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ABSTRACT
International humanitarian actors and academics continue to struggle to understand armed group conduct and how to restrain this conduct when it violates moral, legal and humanitarian norms. Armed groups that lack a visible, explicit formal hierarchical command structure, equivalent to those found in state militaries, have proved a particular puzzle. A growing body of scholarship on the strategic functions of patterns of violence and restraint has usefully moved beyond assumptions that extreme violence is indicative of an absence of authority over armed actors. However, literature has tended to ignore the potential plurality and complexity of authority figures that shape violence and the constraining, conservative nature of certain moral orders. This article makes use of qualitative and ethnographic research in South Sudan to understand patterns of restraint among the gojam and titweng cattle-guarding defense forces from 2014 to 2017. The analysis documents how public authorities gained legitimacy within these groups by renegotiating a group’s social order, moral boundaries, and restraint through their own reinterpretations of meta-ethical ideals and histories. Cultural norms of restraint were manipulated by elites but were also remade into acts of creative refusal against these same elites. The article specifically focuses on how the life-giving work of children, women and old friends was used to protect life as well as incite violence. The article has implications for how international humanitarians can engage with the remaking of custom to enhance armed group restraint and better protect civilians.
Los actores humanitarios internacionales y los académicos continúan teniendo dificultades para comprender la conducta de los grupos armados y de qué manera contenerla cuando incumple las normas morales, legales y humanitarias. Los grupos armados que carecen de una estructura de mando jerárquica, formal, explícita y visible, equivalente a las que se encuentran en las fuerzas armadas estatales, han resultado un enigma particular. Un conjunto creciente de estudios sobre las funciones estratégicas de los patrones de la violencia y la limitación útilmente ha dejado atrás las suposiciones de que la violencia extrema es indicativa de una ausencia de autoridad sobre los actores armados. No obstante, la bibliografía ha tendido a ignorar la pluralidad y la complejidad potenciales de las figuras de autoridad que determinan la violencia y la naturaleza conservadora y restrictiva de ciertas órdenes morales. Este artículo hace uso de investigaciones cualitativas y etnográficas en Sudán del Sur para comprender los patrones de limitación entre las fuerzas de defensa protectoras del ganado titweng y gojam desde 2014 hasta 2017. El análisis documenta de qué manera las autoridades públicas obtuvieron legitimidad en estos grupos renegociando un orden social, límites morales y restricción del grupo a través de sus propias reinterpretaciones de los ideales y las historias metaéticos. Las normas culturales de la limitación no solo se vieron manipuladas por las élites, sino que también se convirtieron en actos de rechazo creativo contra estas mismas élites. El artículo se centra específicamente en cómo se utilizó el trabajo vital de niños, mujeres y antiguas amistades para proteger la vida, así como para incitar violencia. El artículo cuenta con implicaciones de cómo los humanitarios internacionales pueden comprometerse con el cambio de las costumbres para mejorar la limitación de los grupos armados y proteger mejor a los civiles.
Les acteurs humanitaires et universitaires du monde entier continuent de s’efforcer de comprendre la conduite des groupes armés et la manière dont ils se retiennent dans cette conduite lorsqu’elle enfreint les normes morales, légales et humanitaires. Les groupes armés ne disposant pas d’une structure de commandement hiérarchique officielle et clairement visible équivalente à celles des armées d’État se sont avérés comme étant un véritable casse-tête. Un corpus croissant de recherches sur les fonctions stratégiques des schémas de violence et de retenue est utilement allé au-delà des hypothèses selon lesquelles la violence extrême est indicatrice d’une absence d’autorité sur les acteurs armés. Cependant, la littérature a eu tendance à ignorer la pluralité et la complexité potentielles des figures d’autorité façonnant la violence, la retenue et la nature conservative de certains ordres moraux. Cet article exploite des recherches qualitatives et ethnographiques effectuées au Soudan du Sud pour comprendre les schémas de retenue des forces de défense des gardiens de bétail gojams et titwengs entre 2014 et 2017. Son analyze document la manière dont les autorités publiques ont acquis une légitimité au sein de ces groupes en renégociant l’ordre social, les limites morales et la retenue du groupe par le biais de ses propres réinterprétations des idéaux et histoires méta-éthiques. Les normes culturelles de retenue ont été manipulées par les élites mais également traduites en actes de refus créatifs contre ces mêmes élites. Cet article se concenter plus particulièrement sur la façon dont le travail de subsistance des enfants, des femmes et des amis de longue date a été utilisé pour préserver la vie, mais aussi pour inciter à la violence. Cet article a des implications relatives à la manière dont les humanitaires internationaux peuvent s’engager dans la refonte de la coutume afin d’améliorer la retenue des groupes armés et de mieux protéger les civils.
