Organizing international armaments cooperation: institutional design and path dependencies in Europe

Abstract

Few issues are more important to scholars of Europe's emergence as a foreign policy actor than whether the European Union (EU) can forge a common defense-industrial policy out of 27 states' procurement policies and defense industries. Overlooked in most scholarly analyses of European defense-industrial cooperation, the story of Europe's international armaments organizations stretches back more than six decades. In this article, we examine the impact of past institutional outcomes on the defense-industrial field by applying the concepts and analytic tools of historic institutionalism to European armaments organizations. Because past institutional dynamics have channeled the subsequent development of armaments cooperation, what has emerged is a polycentric governance architecture wherein organizations with transatlantic, pan-European and restrictive-European memberships dominate distinct components of the cooperative process. We demonstrate that this maturing institutional pattern will likely limit the opportunities for the EU – and especially its Commission – to shape the future contours of European defense-industrial cooperation.

Keywords:

• armaments cooperation
• European Union
• North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO)
• path dependencies
• organizational design
• historic institutionalism

Acknowledgements

The author would also like to thank Sandra Eisenecker of the University of St. Gallen for both sharing the transcripts of interviews she conducted at NAMSA and OCCAR, and the many fruitful discussions we had on our parallel research into different aspects of international armaments cooperation.

Notes

This article relies heavily on documents from: the Libraries and Archives of Canada (LAC); the United States' National Archives and Records Administration (NARA); and The National Archives (TNA) of the United Kingdom.

1. These facets are derived from, yet not identical to, those employed by Koremenos et al. (2001).

2. In 2009, the USA spent $140 billion on procurement; Britain spent $11 billion, France $10 billion, Germany $6 billion, and Italy $3 billion (EDA 2009).

3. The acronyms in Figure 1 refer to the following organizations: Military Production and Supply Board (MPSB); Defense Production Board (DPB); Temporary Council Committee (TCC), Military Standardisation Agency (MSA); Military Agency for Standardisation (MAS); NATO Standardisation Organisation (NSO); Defence Production Committee (DPC); Armaments Committee (AC); Conference of National Armaments Directors (CNAD); NATO Maintenance and Supply Service System (NMSSS); NATO Maintenance and Supply Agency (NAMSA); Independent European Programme Group (IEPG); Western European Armaments Group (WEAG); Western European Armaments Organization (WEAO); Organisation Conjointe de Coopération en Martières d'Armement (OCCAR); Letter of Intent (LoI); and European Defence Agency (EDA).

4. Two early efforts at armaments cooperation include Germano-Soviet cooperation in the 1920s (Mueller 1976) and the creation of the trilateral (American, British, and Canadian) Combined Production and Resources Board during World War II (Katz 1946). Compared with later efforts, these cases involved small numbers of states and were designed as transitory arrangements.

5. North Atlantic Council, The Council establishes a Defence Financial and Economic Committee and a Military Production and Supply Board, 18 November 1949.

6. NARA 330/192/3 N7-1(1)-F Transcript of the First Meeting of the North Atlantic MPSB, 1949.

7. TNA FO 371/94210 From Ottawa to FO, Telegram No. 36, 20 September 1951.

8. TNA FO 371/94122 Ottawa Telegram No. 9 to FO, 17 September 1951.

9. TNA FO 371/124872 M.R: Starkey, WU Department, 14 December 1956.

10. TNA FO 371/94122 Ottawa (UK Delegation) Telegram No. 9 to FO, 17 September 1951.

11. Board of Directors, Charter of the NMSSS, 21 May 1958 [C-M (58)78].

12. Articles 101–111, Traité instituant la Communauté européenne de défense, Paris, 27 May 1952.

13. TNA FO 371/124872 P.F. Hancock, FO, 23 November 1956.

14. TNA FO 371/124857 W.E.U. Standing Armaments Committee, 12 October 1956.

15. NARA 330/192/10, N7-1(1)-F.4 Impact of Military Assistance Programs on U.S. Economy, 1949; and NARA 330/192/19, N7-1(1)-F.1 Basic Policies of the Military Assistance Programs, 1949.

16. LAC RG 24/21638 Study of NBMR Procedures, 1965.

17. Communiqué issued by Eurogroup Defence Ministers, Brussels, 23 May 1972.

18. TNA FCO 41/1347 Meeting Eurogroup Defence Ministers, March 1973.

19. The $36 million committed by 13 states to EUCLID constituted less than three per cent of what the UK annually spent on defense R&D (Walker and Gummett 1993).

20. Declaration on the WEU, Section C, Treaty on European Union (1992).

21. Interview with Hilmar Linnenkamp, former Deputy Chief Executive of EDA (17 March 2010).

22. This does not include 180 personnel dedicated to individual projects. Interview with Paul Haccuria, Head of OCCAR Public Relations (5 April 2010).

23. Interview with General Christophe Keckeis, former Chief of Staff of the Swiss Armed Forces (9 November 2010).

24. Interview with Linda Bird, NAMSA Logistics Director (24 August 2009).

25. Interview with Nadia Nelson, NAMSA (25 August 2009).

26. NAMSA, Support for Partnership for Peace Nations, www.namsa.nato.int/services/pfp_support_e.htm [Accessed 11 December 2011].

27. Interview with Hilmar Linnenkamp (17 March 2010).

28. Interview with Hilmar Linnenkamp (17 March 2010).

29. Although still in existence, FINABEL and CNAD are excluded from this table because of their marginal importance.