From a willing partner to close political and economic partner: analysing EU political elites’ images of Georgia from 1991 to 2020

ABSTRACT

This article explores EU political elites' images of Georgia and its evolution from 1991 to 2020. The analysis relies on the author’s 25 original interviews with EU political elites, including presidents, prime ministers and ministers of EU member states and EU commissioners, alongside primary documents. By triangulating between novel interview data, document analysis and statements by EU officials, this article unpacks EU perceptions of Georgia’s intentions, capabilities, threats and cultural status over a 30-year historical period. The study shows that three main images of Georgia have emerged over time in the eyes of EU and EU member states leaders: first, Georgia as a willing partner to the EU; second, Georgia as a political partner to the EU and third, Georgia as a close political and economic partner to the EU. This article, by studying the EU political elites’ images of Georgia, adds knowledge to the EU’s perceptions of external actors, which is an under-researched topic in the scholarship of images and perceptions in EU external relations. Moreover, it extends the literature on EU–Georgia relations, and helps to understand some of their peculiarities.

KEYWORDS:

• Georgia
• EU
• political elites
• foreign policy
• image theory

In research on European foreign policy, a growing body of scholarly work has highlighted the importance of analysing external perceptions and images of the EU to understand its external relations. That line of scholarship widely explores the rest of the world’s views about the EU and offers various perceptions of the EU held beyond its borders (Lucarelli 2014, Bachmann and Müller 2015, Elgström 2015, Chaban and Kelly 2017, Chaban et al. 2018, 2019). However, there is a limited but growing literature that emphasises how the EU sees other countries (Bersick 2012, Winand et al. 2015, Knodt et al. 2017) and how this impacts EU foreign policy decisions (Larsen 2014, Chaban and Holland 2019, Scheler 2021). This is an overlooked perspective in the studies of perceptions in the scholarship of the EU and its foreign policy; thus, this article tackles this scholarly deficit and contributes to this end by solely elaborating on the perceptions and images held by EU political elites about the external environment and to what extent such perceptions affect EU foreign policy outlook. As Jervis (1976) mentions, “it is often impossible to explain crucial decisions and policies without reference to the decision-makers’ beliefs about the world and their image of others” (p. 28).

With the aim to explore this scholarly angle in EU foreign policy literature, this paper zooms in on Georgia, where the EU has been externally engaged for 30 years and has implemented normative, civilian and security policies (Knodt and Urdze 2016). Following the Soviet Union’s dissolution, the EU’s engagement in Georgia was mainly technical and economic (Dobrescu and Schumacher 2020, p. 22). However, its presence in Georgia increased after the Rose Revolution in 2003. The EU included Georgia in the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP) in 2004, which addressed 16 countries through a bilateral policy initiative including Georgia. The partnership included two pillars: the accession process and the association model (Bechev and Nicolaïdis 2010). Two years after its launch, the EU concluded the ENP Action Plan (ENP AP) with Georgia, which aimed at advancing the approximation of Georgian legislation, norms and standards to those of the EU. Eight priority areas were identified within the ENP AP framework, including (1) rule of law, (2) improvement of business climate, (3) economic development and poverty reduction, (4) cooperation on Justice Freedom and Security (JLS) and border management, (5) regional cooperation, (6) resolution of internal conflicts, (7) cooperation on foreign and security policy and (8) transports and energy (Commission of the European Communities, 2006). EU gradually intensified a institutionalised relationship with ENP countries, and created two sub-regional arrangements of ENP, namely the Union for the Mediterranean (UfM) and the Eastern Partnership (EaP) initiative, including Georgia in the latter in 2009 (Schumacher 2018, Simão 2018). EaP represents a new multilateral track and promotes multilateral confidence building on four thematic platforms: economy, governance, connectivity and society (Korosteleva et al. 2018). Moreover, EaP supports the delivery of the EU global strategy goals by supporting the stability, prosperity and resilience of the EU neighbours (EU Global Strategy 2016). In 2014, the EU updated the political ties to Georgia and signed the association agreement (AA), followed by enacting visa liberalisation in 2017 (Simão 2018, p. 315, Loda 2019).

