thou relation as a step into what he calls ‘mere social constructivism’ (2017, 62) that he finds unpalatable. I think this would be unfair, but still, the point remains that a view that takes the knowing subject into account, what I have called a K2 approach to knowledge, provides another option besides those he recognises. It will be argued that the K2 approach to knowledge characterises knowledge in RE better than an approach that sees knowledge as ‘exterior’ to subjects.

7. This approach might be extended to include scholars other than Buber, such as Polanyi’s notion of ‘personal knowledge’ (1962).

8. The I–thou/I–it relation is something Gadamer later develops. See Aldridge (2011, 2015a) for an application of Gadamer’s work to RE.

9. It would be wise not to push this allusion too far. For example, I have no intention to try to match the knowledge gained in RE to one or more of the spheres in which Buber ([1923] 1983) says I–Thou relations take place: relation to nature; relation to people; relation to spiritual beings. Others might want to make this link. However, relation to spiritual beings could bring with it its own problem, namely how one could be said to relate to a being, if no such being existed. Alluding to Buber is meant only to emphasise the relational nature of knowledge in RE.

10. It might, of course, be that in an increasingly globalised society, that thinking solely about representing the demographic of one country might seem parochial. The argument does not rest on this, only the idea that RE is about engaging with the other.

11. This ‘text’ could be something other than a text, a religious artwork or artefact would also occupy this position. The use of the word ‘text’ makes sense here, though, as Aldridge’s work is informed by hermeneutics, indeed, it is itself a hermeneutical position.

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Clare Jarmy

Clare Jarmy is Head of the Religious Studies and Philosophy Department at Bedales School and Chair of the Independent Schools Religious Studies Association.