Civil–military Relations in Croatia: Politicisation and Politics of Reform

Abstract

This article argues that since 2000 successive Croatian governments have shown themselves increasingly dedicated to reforming civil–military relations. However, their efforts have been hampered by four key obstacles. First, the need to implement defence reforms in the context of an unwieldy set of civil–military relationships, political and institutional rivalries, a lack of civil and military defence expertise and a continuing legacy of politicisation. Second, the need to cut defence spending as a proportion of the overall budget whilst taking on new military roles and improving the capability of the armed forces. Third, the need to balance the demands of the NATO accession process while implementing a balanced and fundamental reform of the armed forces as a whole. Finally, the need to implement root and branch personnel reforms and downsizing in the OSRH while simultaneously recruiting and retaining quality personnel and addressing the wider social issue of unemployment.

Notes

1. Misha Glenny, BBC Europe Online, 1 August 2003.

2. For further discussion of a typology of military roles see Timothy Edmunds, Anthony Forster & Andrew Cottey, ‘Armed Forces and Society: A Framework for Analysis’, in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds & Andrew Cottey (eds), Soldiers and Societies in Postcommunist Europe: Legitimacy and Change (Houndmills: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2003). On the nation builder role: pp. 11–12.

3. See Ozren Žunec, ‘Democracy in the “Fog of War”: Civil–military Relations in Croatia’, in C. Danopoulos & D. Zirker (eds), Civil–military Relations in the Soviet and Yugoslav Successor States (Boulder: Westview, 1996. Pp. 219–220); Alex J. Bellamy, ‘A Crisis of Legitimacy: the Military and Society in Croatia’, in Forster et al. Soldiers and Societies, pp. 186–188.

4. Many of these had received rudimentary military training as members of Croatia's network of Territorial Defence (TO) units or as conscripts in the JNA. Zvonimir Mahečić, ‘Capability-Building and Good Governance in Security Sector Reform’, in Jan A. Trapans & Philipp H. Fluri (eds), Defence and Security Sector Governance and Reform in South Eastern Europe: Insights and Perspectives (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2003), pp. 404.

5. Biljana Vankovska, ‘Privatisation of Security and Security Sector Reform in Croatia’, in Damian Lilly & Michael von Tangen Page, Security Sector Reform: The Challenges and Opportunities of the Privatisation of Security (London: International Alert, 2002), pp. 56–57.

6. For a more detailed discussion of the government's role in propagating a particular form of national identity see Alex J. Bellamy, The Formation of Croatian National Identity: A Centuries-old Dream? (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2003).

7. Žunec, ‘Democracy in the “Fog of War”’, p. 225. One analyst went so far as to call the OSRH under Tudman ‘one of the most politicised militaries in the postcommunist world’. Biljana Vankovska, ‘Military and Society in War-torn Balkan Countries: Lessons for the Security Sector Reform’, in Alan Bryden & Philipp Fluri (eds), Security Sector Reform: Institutions, Society and Good Governance (Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2003), p. 231.

8. Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Like Drunken Geese in the Fog: Developing Democratic Control of Armed Forces in Croatia’, in Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds & Anthony Forster (eds), Democratic Control of the Military in Postcommunist Europe: Guarding the Guards (Houndmills: Palgrave, 2002), 178–180.

9. Many suspect that the arms embargo was not wholly adhered to by all European countries. Germany in particular has been accused of turning a blind eye to illegal exports of East German weaponry to Croatia as well as assisting in the establishment of the Croatian intelligence services. Tim Ripley, ‘Croatia's Strategic Situation’, Jane's Intelligence Review (1 January 1995); Marko Milivojević, ‘Croatia's Intelligence Services’, Jane's Intelligence Review (1 September 1994).

10. For more on MPRI and its relationship with the US government see Vankovska, ‘Privatisation’, p. 65, 69–71.

11. These are based on defence spending figures provided by HIDRA, the Croatian Information and Documentation Agency. We are grateful to Renata Pekorari for providing this information.

12. Lidija Cehuić, ‘Development of Civil–military Relations in Croatia’, International Issues, 10: 1 (2001), p. 116.

13. This legacy was still apparent as late as May 2002 when civilian employees in the Ministry of Defence and General Staff numbered 9,183 out of a total peacetime force of 42923. Defence Policy 2004/05: Into the Alliance (Zagreb: Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, January 2004), p. 8.

