Common Security and Defence Policy peace operations in the Western Balkans: impact and lessons learned

Abstract

Common Security and Defence Policy (CSDP) missions have increased substantially in number, functions and geographic spread since their inception in 2003. Despite their expansion in numbers and scope, especially in the Western Balkans, few systematic assessments of the contributions that CSDP missions make to peacekeeping and peacebuilding efforts have been undertaken to date. This article addresses that lacuna by assessing the contributions CSDP missions have made in recent years to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in the Western Balkans. It explores whether CSDP missions in that region: make an intrinsic contribution to peacekeeping and peacebuilding in those countries or merely profit (or take credit) from the initial groundwork laid by United Nations (UN) and North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) missions; are adequately coordinated within the European Union (EU) and between the EU and other international organisations, including NATO; are sufficiently embedded or effectively linked to other EU instruments, such as the Stability and Association Process to the Western Balkans; and engender adequate elite or public support or ‘ownership’ in these countries.

Keywords:

• CSDP
• Western Balkans
• peace operations

Acknowledgements

This article marks the final publication under the GARNET project funded by the European Commission's Framework Six Programme. The author would like to thank David Allen, Florent Bakija, Roberto Dominguez, Simon Duke, Sten Rynning and Maria Luisa Sanchez for their helpful comments on earlier versions of this article. The usual disclaimer applies.

Notes

1. Essentially, peacebuilding policies are non-coercive instruments applied in the post-conflict reconstruction of civic institutions, civil societies and the creation of conditions for the promotion of democratic societies. For further details see Van Tongeren et al. (2002), Paris (2004) and Kirchner (2006).

2. For a review of the long-standing conflicts in the Western Balkans see Blitz (2006) and Blockmans (2007).

3. This realisation surfaced particularly strongly around the time of the Kosovo conflict. The statement by the European Council concerning Kosovo on 23–24 March 1999 declared that:

Europe cannot tolerate a humanitarian catastrophe in its midst. It cannot be permitted that, in the middle of Europe, the predominant population of Kosovo is collectively deprived of its rights and subjected to grave human rights abuses. We the countries of the EU, are under a moral obligation to ensure that indiscriminate behaviour or violence … are not repeated … we are responsible for securing peace and cooperation in the region. This is the way to guarantee our fundamental European values, i.e., respect for human rights and the rights of minorities, international law, democratic institutions and the inviolability of borders. (European Council 1999)

4. The CSFP budget, from which civilian operations are provided, is modest in size, but has grown from 46.3 million Euro in 2003 to 243 million Euro in 2009 (Grevi and Keohane 2009, 93). In contrast, military operations are funded by a common cost approach known as Athena, made up of member states’ contribution based on a GDP scale. Athena usually covers 10 per cent of total costs with the majority of the costs based on the ‘costs where they fall’ concept.

5. The ICO has been established for the sole purpose of ensuring compliance with the Ahtisaari Plan of 2008, which underpins the independence of Kosovo. However, the fact that the ICO is double hated creates certain problems, including those of coordination. The ICO representative is also the EUSR. In his role as the ICO representative he recognises the Republic of Kosovo, but as the EUSR he does not, due to the fact that not all 27 EU member states have recognised the independence of Kosovo. For further details see Koeth (2010, 235).

6. This rested upon the extraordinary powers afforded to the SR/BiH which, due to the constitutional situation, did not apply to the posts of other SRs in the Western Balkans.

7. For details of the aims and objectives of these two programmes see Kirchner and Sperling (2007, 85–86).

8. For a fuller description of these programmes see Kirchner and Sperling (2007, 95–100).

9. The Lisbon Treaty has introduced changes which may help in the future to overcome some of the shortcomings in EU coordination. Among these are the establishment of an European External Action Service and whilst preserving unanimity within the Council, opens the way towards permanent structured cooperation.

10. The OSCE also maintained a mission on the ground in Macedonia at the same time as Concordia carried out its mission.

11. This included the use of forensic evidence rather than confessions, and a growing capacity by the Bosnians to investigate organised crime. Also prosecutors have become better at successfully arguing their case in courts (Merlingen 2009, p. 168).

12. For details of the budgets see: IPA: http://europa.eu/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/e50020.htm [accessed 28 May 2009]; ECHO: http://ec.europa.eu/echo/files/funding/budget/finances_2008_2013.pdf [accessed 28 May 2009]; EIDHR: http://www.euroresources.org/guide_to_population_assistance/european_community/eidhr.html> [accessed 28 May 2009].

13. The SEECP is chaired by a country on a rotating basis and includes Romania and Bulgaria. The SEECP plays a crucial role in securing effective regional ownership of the reform process and in bringing about regional cooperation. It works closely with the SAP and the Stability Pact (see European Commission 2004, p. 24).

14. See Stability Pact Newsletter 2004, p. 6.

15. Since 2002, the High Representative has a double heated appointment with the EUSR.

16. In 2005, 49.5 per cent of Macedonians supported Proxima (see Petroska-Beska 2005, p. 16).

17. For further details on the correlation between greater civil society organisations and greater ownership commitment see Jonasson (2009).

18. For example, the Venice Commission reported in March 2005 that the existing constitutional features of Bosnia and particularly its weak central government ‘makes effective government extremely difficult, if not impossible’ (Venice Commission 2005).

19. This effect can be noticed in the case of CARDS. With the merging in 2000 of Obnova, ECHO, and PHARE, CARDS became the principal channel for financial assistance to the Western Balkan region, based on a quick disbursing mechanism. The introduction of CARDS allowed the EU not only to enhance its autonomous action capacity for the Western Balkans, but also to consolidate the role of the European Commission as an independent authority in the SAP.