The multifaceted norm of objectivity in intelligence practices

ABSTRACT

Intelligence doctrines and textbooks on intelligence practices across a range of liberal democracies all describe objectivity as a central norm of intelligence work. However, the core meaning of objectivity is rarely fleshed out in a unified way. It seems to reflect a range of different perceptions, for example that the persons involved in the process of intelligence acquisition should be treated fairly; that intelligence professionals should minimise influence from cognitive biases; that analysts should be neutral and apolitical; or simply that subjectivity should be reduced. Since appeals to objectivity in general guide us when we are evaluating trustworthiness and legitimacy, we need to know what we mean when we talk about objectivity, as well as how we can ensure it and where we should look in order to determine to what extent intelligence practices are objective. This article maps and discusses various notions of objectivity in intelligence practices, such as interpretation-free, value-free and value-neutral. It argues that objectivity reflects at least five different norms that are irreducible to one another. By drawing on the multifaceted articulations of objectivity within the philosophy of science, a range of different meanings of objectivity is identified in the context of intelligence work. Fleshing out the complexity of intelligence objectivity reveals new subtleties that have so far not been elaborated in intelligence theory.

Acknowledgements

I am very thankful for valuable comments on a previous version of the article from Nadja K. Hestehave and Sille O. Søe. Additionally, I am very grateful for comprehensive comments and suggestions from two anonymous reviewers.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1. Douglas, ‘The Irreducible Complexity,’ 454.

2. Marrin, ‘Analytical objectivity.’

3. Ibid.

4. Hedley, ‘The Evolution,’ 25.

5. UK Ministry of Defence, Understanding Intelligence, 33.

6. Jervis, ‘Reports, politics and Intelligence Failures’; Treverton, ‘Intelligence analysis.’

7. Hedley, ‘Learning from Intelligence Failures’; Jervis, ‘Reports, Politics and Intelligence Failures.’

8. Marrin, ‘Analytical Objectivity’.

9. Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis; Woodard, ‘Tasting the Forbidden Fruit.’

10. cf. Colombo et al., ‘Objectivity in Science.’

11. Phythian (ed.), Understanding the Intelligence Cycle.

12. Douglas, ‘The Irreducible Complexity.’

13. Burch et al., ‘Objectivity in science and law.’

14. Ibid. Naturally, the identification of the target is likewise in no way a neutral and objective process, but I will focus on the latter elements of the intelligence cycle.

15. Räsänen and Nyce, ‘The Raw is Cooked’; Bruce and George, ‘Intelligence analysis,’ 12. See also the article by Miller in this special issue.

16. Phythian (ed.) Understanding the Intelligence Cycle.

17. Gitelman and Jackson, ‘Introduction: Raw Data is an Oxymoron,’ 3.

18. Elgin, True enough, 151.

19. Reiss and Sprenger, ‘Scientific Objectivity.’

20. Räsänen and Nyce, ‘The Raw is Cooked.’

21. Ibid., 656.

22. Reiss and Sprenger ‘Scientific Objectivity.’ See also Pili and Gaspard in this special issue.

23. Kaufmann, ‘The Co-Construction,’ Gitelman and Jackson, ‘Introduction: Raw Data is an Oxymoron,’ Räsänen and Nyce, ‘The Raw is Cooked,’ 655.

24. Bowker, ‘Data Flakes,’ Gitelman and Jackson, ‘Introduction: Raw Data is an Oxymoron,’ Kaufmann ‘The co-construction of crime predictions.’

25. See note 20 above.

26. Gundhus, ‘Smart Policing.’

27. Ibid., 153.

28. Ibid.

29. Egbert and Leese ‘Criminal Futures,’ 73.

30. Reiss and Sprenger ‘Scientific Objectivity.’

31. Hestehave, ‘Coppers Chasing Usual Suspects.’

32. Katz, Foreign Intelligence, 18–19.

33. Bowker, ‘Data Flakes’; Gitelman and Jackson, ‘Introduction: Raw Data is an Oxymoron,’ Kaufmann ‘The co-construction of crime predictions,’ Rathmell, ‘Towards Post-Modern Intelligence,’ Tang, ‘How do we know?’