14. The role of the military in the 2000 election is outlined in more depth in see Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Croatia after Tudman: The 2000 Parliamentary and Presidential Elections’, Problems of Post-Communism, 48/5 (2001), pp. 18–31.

15. In contrast to the nationalist and authoritarian Tudman-era HDZ party, the HDZ under Sanader has made a considerable shift towards the political mainstream. While many suspect that the party retains many of its more unpalatable nationalist tendencies at grassroots level, the HDZ in government can best be characterised as a centre-right party with strongly pro-EU and pro-NATO leanings. See Edin Forto, ‘Croatia’, in Adrian Karatnycky, Alexander Motyl & Amanda Schnetzer (eds), Nations in Transit 2004 (New York and Washington: Freedom House, 2004), p. 5.

16. Croatia joined PfP in May 2000.

17. Timothy Edmunds, Defence Reform in Croatia and Serbia–Montenegro, Adelphi Paper 360 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003), pp. 16–17; Jelena Grčić-Polić, ‘Security and Defence Reforms: A Croatian Armed Forces Case’, Croatian International Relations Review, 9: 30/31 (2003), p. 18.

18. See for example, Zvonimir Mahečić, ‘Civilians and the Military in Security Sector Reform’, in Trapans & Fluri, Defence and Security Sector Governance, p. 376; Richard B. Liebl, Marin Braovać & Adrijana Jelić, ‘Security Assistance Programmes: The Catalyst for Transition in the Croatian Military’, The DISAM Journal (Spring 2002), pp. 7–8.

19. Robin Luckham, Democratic Strategies for Security in Transition and Conflict’, in Gavin Cawthra & Robin Luckham (eds), Governing Insecurity: Democratic Control of Military and Security Establishments in Transitional Democracies (London: Zed Books, 2003), pp. 13–18.

20. Jane Chanaa, ‘Security Sector Reform: Issues, Challenges and Prospects’, Adelphi Paper No. 344 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002), p. 28.

21. Zvonimir Mahečić, ‘Security Sector Reform in Croatia’, in Timothy Edmunds (ed.), Security Sector Reform in Croatia and Yugoslavia, DCAF/IISS workshop proceedings, 28 October 2002, p. 15.

22. The Prime Minister, Ivica Račan was a reformist communist/socialist and the president, Stipe Mesić is a moderate nationalist. See Forto, ‘Croatia’, pp. 4–8.

23. Edmunds, Defence Reform, pp. 16–17

24. Edmunds, Defence Reform, pp. 18–20.

25. Edmunds’ interviews, Zagreb July 2004. This is an accusation the government itself denies, pointing in particular to its plans to introduce a fairer and more transparent human resource management system for the Ministry of Defence.

26. Parliament's role in this area is also hampered by secrecy laws which restrict parliamentarian's access to classified documents. Vlatko Cvrtila, ‘Parliament and the Security Sector’, in Trapans & Fluri, Defence and Security Sector Governance, pp. 369–370.

27. Two examples include the Institute for International Relations (IMO) at http://www.imo.hr and the Centre for Defendological Research (CDR) at http://www.defimi.hr

28. See Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds & Andrew Cottey, ‘Introduction: The Professionalisation of Armed Forces in Postcommunist Europe’, in Anthony Forster, Timothy Edmunds & Andrew Cottey (eds), The Challenge of Military Reform in Postcommunist Europe: Building Professional Armed Forces (Houndmills: Palgrave Macmillan, 2002), p. 6.

29. See for example, Andrew Cottey, Timothy Edmunds & Anthony Forster, ‘The Second Generation Problematic: Rethinking Democracy and Civil–military Relations’, Armed Forces and Society, 29: 1 (2002), pp. 41–44.

30. Bellamy, ‘Like Drunken Geese’, pp. 178–180. Dimitrios Koukourdinos, ‘Constitutional Law and the External Limits of the Legal Framing of DCAF: The Case of Croatia and the FR of Yugoslavia’, in Biljana Vankovska, Legal Framing of the Democratic Control of Armed Forces and the Security Sector: Norms and Reality/ies (Geneva: Geneva Centre for the Democratic Control of Armed Forces, 2001), pp. 157–158.

