Legitimacy in municipal experimental governance: questioning the public good in urban innovation practices

ABSTRACT

Urban experiments, living labs and testbeds have emerged as influential approaches to governing cities around the world. Experimental governance allows stakeholders to trial possible futures and to embrace creativity and innovation in the pursuit of sustainability goals. Experiments are often conducted through triple helix partnerships that favour informal and distributed actions. This is a significant departure from traditional urban development processes that are informed by well-defined processes executed by public authorities to ensure the public good and are legitimated by citizens. In this paper, we investigate this tension between experimental governance and public sector legitimacy by focusing on experimental practices in two Swedish municipalities, Stockholm and Gothenburg. We gathered data through a desk-based study, participant observations and semi-structured interviews with municipal actors to investigate the input, throughput and output legitimacy of municipalities in experimental governance. The findings indicate that municipalities emphasise actions and results from experiments, while de-emphasising reflection and attention to democratic procedures and protection of the public good. The focus on legitimacy reveals the fragmented and instrumental practices of experimental governance and a deficit in organizational capacity with potential detrimental impacts on legitimacy.

KEYWORDS:

• Experimental governance
• legitimacy
• municipalities
• democracy

Introduction

In searching for local solutions to global challenges, experiments have rapidly emerged as important interventions to transform cities (Bulkeley and Castán Broto 2013; Evans, Karvonen, and Raven 2016). Experiments are often conducted in living labs, testbeds, platforms and innovation districts where urban stakeholders trial solutions for more desirable futures (Bulkeley and Castán Broto 2013; Bulkeley et al. 2019; Evans, Karvonen, and Raven 2016; Fuenfschilling, Frantzeskaki, and Coenen 2018; Sengers, Wieczorek, and Raven 2019). These activities leverage urban entrepreneurialism and innovation to create durable links between existing conditions in cities and distant sustainability goals, creating a hopeful and action-oriented approach to enact sustainable urban transformations (Karvonen and Van Heur 2014; McCann 2011). Collectively, these activities comprise a new mode of experimental governance to accelerate learning processes and the pursuit of sustainable urban development goals (Kronsell and Mukhtar-Landgren 2018; Laakso, Berg, and Annala 2017).

Experimental governance frequently involves triple helix collaborative partnerships (Ansell and Bartenberger 2016; Bulkeley et al. 2016) with the public sector, private sector and academia, and in rare instances, quadruple helix partnerships that also include civil society. These collaborations champion co-creation through distributed decision-making and action processes that blur the roles and responsibilities of the involved stakeholders while also raising pertinent questions about interests, conflict resolution and power dynamics (Klijn and Skelcher 2007; Sørensen and Torfing 2009). Of particular concern in this study is the decentredness of experimental governance and how this influences the legitimacy of the public sector. Local authorities are the designated protector of the public good in conventional modes of urban governance (March and Olsen 1989; Pollitt and Bouckaert 2017) and it is unclear how decentred modes of experimental governance influence their legitimacy.

In this article, we investigate legitimacy in experimental governance through the following research question: How is public sector legitimacy influenced by experimental governance? We address this question by applying a conceptual framework of input, throughput and output legitimacy (Klijn and Koppenjan 2015; Scharpf 1999) to experimental activities by the municipalities of two Swedish cities, Stockholm and Gothenburg.¹ These municipalities are typical of many local governments around the world that are embracing various modes of experimentation to forward their social, environmental and economic goals. Our study does not focus on single experiments, specific logics or experimental outcomes in each city but rather on the collective actions by the municipal representatives to engage in innovation activities while maintaining their commitment to protecting the public good. The findings from Stockholm and Gothenburg suggest that experimental governance tends to focus on outputs and results with little reflection on the municipality’s duty to protect the public good. This suggests that municipalities need to modify their experimental governance practices to be less instrumental and outcome-driven and instead, focus more on realizing decision-making and action processes to be democratic, open and inclusive.

We begin with a theoretical background on experiments and legitimacy and then describe our conceptual framework on input, throughput and output legitimacy. This is followed by a description of the methodology and findings on how the experimental governance practices in Stockholm and Gothenburg influence the three forms of legitimacies. We conclude that experimental governance challenges the commitment of the public sector to the public good and call for enhanced experimental practices that are reflective, open and democratic to ensure the legitimacy of public authorities.

Experimental governance and legitimacy

Experiments in cities frequently involve partnerships with stakeholders from the public and private sectors, academia and NGOs to collaborate on action-oriented activities and drive sustainable urban transformations. This provides ‘a growing number of choices about who to involve, when, where and how’ (Torfing et al. 2012, 229). Osborne (2010) refers to this as New Public Governance, where actors from different sectors comes together to contribute to collective problem-solving. The design, development and execution of collaborative experiments is often challenge-driven and is fuelled by the exchange of resources and ideas between these actors (Marvin et al. 2018). The emphasis on concrete actions to produce new insights involves ‘negotiation, accommodation, concertation, cooperation and alliance formation rather than the traditional processes of coercion, command and control’ (Kersbergen and Waarden 2004, 152). The resulting mode of ‘experimental governance’ is frequently conducted outside of existing decision-making structures, resulting in uncertainty with respect to power relations and responsibilities.