Acknowledgment
The author is thankful for the support of Fiona Terry and Brian McQuinn. The whole research project was reliant on their insightful and intellectual leadership, as well as their careful navigation of the academic and policy worlds. It was a deep privilege to work with such incredible people. I am also grateful to my two South Sudanese colleagues who contributed so much to this research and whose names are sadly not included in order to guard their safety. I am always grateful to Tim Allen at LSE for his consistent guidance and support, and for the ESRC's funding through CPAID. Finally, I am grateful to Oliver Kaplan, the journal editors and the anonymous reviewers who guided the article to publication.
Notes
1 The author knew these researchers from periods when she lived and worked in these areas. Co-authorship of this paper was discussed but it was decided against because of the sensitivity of some material. At the same time, the author is still working with these researchers to support them to develop their own research agendas, experience and writing to ensure that they gain full recognition for their growing abilities to research.
2 The author has continued to travel to South Sudan throughout the war years but reservations from the funder of this research prevented her travel to South Sudan for this specific piece of research.
3 This research underwent ethical review.
4 For example, in 2014, the White Army apparently mobilized in numbers of 4,000–5,000 to march on Bor Town.
5 Titweng can mean “wait for a cow” as well as “protect a cow.” This ambiguity is why gelweng is preferred in southern Bahr el Ghazal. ICRC staff, e-mail correspondence, May 2017; Research assistant, e-mail correspondence, June 2017.
6 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 2 with a titweng, Warrap State, 15th January 2016, in Dinka
7 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 2 with a titweng, Warrap State, 15th January 2016, in Dinka; Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 3 with a gelweng, Greater Rumbek, 12th February 2016, in Dinka.
8 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 2 with a titweng, Warrap State, 15th January 2016, in Dinka.
9 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 1 with gojam, Thonjor, 18th June 2016; Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 1 with former gojam, Kakuma Refugee Camp, 6th February 2017.
10 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 1 with gojam, Thonjor, 18th June 2016.
11 Craze, Numbers, 73.
12 Craze, Numbers, 73.
13 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 1 with cattle camp chief, Cattle Camp near Thonyor, 4th June 2016, in Nuer.
14 Discussions in Addis Ababa between the author and members of the SPLA-IO during the IGAD led peace negotiations, Addis Ababa, May-June 2014.
15 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 1 with cattle camp chief, Cattle Camp near Thonyor, 4th June 2016, in Nuer.
16 Riek Machar and SPLA-IO commanders never achieved political homogeneity among a Nuer community as Nuer commanders sided with the government from the outbreak of violence in December 2013.
17 Interviews with Dinka chiefs, Kuajok, 2012.
18 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 2 with a titweng, Warrap State, 17th January 2016, in Dinka.
19 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 1 with cattle camp gojam, Cattle Camp near Thonyor, 14th June 2016, in Nuer; Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 1 with former gojam, Kakuma Refugee Camp, 6th February 2017.
20 While there are clear accounts of these various patterns of violence, it has been harder to establish the frequency of these patterns. The warring parties have heavily censored the media and limited journalist reporting. The international community has very minimal presence, especially at times of violence. Some organizations do have a more detailed perspective on violence and its frequency but they are careful about reporting such violence in case it undermines their ability to operate in an area and deliver humanitarian assistance.
21 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 2 with the family of the boy killed, January 2017.
22 South Sudanese Researcher 2 observations of public meetings, in Dinka.
23 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 1 with elder, Gill near Ler, 13th June 2016, in Nuer.
24 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 1 with elder, Gill near Ler, 13th June 2016, in Nuer.
25 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 1 with elder, Gill near Ler, 13th June 2016, in Nuer.
26 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 1 with 17-year-old gojam, near Thonyor, June 2016, in Nuer.
27 Interview conducted by South Sudanese Researcher 1 with educated gojam initiated in 2001, Yang Cattle Camp, 17th June 2016.
28 Narrated by the woman to South Sudanese Researcher 1, near Thonyor, June 2016, in Nuer.
29 The elderly woman was the mother of the researcher. The attack happened a few days before he visited her in Ler. The woman survived the attack. She was later able to gain transport to Bentiu and her family eventually supported her to travel to her son’s home in Nairobi. In Nairobi the publication of this story was explicitly discussed with her to gain her consent for it to be published.