Such a relationship configuration between the EU and Georgia and those tools in the EU’s foreign policy toolkit vis-a-vis Georgia from 1991 to 2020 offers a possibility for empirical explorations and an in-depth elaboration on the perceptions of Georgia, and the drivers of EU policies towards Georgia, among EU and EU member states leaders. Consequently, this research examines the EU political elites’ perceptions and images of Georgia from 1991 to 2020 and, for nuanced analysis, divides the findings into three main phases. The first phase, 1991–2003 – from Georgia’s independence to Rose Revolution; the second phase, 2003–2012 – from Rose Revolution to the election of the new political party in Georgia in 2012 and the third phase – from 2012 to 2020.

This article employs IR’s image theory conceptual framework for studying one actor’s perceptions and images to another and relies on the data source triangulation of the author’s 25 interviews with EU political top elites, alongside document analysis, including speeches, press briefings and statements made by EU officials. In particular, the present study benefits from unique interview data with EU decision-makers, including presidents, prime ministers and ministers of EU member states and EU commissioners. By studying the EU’s perceptions of external actors, which is an under-researched topic in the scholarship of images and perceptions in EU external relations, this paper enriches scholarship on EU external relations. Moreover, it extends the literature on EU–Georgia relations and EU actorness in Georgia. To shed some light on this, I first present the theoretical considerations based on this research and introduce data and methods for analysis. In the next step, I analyse the data; finally, I discuss selected findings before drawing my conclusions.

Theoretical departure

Studies dealing with perceptions and images in the EU foreign policy scholarship can be classified into three main themes, namely perceptions of the EU held by other actors, EU’s self-perceptions and EU’s perceptions of others. In the first strand of the literature, studies elaborate on the perceptions of the EU in bilateral and multilateral relations, and in conflict settings. Starting with perceptions of the EU in bilateral relations, scholars have explored views on the EU held by rising powers, including China (Lai et al. 2019, Zhang 2020), India (Lai et al. 2019, Sachdeva 2019,) and Russia (Chaban et al. 2017, Foxall 2019, Ananieva 2020). Some important studies should be outlined such as Chaban et al. (2020) on perceptions of the EU in strategic regions around the world in the aftermath of Brexit, Chaban and Lucarelli's (2021) work on EU’s performance in the Eurozone sovereign debt crisis, the Ukraine crisis, the so-called irregular migration crisis, and the Covid-19 pandemic and the impact on the external image of the EU, and last but not least, Chaban and Elgström’s (2021) work on theorising external perceptions of the EU. Regarding perceptions of the EU in multilateral relations, scholars have focused on how the EU is perceived in international negotiations (Kilian and Elgström 2010, Fitriani 2011). When it comes to the views of the EU in conflict settings, scholars focused on Ukraine–Russia and Israel–Palestine conflicts (Elgström 2018, Chaban et al. 2019, Miskimmon and O'Loughlin 2019, Müller 2019). The second strand of the literature, studies the “mirror” perceptions, with a particular focus on EU self-images in mediation (Chaban et al. 2019) and bilateral relations. For example, Casier and DeBardeleben (2017) explored EU–Russia relations by focusing on both sides’ perceptions and images. More recently Chaban and Elgström (2020, 2021) compared the perceptions of the EU in Ukraine with the EU’s self-perceptions. Finally, the third strand of the literature, which is so far the least developed, explores how the EU views other countries. The literature in this regard frames Europeans’ perception of Asia (Bersick 2012), the EU’s views on Turkey’s membership (Dostál et al. 2011), and EU’s perceptions of the BICS countries in the context of energy governance (Knodt et al. 2017).

