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Abstract
This article analyses the role of narratives in European Union (EU) external relations in the revised European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) and systematically explores how they operate in practice in the context of the EU's border management practices vis-à-vis the “southern borderlands”, in particular with respect to their inclusionary and exclusionary potential. Key EU documents and statements by EU agents, released throughout the first three years of Arab uprisings and pertaining to the revised ENP, will be subjected to a thorough examination which highlights four observations: first, in spite of the fact that the revised ENP is rooted in several narratives, some nevertheless dominate over others; second, the simultaneous presence of and recourse to different narratives contribute to an increase, rather than a decrease, of uncertainty in the EU's southern borderlands; third, despite a multitude of narratives which serve to legitimize EU action in the framework of the revised ENP, the latter perpetuates the logics of its predecessor by generating benefits mainly for the EU itself; fourth, that the first three years of the revised ENP have in practice demonstrated that an imbalance exists between on the one hand the original acceptance of the narratives by EU stakeholders and on the other hand their willingness to abide by them and fill them with life.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the authors.
Notes on contributor
Tobias Schumacher is the Chair holder of the European Neighbourhood Policy Chair at the College of Europe (Natolin campus) and a Senior Research Associate at the Center for International Studies (CEI-IUL) in Lisbon.
Notes
1. Quoted in Lipgens and Loth (Citation1988, p. 664).
2. Such a reference is, for example, embodied in “the statement that ‘world peace cannot be safeguarded without the making of creative efforts proportionate to the dangers which threaten it.’”
3. “Statement by President Barroso on the situation in North Africa”, Point Press, Speech 11/137; see http://www.notre-europe.eu/media/eu_arabtransition_t.behr_ne_april2012.pdf?pdf=ok [Accessed 2 March 2011].
4. See Commission of the European Communities, Wider Europe – Neighborhood: A New Framework for Relations with our Eastern and Southern Neighbors, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament, Brussels, 11 March 2003, 12.
8. See Speech by HRVP Catherine Ashton on Syria at the European Parliament, 13/688, 11 September 2013.
10. http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-middle-east-23928871. See also http://www.lrb.co.uk/v36/n08/seymour-m-hersh/the-red-line-and-the-rat-line
11. http://www.theguardian.com/world/german-elections-blog-2013/2013/sep/09/merkel-unlikely-allies-syria
14. While the US–Morocco free trade agreement does not contain any stipulation related to Western Sahara, Bob Zoellick, the US Trade Representative at the time of the conclusion of the agreement, in a letter to the House of Representatives on 20 July 2004 stated explicitly that the agreement will cover “trade and investment in the territory of Morocco as recognized internationally, and will not include Western Sahara.” See http://www.bilaterals.org/IMG/pdf/040719l-ustr-moroccoFTA.pdf
16. Guidelines on the eligibility of Israeli entities and their activities in the territories occupied by Israel since June 1967 for grants, prizes, and financial instruments funded by the EU from 2014 onwards (2013/C 205/05). Available from: Official Journal of the European Union, 19 July 2013, C205/9.
17. See Council of the European Union, Council Conclusions on the Middle East Peace Process, Foreign Affairs Council meeting, Brussels, 16 December 2013.
18. See the letter on the labelling of settlement products by Catherine Ashton of 8 July 2013 sent to Commission President Barroso and seven other commissioners. Available from: http://www.timesofisrael.com/full-text-of-eu-foreign-policy-chiefs-letter-on-settlement-labeling/
19. See Barak Ravid, Horizon 2020 crisis – Israel and EU compromise on terms of joint initiative, following rift over settlement funding ban, Haaretz, 26 November 2013. Available from: http://www.haaretz.com/news/diplomacy-defense/.premium-1.560292
20. See EU Neighborhood Barometer – South, November, 12/2012. Available from: http://www.enpi-info.eu/files/publications/ANSA_ENPI%20SOUTH_Infographic_April%2013.jpg
21. The EU Council of Ministers adopted negotiation directives in December 2011, but by December 2013, no negotiations with Tunisia and Jordan had taken place.
22. See European Commission, Communication from the Commission to the Council and the European Parliament on strengthening the European Neighborhood Policy, COM (Citation2006) 726 final, 4 December 2006. See also Non-paper expanding on the proposals contained in the communication to the European Parliament and the Council on “Strengthening the ENP”. ENP – A Path towards further economic integration.
23. Only one reference exists, mentioning the “long-term vision of an economic community”. See European Commission and High Representative of the EU for Foreign and Security Policy (Citation2011, p. 9).
24. See Arab NGO Network for Development, Civil Society Reaction to the Joint Communication “A Partnership for Democracy and Shared Prosperity”. Available from: http://www.eurostep.org/wcm/dmdocuments/es_internal/Civil_Society_Reaction_to_the_Joint_Communication_on_MENA_partnership_final_version-1.pdf
25. Non-paper expanding on the proposals contained in the communication to the European Parliament and the Council on “Strengthening the ENP”. ENP – A path towards further economic integration.