31. Marina Ottaway & Gideon Maltz, ‘Croatia's Second Transition and the International Community’, Current History, November (2001), pp. 379–380.

32. Mahečić, ‘Civilians’, p. 375.

33. Damir Grubiša, ‘Democratic Control of Armed Forces’ and Cvrtila, ‘Parliament’ in Trapans & Fluri, Defence and Security Sector Governance, pp. 351, 356, 357, 365.

34. Edmunds’ interview with Zvonimir Mahečić, Assistant Head, Military Cabinet of the President of the Republic of Croatia, 11 June 2002.

35. Edmunds et al., ‘Armed Forces and Society’, pp. 9–14.

36. Cehulić, ‘Development of Civil–military Relations’, p. 121.

37. One observer noted wryly in 2004 that while the Račan government were democrats that had to prove their nationalist credentials, the HDZ are nationalists who have to prove their democratic credentials. Edmunds’ interview, Zagreb, July 2004.

38. Bellamy's interviews with Zdenko Franić, Social Democratic Party management committee member, 12 May 1998 and Božo Kovačević, Liberal Party politician and former government minister, 14 May 1998. See also Eric Kopač, ‘Economic Constraints of Defence Reform in SEE’, Croatian International Relations Review, 8: 26/27 (2002), p. 34.

39. See for example, Zoran Kusovac, ‘HDZ Tests Croat Coallition’, Jane's Intelligence Review, 13: 4 (April 2001).

40. For example, the latest national security documentation stresses repeatedly that Croatia faces no direct military threat from any direction. Defence Policy 2004/05, p. 11.

41. In his election campaign, Nikolić made specific reference to his dream of a ‘Greater Serbia’ whose expanded borders would include significant parts of Croatian territory. See ‘Nikolic Still Dreaming of a Greater Serbia’, B92 News Archive, 23 June 2004. Available at http://www.b92.

42. Chanaa, ‘Security Sector Reform’, p. 30.

43. Discussed further in Alex J. Bellamy, ‘Like Drunken Geese’.

44. The Croatian defence budget fell from 6.084 bn Kuna or 4.4% of GDP in 1998 to Defence Policy 2004/05, p. 19; Kopač, p. 33.

45. Jozo Radoš, ‘Statement to the IMO–NATO Conference on Regional Stability and Cooperation: NATO, Croatia and South-Eastern Europe, Zagreb, 24–25 June 2002’, Croatian International Relations Review: Dossier, 8: 26–27 (2002), pp. 14.

46. See for example the policy priorities identified in Defence Policy 2004/05, pp. 17–18.

47. Vankovska, ‘Privatisation’, p. 69–71.

48. Edmunds’ interview with Polić, 7 July 2003. See also Amadeo Watkins, PfP Integration: Croatia and Serbia-Montenegro, CSRC Balkans Series Report 04/5 (Camberley: CSRC, April 2004), p. 8.

49. Ozren Žunec, ‘Democracy in the “Fog of War”’, p. 216.

50. Žunec, ‘Democracy in the “Fog of War”’, p. 220; Milivojević, ‘Croatia's Intelligence Services’.

51. Žunec, ‘Democracy in the “Fog of War”’, pp. 224–225.

52. Edmunds, Defence Reform, p. 14.

53. Vankovska-Cvetkovska, ‘Between the Past and the Future’, p. 40.

54. Ozren Žunec, ‘Democratic Oversight and Control Over Intelligence and Security Agencies’, in Trapans & Fluri, Defence and Security Sector Governance, p. 384; John Hatzadony, The Croatian Intelligence Community, Federation of American Scientists, Intelligence Resource Programme Report (1999). Available at http://www.fas.org/irp/world/croatia/hatzadony.html (accessed 15 March 2005).

55. Bellamy, ‘A Crisis of Legitimacy’, pp. 193–194.

56. Žunec, ‘Democracy in the “Fog of War”’, p. 224.

