The High Representative and directoires in European foreign policy: the case of the nuclear negotiations with Iran

ABSTRACT

The negotiations with Iran about its nuclear programme have seen the most protracted involvement of the High Representatives of the European Union in a high-profile policy case. This article traces the evolution of the High Representatives’ participation in the negotiations, from the first contacts with the E3 (Germany, France and the United Kingdom) in 2003 to the adoption of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action in 2015. It focuses on the institutional role the High Representatives played in relation with the directoires leading the talks with Iran – first the E3 and, since 2006, E3/EU. In this context, it examines the personal and organisational factors that affected the influence each of the three High Representatives (Javier Solana, Catherine Ashton and Federica Mogherini) had in regard to the directoires. The analysis distinguishes specifically between the phases before and after the 2009 Lisbon Treaty. The article shows how similar personal qualities of the three High Representatives in terms of problem-solving and trust-building gave them political capital that enabled them to adopt a fairly constant role as bridge-builders within the directoires and between the directoires and other actors. The reforms of the Lisbon Treaty had only a minor impact.

KEYWORDS:

• High Representative
• European foreign policy
• informal governance
• directoires
• E3/EU
• Iran

Acknowledgements

The authors would like to thank the editors of the special issue for their helpful and constructive comments. Likewise, they would like to thank the interviewees for taking their time to provide frank and insightful responses. Benjamin Kienzle would also like to thank the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness for its support for this research.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes on contributors

Aniseh Bassiri Tabrizi is Senior Research Fellow at the International Security Studies department at RUSI. Her research is concerned with security and geopolitics in the Middle East, with a particular focus on Iran and Iraq's foreign and domestic politics, drivers of radicalisation, and drones proliferation.

Benjamin Kienzle is a Senior Lecturer in the Defence Studies Department at King’s College London and an Associate Researcher at King’s Centre for Science & Security Studies. He studies international security cooperation and is particularly interested in the control of nuclear weapons, European defence and “Brexit”.

Notes

1 Before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty, the post was known as “High Representative for the common foreign and security policy”, as defined by the 1999 Amsterdam Treaty. After the Lisbon Treaty, some publications refer to the High Representative/Vice President (HR/VP) to highlight the post-holder’s double-hatted role in the European Commission. Henceforth, this article will use the abbreviation HR/VP for the post-Lisbon Treaty period and the term/abbreviation “High Representative/HR” for the pre-Lisbon period or the period that covers both the time before and after the Lisbon Treaty.

2 See Gegout (2002) on previous directoires.

3 The E3 were constituted by Germany, France and the United Kingdom. In 2004, when Javier Solana, the EU’s High Representative at the time, joined the group it became known as E3/EU. In 2006, the United States, China and Russia joined the group, which became known since then as the E3/EU+3 or the P5+1 (which stands for the permanent five members of the United Nations Security Council plus Germany).

4 Twenty-two interviews were conducted with senior European, Iranian and US officials previously involved, directly or not, in the negotiations with Iran either as political directors, ambassadors, foreign ministers or senior officials; three interviews were conducted with experts on Iran and EU foreign policy.

5 See, in particular, Koops and Tercovich (2020) and their set of institutional, situational and personal factors.

6 The JCPOA foresees the implementation of strict international controls on Iran’s nuclear programme in exchange for the lifting of nuclear-related sanctions against Iran. The agreement was endorsed by UN Security Council Resolution 2231 (2015). In May 2018, the United States withdrew from the agreement under the new administration of President Trump. The future of the agreement is at the time of writing (June 2020) uncertain.

7 On the origins of the E3, see Alcaro (2018).

8 Interview with former senior EU official (R) previously involved in the negotiations with Iran, Brussels, December 2014.

9 Interview with former senior UK official (A), London, February 2015, phone interview with former senior German official (B), May 2015 and phone interview with senior Italian official (C), May 2015.

10 Interview via email with former senior Spanish official (D), May 2015.

11 Interview with C and with former senior EU official (E), Brussels, December 2014.

12 Phone interview with A and C.

13 Interview via email with former senior Italian official (F), May 2015.

14 Interview with F and with former senior French official (G), March 2015.

15 Phone interview with former senior German official (H), February 2015, phone interview with senior EU official (I), July 2015 and interview with G.

16 Interview with former senior Iranian official (L), London, October 2015 and with G.

17 Interview with L, via phone with senior Iranian official (M), August 2015 and via email with former senior Iranian official (N), September 2015.

18 Interview with senior Belgian official (O), April 2014, interview with senior Iranian official (P), Vienna, November 2014, phone interview with senior US official (Q), June 2015 and via email with Iranian expert (J), August 2015.

19 Interview with (R), November 2014.

20 Interview with O and R, and phone interview with former senior US official (S), June 2015.

21 Phone interview with German expert (K), October 2015.

22 Interview with M and phone interview with Iranian expert (V), August 2015.

23 Interview with S.

24 Interview with L, S and phone interview with two former senior US officials (T and U) June-July 2015.

25 Interview with L and I.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the EU-NormCon research project (Normative contestation in Europe: Implications for the EU in a changing global order) funded by the National R+D Plan of the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness [grant number CSO2016-79205-P].