This article, by studying the EU political elites’ perceptions of Georgia, adds knowledge to this limited third strand of studies by focusing on how the EU sees its external partners. The theoretical framework for examining EU members’ perceptions of Georgia uses the literature mentioned above as a point of departure. A review of academic writings on perceptions of the EU or the EU’s perceptions of others leads us to focus on cognitive and agenda-setting approaches, in which image theory has attracted renewed interest in the last two decades in EU studies. IR image theory focuses on the perception of others. As Herrmann (1986) mentions in his work, image theory has four leading indicators – intentions, threats, capabilities and cultural status – for operationalising others’ perceptions (see also Herrmann 2013 for an overview). It is argued that those perceptions determine imagery that a subject will use to define the situation. Intentions describes the extent to which countries’ goals accord with each other (Herrmann 2013, p. 340). Threats pay attention to what leaders perceive as threatening (Jervis 1976), and sheds light on if the country is hostile or friendly. This component takes a central role in elaborating images of the target country and incline a subject to act (Boulding 1959, Jervis 1976, R. Herrmann 1985, 1988, R.K. Herrmann 2003, p. 287, Stein 2013, Jervis 2017) but then often as “threats to yourself posed by the object of perceptions”. That link is visible in the study of great powers’ perceptions of each other. In this paper, I instead emphasise the importance of “threats against the object of perception”, external and internal, as it is essential for the EU to understand what threats are perceived for its policies to be successful. As Lucarelli (2019, p. 420) argues, common perceptions of common threats frequently lead to enhanced coordination of actions, while divergent threat perceptions result in a lack of coordination. Because the EU has implemented different kinds of policies towards Georgia, some coordinated within a short time, it will be interesting to see to what extent differently perceived threats have impinged on EU policies towards Georgia. Perceptions of capabilities show, for example, how a country’s economy works, how its military and political system works and reveals how one perceives another country’s strengths and weaknesses (Cottam 1994, p. 21, Herrmann 2003, p. 286). Cultural status identifies how norms operating in the other’s country are perceived as culturally comparable or culturally distant (Herrmann and Fischerkeller 1995). Scholars usefully build their study of EU perceptions on those indicators. For example, Chaban et al. (2017), in analysing Russian images of the EU, focus on Russian perceptions of EU intentions – whether a state (the EU in this case) is seen favourably or unfavourably, perceptions of EU capabilities (is it relatively strong or weak?) and perceptions of EU cultural status (is it culturally close or distant?).

To summarise, image theory suggests that every perceived relationship would have a component of threat, intentions, capability judgments, cultural considerations; thus, this article’s analytical framework builds on those four elements of images. As mentioned, this article frames the 1991–2020 period and the analysis is divided into three main periods, from Georgia’s independence to the Rose Revolution, from the Rose Revolution to the election of the new political party in Georgia in 2012 and from 2012 to 2020. For each period, this paper will study how the EU leaders perceived the intentions, capabilities and cultural status of Georgia; threats within and against Georgia; in the end, findings will account for variations over time.

Methods and data

This paper analyses EU images and perceptions¹ of Georgia. Scholars in EU studies focus on elite interviewing, media, public and document analysis for studying images and perceptions (Lucarelli 2014, Elgström and Chaban 2015, Chaban and Kelly 2017, Wrange and Bengtsson 2019). For this study, elite perceptions are key to understanding EU views. Elites are defined as groups of individuals being “in positions to make decisions having major consequences” (Mills 1956, p. 3) regarding EU foreign policy. Seventy members of EU political elites who were in power from 1991 to 2020 were contacted for this study, ensuring an element of credibility. Due to the fact that this piece covers the period of 1991–2020, the ambition was to get interviews from the EU elites who have worked with Georgia and who have been involved in policies which the EU implemented towards Georgia during this time frame. Therefore, former and current presidents, prime ministers, foreign ministers of different EU countries, EU commissioners and EU representatives and ambassadors to Georgia were contacted. Finally, empirical data for the analysis came from the author’s original 25 open-ended interviews with the former presidents, prime ministers and foreign ministers of EU countries, EU Parliament president, EU commissioners, EU ambassadors and special representatives to Georgia, collected between September 2020 and January 2021. Six were done in person in Sweden and Denmark due to the location of the author and in-person access to the respondents.² Seventeen were conducted using Zoom, and two through written correspondence. The interview questions dealt with the perceptions (not knowledge) of the EU respondents. They were organised based on the above-mentioned four image determinants. In particular, respondents were asked about their perceptions of (1) Georgia’s intentions, (2) Georgia’s capabilities, (3) threats within and against Georgia and (4) the cultural status of Georgia.

