- Cliffe , L and Luckham , R . 1999 . 'Complex political emergencies and the state: failure and the fate of the state' . Third World Quarterly , 20 (1) : 27 – 50 .
- Turner , M . 2002 . 'Under unusual fire during the six days of the Condor' . Financial Times Weekend , 25-26 May For example, in the six-day Operation Condor in May 2002 a somewhat bemused British marine commander commented "There's a huge power struggle going on there at every level-there were a lot of warring tribal factions … One village will say the village across the valley is al Qaeda but then that village will say the same thing [about the first]. The Afghans jump from one side to another; it is not clear cut'
- Duffield , M . 2001 . Global Governance and the New Wars: the Merging of Development and Security , London : Zed Books .
- Collier , P . “ 'Doing well out of wan an economic perspective' ” . In Greed and Grievance. Economic Agendas in Civil Wars , Edited by: Berdhal , M and Malone , D M . London : Lynne Reinner . A term borrowed from
- See Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars.
- Rubin , B , Ghani , A , Maley , W , Rashid , A and Roy , O . 2001 . “ 'Afghanistan: reconstruction and peacemaking in a regional framework' ” . Bern Centre for Peacebuilding, Swiss Peace Foundation .
- Warner , M , ed. 1999 . Discussion paper on conflict , Conflict and Humanitarian Affairs Department, DfID . Adapted from Bush (1996), cited, Unpublished Report
- Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars.
- See Rubin et al, 'Afghanistan'.
- Boyce , J . 2000 . “ 'Beyond good intentions: external assistance and peace building' ” . In Good Intentions. Pledges of Aid for Post Conflict Recovery , Edited by: Forman , S and Patrick , S . Boulder, CO : Lynne Reinner .
- For a more extensive analysis of these schools of thought, see J Goodhand with P Atkinson, Conflict and aid: enhancing the peacebuilding impact of international engagement. A synthesis of findings from Afghanistan, Liberia and Sri Lanka, International Alert, 2001.
- Jackson , S and Walker , P . 1999 . 'Depolarising the "broadened" and 'back-to-basics" relief models' . Disasters , 23 (2) : 93 – 114 . For a good overview of this debate
- Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars.
- Forman , S and Patrick , S . 2000 . Good Intentions: Pledges of Aid for Post Conflict Recovery , Boulder, CO : Lynne Reinner .
- Goodhand , J . “ 'NCOS and peacebuilding in complex political emergencies: Afghanistan study' ” . Working Paper no 3 IDPM, University of Manchester . For more in-depth accounts
- Korten , D . 1987 . 'Third generation NGO strategies: a key to people-centred development' . World Development , 15 : 145 – 159 . It is recognized that in practice aid strategies were not as evolutionary or distinct as the generational theory implies. For example, during the 'third generation' most donor assistance still came out of humanitarian relief budget lines, much of it in the form of food aid. However, the model is useful in mapping out broad changes in the thinking and strategy of aid agencies during the course of the conflict. The idea of NGO generations was first developed by David Korten, (suppl)
- Atmar , H and Goodhand , J . 2002 . 'Aid, conflict and peacebuilding in Afghanistan. What lessons can be learned?' . International Alert , February http://idpm.man. ac.uk/idpm/adpm_dp.htm#peace, 2000
- Dupree , L . 1980 . Afghanistan , 766 Princeton, NJ : Princeton University Press . However, as noted by, Afghanistan also received significant aid from Iran
- Pain , A and Goodhand , J . March 2002 . “ 'Afghanistan: current employment and socio-economic situation and prospects' ” . In International Labour Organisation, InFocus Programme on Crisis Response and Reconstruction , Working Paper 8 March , Geneva
- Rubin , B . 1995 . The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. State formation and Collapse in the International System , 142 New Haven, CT : Yale University Press .
- Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan. Dupree's, description, in Afghanistan, of the Westernsponsored Industrial Development Bank of Afghanistan (IDBA) in the 1960s might well serve as a warning to international aid officials today: 'An increase in foreign loans meant a jump in total indebtedness … What really disturbed some critics of the IDBA was the spectre of "neocolonialism" or "economic imperialism": a rise in internal investments without a solid knowledge of finance or government protection for those small-scale industries competing with cheap imports, combined with the need for external advisers, few equipped with the knowledge and understanding of, or sympathy with, local cultural patterns" (p 757).
