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ABSTRACT
Contrary to some expectations, the Baltic states’ accession to the EU in 2004 was not followed by an improvement in their relations with Russia. Instead, the Baltic states became known as the “troublemakers” of EU–Russia relations. This was commonly explained by their history and national identity, which contributed to an understanding of the Baltic concerns as marginal. The Ukraine crisis brought a reaction of “I told you so” by the Baltic states that for many years had been warning the West about Russia’s expansionist ambitions. This article explores the ideational underpinnings of the gap between the Baltic states’ perceptions of and relations with Russia on the one hand and mainstream views in Europe on the other. It identifies liberal interdependence, democratic peace, and realist geopolitics as key ideas that have framed the EU’s and Baltic states’ perceptions of Russia. In the vein of constructivist foreign policy analysis, these ideational structures are seen to condition the EU’s and Baltic states’ interests and policies vis-à-vis Russia. An analysis of the “Baltic factor” helps to illuminate the contradictions and shortcomings in the EU’s Russia policy and review its ideational basis which is now in need of a strategic rethink.
Acknowledgements
A draft of this article was presented at the 5th national conference of the Finnish International Studies Association, held on 15–16 January 2016 in Hämeenlinna. I would like to thank the colleagues who gave useful comments on that occasion and the two anonymous reviewers who helped to further develop the text. I am also grateful to the diplomats and officials of the EU and the Baltic states who dedicated some of their time for the interviews.
Disclosure statement
No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author.
Notes on Contributor
Dr Kristi Raik is a Senior Research Fellow at the Finnish Institute of International Affairs (FIIA) and Adjunct Professor at the University of Turku. Prior to joining FIIA in 2011, she served inter alia as an official at the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Directorate General for External and Politico-Military Affairs, and as a Visiting Fellow at the Centre for European Policy Studies in Brussels.
Notes
1. While the article contrasts the Baltic perspective with “mainstream” or “dominant” positions that had a key role in shaping EU policy, it should be noted that there have always been different views on Russia among and within the rest of the member states (see David et al. Citation2013).
2. I conducted altogether 34 interviews in 2004, 2011–2013, and 2015 in Brussels, Tallinn, and Vilnius. There was some variation between interviews conducted at different points of time, but the main themes were the same. Careful notes made during and immediately after each interview have allowed for the systematic use of the material for this article.
3. Translation by the author.
4. After the Russio-Georgian war, the Western threat assessments changed to some degree and consequently Estonia succeeded in initiating the preparation of a defence plan for the Baltic states, which was secretly approved by NATO in 2010 (Author interview, Brussels, December 2015).
5. The three main dimensions of foreign policy Europeanisation have been defined as adaptation and policy convergence, national projection, and identity reconstruction through socialisation (Wong and Hill, Citation2011, 7). The approach taken here is mainly interested in the third dimension, socialisation – or a lack of it – at the level of core ideas of foreign policy.
6. Freedom House (Citation2016) reports indicate a constant decline of Russia’s democracy score since 2001.
7. Translation by the author.
8. Interviews, Brussels, February 2004; Vilnius, May 2013; Tallinn, August 2011 and August 2015.
9. Interviews, Brussels, February 2004.
10. Interviews, Tallinn, August 2011.
11. Interviews, Vilnius, May 2013 and Tallinn, August 2015.
12. Interviews, Tallinn, August 2011 and Vilnius, May 2013.
13. According to the national statistical offices of the three Baltic states, Russia’s share in their foreign trade was approximately 6–9% in 2004. In 2012–2014, it peaked at close to 12% in the cases of Estonia and Latvia, and over 20% in the case of Lithuania – while the latter was the most vocal critic of Russia.
14. Interviews, Brussels, December 2015.