The secret lives of unrecognised states: Internal dynamics, external relations, and counter-recognition strategies

Abstract

This article focuses on how unrecognised states have tried to establish themselves domestically and internationally, and on the efforts of base states designed to counter these initiatives. Having provided an overview of the main features of post-Soviet unrecognised states, we examine the political systems found in these territories, focusing on their presidents, parliaments, and elections. We then focus on how unrecognised states strive to strengthen themselves through support from abroad, in spite of international isolation. Finally, we debate the strategies enacted by base states to counter such efforts and deny international legitimacy and recognition to these entities.

Keywords:

• Unrecognised states
• Abkhazia
• South Ossetia
• Transnistria
• Nagorno-Karabakh

Notes

1. See, for example, Kolstø and Paukovic, ‘The Short and Brutish Life of Republika Srpska Krajina’.

2. King, ‘The Benefits of Ethnic War’, 550.

3. Geldenhuys, Deviant Conduct in World Politics.

4. Caspersen, Unrecognised States, 2.

5. Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States, 18.

6. The non-Soviet half-dozen are Somaliland (completely unrecognised), Sahrawi Arab Democratic Republic (recognised by 84 UN member states), Palestine (recognised by 135 UN member states), the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (recognised by Turkey), Taiwan/Republic of China (recognised by 21 UN member states and the Holy See), and Kosovo (recognised by 112 UN member states).

7. Though Adjara had a status within the Georgian SSR equal to Abkhazia and superior to South Ossetia and despite the independence of Aslan Abashidze’s post-Soviet presidency from the Georgian government, Adjara never achieved nor aspired to international recognition as a separate state. See Coene, The Caucasus, 40–1. For cooperation between Abashidze and Shevardnadze, see Ó Beacháin, ‘Roses and Tulips’, 15.

8. Pegg, De Facto States.

9. King ‘The Benefits of Ethnic War’, Caspersen, Unrecognised States.

10. Kolossov and O’Loughlin, ‘Pseudo‐States as Harbingers of a New Geopolitics’.

11. Kingston and Spears, States Within States.

12. Baev, Russia’s Policies in Secessionist Conflicts.

13. Kolstø, ‘The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States’. In his influential book, Quasi-States, Robert Jackson uses the term ‘quasi-states’ to describe ineffectual recognised states.

14. Byman and King, ‘The Mystery of Phantom States’.

15. Geldenhuys, Deviant Conduct in World Politics.

16. Isachenko, The Making of Informal States.

17. For a masterly overview of the literature on unrecognised states, see Broers ‘Recognising Politics in Unrecognised States’.

18. See The Law of Georgia on Occupied Territories (23 October 2008). Available at http://www.smr.gov.ge/docs/doc216.pdf.

19. In terms of the names of institutions and positions within the unrecognised states, for the most part we use the terms currently employed within those entities. No political preferences should be assumed or is implied by the choices made for the purposes of this article. In the case of Abkhazia and South Ossetia, these are in some respects ‘partially recognised states’ in that they have secured recognition from a handful of UN member states, including a permanent member of the UN Security Council, Russia. However, while this symbolically elevates them above Nagorno-Karabakh and Transnistria it matters little in most other respects. Lack of collective recognition denies them access to the UN and a plethora of other international organisations, not to mention the means to act bilaterally with almost every state in the world.

20. This was pointed out to Donnacha Ó Beacháin by Artak Beglaryan, Spokesman of the Prime Minister of the NKR (September 2014).

21. Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession.

22. Lynch, ‘De Facto “States” Around the Black Sea’, 486.

23. Blakkisrud and Kolstø, ‘Dynamics of De Facto Statehood’, 293. In his seminal work, De Facto States, Pegg recommends a minimum of two years; the same time requirement has been included in later definitions of the concept, including by Kolstø, ‘The Sustainability and Future of Unrecognized Quasi-States’ and Caspersen, Unrecognised States.

24. In response to a question put by Donnacha Ó Beacháin in July 2011 Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili said: ‘These conflicts are not frozen. There is nothing frozen for the 500,000 IDPs from those territories, there is nothing frozen for people who are still left there, living in what is basically total lawlessness, where they can be killed.’ For an analysis of the 2008 war, see Companjen and Polese, ‘Subtle Line Between Self-Defence and War’.

25. This term is used in Byman and King, ‘The Mystery of Phantom States’.

26. Toponyms in post-Soviet unrecognised states are often objects of contention. The Megrelian-populated region of South Abkhazia is called ‘Gal’ by the Abkhazian authorities and ‘Gali’ by Georgians. Similarly, the Abkhazian de facto authorities refer to Abkhazia’s main city and seat of its de facto government as ‘Sukhum’; ‘Sukhumi’ is established both in Russian and English, while in Georgian it is called ‘Sokhumi’.

