A “hybrid offensive” in the Balkans? Russia and the EU-led Kosovo-Serb negotiations

ABSTRACT

Recent analysis has interpreted Russia’s approach to the EU-led dialogue between Kosovo and Serbia through the lens of its actions in Ukraine. This has been characterised as “hybrid warfare” designed to disrupt the negotiations to prevent the integration of the Balkans into Western institutions. This article examines whether Russian actions in Ukraine have signalled a recalibration of Russia’s response to the Kosovo issue based on a repudiation of the EU-led dialogue. This article argues that while Russia’s behaviour has been shaped by its growing competition with the Western powers, its approach has been ambiguous and driven by a range of humanitarian, legal and security-based arguments rooted in the context of the Kosovo problem. These arguments have emerged as important trends in Russia’s behaviour and can be traced to its response to the Kosovo conflict in 1999. This article shows that there has not been a complete recalibration in Russia’s policy towards the dialogue. Russia’s approach has shown both continuity with these trends and a growing politicisation accelerated by the sharp decline in Russia’s relations with the West since 2014. In a broader sense, this article questions the intent and form of Russia’s actions in Ukraine as an explanatory framework for Russia’s behaviour elsewhere.

KEYWORDS:

• Russia
• EU dialogue
• Kosovo
• Serbia
• Hybrid warfare

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 Security Council Meetings are referenced as S/PV.[number], Resolutions as S/RES/[number], and Secretary General Reports as S/[date]/[number], General Assembly Resolutions as A/RES/[number]/[number].

2 A UNHCR assessment was critical of UNMIK’s inability “to ensure basic security in Kosovo and bring to justice those responsible for crimes against minorities” (See Mertus 2009, p. 472).

3 For the 1996 Florence Agreement, see https://www.osce.org/cio/129436, accessed 16 November 2020.

4 For example, see S/2013/72, 4 Feb. 2013; S/2015/579b, 30 July 2015b; S/2016/666, 29 July 2016; S/2017/95/Rev.1, 6 Feb. 2017; and S/2019/102, 1 Feb. 2019.