![Sample our Politics & International Relations journals, sign in here to start your FREE access for 14 days]({"type":"image" , "src" : "/sda/5947/TOC-Subject-Sample-2021-Politics-International-Relations.jpg"})
ABSTRACT
The occurrence and outcomes of the Cod Wars defy both popular and academic expectations. Iceland, a microstate, essentially won four disputes against the UK, a great power. The two states furthermore belonged to a Western security community, sharing significant institutional, economic and cultural ties. This article reviews the history and international relations literature on the Cod Wars to explain and evaluate why the Cod Wars occurred and why Iceland won them. This article also explains what lessons international relations scholarship has learned from the Cod Wars for liberal international relations theory, realism and asymmetric bargaining.
Acknowledgements
I would like to thank Guðni Th. Jóhannesson and the two anonymous reviewers for helpful comments on this paper.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on contributor
Sverrir Steinsson has a BA in Political Science (2013) and an MA in International Affairs (2015) from the University of Iceland. He is currently working as a researcher in the Faculty of Political Science at the University of Iceland.
Notes
1. It is not rare for Western democracies to engage in maritime disputes, but it is rare for those disputes to be as intense and of high stakes as the Cod Wars were.
2. I will refer to “nautical miles” as “miles” from here on. The Icelanders drew the four-mile limits in a way that closed off Icelandic bays (e.g. Faxa Bay). These bays encompassed large swaths of territory and fruitful fishing grounds. So the extension from 3 to 4 miles almost doubled the Icelandic jurisdiction: from 25,000 to 43,000 km2 according to Jóhannesson (Citation2006, p. 31).
3. These clashes were not as serious as in the subsequent Cod Wars.
4. The British government did not stop the landing ban imposed by the trawling industry, despite evidence that British officials considered the actions of the trawling industry a violation of the UK's treaty obligations and domestic laws (Jóhannesson Citation2007, p. 104).
5. As a concession to facilitate a final agreement, Iceland committed itself to settle any future disagreement over fishery limits through the ICJ.
6. But they did not go as far as to threaten the expulsion of US troops (Ingimundarson Citation2003, p. 92, Citation2011, p. 136).
7. According to Hart (Citation1976, p. 57), “domestic politics was not a major factor in British policies and actions”.
8. Both left-of-centre governments were short-lived, but would have ended quicker if the Progressive Party (part of both left-of-centre governments), Social Democrats (part of the left-of-centre government of 1958–1959) and the short-lived splinter-party formed from the Social Democrats (part of the left-of-centre government of 1971–1974) had not acquiesced to the demands of the Socialists.
9. Jóhannesson (Citation2004, p. 555) and Guðmundsson (Citation2006, p. 111) briefly consider the role of imperial pride on British decision-making.
10. I will refer to the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries, which was renamed as the Ministry of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food in 1955, as MAF/MAFF from here on.
11. See also Ingimundarson (Citation2002) on interdepartmental fighting over Cod War policy among the British.
12. This was the case in the Proto (Jóhannesson Citation2007), First (Jóhannesson Citation2007), Second (Ingimundarson Citation2002, p. 222) and Third (Guðmundsson Citation2006) Cod Wars.
13. Historians who write on the Cod Wars do occasionally make references to IR theory, but the use of theory to explain the behaviour of Iceland and the UK is not extensive (Ingimundarson Citation2002, pp. 20, 337–338, Jóhannesson Citation2007).
14. Lupu and Traag (Citation2013) and Kinne (Citation2014) argue that trade ties with third parties deter disputes between states even if the dyad is not economically interdependent.
15. Jóhannesson (Citation2007, pp. 50–51) recognises that realist thinkers have emphasised how alliances can have a restraining power on allies.
16. See earlier section on interdepartmental competition.
17. Victory in a Cod War is understood as coming closest to achieving one's final offer prior to Iceland's unilateral extension in the settlement of a Cod War.
18. It was unfeasible for both the trawling industry and the British government to maintain naval protection over a long period. The Navy could only protect trawlers if they remained in closely guarded zones. This limited the catches of the trawlers. It was costly for the British government to divert the Navy to Icelandic waters and shoulder the costs from the damages to ships from the rough Icelandic waters.
19. Jóhannesson (Citation2007, pp. 293–294, 297–298) concurs with Habeeb's and Keohane and Nye's assessments.