27. In an interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin (2006), the Minister for Reintegration of the Republic of Moldova, Vasile Sova, claimed that a majority of Transnistria’s population had Moldovan citizenship. To complicate matters further, a substantial number of Moldovans have obtained citizenship of Romania, particularly prior to that country joining the EU in 2007. Natalia Angheli, Senior Consultant with Independent Journalism Center, Chișinău, Moldova, interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin (2006).

28. Prime Minister of Abkhazia (1995–1997, 2002–2003), Genadi Gaguli, interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin (2006). Gagulia negotiated directly with Purin on the issue of passports and pensions.

29. Indeed, it was the possession of Georgian passports that led to the disenfranchisement of citizens in the Gal/i region of Abkhazia shortly before the snap presidential elections of August 2014. It was widely understood before then that Gal/i residents had Georgian passports ‘under the bed’ and used them to claim benefits in Georgia (they did not, for the most part, benefit from the pensions and passports provided by Russia). Prime Minister of Abkhazia (2011–2014), Leonid Lakerbaia, interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin (2012).

30. According to Armine Aleksanyan of the NKR Ministry for Foreign Affairs of Nagorno-Karabakh passport serial numbers indicate that the holders are resident in NKR. (interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin 2008).

31. Abkhaz language teacher, Supen Papba, interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin (2006); Armenian School Director, Azniv Keyyan, interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin (2012). Minister of Education of Abkhazia, Indira Vardania, interview with Giorgio Comai (2011); Suren Kerselian, former head of the Armenian community of Abkhazia, interview with Giorgio Comai (2011). See also Comai, ‘Sovereignty Conflicts and Minority Protection’, 168–72 and Comai and Venturi, ‘Language and Education Laws’.

32. Ó Beacháin, ‘Nation-building and elections in an unrecognised state’.

33. Details of the Status Neutral Documents can be found on the website of the Georgian Government’s Ministry for Reconciliation and Civic Equality available at http://www.smr.gov.ge/index.php?opt=101 (accessed 29 July 2015). A useful comparative study of status neutral travel documents prepared by the EU for the Georgian Government can be found at http://www.themediateur.eu/resources/publications/item/30-comparative-study-on-status-neutral-travel-documents (accessed 29 July 2015). As of the beginning of 2014, only 12 countries, including the United States, had accepted these documents.

34. This conclusion is based on numerous interviews and meetings held in Abkhazia, including those with the Minister of Foreign Affairs, Viacheslav Chirikba and the Deputy Minister for Foreign Affairs, Irakli Khintba (conducted by Donnacha Ó Beacháin, 2011, 2012, 2014).

35. For overviews of how the unrecognised states interact with external actors mandated to try and resolve unresolved issues with the base states and between base and patron states, see Ó Beacháin, ‘Ireland’s Chairmanship of the OSCE’ in particular 101–7; Ó Beacháin, ‘Ireland’s Foreign Relations in 2012’, 368–75; Ó Beacháin, ‘The Role of External Actors’; Ó Beacháin, ‘The Role of the EU and the OSCE’.

36. This is notwithstanding Raul Khadjimba’s elevation from parliamentarian to president in Abkhazia in 2014. See Ó Beacháin, ‘What Happens When an Unrecognised Country Experiences a Revolution?’; Ó Beacháin, ‘Elections Without Recognition’. For the importance of elections as catalysts for change in the post-Soviet space, see Ó Beacháin and Polese, The Colour Revolutions in the Former Soviet Republics.

37. After an unprecedented level of competition in the 2012 presidential election, the NKR regained its ‘partly free’ ranking. See Ó Beacháin, ‘Elections Without Recognition’.

38. For example, all 206 parliamentary candidates contesting the 2015 NKR parliamentary elections were ethnic Armenians.

39. This stems from the mass deportation of the Abkhaz to Turkey in the late nineteenth century, compounded by the movement of Georgians to Abkhazia during Soviet times. See Lak’oba, ‘History’; Ó Beacháin, ‘Abkhaz’, 3–4.

40. Teacher of Abkhaz Language, Supen Papba, interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin (2006); NGO leader and Deputy Director of League of Voters, Aliona Kuvichko, interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin (2009); Scholar and since 2011 Abkhazia’s Minister for Foreign Affairs, Vyacheslav Chirikba, interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin (2011).

41. Though linguistic requirements for executive office are rare, they can be found in several post-Soviet states in Central Asia. See Ó Beacháin and Kevlihan, ‘Threading a Needle’. In the August 2014 presidential election, the ethnic exclusivity was further refined by the disenfranchisement of most Georgians and enfranchisement of ethnic Abkhaz living abroad. See Ó Beacháin, ‘Elections Without Recognition’.