The rise of experimental governance raises important questions about the role of the public sector in serving the public good. Municipalities are central stakeholders in experimental governance, both as leaders, supporters and participants (Castán Broto and Bulkeley 2013; Eneqvist and Karvonen 2021). However, they also have a unique role as guardians of democracy, they are responsible for protecting public values related to representation, accountability, equity and efficiency (Bryson, Crosby, and Bloomberg 2014; Sørensen, Bryson, and Crosby 2021). As Bryson and colleagues (2014, 445) succinctly note, the ‘government has a special role as a guarantor of public values’. Guarding public values is intended to produce a legitimate system of governance where the citizens understand and accept the governance procedures, and have trust in the outcomes of governing processes (Bäckstrand 2006). This has been realized through bureaucratic, sectorized municipalities that employ administration, rule control and hierarchies to serve the public good and be legitimized by citizens (Christensen, Lægreid, and Rovik 2020).

The rise of experimental governance changes the function of municipalities in fundamental ways (e.g. Agger and Sørensen 2018; Berglund-Snodgrass and Mukhtar-Landgren 2020; Kronsell and Mukhtar-Landgren 2018) with respect to the democratic implications of collaboration and the emphasis on innovation actions and outcomes (Klijn and Koppenjan 2015; Sørensen and Torfing 2005). Experimental governance supplements conventional bureaucracies with an informal, hybrid layer that has the potential to create a clash in governance logics (Agger and Sørensen 2018; Berglund-Snodgrass and Mukhtar-Landgren 2020). Bekkers and colleagues argue that governments are struggling with their roles and responsibilities in relation to wicked problems, and the ‘handling [of] these problems not only affect their effectiveness but also influence the legitimacy of the governments themselves’ (Bekkers, Edelenbos, and Steijn 2011, 4–5). To date, there has been little emphasis on the question of legitimacy in relation to experimental governance.

Legitimacy in municipalities

Studies of legitimacy in the field of political science involve the examination of procedures, outcomes and acceptance of decisions (Beetham 1991; Easton 1965). Legitimacy is closely intertwined with democracy, authority and power (Gordon, Kornberger, and Clegg 2009). Typically, legitimacy is not an outcome of a particular decision but is rather a judgement made by citizens based on multiple government actions. Democratic legitimacy acknowledges that governmental processes and institutions that appear to be legitimate have more potential to be accepted by citizens even if there is disagreement on the content of the decision (Gilley 2006; Held 2006). A legitimate system, in liberal constitutional democracies, is based on approval and consent of the citizens, subordinating government power to the will of the people, and the possibilities to hold actors accountable for their work. In representative democracies, legitimacy and accountability are ultimately determined by voting and is not binary or self-evident, but can be enhanced through transparency, openness and participation (Kronsell 2013). The rise of distributed, networked and collaborative modes of governance – as exemplified by experimental governance – circumvents voting processes and raises fundamental questions about how representation, participation and democracy is realized in stakeholder partnerships (Bäckstrand 2006; Fung 2015; Bekkers et al. 2007; Sørensen and Torfing 2005).

Legitimacy can be categorized as ‘input legitimacy’ and ‘output legitimacy’ (Scharpf 1999). Input legitimacy emphasises governmental processes and how they embody the rule of law, democracy, transparency and competition (e.g. ‘government by the people’). Output legitimacy emphasises the problem-solving capacity of the government and the government’s ability to deliver collective services (e.g. ‘government for the people’). A third category of legitimacy, throughput legitimacy, emphasises the design of the policymaking process and the ability to transform ideas and plans into outcomes (e.g. ‘government with the people’). Here, there is an emphasis on the ‘black box’ of governance processes and the ability of citizens to understand and contribute to these processes (Schmidt 2013). Taken together, input legitimacy is about how citizens inform government, throughput legitimacy is about how governance processes are conducted, and output legitimacy is about the services that are created by these processes.

The three types of legitimacy are closely related and there are mutual reinforcements and trade-offs between them. Public authorities achieve different degrees of input, throughput and output legitimacy, resulting in different outcomes (Lindgren and Persson 2010; Rothstein 2009). This involves a balance between developing and applying procedural control mechanisms versus achieving actionable outcomes. Administrations that prioritize processes may not be as successful with output legitimacy and those who emphasize performance and results tend to introduce processes that do not always goes hand in hand with input and throughput legitimacy (Moore 1995).