For further validation of the analysis, I also draw on primary documents, including speeches, joint statements and press briefings made by EU political elites on Georgia from 1991 to 2020. Therefore, this paper relies on data source triangulation, which means collecting and using multiple data sources of the same phenomenon across time, space or person (Denzin 1970). By triangulating the interview data, and primary documents published between 1991 and 2020, this paper reduces reliance on a single form of data and helps to increase the validity of the findings. Results involve the quotations from the respondents’ answers that have been formally agreed with them; therefore, I have respondents’ consent to being cited.

The limitations of this study are twofold. First, there is a limitation of the interview data collected that needs to be outlined. The data were collected in 2020, while the analysis deals with the years back to 1991. There is a possibility that respondents’ perceptions changed over time, which leads us to the “rosy past syndrome” (Duffy 2018). “Rosy past syndrome” is a well-known notion in political psychology and refers to the fact that respondents tend to remember past events as more positive than they used to be. However, what must be outlined here is that the rosy past syndrome is more likely to play a role in positive events and should not be viewed as an unavoidable factor that affects every person in every situation. However, to address this challenge, I cross-checked information from respondents with primary documents. The primary documents included the remarks from some of the respondents interviewed for this study that further helped to reduce the limitation of the possible changed perceptions. Another limitation of this article concerns the study period. It should be noted that this article does not reflect on the current developments between the EU and Georgia, but studies the period up to 2020. The recent developments of the EU–Georgia relations refer to the fact that Georgia’s ruling Georgian Dream (GD) party annulled the EU-brokered 19 April 2021, agreement. This has been explained by the refusal of the biggest opposition party (the United National Movement) to join the deal. Those decisions are critically viewed among EU political elites. As they outline in the official statements (Cramon 2021, Michel 2021), such actions harm the country’s democratic future. Those statements open up the possibility that EU elite images of Georgia have changed after 2020, and there is a chance that current events may have influenced the perceptions of the past. However, this paper does not analyse the recent EU elites’ images of Georgia as the author’s interviews with EU political elites end in 2020. Hence, the current angle is a study period for future research.

Findings

Phase I: Georgia as a willing partner to the EU

Shortly after attaining independence from the USSR, Georgia was not often in the minds of European political elites. Findings reveal that the EU elites and the European agenda were occupied by what was happening in Russia and larger countries. However, there was a question about the stability and democratic development in the post-Soviet space. For this reason, EU political elites had an eye on the post-Soviet states’ intentions: for those who wanted relations with the EU, the EU wanted relations with them as well (Solana; Bildt; Lykketoft; EU Commission 2002³). From this point of view, since the beginning of Georgia’s independence, respondents understood it “as a country who was keen to have friendly relations with European Union” (Solana). As the former Danish Foreign Minister Per Stig Moller mentioned, “I saw Georgia as a country whose intention was integration into our family, and therefore EU looked at Georgia as an evident candidate for becoming our partner” (Moller). Along with Georgia’s perceived European intentions, EU respondents acknowledged that Georgia was seen as a country that was conceptually and spiritually close to the EU ideology (Vike-Freiberga; Eklund; Talvitie). Zooming in on Georgia’s cultural affinity in the eyes of EU respondents, Georgia was depicted as a Christian country with strong historical links to Europe. However, it was not fully perceived as a culturally European country, but rather a country that had started fighting to come closer to the EU (Pöttering; Cornell; Bildt). Most typically, findings show that the EU looked at Georgia as a country that had very early Christianity, even before many European countries, and in this sense was closer to a European cultural understanding (Adamkus; Talvitie; Solana; Lykketoft).