42. Protsyk, ‘Representation and Democracy in Transnistria’, 260–7.

43. In the 2005–2010 legislature, only 30.2% of deputies were reported on the parliamentary website to have been born in Transnistria compared to 42% in either Russia or Ukraine and 11.6% in Chișinău-controlled Moldova (Protsyk 2009: 265). The subsequent parliament (2010 -2015) contained a slight majority (22 out of 43) of deputies born in Transnistria. See profiles of parliamentarians at the website of the Supreme Soviet of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic [Верховный Cовет Приднестровской Молдавской Республики]. Available at http://www.vspmr.org/structure/deputies/ (accessed 27 July 2015).

44. Ó Beacháin-Stefanczak and Connolly, ‘Gender and Political Representation’.

45. With the renewal of the war in Chechnya, a total blockade at the border on the Psou between Abkhazia and Krasnodar Krai was introduced by decree starting with 21 December 1994. On 7 July 1995, a new decision by the Russian government opened the border to men of pensionable age (60 years), women independently of their age, and children until the age of 16. These provisions were kept in place until 9 September 1999, when the new government headed by Vladimir Putin issued a new decision, nullifying them. See Volkhonskiy et al., Konflikty v Abkhazii I Yuzhnoi Osetii.

46. ‘The United Nations and international nongovernmental organizations, such as Acciòn Contra la Hambre, the International Committee of the Red Cross, and Médicines sans Frontieres, have become the pillars of social security in Abkhazia. The Abkhaz Ministry of Health is little more than a façade for the support of the vulnerable and ill provided by these international humanitarian organizations. The money brought into Abkhazia by international humanitarian organizations is far larger than the declared budget of the separatist state.’ Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States, 44. For an extended journalistic account of the situation in Abkhazia in the 1990s, see Górecki, Abchazja.

47. Médecins Sans Frontières, ‘Abkhazia, Old and Frail’.

48. International Crisis Group, ‘Abkhazia: Deepening Dependence’; International Crisis Group, ‘Abkhazia: The Long Road to Reconciliation,’ 24–5.

49. According to the treaty signed with Abkhazia (art. 7), in case of military aggression a representative of the Russian military will take command over joint forces. In the treaty signed with South Ossetia (art. 2), local military units are to be fully integrated into Russian military forces.

50. It should be highlighted, however, that even staunch supporters of independence wish to see a high level of integration with Russia. For example, Stanislav Lak’oba, former head of Abkhazia’s Security Council and well-known local historian, has stated in an interview with one of the authors that he thinks relations between Russia and Abkhazia should be ‘about the same as the ones between France and Monaco’ (Stanislav Lak’oba, interview with Giorgio Comai, 2010).

51. De Waal, ‘The Karabakh Trap’, 7–8; de Waal, ‘Remaking the Nagorno-Karabakh Peace Process,’ 159.

52. Toal and O’Loughlin, ‘Inside South Ossetia’.

53. Joining Russia was the preferred option for over 50% of both ethnic Russian and Ukrainian respondents. See O’Loughlin et al., ‘Divided Space, Divided Attitudes?’.

54. See in particular Kosienkowski, Continuity and Change; Kosienkowski, ‘Is Internationally Recognised Independence the Goal of Quasi-States?’

55. Technically speaking, only sovereign entities can become part of the Russian Federation. In March 2014 Crimea formally declared its independence in order to become a constituent part of the Russian Federation. See Walter et al., Self-Determination and Secession, 297–8.

56. For a Transnistrian perspective on the negative effects for the Transnistrian economy of customs registration in Moldova, see Shtanski et al., ‘Blokada Pridnestrov’ya’.

57. Transnistria’s Bureau of Statistics, Statisticheskii Ezhegodnik PMR 2014.

58. See EurasiaNet, ‘Syrian Refugees’. In the rhetoric and administrative decisions of authorities in Stepanakert, the distinction between the territories of Soviet time Nagorno-Karabakh and the districts surrounding it conquered during the war in the early 1990s is disappearing. See Toal and O’Loughlin, ‘Land for Peace?’

59. In 2014, adult repatriates received approximately €40 per month, while children and pensioners received about €60 per month. See Kapba, ‘Syrian Repatriates’.

60. O Strakhovykh Vznosakh I Platezhakh.

61. See Bargandzhia, ‘V Abkhazii Prozhivaet 4 Tysiachi Repatriantov – Smyr’.

62. For a debate on Internet use by authorities of post-Soviet de facto states, see Comai, ‘Post-Soviet de Facto States Online’.

63. As argued by Ker-Lindsay, ‘there is often a reluctance to engage with anyone attached to a foreign ministry [of a de facto state], exactly because such interaction may be constructed as an implicit recognition of the sovereign nature of the territory: only sovereign states have a Ministry of Foreign Affairs’. See Ker-Lindsay, ‘Engagement without Recognition’, 278.