- 'The political economy of war and peace in Afghanistan' . World Development , 28 (10) 1792 1789 – 1803 . Rubin, 2000
- Baitenmann , M . 1990 . 'NCOS and the Afghan wan the polfticisation of humanitarian aid' . Third World Quarterly , 12 (1) : 62 – 85 . See, for instance, 'Much of the US aid has been an extension of the war effort, and NCOS have been used as the instruments of this policy' (p 76)
- Nicholas , N and Borton , J . 1994 . "The changing role of NCOS in the provision of relief&rehabilitation assistance ” . London, , Afghanistan/Pakistan : ODI . case study 1
- Baitenmann, 'NCOS and the Afghan war', for instance, distinguishes between solidarity NCOS linked to US right wing political interests who had conscious 'pro-war' agendas and more professional (and politically neutral) humanitarian organizations.
- Rubin, 2000, "The political economy'.
- Donini , A . 1995 . “ 'United Nations coordination in complex emergencies. Lessons from Afghanistan, Mozambique and Rwanda' ” . Occasional Paper No 22 Boston : Brown University . Humanitarianism and War Project, reports that on several occasions the UN was asked by USAID or the ISI to pre-position food in areas surrounding government-held cities so that the offensives against them could be stepped up
- N Nicholds&Borton, 'The changing role of NCOS'. Moreover, as Donini, 'United Nations coordination in complex emergencies ', notes '..the complicated web of complicity that united resistance party leaders-the ISI, Pakistani border guards, bona fide mujahedeen and nondescript bearded bandits-resulting in the siphoning off of large quantities of commodities, especially food aid, which was easier to "monetize"' (p 47).
- Rubin . 2000 . "The political economy' ” . 1792
- Donini , A . “ 'United Nations coordination in complex emergencies ' ” . 46
- Ibid.
- Baitenmann . “ 'NCOS and the Afghan war' ” . 82
- Donini , A , Dudley , E and Ockwell , R . December 1996 . “ 'Afghanistan. Coordination in a fragmented state' ” . December , a Lessons Learned report prepared for the United Nations Department of Humanitarian Affairs .
- A shura is a consultation or a council; principle or institution of Islamic government Source: B Rubin, The Fragmentation of Afghanistan.
- The primary NGO coordination body was the Agency Coordination Body for Afghan Relief (ACBAR), formed in 1988. Before 11 September there were five NGO coordination bodies-ACBAR, SWABEC, ANCB, ice, NCB--offering a range of services including strategic (advocacy, representation, policy debate and formulation), programme (information sharing, standard setting, surveying, etc) and technical support (postal, printing, etc). Atmar&Goodhand, 'Aid, conflict and peacebuilding in Afghanistan ', p. 37
- Currently, the NCO community can be divided into three broad categories: International, Afghan, and Islamic NCOS. Of all these categories, over 250 NCOS are members of one of the six NCO Co-ordination Bodies. If one includes the non-member NCOS, the number probably reaches 300. The ACBAR Directory of Humanitarian Agencies Working for Afghans 2000 covers 160 NCOS of all categories. From 17 countries, these NCOS, have 23 413 staff members on their payroll (22 377 Afghans, 705 Pakistanis and 331 expatriates) and their total expenditure between 1997 and 1999 amounted to US$376.4 million (US$120.5 million in 1997, US$117.7 million in 1998 and US$138.2 million in 1999). NCOS' 1999 budget came from the UN (33), EU (20), bilateral donors (20), overseas international NCOS (20) and others. In 1999, 91 of their budget was spent on Afghans inside Afghanistan and 9 on the refugee programmes outside the country. The largest among the above 160 NCOS seem to be the following with 73 of the total NGO staff and 75 of the total NGO budget in 1999. Atmar&J Goodhand, 'Aid, conflict and peacebuilding in Afghanistan '.
- Surkhe , A , Strand , A and Harpviken , K B . 14 January 2002 . Peacebuilding Strategies for Afghanistan. Part One, Lessons from Past Experience in Afghanistan , 14 January , Chr. Michelson Institute . See, for instance, Commissioned Report prepared for the Norwegian Ministry of Foreign Affairs
- See Goodhand, 'NCOS and peacebuilding in complex political emergencies', for case studies of three NCOS-Afghan Development Association (ADA), CARE and Afghanaid.