Reflecting on Georgia’s capabilities, there is a strong view among EU leaders that during the first phase (1991–2003), Georgia was a weak country whose economic, political and defence capabilities were miserable. In particular, respondents emphasised the country’s high corruption and crime rate (Vike-Freiberga; Solana; Dimitrov). As Carl Bildt, the former prime minister and foreign minister of Sweden, outlines, “Georgia was seen as a fairly corrupt place; it was exceedingly corrupt”. Regarding Georgia’s perceived capabilities, EU officials expressed their concerns that the country’s tax, customs regulations and collection procedures were in bad shape (EU Commission 2002). In the words of the former president of the EU Parliament, “One could add that because of the weak energy sector, electric blackouts happened frequently, and basic public services were completely underfunded” (Hans-Gert Pöttering).

Even though the country’s economic, political and military capacities were seen as poor, respondents noted that Shevardnadze’s personality was an asset to Georgia in terms of capabilities at that time. EU leaders looked at Georgia’s president as an intelligent man, extremely well informed and well mannered. According to this view, Shevardnadze had strengths as a respected leader, and the relative stability that his government projected was also seen as an asset in relations with the EU (Adamkus; Vike-Freiberga; Eklund; Hakala). As EU High Representative Javier Solana points out,

I had an excellent friendship with Shevardnadze when he engaged in Georgia. I visited him on several occasions, I helped him. It was a great experience for me. From then on, I have been very close to Georgia until I left the EU.

An additional essential point to elaborate on regarding the EU’s images of Georgia relates to EU respondents’ views on the threats to Georgia. It is widely believed among EU officials that Georgia’s divorce from the Soviet Union resulted in violence, political instability and territorial fragmentation (Adamkus; Talvitie; Haber). In the reflections of EU political elites, Georgia was externally vulnerable because of its relationship with Russia and the Russian approach to Georgia. However, a majority of respondents stressed that Georgia faced micro-level instabilities coming from internal military conflicts and poorly functioning political institutions (Lykketoft; Cornell; Eklund; Hakala). Starting with the military conflicts, much attention was given to the ethno-territorial conflicts and wars in Abkhazia and South Ossetia, and later to the outbreak of the Chechen War (Moller). Therefore, respondents noted that the significant challenges to Georgia were seen in the eruption of different wars and its struggling with its own identity, which in the end contributed to the country’s sharp institutional decay. Additionally, a strong view becomes apparent that because of the lack of functioning political institutions, the rule of law, economy and diplomatic ties, Georgia was falling apart as a country (Solana; Hakala; Dimitrov; Semneby). In the words of a former president of Estonia, Toomas Hendrik Ilves, Georgia lacked statehood: “I went to Tbilisi the first time in 1998. It was a genuinely post-Soviet state with trappings of statehood, but no genuine reforms. I just liked Georgia and Georgians. So, I kept hoping”.

Interviews emphasised that the EU pictured Georgia as a country that clearly expressed the willingness for close relations with the EU – but which, because of internal conflicts and weak institutions, was unable to provide impulses with respect to the EC/EU at the time (Pöttering; Solana). Based on the responses, in addition to the views mentioned above, the driving force for EU policies vis-à-vis Georgia during the first phase was the fact that the EU stands for democracy, fundamental rights, international law and a market economy and “supports Georgia’s reform policies and the country’s efforts for closer cooperation with the EU” (Anna Lindh 2001). According to this view, there was a vacuum left by the USSR, and the EU could fill this vacuum by getting Georgia into the democratic system. As the former EU representative to the South Caucasus outlines, “Brussels thought that once you get the democratic system in EU’s neighbourhood, you are better off” (Heikki Talvitie). Views from the respondents showed that strengthening democratic institutions inside Georgia and sending financial assistance to Georgia were vital. The EU would support Georgia’s European aspirations and strengthen its statehood, on the one hand, and would promote the European rule of law, on the other. Such views motivated the EU’s Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Georgia, which entered into force in 1999 (European Commission 1999; Hakala), and the appointment of an EU special representative for the South Caucasus in 2003 (Council Joint Action 2003).

To summarise, my findings on the EU elites’ perceptions on the intentions, capabilities, threats and cultural status of Georgia reveal that Georgia was perceived as a country with a European Christianity during the first phase. Georgia shared and showed EU ideals and desired close relations with the EU, but had no capabilities, a lack of real statehood, and a crisis-like accumulation of internal conflict situations at that time. EU political elite views showed that they were devoted to helping Georgia gain and keep its statehood by forming the PCA and appointing the special representative for the South Caucasus.

