Evolving patterns of internal security cooperation: lessons from the Schengen and Prüm laboratories

Abstract

This article discusses evolving patterns of internal security cooperation that start in the realm of international public law and end up more or less entirely in the treaty framework of the European Union. By applying the theory of clubs (Buchanan) it shows the fertility as well as limitations of a public goods approach to analyse and explain such instances of differentiated integration and to assess their effectiveness. By way of the comparative analysis of the Schengen regime and the Prüm Treaty it analyses five main stages of an internal security club's life circle from the causing obstacle (blocking of a certain policy) to the final incorporation endgame. Both clubs under investigation produced so-called network goods with negative rivalry logic, i.e. the more members participate and ‘consume’ the good the higher the benefit for all. However, it is also shown that club formation and expansion could not only be understood as a strategically rational process, and that various contextual costs inhibited the formation and eventual expansion of the clubs. The article concludes that incorporation efforts necessarily lead to pick-and-choose situations that preclude full uniformity; consequently, outside treaty clubs tend to create á la carte fragmentation to a certain degree.

Keywords:

• differentiated integration
• Justice and Home Affairs
• Prüm Treaty
• Schengen
• theory of clubs
• transaction-cost analysis

Notes

1. Convention between the Kingdom of Belgium, the Federal Republic of Germany, the Kingdom of Spain, the French Republic, the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the Kingdom of the Netherlands and the Republic of Austria on the stepping up of cross-border cooperation, particularly in combating terrorism, cross-border crime and illegal migration (10900/05 CRIMORG 65 ENFOPOL 85, Brussels).

2. Interestingly enough the G5 group followed an unsuccessful attempt of the German Ministry of Interior to ‘replay’ Schengen in 2001, then termed ‘Schengen II’ initiative (cf. Lavenex and Wallace 2005, p. 466).

3. Schily tabled a proposition of EU wide computer-aided profile-searching in a Council meeting in October 2001: 13176/01 JAI 120, 24.10.2001. Welt online (2004). Schily setzt auf Rasterfahndung, 27.03.2004.

4. Cf. 6403/02 ENFOPOL 27, 8.03.2002; 11858/02 ENFOPOL 117, 13.09.2002; 11858/1/02 ENFOPOL, 14.10.2002; 13626/02 ENFOPOL 130, 31.10.2002.

5. Cf. 5865/03 ENFOPOL 9, 31.10.2002.

6. Interview with an official from the Department for bilateral relations at the Austrian Ministry of Interior, 8 September 2008.

7. See note 2 above.

8. Nonetheless, further below it is also shown that Prüm retained a considerable degree of experimentation during its political definition phase.

9. See note 8 above.

10. COM (2005) 490 final; COM (2005) 317 final: Proposal for a Council decision on the improvement of police cooperation between the Member States of the European Union, especially at the internal borders and amending the Convention implementing the Schengen Agreement.

11. Interview, see note 6 above.

12. Interview with an official representing Austria in the Art.-36-committee, Austrian Ministry of Interior, 13 November 2009.