Working on the Other Side. Cooperative Tour Organizers and Uncooperative Hoteliers: Evidence from Greek Cypriot Tourism Professionals

Abstract

In this research, the authors investigate the willingness of the Greek Cypriot tourism professionals to cooperate with the Turkish Cypriot counterparts in the industry. The analytical framework draws on the literature on the conflict in Cyprus, in general, and on the conflict and its impact on tourism, in particular. A few hypotheses are explored relating to what influences the tourism professionals towards cooperating with the Turkish Cypriots: their refugee experience, their increased level of contact with Turkish Cypriots, the size of the organization in which they work and the location and nature of these organizations. The data are based on a series of interviews on the support for cooperation between the tourism professionals among the Greek Cypriots. The findings show that there is clear evidence that the Greek Cypriot hotel managers are unlikely at present to cooperate with the Turkish Cypriot counterparts. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot tour operators and tourist agencies are willing to collaborate with the other side. This paper follows with a case study of a Greek Cypriot tour-operating company which collaborates with the other side. It is suggested that policies could be designed that aim at the reconciliation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots through the introduction of political correctness in the business, which is one of the theatres on which the Cyprus conflict is staged.

Acknowledgements

This study was part of a joined study (Mehmet et al., 2008) in which an identical questionnaire was used both for Turkish Cypriot and for Greek Cypriot tourism professionals. This paper reports on the Greek Cypriot part of the survey.

Notes

The defamation campaign was directed mainly against the politicians and journalists who expressed support for the UN plan in the run up to the referendum, though single members of the civil society had also been targeted (see Drousiotis, 2005).

There are prominent cases of individuals who demonstrated interest in bi-communal business cooperation which received negative press coverage. For example, Vassiliko Cement Works (in Greek Cypriot south) was interested in selling cement to Turkish Cypriot buyers (http://www.simerini.com/nqcontent.cfm?a_id=159480) and a company was established by ex-minister of Agriculture Costas Themistocleous with Turkish Cypriot partners (http://www.hri.org/cgi-bin/brief?/news/cyprus/kypegr/2005/05-06-11.kypegr.html).

According to Eurostat, Cyprus has also a relatively large bed capacity compared to its population (115 per 1000 inhabitants in 2006). For comparison, France has 20 beds per 1000 inhabitants, Greece 62, Italy 35 and Spain 37.

For those who want to investigate the size of the literature written on the Cyprus conflict, Demetriou's (2004) article is a good introduction.

The term refugee applied in this document refers to dislocated Greek Cypriots who lived prior to the 1974 events north of the demarcation line and their descendants.

Detailed survey material can be found in Mehmet et al. (2008).

The respondents were predominantly male.

Other measures of correlation were also used in this diagnostic analysis (Kendall's Tau and Spearman's Rho). The correlation coefficients and significance levels using these alternative measures were almost identical to those derived from the Pearson approach.

This is consistent with the analysis of the results of the 2004 referendum on the Annan plan, which shows an increase in the negative vote, which is positively correlated with distance from the dividing line (70% rejection in Nicosia against 82% in Paphos—Christophorou, 2005, p. 97).

Similar findings confirming the non-relevance of the refugee status have also been reported in the literature within different research contexts. In her work on the crossings of the Green Line, Hadjipavlou (2007, p. 69) indicates that “The crossings do carry personal, political and social meanings which vary among the different social groups cutting across ideologies, class, age and refugee or non-refugee identity”. Similarly, in his study of the background of the referenda in Cyprus on the Annan Plan, Christophorou (2005, p. 97) notes that “At first sight, it appeared that the Greek Cypriot refugees, who fled the north of the island during and following the advance of the Turkish Army in summer 1974 had similar attitudes to the rest of the population. It appears that the vast majority viewed the return of territory and about half of the refugees to their homes, under Greek Cypriot control, as insufficient reason to support the plan”.

Over 97% of the hoteliers in our sample are not currently cooperating across the Green Line, while the corresponding figure for non-hoteliers is about 53%.

Mullen (2008, p. 3) reports that:

• Greek Cypriot businesses appear to be the net beneficiaries of the opening of the Green Line in April 2003, as total spending by Turkish Cypriots in the south reached EUR 14.3 mln in January-September, whereas total spending by Greek Cypriots reached only around EUR 5.5 mln, according to the JCC [credit card clearing house] joint venture run by the commercial banks. The largest beneficiary of spending using Turkish credit cards in the south was supermarkets, earning EUR 3.4 mln, followed by clothing (EUR 2.8 mln), “other retailers” (EUR 2.08 mln) and DIY and household stores (EUR 2.06 mln).