- Surhke . Peacebuilding Strategies for Afghanistan 46
- Mansfield , D . 2001 . 'Alternative development in Afghanistan: the failure of quid pro quo' . paper prepared for the International Conference on Alternative Development in drug control and cooperation . September 17-22 2001 , Feldafmg. August, Mansfield argues that it is impossible to isolate drugs from the wider issue of governance in Afghanistan
- Surkhe et al, Peacebuilding Strategies for Afghanistan, argue that many of the practices in which aid colluded with violence continued into the early 1990s: 'the pattern from the mujadideen period in the early 1990s is that the humanitarians made deals with local commanders, sometimes as a last resort, to obtain security … commanders that were strategically well placed on major access routes got a large share of the assistance as they were prioritised by aid organisations. Taxation of aid transport (at gunpoint if needed) was common as well. The result was a skewed distribution of aid, which undermined all principles of sound assistance by demonstrating that military power ultimately determined aid priorities and channels' (p 8).
- Duffield , M , Leader , N and Grossman , P . 2001 . “ 'Review of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan' ” . In Final Draft , 11 Islamabad : Strategic Monitoring Unit .
- Atmar and Goodhand . “ 'Aid, conflict and peacebuilding in Afghanistan' ” . 26 In the late 1990s there was general agreement, at least at a rhetorical level within the donor community, about the key policy objectives: peace through a negotiated settlement, respect for human rights, maintaining the integrity of aid and the security of aid staff, counter-narcotics, counterterrorism and refugee return and integration
- Rubin . “ 'Afghanistan' ” . 25 In 2001, as Rubin et al note, one could distinguish at least three distinct (and contradictory) policies towards the Afghan conflict. First, there was the UNSC, which, led by the USA and Russia, had imposed one-sided sanctions against the Taliban. Second, there was the UN Special Mission for Afghanistan (UNSMA) with its mandate to mediate between the Taliban and UF. The UNSC resolution 1333 undermined the ability of UNSMA to act as a neutral and impartial mediator. Third, the UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) has the mission of delivering humanitarian assistance to the Afghan population. UNOCHA, in the interests of aid delivery, has been willing to engage with the Taliban (and compromise principles according to its critics) to a greater extent than the other two UN bodies. Finally, there is a fourth UN body in the form of the UN Human Rights Commission which, through the Special Rapporteur on Afghanistan, reports on human rights violations
- Duffield . “ 'Review of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan ' ” . 22
- Brabant , K Van and Killock , T . 1999 . The Limits and Scope for the Use of Development Assistance Incentives and Disincentives for Influencing Conflict Situations: Case Study , Paris, , Afghanistan : OECD/DAC .
- Naqvi , Z F . 1999 . Afghanistan-Pakistan Trade Relations , Islamabad : World Bank . 2000
- Human Rights Watch . “ 'Afghanistan. Crisis of impunity. The role of Pakistan, Russia, and Iran in fueling the civil war' ” . New York : Human Rights Watch . it was estimated that the value of Afghanistan's exports and re-exports to Pakistan had dropped to $1227 million. World Bank, 'Study report: Afghanistan's international trade relations with neighbouring countries'. International conference on analytical foundations for assistance to Afghanistan, Islamabad, Pakistan, 2001. In addition to internally generated revenue, the Taliban benefited from substantial external support, which further lessened the potential leverage of humanitarian aid
- Duffield et al, 'Review of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan'.
- Ibid.
- Shearer , D . 1997 . 'Exploring the limits of consent: conflict resolution in Sierra Leone' . Millenium , 26 (3) : 845 – 860 . David Shearer argues that in 'new wars' military engagement may be the only way to break the stalemate and the US-led military action in Afghanistan in many respects appears to strengthen this argument
- Atmar , H , Barakat , S and Strand , A . “ 'From rhetoric to reality: the role of aid in local peacebuilding in Afghanistan' ” . University of York . 1998 for a more extensive description of these workshops and their role in raising the consciousness of aid agencies about the potential for community-based peacebuilding initiatives. They were particularly important in forcing agencies to question the lingering taboo from the 1980s surrounding the issues of peace building
- Atmar and Goodhand . “ 'Aid, conflict and peacebuilding in Afghanistan ” . 43 A small number of donors, including Norway, the Netherlands and Switzerland, encouraged their partners to mainstream conflict resolution and peace-building strategies into their relief and rehabilitation activities
- For a more extensive description of these peace-building programmes, see ibid; and Atmar et al, 'From rhetoric to reality'.
