Aiding violence or building peace? The role of international aid in Afghanistan

The political and military landscape in Afghanistan has been transformed since 11 September. Whether the fall of the Taliban and the transition to an Afghan Interim Administration signify the emergence of a new peaceful order or a dangerous disorder it is too early to tell. The underlying dynamics of the Afghan crisis have yet to be addressed and it will be argued in this article that the main challenge for the newly installed interim administration and the international community will be one of 'winning the peace'. Military and diplomatic measures, though important, are unlikely by themselves to secure a transition towards a stable peace. Over two decades of war a regional conflict complex has developed which has transformed institutions, incentives systems and livelihoods. War cannot simply be declared over. It is recognised that a substantial aid package or 'Marshall Plan' for Afghanistan will be necessary to transform the war economy into a peace economy, and already significant pledges of aid have been made by donor countries. This represents an important departure from policies of the previous decade, in which the international response was one of disengagement and containment and Afghanistan became an orphaned conflict. Whether this aid will materialise and whether it will be used to good effect in 'winning the peace' is another matter. This article will focus on the historical and contemporary role of aid in relation to the Afghan crisis. It will ask how international assistance has interacted with the dynamics of conflict and peace in the past. What lessons should be learned (and unlearned) to inform current policy and practice? What will be the likely challenges facing assistance actors aiming to build peace?