The Epistemic Integrity of NASA Practices in the Space Shuttle Program

Abstract

This article presents an account of epistemic integrity and uses it to demonstrate that the epistemic integrity of different kinds of practices in NASA's Space Shuttle Program was limited. We focus on the following kinds of practices: (1) research by working engineers, (2) review by middle-level managers, and (3) communication with the public. We argue that the epistemic integrity of these practices was undermined by production pressure at NASA, i.e., the pressure to launch an unreasonable amount of flights per year. Finally, our findings are used to develop some potential strategies to protect epistemic integrity in aerospace science.

Keywords:

• aerospace science
• deception
• epistemic integrity
• NASA
• production pressure
• Space Shuttle

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

Jan De Winter is a Ph.D. fellow of the Research Foundation (FWO)—Flanders. Research for this paper by Laszlo Kosolosky was supported by subventions from the Research Foundation (FWO)—Flanders through research project G.0122.10. We are very grateful to Erik Weber and two anonymous reviewers for reviewing earlier versions of this paper.

Notes

1. In detail, we conceive of this “new” discipline in the following manner: social epistemological research arose as an epistemological and philosophy of science reaction against the grown division between, on the one hand, analytic philosophy of science (as it became present after World War II) and, on the other hand, sociology of science (from the early 1970s). The difference between both disciplines is often perceived as a difference between a mainly normative and a mainly empirical discipline. Whereas philosophers of science (and epistemologists) focused more on grasping the right methodological rules that a single, rational scientist is to pursue, sociologists of science (and researchers within science studies in general) focus more on the description and explanation of the social history of science. Social epistemologists aspire to transcend this grown division. Social epistemology can be described by a number of characteristics, of which we align two here. First, social epistemologists emphasize the social or collective aspect of science and knowledge in general, as opposed to an individualistic approach in the traditional philosophy of science and epistemology; scientists accept claims as a result of interaction with, and mutual dependence of, others (and society in general). Methodological rules are always to comprise rules on how the social interaction between scientists should look like and how institutions should be shaped accordingly. Second, social epistemologists do not conclude that the social character of knowledge gaining is a source of bias or irrationality that would undermine or negatively influence the acceptance of true (or truth conforming) statements, this in contrast to a large audience within sociology of science. Social epistemologists regard the social dimension as constitutive for good knowledge and see it as their duty to sort out how the quest for knowledge should be organized—including its social (and institutional) dimensions. Social epistemologists do normative research, without hereby losing grip on the social dimension of knowledge. (This note is based on an unpublished research project proposal written by Jeroen Van Bouwel.)

2. David Resnik has been pursuing this type of research for a number of years. He has explored applied ethical and political issues in scientific practice from a social epistemology viewpoint (Resnik, 1996, 1998, 2007, 2009).

3. This notion should be distinguished from other notions of integrity, such as epistemic integrity of individuals, ethical integrity of practices, and ethical integrity of individuals. We leave the question of what the latter notions exactly stand for, and how the different notions exactly relate to each other to further research. Also see Resnik (1996, 1998).

4. For illustrations from other areas of research, see De Winter and Kosolosky (in press).

5. These two concepts were suggested by an anonymous reviewer of an earlier version of this paper.

6. See http://www.nasa.gov/

7. Thiokol's Boisjoly seemed to be aware of this. In an internal memo he sent to Robert Lund on July 31, 1985, he stated that the same scenario that resulted in the failure of the nozzle joint could also occur in a field joint (Presidential Commission, 1986, Vol. 1, pp. 249--250).

8. It should be noted that the pressure to produce is not unique to aerospace science. Similar pressures feature other areas of research. Think, for instance, of the pressure to produce results and the pressure to publish (Shamoo and Resnik, 2009).

9. Also see the report of the U.S. House Committee on Science and Technology: “[T]he present system permits [contractors] to “express concern” without actually saying, “stop the flight, it is unsafe”. If the odds favor a successful flight they do not have to be responsible for cancelling, yet if the mission fails they are on record as having warned about potential dangers” (House Committee, 1986, p. 152).

10. The recommendation that the importance of safety should be stressed within the organization has also been offered in the field of health care; see Institute of Medicine (2000).

11. We should mention that there already is a lot of research on the effects of different kinds of pressure in science (e.g., Shamoo and Resnik, 2009). What we propose here more specifically is to use our concept of epistemic integrity to clarify whether, how, and why different kinds of pressure compromise epistemic integrity.