With respect to experimental governance, it is logical to expect an emphasis on output legitimacy since experiments are action-oriented and tend to focus on end goals. However, this study does not focus on the outcome of experiments but rather on the collective influence of experimental activities. It provides an opportunity to reflect on how experiments are conducted and how they influence governance processes rather than how they can improve urban conditions. This creates direct connections between all three forms of legitimacy and experimental governance. In the following sections, we briefly describe how input, throughput and output legitimacy are influenced by experimental governance before turning to our case studies.

Input legitimacy

Input legitimacy in experimental governance is informed by procedural demand. The processes that inform experiments need to be understandable and transparent for those that are both inside and outside of these activities. This includes representation of relevant stakeholders and the interests they represent (Bäckstrand 2006). Bulkeley and Castán Broto (2013, 13) note that ‘experiments are often vested with particular interests and strategic purposes in the governing of the city’ and these interests and purposes vary from stakeholder to stakeholder. The selection of relevant actors is central to representation. Collaborations are sometimes promoted as a way to include more interests and to strengthen democratic decision-making (Fung and Wright 2001). However, there is a need to ensure that relevant actors have the opportunity to be involved (Booher 2004) to avoid social closure (Schaap 2007), and to ensure that no actor has carte blanc authority to use the city as an experimental arena. Moreover, transparency requires open decision-making processes that encourage the involvement of multiple stakeholders (Lundgren and Westlund 2017). Supporting input legitimacy requires transparent procedures for stakeholder selection, representation of their interests, and opportunities for others to join or at least understand governance processes.

Throughput legitimacy

Throughput legitimacy focuses on the democratic quality of experimental governance rather than the initial setup or outcomes. For experiments to be legitimate, how and why they are conducted needs to be open to scrutiny (Fenger and Bekkers 2007; Klijn and Koppenjan 2015). Here, there is a focus on undertaking experimental processes in a transparent and understandable manner (Klijn and Koppenjan 2015; van Meerkerk, Edelenbos, and Klijn 2015). Experiments are often conducted outside of conventional governance processes and tend to avoid oversight and scrutiny. Throughput legitimacy shines a light on how decisions are made during an experiment through deliberation, consensus and voting as well as about who participates and what interests they represent, and how information is shared (Fenger and Bekkers 2007).

Output legitimacy

Output legitimacy is related to the effectiveness of experimental outcomes and their ability to solve problems. Output legitimacy is informed by goal achievement and the institutional setting. Goal achievement concerns how the experiment contributes to the municipality’s overall future visions (e.g. a carbon-neutral city) (Pierre and Peters 2005). The municipality is responsible for aligning the experimental outputs with the visions and goals of the municipality. There is a need to select projects carefully to ensure that they can fulfil the municipality’s goals in the face of limited public resources and multiple priorities. The institutional setting is related to whether the design of the experimental collaboration leads to goal achievement (Healey 1998). This includes the capacity to connect relevant resources to reach the goals, such as expert knowledge, personnel, financial resources and legitimacy (Pierre and Peters 2005) and how to organize the existing resources based on new challenges (Montin 2007). Furthermore, there are opportunities to include scaling in the institutional design and to ensure that experimental results inform future activities (Argyris and Schön 1995; Lam et al. 2020). Experimental governance often relies on demonstration to promote innovation but the experimental outcomes and methods need to be ‘integrated into the governance system […] to build capacity’ (Innes and Booher 2003, 9).

Table 1 provides a summary of the three forms of legitimacy and how they relate to experimental governance. It is important to note that the three forms of legitimacy are closely connected to the different stages of experiments but can also overlap and interact. This emphasises the organization’s governance of experiments as a whole rather than a single experiment. Input legitimacy refers to the initial setup of experiments but can also indicate which experiments to support or not. Throughput legitimacy is clearly connected to experimental processes, but also how the organization as a whole can learn from the experiment, both during and after the experiment. Output legitimacy is connected to the outcomes of an experiment and the goal-targeting, not only for the single experiment, but for the municipality itself. This makes output legitimacy relevant when initiating an experiment, to ensure that municipal goals are met (as opposed to the goals of other experimental stakeholders).

Table 1. Three Types of Legitimacy in Experimental Governance (adapted from Scharpf 1999; Bäckstrand, 2006; Klijn and Koppenjan, 2016).

	Input Legitimacy	Throughput Legitimacy	Output Legitimacy
Key Question	Who is involved?	How are they governing?	What are they attempting to achieve?
Experimental Phase	Design and setup	Testing and analysis	Results and knowledge transfer
Key Activities	Selecting actors Mapping interests Creating open and transparent processes	Establishing decision-making processes Ensuring opportunities for feedback and information exchange Sharing information with affected citizens Supporting learning processes	Creating processes for problem formulation and prioritization Developing institutional structures for implementation

Methodology

The aim of this article is to examine how public sector legitimacy is influenced by experimental governance practices. To address this aim, we designed a multi-case study of two Swedish cities, Stockholm and Gothenburg, and followed the municipality stakeholders over a period of four years. We describe the case studies, research approach and methods, and data collection and analysis in the following paragraphs.