- Other agencies supported include SIEAL and CCA. See M Eshan 'An analysis of peacebuilding approaches in Afghanistan', www.asiasource.org/asip/peacebuilding.cfm 2001; and Atmar&J Goodhand, 'Aid, conflict and peacebuilding '.
- See Van Brabant&Killock, 'The limits and scope'.
- Lederach , J P . 1997 . Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies , Washington, DC : United States Institute of Peace . As Lederach notes, the mid-level actors are often the critical ones when it comes to conflict resolution processes. Aid agencies may be well positioned to play this role
- Studies by Goodhand, 'NCOS and peacebuilding in complex political emergencies', Atmar&Goodhand, 'Aid, conflict and peacebuilding in Afghanistan'; and M Eshan, 'An analysis of peacebuilding approaches in Afghanistan ', have been the only substantial pieces of work in this area.
- Goodhand . May 1997 . “ 'NCOS and peacebuilding in complex political emergencies' ” . AFG/96/003 May , Afghanistan Rural Rehabilitation Programme/Community Self Help . UNOPS/UNDP, Final Progress Report, December 2000', December 2000
- Anderson , M . 1999 . “ 'Do no harm. How aid can supportr Peace or War' ” . London : Lynne Reinner .
- Surkhe . Peacebuilding Strategies for Afghanistan 38
- For instance ADA'S education programmes, which brought together Hazara and Pushtun school children See Goodhand, 'NCOS and peacebuilding in complex political emergencies'.
- Duffield, Global Governance and the New Wars.
- Duffield , M . “ 'Review of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan ' ” . 33
- Van Brabant and Killock . "The limits and scope' ” . 6
- Duffield et al, 'Review of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan'.
- Rubin cited in ibid, p. 28.
- Surkhe et al, Peacebuilding Strategies for Afghanistan.
- Austin , G . September 2001 . “ 'Great power geo-strategic roles in South and Central Asia' ” . In Talibanisation: Extremism and Regional Instability in South and Central Asia , September , 112 CPN In-Depth Study . Conflict Prevention Network
- For instance, in the 1999 Consolidated Appeal, while refugee return and alleviation of human suffering (mine action, food aid, emergency response) received 97 and 67, respectively of the requirements, for social services and livelihoods reconstruction only 27 and 18 of the necessary funding was received. Similarly, for the same year, although human rights was, in theory a donor priority, in practice none of the projects in the human rights thematic area was funded. Atmar&Goodhand, 'Aid, conflict and peacebuilding in Afghanistan'.
- 1999 . DAMDA, Danish Humanitarian Asistance, VoI 2; and Afghanistan , Vol. VoI 2 , VII London : ODI . 'Donor performance and conduct is a serious concern, involving a lack of coordination and consistency, politicization of assistance, micro-management and failure to provide a stable funding climate together with an apparent lack of accountability'
- Van Brabant and Killock . “ 'The limits and scope', also state that 'donors put pressure on operational agencies to better coordinate but they themselves do not pursue coordinated policies and approaches ' ” . 6
- Reindorp , N . April 2002 . “ 'Trends and challenges in the UN humanitarian system' ” . In 'The new humanitarianisms: a review of trends in global humanitarian action , Edited by: Macrae , J . April , ODI . Humanitarian Policy Group Report 11
- See Atmar&Goodhand, 'Aid, conflict and peacebuilding in Afghanistan '.
- Van Brabant and Killock . "The limits and scope' ” . 38 highlight the effectiveness of organizations with a substantial field presence in Afghanistan such as I CRC
- Surkhe . Peacebuilding Strategies for Afghanistan 37
- Edwards , M . 1999 . Future Positive: International Co-operation in the 21st Century , 206 London : Earthscan .
- Cliff and Luckham . “ 'Complex political emergencies and the state' ” . 29
- Goodhand, 'NCOS and peacebuilding in complex political emergencies'; Van Brabant&Killock, "The limits and scope'; and Duffield et al, 'Review of the Strategic Framework for Afghanistan'.
- Rubin et al, 'Afghanistan'.
- Donini . “ 'United Nations coordination in complex emergencies' ” . 25
- Vaux , T and Goodhand , J . “ 'Disturbing connections: aid and conflict in Kyrgyzstan' ” . The Conflict, Security and Development Group, Centre for Defence Studies, Kings College London . Conflict Assessments 3,2001
Third World Quarterly
Volume 23, 2002 - Issue 5