57. For further discussion of the role of HVIDRA see, Kusovac, ‘HDZ Tests Croat Coalition’, p. 21; Bellamy, ‘Like Drunken Geese’, p. 181; Edmunds, Defence Reform, pp. 18–19.

58. See in particular events surrounding the attempted extradition of General Janko Bobetko to the Hague. Edmunds, Defence Reform, pp. 62–63.

59. Vankovska, ‘Military and Society’, pp. 233–235.

60. Kusovac, ‘Interview with Jozo Radoš’.

61. Kusovac, ‘HDZ Tests Croat Coalition’, p. 21.

62. Bellamy, interview with senior official from the Croatian Ministry of Defence, 14 October 2001.

63. For a discussion of military professionalisation see: Forster et al., ‘Introduction’.

64. Edmunds’ interview with Dr Jelena Grčić-Polić, Assistant Minister for Defence Policy, Republic of Croatia, 07 July 2004; Edmunds interview with Brigadier Željko Cepanec, Head, Defence Policy and Planning Department, Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, 7 July 2004.

65. Edmunds’ interview with Zoran Milanović, Head of the Department for International Security, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Republic of Croatia, 19 July 2002.

66. Defence Policy 2004/05, p. 9.

67. Zvonimir Mahečić, ‘Peacekeeping and Regional Security’, in Trapans & Fluri, Defence and Security Sector Governance, p. 460.

68. Mahečić, ‘Peacekeeping and Regional Security’, pp. 459–460.

69. Slobodna Dalmacija, 22 March 2002. Cited in Ozren Žunec, ‘Croatia's Decision to Abandon the upgrade of Mig-21 Aircraft with the Israeli Company’, unpublished Draft Paper, 2004, p. 25.

70. Žunec, ‘Croatia's Decision’, pp. 25–26.

71. SDR: CAF Missions and Tasks (Draft), information provided to Edmunds by the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Croatia, 7 July 2004.

72. Wartime Defence Minister Šušak, for example, observed that ‘war experience is much more important than some diplomas’. Quoted in Cehulić, ‘Civil–military Relations’, p. 127. See also, Zvonimir Mahečić, ‘Capacity-Building and Good Governance in Security and Defence Reform’ in Trapans & Fluri. Defence and Security Sector Governance, pp. 404–406.

73. On the basic concepts that underpinned the JNA approach to war fighting, such as the general peoples defence, see Adam Roberts, Nations in Arms: The Theory and Practice of Territorial Defence (London: Chatto & Windus, 1976), pp. 124–217 and the opening chapters of James Gow, Legitimacy and the Military: The Yugoslav Crisis (London: Macmillan, 1992).

74. Alex J. Bellamy, ‘A Revolution in Civil–military Affairs: The Professionalisation of Croatia's Armed Forces’, in Forster et al. The Challenge of Military Reform, p. 173.

75. Mahečić, ‘Capacity-Building’, p. 405.

76. Wheaton, ‘Cultivating Croatia's Military’, p. 11; See also, Liebl et al. ‘Security Assistance Programs’.

77. Edmunds’ interview with Lt.Col. Richard Thornely, UK Defence Attaché, Zagreb, 08 July 2002.

78. Edmunds’ interview, Zagreb, 6 July 2004.

79. Bellamy, ‘A Revolution’, p. 175.

80. Defence Policy 2004/05, p. 18.

81. From 12,041 in May 2002 to 6,885 in January 2004. Defence Policy 2004/05, p. 8.

82. Croatia's unemployment rate is very high, currently standing at around 19% of the population in 2003. ‘Croatia’, CIA World Factbook 2004, Available at http://www.cia.gov/cia/publications/factbook/ (accessed July 2005).

83. Edmunds, Defence Reform, pp. 40–43. Watkins, PfP Integration, p. 8.

84. In contast to Radoš, Antunović was also a Deputy Prime Minister and had enough political clout to force the policy through.

85. Defence Policy 2004/05, p. 8. Edmunds’ interview with Polić, 7 July 2004.

86. Edmunds interviews, Zagreb, July 2004.

87. For a more detailed discussion of some of the problems and complexities of the promotion system in the OSRH see Grubiša, ‘Democratic Control’ and Mahečić, ‘Capacity-Building’ in Trapans & Fluri, Defence and Security Sector Governance.