Case studies

Stockholm and Gothenburg, similar to other Swedish municipalities, have a long-standing tradition of self-governmenance and are responsible for urban planning, social services, education and child and elderly care. Swedish municipalities fund these services through the collection of income tax while also benefitting from a planning monopoly over their territory. They are often large landowners (the municipality owns 70% of the land in Stockholm and 55% in Gothenburg) and serve as full or partial owners of public service organizations related to housing, energy and water supply, wastewater treatment, internet provision and port facilities.

With respect to experimental governance, Stockholm and Gothenburg are active participants in national and international knowledge networks while also supporting city-wide innovation strategies through multiple collaborative projects (City of Gothenburg N.D.; City of Stockholm 2020a, 2020b). Both cities have long-standing collaborations with their local universities and businesses, and strong ambitions to use the city as a test bed, both in policy development and through triple helix collaborations. This includes flagship urban redevelopment projects that reimagine former industrial sites as well as numerous smaller experimental projects. As a whole, these projects, experiments and programmes exemplify the municipalities’ embrace of experimental governance. Table 2 provides examples of experimental governance in Stockholm and Gothenburg.

Table 2 . Examples of Experimental Governance in Stockholm and Gothenburg.

	Stockholm	Gothenburg
Triple Helix Collaborations	Digital Demo Stockholm, Urban ICT Arena	Lindholmen Science Park, Johanneberg, Science Park, Test Bed Gothenburg
Flagship Urban Development Project	Royal Seaport – mixed-used development with 12,000 apartments and 35,000 workplaces	Rivercity – mixed-use development with 25,000 apartments and 50,000 workplaces
EU Smart City Light House Project	GrowSmarter – smart retrofitting, energy, ICT and mobility systems	IRIS – testing new solutions for urban development, energy, ICT & mobility
Examples of Experiments	Night-time goods deliveries, pilots of data platforms, building logistics	Electric bus line, goods delivery with bikes and electric vehicles, night-time waste collection

Research approach and methods

To analyse how experimental governance influences municipal legitimacy in Stockholm and Gothenburg, we conducted a multi-case study ‘to fully understand the complex processes and causalities in the production of collaborative innovation’ (Sørensen and Torfing 2011, 862). We participated in research projects in Stockholm and Gothenburg that aimed to increase the organizational capacity for innovation actions (Eneqvist et al., 2019). This work was inspired by Czarniawska’s (2007) concept of shadowing, that involves the close scrutiny of actors and practices. Our positionality as engaged researchers provided unique opportunities to understand the organizational structures from the inside and to witness how experimental governance was initiated, interpreted, debated and practiced in real time. This role also provided us with inside access to internal municipal meetings and connections to relevant municipal officials. Our close proximity to the research subject challenged traditional notions of research objectivity. However, we recognized such an engaged mode of research as useful to produce an insider’s perspective on experimental governance processes (Rosen 1991). It is important to note that this is not designed as a comparative study of Stockholm and Gothenburg but rather an attempt to develop multiple insights on legitimacy from two cities that practice experimental governance.

Data collection, analysis and limitations

To collect data in each city, we conducted desk-based analyses of municipal policy documents and websites relating to experimental governance. This included municipal budget reports as well as visions and strategies for innovation, growth, internationalization and digitalization. We specifically searched for the words ‘test’, ‘experiment’, ‘collaboration’, ‘innovation’ and ‘partnership’ to examine how experimental governance was framed and practiced, and how it connected to input, throughput and output legitimacy. We complemented the desk-based study with participant observations of 12 meetings with the development group in Gothenburg and 14 meetings with the R&D network in Stockholm between 2016 and 2020. These groups consist of innovation strategists and development managers from various municipal departments and municipal companies in each city. The meetings involved discussions of various innovation projects being planned and implemented in each city. We took detailed written notes at all meetings for subsequent analysis.

We also conducted 12 semi-structured interviews in each municipality with strategists, intermediaries and project managers involved in urban collaborative experiments between June 2017 and December 2019. All interviews were audio recorded and transcribed. The 24 respondents were selected due to their involvement in one or more experiments, either through project activities or strategic oversight (see Appendix A for the complete list of respondents). The interviews focused on the challenges with real life experimentation in urban settings, the role of local government and the opportunities and challenges of collaborating on experiments.

We thematically coded the empirical data (secondary data, meeting notes and interview transcripts) based on our analytic framework of legitimacy (as summarized in the previous section). The study was limited to municipal stakeholders in urban development departments. A broader selection of experimental governance stakeholders would likely produce different insights. All quotations have been translated from Swedish by the authors.