34. See the article by Hendrickson in this special issue.

35. Rønn, ‘(Mis-) Informed Decisions?’

36. Heuer, The Psychology of Intelligence; Pherson & Heuer, Structured Analytic Techniques.

37. Former Principal Deputy DNI, Dr. Donald M. Kerr, 2007, quoted from Reuters available at: https://www.reuters.com/article/us-iran-nuclear-bolton-idUSL081165120071208

38. Norwegian Police’s Doctrine of Intelligence.

39. See note 12 above.

40. Ibid., 459

41. Ibid.

42. Ibid.

43. In order to illustrate the distinctions pertaining to the norm of objectivity understood as value-free, imagine for example a specialist on right-wing extremism employed in a national intelligence service, who chooses to initiate an analysis on a current trend in this environment – among other things, due to their personal interests and expertise on the area – but refrains from letting their interests in the topic influence the results of the analysis, and makes both aspects explicit in their analysis. In this example, the non-value-free conduct appears unproblematic.

44. Treverton, ‘The future of intelligence,’ 30.

45. Marrin, ‘Analytical Objectivity,’ 353

46. Reiss and Sprenger, ‘Scientific Objectivity,’ 2.

47. See note 45 above 354.

48. Gundhus, ‘Smart Policing.’.

49. Innes et al., ‘The Appliance of Science?’.

50. Heuer, The Psychology of Intelligence.

51. Ibid., 10.

52. Gadamer, Truth and method.

53. See note 1 above 460.

54. Cf. Jervis, ‘Reports, politics and Intelligence Failures,’ and Treverton, ‘Intelligence analysis.’.

55. See note 45 above 353.

56. Phythian, ‘Policing uncertainty,’ 199.

57. Bruce and George, ‘Intelligence analysis,’ 9.

58. Riste, ‘The Intelligence–Policy Maker Relationship.’

59. Ibid., 180.

60. Treverton, ‘Intelligence analysis.’

61. See note 1 above 459.

62. Rasch-Olsen, ‘Politiets Bruk av Informanter’. Naturally, this kind of intelligence collection is surrounded by norms and procedures aimed at ensuring quality and validity (see, e.g., Wippl et al. ‘The Qualities That Make a Great Collection Management Officer’).

63. Ibid.

64. Kent, Strategic Intelligence, 182, see also Davis, ‘Intelligence analysts and policymakers.’

65. Ibid.

66. See note 58 above.

67. Ibid., 187 (Riste refers to Betts, ‘The New Politics of Intelligence,’, when making this point).

68. See note 45 above 359.

69. Ibid.

70. Riste, ‘The Intelligence–Policy Maker Relationship,’ Rønn, ‘(Mis-)Informed Decisions.’

71. Treverton, ‘Intelligence analysis.’ Treverton additionally addresses ‘cherry picking’ as a type of politicisation in the context of intelligence, in which decision-makers select the conclusions that support their interests and disregard all other conclusions. In this regard, it would be interesting to discuss further whether objective intelligence processes and conclusions could be used for non-objective purposes, as pointed out by one of the anonymous reviewers.

72. Moen, ‘Recommendations in the police intelligence products.’

73. Bjerknes & Fahsing, [Investigation], 82.

74. Burch et al., ‘Objectivity in science and law,’ 63.

75. Ibid.

76. C.f. Bellaby, ‘What’s the Harm?,’ Omand and Phythian, Principled spying; Rønn, ‘Intelligence Ethics.’ See also Bellaby in this special issue.

77. Born & Wills, ‘Beyond the Oxymoron.’

78. Bellaby, ‘What’s the harm?’; Rønn and Lippert, ‘Out of Proportions?’

79. Fricker, Epistemic Injustice.

80. Marrin, ‘Analytical Objectivity.’

81. See note 1 above 454.

82. Pili and Gaspard in this special issue.

83. See note 45 above 359.

84. This is particularly evident in the initial work of Sherman Kent, who equates intelligence analysts with detached, scientific experts. See also (Jakobsen, Stridbeck, and Langballe 2018) for an interesting discussion on the tendency to rely on and apply concepts from ‘hard sciences’ when articulating and professionalising the crime-detection profession.

85. Marrin, Improving Intelligence Analysis, 37.

86. Folker, Intelligence Analysis.

87. Wilson, ‘The myth of objectivity.’

88. Kolflaath, ‘[On the Scientification of detective’s work]’.

89. See Pili and Gaspard in this special issue.

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Kira Vrist Rønn

Kira Vrist Rønn, Ph.D., Associate Professor at Department of Political Science and Public Management, University of Southern Denmark and Programme Director for the Master in Intelligence Studies. Rønn’s primary research interests are ethical issues related to policing, surveillance and security studies.