Phase II: Georgia as a political partner to the EU

Following the Rose Revolution in Georgia in November 2003, Georgia received more attention in EU political elites’ minds and on the EU’s agenda (Pavilionis; Danielson; Bildt; Leterme). In the EU respondents’ reflections, this event gave rise to hopes for a surge for democratisation in the region (Pöttering; Ilves). As the former president of Lithuania, Valdas Adamkus, notes,

Georgian people demanded their old elites to go; a new generation of leadership was emerging. Their ultimate goals were, by and large, overlapping with Lithuania’s own vision of Europe, whole and free. So, our synergies and cooperation were nothing but natural. From today’s historical perspective, the pace of Georgia’s domestic reforms and transatlantic integration was at that time colossal. (Adamkus)

It is argued that there was an understanding in Brussels of Georgians that the country was trying to get closer to the EU based on democratic progress (Levitte; Talvitie; Semneby). Therefore, with this event, European leaders saw a positive move regarding Georgia’s European development. As they point out, a continuation of the reforms that President Saakashvili had loudly announced seemed to be going extremely well in EU elites’ perceptions. The EU was looking forward to extensive cooperation with a more democratic and independent Georgia, but without offering a membership guarantee (Vike-Freiberga; Solana). During Shevardnadze’s time, EU elites saw Georgia as a willing partner to the EU, especially after the Rose Revolution. As EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus Peter Semneby mentions,

it was almost a relationship of a parent that had suddenly discovered that it had an adolescent child, but it has evolved into a much more mature relationship. One that is still very much dependent on the support of various kinds (political, economic, and so on) from the European Union.

EU elites argue that Georgia’s European intentions became very evident after the Rose Revolution, and that the EU was a partner in supporting Georgia’s political, social and economic reforms (Leterme; Ilves; Haber; Jensen). As a result, the EU–Georgia partnership strengthened, and Georgia was seen as a political partner country in the EU respondents’ reflections.

Focusing on Georgia’s capabilities, there is a dominant view that after the Rose Revolution, they changed dramatically (Pöttering). In the reflections of EU respondents, the main capabilities and the major success of Georgia after 2003 were the modernisation of society, the creation of stable political institutions and the implementation of economic and social reforms (Levitte; Ilves; Chris Patten 2004). As the president of Latvia, Vaira Vike-Freiberga outlines, “Georgia’s main achievements at that time were significant gains in the fight against corruption, which was a terrible problem in all post-communist countries”. The former prime minister of Belgium stresses the country’s economic development as well:

The good performance in economic terms, going to a free market economy, immediately delivered some good results with very impressive growth figures. Therefore, the first reaction to when we were discussing Georgia at that time, Georgia was linked to dynamism, very resilient people, dynamic economy. (Yves Leterme).

Those reforms were seen as the right way towards democracy, justice and good governance. There was an understanding that the new government was transforming Georgia from an ex-Soviet Republic to a European country.

The perception of Georgia’s cultural affinity to the EU changed after the Rose Revolution. EU elites at that time captured Georgia as more active with its cultural performance. The dominant view is that there was little knowledge about Georgia in the EU in the late ‘90s. From time to time, Georgia was discussed as a culturally outstanding country in the region with strong historical links to Europe (Dimitrov). According to the former prime minister of Belgium,

Compared to other places in the same region, I think that Georgia serves in countries like France, Germany, Belgium, etc. and there is a consciousness about the fact that you have solid ties to the EU in terms of Christian origin, the architecture of literature, the way of life. We have seen cultural ties between Europe and Georgia. (Yves Leterme)

Respondents emphasised the European nature of the Georgian flag, which was adopted after the Rose Revolution. In the words of the former European Parliament’s president, “Georgia not only changed the flag to the five red crosses on white ground, which is a known symbol in the West, but also its outlook to the West” (Hans-Gert Pöttering).

