“De-Risking” East London: Olympic Regeneration Planning 2000–2012

Abstract

The concept of legacy has emerged in the twenty-first century as a dominant narrative within mega-event projects. Accordingly, event hosts now engage in detailed legacy planning. This often means creating new agencies and new plans; something that has important implications for wider urban governance and planning. This paper focuses on initiatives attached to the 2012 Olympic Games in London. One of the main aims of staging the Games was regenerating East London; and the pre-event planning (2000–2012) associated with this legacy promise is the focus here. Using evidence collected from primary and secondary research, the paper records how the governance and planning arrangements evolved over 2000–2012. These were designed to achieve regeneration effects at different scales; in the Olympic Park, the fringes of the Park and in the wider sub-region. The paper acknowledges the pioneering work undertaken in London, but also identifies the key issues, challenges and dilemmas involved. The paper concludes that Olympic regeneration planning has rescaled regeneration governance in London, privileging city-wide and national stakeholders. It also suggests that, rather than a process driven by corporate interests and public–private partnerships, London 2012 regeneration planning is best understood as government intervention that de-risked East London for private-sector investors.

Acknowledgements

This paper is derived from a wider project funded by the Royal Institution of Chartered Surveyors 2010–2011. The author would like to acknowledge the contribution of Nancy Stevenson who assisted with the interviews and their preliminary analysis.

Notes

1. For example, work often bemoans the lack of affordable housing in the Olympic Village. Fussey et al. (2012, p. 272) state “commitments to affordable housing within the post-Games Olympic Village have been repeatedly downgraded since their announcement”. Approximately 50% of the Athletes Village is designated as affordable. This figure has remained constant since it was first cited in London's Candidate File (2004) and it represents a higher proportion than minimum requirements for new developments stipulated in all recent London Plans. Fussey et al. seem to be confusing the provision of affordable housing in the Village with affordable housing in the Olympic Park more generally; an understandable conflation that highlights the complexity of the case study.

2. The work of Minton (2012) is a good example. In the latest edition of her book “Ground Control” she claims that places within the Queen Elizabeth Olympic Park “will be private” and “run by private companies” (p. xviii). That would contravene various agreements and is not a fair reflection of plans past or present.

3. For example, a failure to acknowledge the expiry of certain plans and organisations. Whilst admitting some plans are under review, Davies (2012, p. 17) suggests it will be “difficult to link together” all the fragmented regenerations plans; but many of the plans she cites to support this argument are now defunct, were merely consultation drafts or were never adopted.

4. Post Games this has been retained and renamed the Growth Boroughs Unit.

5. In May 2013 the LLDC signed a deal with the iCITY consortium giving them a 200 year lease of the media centres.

6. This was finally resolved in 2013, ending a 10-year struggle to determine a long-term use.