Hadjipavlou (2007, p. 64) adds:

• The property issue is the most complex and significant one in the Cyprus conflict because of its connection to identity, justice and family history. This complexity emerged during the ‘crossings’. This is an example where the same space, a family house, provides for and symbolizes past and present memories and realities. Both parties legitimately claim it to be their own. These individuals shared personal stories related to the same piece of land, which violence and war took its past owner and handed it to the present one. They both experienced dislocation and fear.

Except where otherwise indicated, this section—and any quotes in it—are drawn from personal communication with Mrs. Papageorgiou.

From a commercial point of view, the tour operator collaborates with a Turkish Cypriot company, which takes care of all the details of the operations in the north. As it stands today, this collaboration is smooth and requires communication with only one partner and the excursion is reported to be an interesting product offering a high yield.

When several coaches are re-united for the purpose of a guided visit at a given tourist spot, the “one coach-one guide” rule is still strictly enforced. It can be argued that the guides in the south operate with a kind of “closed shop mentality” and are highly regulated by their own association (the Cyprus Tourist Guides Association—CTGA) and the Cyprus Tourism Organisation. The guides are seen to protect their monopoly in the market, partly by imposing Greek as an obligatory language for accredited guides while in fact it is the least used language in the market.

According to Leonard (2007, p. 69),

• As with the Turkish Cypriot tour guides, the Greek Cypriot guides claim that their tours are historical, however, the over-emphasis of certain historical events and neglect of others is a deeply political act enabling guides from both sides of Nicosia to present a partial view of history favourable to a specific biased interpretation of the conflict. Hence both Greek and Turkish Cypriots hope to gain more political sympathy with their struggle by exposing tourists to certain dimensions of the conflict. Moreover, as with the Turkish Cypriot guide, during informal conversations, both Greek Cypriot guides draw poignantly on their personal history of losing their former homes in the North adding credibility to their subsequent interpretation of the contested nature of their country.

On political tourism see also other relevant contributions in Israel and Ireland by Brin (2006), Gelbman (2008), and McDowell (2008).

Altinay and Bowen (2006, p. 953) concur with the view that diversity will be the asset of the new Cyprus: “… both mistrust and negative competition would lose some of their venom if the Cyprus product could be viewed as diversified: not out of neglect or lack of political power, but out of a sensible island-wide strategy to encourage breadth in the product offering”.

Others have also echoed this view. Altinay and Bowen (2006, p. 953) indicate that “a political solution in Cyprus requires appropriate preparation of both the national and the operating environment of the country even before a federal solution is established”. Hadjipavlou (2007, p. 62) makes the same argument in a more forceful way: “In fact, the state has undermined the importance of reconciliation by insisting that there can be no reconciliation prior to a solution. From my research, I find that the reconciliation processes need to start in parallel to the official negotiations. People need to be socialized in a culture of safety, trust and confidence in the future so that they can invest in the implementation of the political solution when it comes”. Christophorou (2005, p. 102) explains the rejection of the Annan peace plan with a range of reasons including the fact that “nothing substantial had been done to prepare the Greek Cypriots for reconciliation, to face the realities of a federal solution, and, especially, to come to terms with the radical changes that time has brought to all aspects of life on the island”. Still, we should not ignore efforts that are being made by the Greek Cypriot minister of Education Mr. Andreas Demetriou as well as the steps that have already been taken by the TRNC government under pro-reunification Turkish Republican Party (CTP) in reviewing the content of the respective schoolbooks on the history of Cyprus in an attempt to promote reconciliation and empathy with the other side (see also Papadakis, 2008). These attempts may also serve as a basis for reviewing the content of tourist brochures or the information given by tourist guides.

“While tourists are not passive recipients of dominant discourses, for a short period of time they provide a captive audience which can be influenced, persuaded, cajoled and deceived into accepting the legitimacy of certain interpretations of events over others” (Leonard, 2007, p. 72).

This is also evidenced by a letter sent to the editor of the Sunday Mail, the main English language newspaper published in Nicosia. The letter was entitled “Tourists don't want a Cyprus problem lecture” (Winnett, 2008).