64. Lynch, Engaging Eurasia’s Separatist States, 18

65. ‘Putin calls Kosovo independence ‘terrible precedent’’, The Sydney Morning Herald, 23 February 2008.

66. A representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry to the Transnistrian settlement, Sergey Gubarev, put it sharply in April 2011: ‘Transnistria can live independently from Moldova only if it flies to the Moon’. Despite not officially recognising Transnistria’s independence, Russia has established a consulate in the disputed territory. Kosienkowski, ‘Is Internationally Recognised Independence the Goal of Quasi-States?’, 59.

67. One of the authors (Donnacha Ó Beacháin) was in Abkhazia when Venezuela’s recognition was announced. Considering that this was only Abkhazia’s third recognition and the first in a year the absence of mass celebrations was remarkable. Instead, there was a widespread acceptance that geopolitical alliances and money had secured the recognition rather than any assessment of the merits of Abkhazia’s case for independence. These realities were underlined by the fact that President Hugo Chavez didn’t travel to the Caucasus but rather made the announcement in Moscow.

68. Civil.ge, ‘Sokhumi Says Recognized by Vanuatu’.

69. Former Georgian diplomats in interviews with Ann Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili (2015).

70. Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession, 82.

71. See Popescu, EU Foreign Policy and Post-Soviet Conflicts, for a concise and comprehensive overview of how EU policy towards the post-Soviet de facto states has evolved since the early 1990s. Europe’s Unrecognised Neighbours, 9.

72. Ker-Lindsay, The Foreign Policy of Counter Secession, 21.

73. The Foreign Policy Concept of the Pridnestrovian Moldavian Republic. http://mfa-pmr.org/en/yGL.

74. Statement by the MFA of the PMR in connection with the incident that occurred on 20 April 2015 at the airport in Kishinev involving an official of the Foreign Ministry of Pridnestrovie. http://mfa-pmr.org/en/phC.

75. Ó Beacháin, ‘Elections Without Recognition’.

76. Abkhazworld.com, ‘A polling-station has been opened’.

77. Civil.ge, ‘Georgia Summons Armenian Diplomat’.

78. Civil.ge, ‘თბილისი აფხაზეთში ‘ბენეტონის’ მაღაზიის გახსნის გეგმებს აპროტესტებს’. 25 May, 2009.

79. Democracy and Freedom Watch, ‘McDonald’s to open restaurant in Abkhazia?’.

80. Ann Tsurtsumia-Zurabashvili, interview with former Georgian diplomat, 2015.

81. Donnacha Ó Beacháin, interview with member of Georgian parliament, 2010.

82. Minister for Foreign Affairs, Maxim Gvinjia, interview with Donnacha Ó Beacháin (2011). A similar complaint was made by Juris Gulbis, Abkhazia’s ambassador to the Pacific and Caribbean who opined that ‘There is great pressure on . . . Vanuatu, Tuvalu, and Nauru to unrecognise Abkhazia,’ adding that Washington withheld to the countries over the issue at that time. Quoted in Radio Free Europe, ‘To Recognize or Not to Recognize Abkhazia?’.

83. See http://www.mfa.gov.ge.

84. ‘Georgian MFA: Vanuatu does not recognize Abkhazia’s independence’, Georgia Times, 16 June 2011. Radio Free Europe, ‘To Recognize or Not To Recognize Abkhazia?’.

85. Barry, ‘Vanuatu Recognizes Abkhazia’.

86. As Berg and Toomla have put it, ‘[the] current legal and normative doctrine forbids de jure recognition to those territorial units whose political leadership has been successfully resisted by metropolitan central authorities’. Berg and Toomla, ‘Forms of Normalisation in the Quest for De Facto Statehood’, 222.

87. See Walls and Kibble, ‘What Makes Somaliland’s Case for Recognition So Different?’, Pegg and Kolstø. ‘Somaliland’.

88. The ‘separated brethren’ narrative is particularly strong in Georgia where it is frequently argued that were it not for Russia, Georgian–Abkhaz and Georgian–Ossetian relations would be amicable, as they have been for centuries. The narrative is less strong in Moldova given the rather confused sense of nationality in both base and unrecognised states, and is absent altogether in Azerbaijan where Armenians, be they in Yerevan or Stepanakert, are viewed as implacable enemies. A particularly stark example of this is the Safarov case. See Ó Beacháin, ‘Ireland’s Chairmanship of the OSCE’, 104–5. For how the Georgian government has attempted to garner EU support to bring Abkhazia and South Ossetia under Tbilisi’s jurisdiction see Ó Beacháin and Coene, ‘Go West’.

89. With its significant industrial exports to a variety of countries in Europe and beyond, Transnistria is a partial exception.