Findings

In the following sections, we summarize the research findings related to experimental governance and legitimacy in the municipalities of Stockholm and Gothenburg. The empirical material is a synthesis of information from overarching strategic policy programmes on innovation, collaboration platforms and cluster development as well as specific innovation projects related to urban development. Examples of projects include night time goods delivery and waste collection in dense areas, autonomous cars in cities, new approaches to construction logistics, development of sensor networks to manage traffic flows, trials of smart mobility services and trials of novel wastewater treatment processes. Collectively, these comprise the actions that inform the experimental governance approach in each city.

Input legitimacy

Both cities use triple-helix partnerships in their experimental governance activities to solve societal challenges and create business opportunities. In their policy documents, the municipalities describe these collaborations as the ‘linchpin for a city with a belief in the future’ (City of Gothenburg 2019, 7) and as essential to ‘better utilize research results’ (City of Stockholm 2019, 31). Many of the partnerships focus on a particular economic sector such as ICT, life science or the automotive industry (e.g. City of Stockholm 2019). They often extend the work of existing collaborations and experiments in new directions without involving new members (Sørensen and Torfing 2017). One respondent (S1) justified this closed approach to experimental governance by emphasising the importance of maintaining a small group of key individuals in a collaboration platform on digitalization:

We have said that these actors are the initiators, and then we choose who can join as a member, but the group of initiators should not grow […] So, it is not that the big companies have exclusive rights, we rather invite those who can contribute with something.

This has significant implications for input legitimacy since the selection process for stakeholders is opaque and tends to favour elite actors who are already involved in urban innovation activities (Karvonen, Evans, and van Heur 2014; Shove and Walker 2007; Vanolo 2014). It also suggests that maintaining momentum in experimental governance processes requires a limited set of stakeholders who can be tasked with achieving a narrowly defined objective.

A second characteristic that informs input legitimacy is the initiator of the experimental agenda. The findings from Stockholm and Gothenburg indicate that the municipalities often do not initiate the experiments. As one innovation strategist (G1) with experience from multiple innovation projects on mobility described it, ‘It is usually other actors who contact us and want us to be involved in projects’. A sustainability specialist (S9) that both participated and led planning projects justified this external initiation of projects, noting ‘We do not have the capacity to work with test projects, […] so we are happy when others approach us’. The external drive for experiments in Gothenburg and Stockholm allows other actors to select the experimental stakeholders. Actor selection is often taken for granted and is rarely discussed in meetings. Instead, it tends to be done in an ad hoc manner. Another municipal officer (G4) noted that ‘there are no guidelines on [stakeholder selection], each administration and company define this by themselves’. Reflecting on stakeholder selection, an innovation strategist (S1) noted that ‘we started by inviting the strategic partners that [the university] has’. Thus, they tend to rely on existing stakeholder relationships rather than considering who should be involved. This is even more prominent when the municipality takes a passive role as participant rather than as the leader of an experimental partnership and stakeholder selection is done by another stakeholder.

Some of the respondents were concerned about the lack of transparency in stakeholder selection. One project manager (G1) with long-standing experience in mobility projects said, ‘I sometimes get a stomach ache when I think about how we selected partners for this project’. The lack of guidance and discussion on stakeholder selection has forced some municipal actors to develop their own individual strategies. One municipal officer, responsible for business development (G3) noted:

I have my own mental checklist for how to select partners. For example, I ask myself what the intentions of the potential partners are, what they will gain and how they will contribute with value, but also if there are other partners that should be included in the process in order for it to be fair and inclusive.

In addition to actor selection, input legitimacy is informed by which interests of the actors are considered and how minority interests are represented. The findings from Stockholm and Gothenburg indicate that minority interests are not commonly considered by the municipal representatives. A municipal mobility specialist (G2) conflated representation with attendance at public events: ‘we are just so happy that people attend our workshop’. In another instance, the municipality allowed a large industrial actor to organize a workshop on future mobility without reflecting on how this would influence stakeholder involvement. For some of the respondents, our research process served as a wakeup call to reflect on stakeholder selection processes and the representation of minority interests. In one case, the respondent contacted us afterwards to brainstorm on ways to improve stakeholder selection processes.

Another characteristic of input legitimacy involves the openness and accessibility of experiments. The policy documents from Stockholm and Gothenburg include explicit statements such as, ‘The City of Stockholm's operations, processes and data are open, accessible and innovative’ (City of Stockholm N.D., 18) and ‘the municipality in collaboration with other actors have a particular responsibility as a public actor, to ensure long-term, transparency, equal treatment and public goods’ (City of Gothenburg 2017, 11). However, in practice, there is less emphasis on openness and transparency. One respondent (G8) noted that, ‘This kind of collaboration is at such an early stage, so I do not see why we should have selected partners in an open process like when procuring something’. Another respondent (S7), with experiences from traffic projects, showed an action-oriented focus on openness, without problematizing the legitimacy consequences: ‘We developed the testbed based on previous collaborations. It is good to work with partners and people you can trust’. Thus, experiments are framed as being outside of democratic accountability because of their specialized nature and status as trial activities.

