The US–Russian security ‘reset’: implications for Central-Eastern Europe and Germany

Abstract

The article examines the reactions of selected European states to the US-performed ‘reset’ in relations with Russia and explores the ways in which they have been adapting to the new set-up. The article is divided into three parts: after the discussion of the substantive continuity and limited change in US foreign and security policy (USFSP), the multilateral and bilateral dimensions of USFSP procedure are examined through John Ruggie's theoretical observations. The second part of the article deals with implications of the USFSP for Central-Eastern European countries. This part begins with a discussion of Russian attempts to wheedle Europe into embracing its plans for new European security architecture. The next section sheds light on the unexpected process of strategic realignment of the region (USA/NATO/EU/CSDP) and simultaneous transformation of the special relationship with the USA into ‘normal life’. The third part of the article tackles the implications of heightened US–Russian bilateralism for Germany. Authors' findings, many of them based on conducted elite interviews, suggest the contrary process, namely Germany's strengthened multilateral commitment to the EU and specifically to European Security and Defence Policy, limiting the bilateral option to energy trade with Russia. What follows are concluding remarks.

Keywords:

• US–Russian relations
• Central-Eastern Europe
• Germany's multilateralism and bilateralism
• transatlantic security (NATO) and European security (CSDP)
• Obama vs. Bush
• geopolitics

Acknowledgements

The authors thank Richard Betts, Robert Jervis, Volker Weichsel and anonymous reviewers for their comments on earlier drafts of this article. The article examines the reactions of selected European states to the US-performed ‘reset’.

Notes

1. Very recently, Poland's interpretations of the so-called G6 have been modified so that Italy and Spain were not counted among the six members, but the EU presidential country and the European Commission were (thus replacing Italy and Spain). This can be read as Poland's further attempt to establish itself as one of the major EU powers (interview with a Polish Security Analyst familiar with this development, Brno, the Czech Republic, 6 November 2009).

2. According to von Klaeden, Russian policy has ‘unmistakably neo-imperialist traits’ (see Internationale Politik 2009, p. 23).

3. ‘Merkel remembered the “generous offer” but further elaborated only on a partnership between Europe and the United States, avoiding direct references to US–German bilateralism’ (Die Bundeskanzlerin 2009).

4. Germany imports about 32 per cent of its oil and 37 per cent of its gas from Russia. The most important and the most controversial German–Russian project is the North Stream gas pipeline. The pipeline is worth 6 billion euros and will supply Germany and Western Europe with 55 bcm per year, bypassing the traditional transit countries – Poland and Ukraine, and also the Baltic states. Essentially a private project, the North Stream would never have taken off without the crucial – and controversial – involvement of the former German Chancellor Schroeder. Importantly, the German Government has secured the support of the European Commission for this enterprise.

5. The principal change of the security environment (the peace dividend of the end of the cold war) has been at the core of the new security policy of Germany since the early 1990s; Russia is perceived not as a threat but as a partner. See the ‘Verteidigunspolitische Richtlinien 2003’ (the principal directions of the German defence policy) as adopted by the government of the Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD) and the Greens in 2003. Similarly, the government of the Christian Democratic Union (CDU–CSU) and the SPD exceptionally referred to Russia in its white paper on security and armed forces as a ‘security partner’ (see Bundesministerium der Verteidigung 2006, p. 23; similarly see Belkin 2008).