Overall, input legitimacy is clearly spelled out in policy documents and recognized as central to experimental governance. However, in practice, openness, actor selection and interest representation tend to be left to an individual’s preferences and priorities (Lundquist 1998). There are no guidelines or discussions on how to select stakeholders, what interests they represent and how to ensure openness in processes. Some of the municipal officials reported that they recognized the deficiencies in stakeholder selection and developed their own strategies to increase openness and representation, while others did not acknowledge these issues as relevant to experimental governance.

Throughput legitimacy

Throughput legitimacy builds upon input legitimacy and addresses procedures to ensure openness between involved stakeholders (as well as those outside of partnerships), the potential to influence experimental activities, transparency and ethical considerations for those affected by these activities, and procedures related to learning. While there are high expectations for collaborations and experiments to address societal challenges, how municipalities lead, contribute to, and develop insights from these activities tends to be a black box. The experiments are often conducted in siloed projects (Hodgson et al., 2019) and our analysis reveals limited structures and guidelines to direct how experiments should be performed. Specifically, there is no guidance in the published reports and policy documents in either city on how to ensure fair and equal representation in decision making related to experimental governance. Instead, there is a strong emphasis on experimental outcomes. Likewise, the meetings we attended did not feature discussions on how to perform the experiments but instead, focused on the end results. This suggests that experiments follow a ‘projectification’ logic in which the permanent organization awaits the results of a temporary project (Fred, 2018).

While multiple opportunities exist to involve citizens in the processes of experimentation, it was uncommon for municipal officials and their collaborators to inform citizens or involve them even when they could potentially be affected. For example, in projects in both cities to test night-time freight deliveries and garbage collection, the residents in the affected neighbourhoods received no information from the experimental stakeholders. One project manager (S7) noted, ‘No, we did not inform the residents. For natural reasons, because then people are awake, listening for disturbing noise’ while another respondent working on the same project (G5) noted that, ‘We collect garbage at night, but no one complains’. The respondents tended to emphasise the testing aspects instead of the ethical implications of the experiments on different stakeholders. However, they recognized that in some cases, it is helpful to invite new stakeholders to participate. As one innovation strategist (S1) noted, this is necessary to avoid lock-ins: ‘If someone comes knocking on the door, we should be able to open up to more actors. […] We cannot put all of our eggs in one basket’. On the other hand, externally funded projects tend to be closed to new stakeholders. The funding application dictates that project actors are identified from the start, limiting opportunities to invite other stakeholders to participate after the project has started.

Evaluation and learning from experiments is important to use the knowledge gained at a broader scale and in different sectors. The policy documents note the ambitions to develop a ‘learning culture’ (City of Stockholm 2015, 17) or ‘learning organization’ (City of Stockholm 2019, 31) to maximize the benefits of experimental activities. They also hope to ‘create permissive environments that promote entrepreneurship where grassroots initiatives are given the opportunity to develop’ (City of Gothenburg 2018a, 21). However, these ambitions to foster learning are generally not supported in organizational structures. Instead, experiments are often evaluated for technical efficacy and performance rather than how the findings were used to create broader impacts (Kivimaa et al., 2017).

The emphasis on learning in experiments tends to depend on the stakeholders and their particular approach to management rather than adherence to established protocols. An innovation strategist (S5) involved in an urban development project with high innovation ambitions concluded: ‘We learn a lot in our project, and we try to document this, but it is not always so easy to document everything. A much clearer two-way communication with the rest of the organization is needed’. In connection to this, another respondent (S4) continued, ‘It is difficult for us to be responsible for the internalization of the learnings’. This suggests that individuals are the carriers of experimental learnings and struggle to find ways to institutionalize their knowledge (Wolfram et al. 2018). One barrier to formal learning processes is the fear of failure. One project manager (S9) noted that, ‘We are not used to the function of tests in the municipal organization’. This reflects the ‘zero-error-culture’ that is commonplace in governmental organizations (Sørensen and Torfing 2011) and a general reluctance to take risks.

At the same time, the respondents recognize the value of learning from experiments to improve existing municipal processes. As one collaboration platform manager (G6) concluded, ‘The project gave us time to explain to each other how different actors work. That improves our requirements in procurements, for example’. Experiments can also provide learning for those experimental stakeholders who are outside of the municipality. An innovation strategist (S5) noted that, ‘The business partners have learned about how the planning process works – that it is not just about rolling out a new solution. It is the same with the researchers’. This suggests that learning occurs through informal actions rather than institutionalized norms and procedures.

As a whole, the analysis of throughput legitimacy suggests that evaluation and learning are far from transparent and open in experimental governance. The municipalities have high aspirations and expectations for experiments, but critical democratic issues related to decision making and citizen involvement are not featured in policy documents or project meetings. Experienced project managers contribute to throughput legitimacy in their experimental activities, but this tends to be individually driven and is not supported by a broader culture of learning with explicit guidelines and structures. This points towards a limited potential to learn from experiments and to support throughput legitimacy.

Output legitimacy

Where input legitimacy is connected to the establishment of experiments and throughput legitimacy is related to processes of experimentation, output legitimacy involves the goals of experimental activities, their problem-solving capacity and structures for implementation. Stockholm and Gothenburg have clear aspirations to achieve their sustainable development goals through experiments. Referring to the redevelopment of a central area of Gothenburg, a policy document states that, ‘The area will be […] used as a test-bed for new methods and techniques that can be used to build a sustainable city’ (City of Gothenburg 2012). Similarly, the City of Stockholm’s Comprehensive Plan (2018, 108) states that ‘The City of Stockholm actively encourages companies and institutions to use the city’s land and operations as a testbed for new innovations or as a springboard for future innovations’. The testbed is an alluring concept that municipalities use to demonstrate their commitment to innovation.

Long-standing collaborations with triple helix partners are used to drive innovation in different directions. One innovation strategist working in the City Office (S1) claimed: ‘We are now using the collaboration more strategically, it is about solving our challenges’. This points towards an expansion of collaboration activities beyond entrepreneurialism and attractiveness to focus on collective problem-solving (Kivimaa et al., 2017). A sustainability strategist (S9) recognized the utility of experiments, stating that, ‘We need to experiment, […] we don’t always have the excellent competence, but we can offer the city as an arena for research’. Another respondent (S7) added that experimental governance is promoted by the municipal leadership: ‘It is a message that is conveyed from the top management. We want to see the city as a testbed and we should dare to test new solutions’. This informs output legitimacy by framing experiments as a means to realize the municipality’s ambitious long-term goals.

At the same time, there is acknowledgement in both municipalities of the lack of implementation and scaling of experimental outcomes to address broader municipal goals. In part, this is due to a misalignment between experimental outcomes and municipal goals. The municipalities have attempted to address this by prioritizing the most suitable projects. For example, the Innovation Programme in Gothenburg notes that, ‘Through implementing strategic and focused innovation work, the city administration is able to coordinate and prioritize its resources so that it does the ‘right’ things, engages the ‘right’ actors and achieves the desired effect more rapidly’ (City of Gothenburg 2018b, 3). In Stockholm, attempts to align experimental outcomes with broader municipal goals is also a priority. For example, Stockholm’s annual budget document calls for the data driven urban planning lab to focus on the city's needs and challenges, and to ensure that the ‘employees contribute to ensure the benefit of the city’ (City of Stockholm 2019, 31). While these policy documents emphasise the need to prioritize those experiments that are most beneficial to the municipality, how this is achieved in practice is often at the discretion of the experimental stakeholders. As an innovation strategist (S2) with experience in the welfare sector as well as broader municipal strategy concluded, ‘The policy we have doesn’t support prioritization among different projects’. Both cites have initiatives to discuss ideas, prioritization and links between departments, but these tend to be connected to larger projects or platforms. And although there are structures in place to facilitate prioritization, they often do not reach the whole organization or are not fully implemented. In this regard, one respondent (G9) asked, ‘Are we really doing the right things?’ This indicates that there are ambitions to prioritize experiments that are most relevant to municipal goals but realizing this in practice is a significant challenge for the municipal stakeholders.

Beyond the prioritization of experiments, an important contributor to output legitimacy is the institutional capacity to apply experimental results at a larger scale. The primary purpose of experiments is to scale up the results to influence broader change (Kern 2019; Lam et al. 2020; Naber et al. 2017). Regarding implementation and scalability, the policy documents in Stockholm generally call for ‘encouraging new innovative solutions […] that can be scalable’ (City of Stockholm 2019, 56). They also call for increased innovation capacity in conventional management to ensure that the municipality has the ability to translate the findings of experiments into existing governance activities (City of Stockholm 2015). The Innovation Programme in Gothenburg (City of Gothenburg, 2018b) includes similar ambitions without any clear guidance on how they should be achieved:

The innovation process is about what and how, and there are clear structures for learning, evaluation and decision points in this process. An integral part of developing the city administration’s overall capacity and capability is being able to prioritise, to assess ideas and concepts and to learn and verify during the testing phase before any decisions are taken on scaling up and dissemination.

The respondents in this study pointed to multiple barriers to upscaling. One respondent (S9) argued that many experiments are driven by enthusiasts in all departments, but they lack structures to upscale the findings: ‘The enthusiasts hope that the scaling will happen by itself, but it never does. So, the result will be yet a new slow mover or another prototype at the prototype cemetery’. Other respondents noted that the problem lies in not involving the right individuals or departments who actually own the problem or can do something constructive with the results. Upscaling is seldom part of the experiments; a sustainability specialist (S9) argued that upscaling is an afterthought and instead, needs to be built into the experimental activities: ‘There is a need to include participants who understand the project and are involved in the thinking of implementation, also when running the project’. While there is a general focus on achieving experimental outputs, there is less emphasis and mechanisms to use these findings to influence broader change.

Experimental governance in Stockholm and Gothenburg is framed and practiced to maximize output legitimacy by using experimental outcomes to achieve municipal goals. However, both municipalities struggle with upscaling experimental outcomes. Instead, the experiments tend to be ends in themselves to demonstrate the municipality’s active commitment to innovation (Evans et al. 2021). This limits the output legitimacy that can be achieved through experimental governance.

Conclusions

In this article, we examined experimental governance through the lens of legitimacy. We developed an analytic framework of input, throughput and output legitimacy and then applied it to the experimental activities of the municipal stakeholders in Stockholm and Gothenburg. Previous research has shown that experiments support the legitimacy of public authorities by demonstrating that they are taking action and are committed to solving problems (Karvonen and Van Heur 2014). However, there is less emphasis on ensuring that these actions are democratic and beneficial to the public. Municipalities fulfil multiple roles in experimental governance that influence input legitimacy in terms of procedural safeguarding, throughput legitimacy related to open and well-structured experimental processes, and output legitimacy concerning goal achievement and implementation of results (e.g. Kronsell and Mukhtar-Landgren 2018).

Our findings illustrate that legitimacy is an important but frequently underemphasised aspect of experimental governance. Both municipalities emphasise the importance of all three forms of legitimacy in their respective policy documents, with particular emphasis on output legitimacy. However, beyond general pronouncements, there is little guidance on how to ensure openness, transparency and fairness in the practices of experimental governance. Instead, these issues are addressed by individuals in an ad hoc manner depend upon the particular experimental process. There are no formal procedures in place for municipal stakeholders to influence input, throughout and output legitimacy, and this has the potential to undermine municipal authority and effectiveness in the future if experimental governance becomes the norm (Karvonen, 2018). In effect, there is a danger of sacrificing legitimacy through the unfettered pursuit of innovation.

To reinforce the legitimacy of public authorities in experimental governance, municipalities could take inspiration from the principles of Responsible Research and Innovation (RRI).² This would ensure that experiments and collaborative research projects have, from the municipal perspective, desirable, sustainable and legitimate processes, purposes and outcomes (Stahl et al. 2017). It this would also allow municipalities to translate their ambitions to serve the public good in the day-to-day practices of designing, implementing and learning from experimental activities. To achieve this requires institutional changes that more closely align existing bureaucratic decision making and action by adopting new institutional practices, structures and norms to ensure the stated ambitions of legitimacy in the policy documents are achieved in practice (Oliver 1992; Raven et al. 2019).

Further research on legitimacy in experimental governance could follow specific experiments from conception to completion to see how input, throughput and output legitimacy are practiced in particular experimental activities. It would also be useful to conduct comparative studies of multiple sectors (e.g. transportation, housing, or energy) to examine how legitimacy plays out differently for particular issues. Finally, there are multiple opportunities for researchers to take a more active role in experimental governance practices through participatory action research. Researchers would be intimately involved in informing and shaping actor selection, decision-making and upscaling of results, and provide reflection and scrutiny to ensure that legitimacy is not sacrificed in the pursuit of innovation.

Experimental governance is an increasingly important approach for municipalities to achieve their sustainable development goals. However, there is a need to ensure that these activities do not undermine the democratic responsibilities of public authorities. Municipalities are uniquely positioned to protect the public good in experimental governance and this is championed in policy documents. However, there is a need to develop institutional capacity to ensure that experimental governance activities support rather than undermine the legitimacy of public authorities. This is a key challenge to address as experimental governance evolves in the coming decades.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Note that the article focuses on the municipalities in two cities. The municipal bodies are named the City of Stockholm and the City of Gothenburg.

2 https://ec.europa.eu/programmes/horizon2020/en/h2020-section/responsible-research-innovation

Appendix A.

Respondents in Stockholm and Gothenburg.

All respondents work within the municipal organizations, as strategist, specialists or managers for mobility, environment, innovation, research, business development or ICT.

Table

City of Stockholm		City of Gothenburg
S1	City Office	G1	Traffic Department
S2	City Office	G2	Traffic Department
S3	City Office	G3	Business Development Department
S4	Development Office	G4	Urban Planning Department
S5	Development Office	G5	Collaboration Platform
S6	City Office	G6	Collaboration Platform
S7	Traffic Department	G7	City Office
S8	Traffic Department	G8	City Office
S9	Urban Planning Department	G9	Environmental Department
S10	Collaboration Platform	G10	Recycling and Water Department
S11	City Office	G11	City Office
S12	City Office	G12	Real Estate Development (municipal company)