While analysing the threats within and against Georgia during the second phase, many respondents outlined that with the transfer of power from Shevardnadze to Saakashvili, the internal security situation improved; however, it backfired during Saakashvili’s presidency (Bildt; Westerholm; Solana). According to this view, the threats coming from internal polarisation, political influence on the judicial system and pressure against media freedom became visible. However, significant concern has been revealed regarding the external threat to Georgia. As it is argued, confrontation with Russia took on a more acute character and became a very real threat to Georgia’s security. In the words of a former head of the European Union Delegation to Georgia, “We observed the build-up of the war, incidents took place, and provocations occurred in the spring of 2008” (Per Eklund). The war took place in August 2008. EU reflections on the August 2008 War showed that they had seen a long period of increased tensions, provocations and incidents perpetrated by Russians, but had urged Georgia’s government not to fall into the trap (Ilves; Moller; Solana; Bildt). In the words of the former president of Latvia,

Back in early 2008, I remember begging President Saakashvili to be very careful, so as not to give Russia the slightest excuse to claim that Georgian forces had breached the borders with the territories that they say have a wish to become independent: ‘Keep strengthening your own internal security, political stability, democratic structures, the justice system, and everything that a post-communist country needs to do, but do be extremely careful’. (Vaira Vike-Freiberga)

A majority of respondents outlined that the August 2008 War was seen as a danger to the rules the EU created after the Cold War (Fule; Hartzell; Adamkus; Pavilionis). As the adviser to President Sarkozy of France mentions,

What was deeply rooted in our minds is that if we were to swallow this invasion, the day after or a year after, we would have to swallow a second one. It could be the beginning of the end of peaceful, positive cooperation between countries on the continent. (Jean-David Levitte)

Although the August 2008 War was perceived as a challenge to European interests, stability and security, respondents also argued that Europe was absolutely not, in any sense, ready to defend a neighbouring country against Russia (Solana). Therefore, the only possibility they saw from the European side to deescalate the conflict was political negotiations – a ceasefire agreement (Kouchner 2008), which President Sarkozy, who by that time was leading France as the president of the EU, succeeded to initiate. There was a dominant view among the respondents that it was imperative to have the French presidency on their side at that time – that the president of France was coming in and taking the lead. They argue that had it been the president or prime minister of another, smaller EU country, efforts would have been met with much more suspicion from EU member states (Bildt; Hartzell; Haber). In the words of Jean-David Levitte, an adviser of the former president of France, Sarkozy wanted to stop the war and decided to go to Moscow on 12 August 2008:

The key message of Sarkozy was that August War 2008 was a clear violation of the rules of Helsinki, the UN Charter, peace that EU was building throughout the European continent, and the starting point of a new Cold War between Russia and the EU.

Therefore, in this war, Sarkozy and other EU leaders saw Russia’s threat to Georgia as a danger and challenge to European stability.

The reflections mentioned above with regard to the intentions, capabilities and cultural status of Georgia and threats to the country showed that EU elites featured Georgia as a political partner to the EU, whose capabilities and cultural affinity to the EU had significantly increased. However, the external threats that the country was facing were also perceived as a challenge to the EU rule-based order. Those views, such as improvement in Georgia’s capabilities and closer cultural ties to the EU, had a positive influence on the EU’s decision to include Georgia in the ENP. As respondents outline, they saw that Georgia was adopting a political system based on the rule of law, which was necessary for a functional democracy, and the country seemed quite open to the market access approach that the EU suggested (Danielsson; Fule; Solana; Hartzell). According to EU elites, Georgia’s reforms after the Rose Revolution and changing views of EU political elites gave Georgia a clear label of political partner to the EU. Then, the August 2008 War happened, and the threats Georgia was facing externally were connected to Europe in EU respondents’ eyes. Answers from the respondents reveal that those views on threats, together with Georgia’s political and cultural closeness to the EU and French presidency, led to the setting up of the EU Monitoring Mission (EUMM) in Georgia, which was the fastest-ever deployed EU mission anywhere in the world (Jensen; Levitte; Kaljurand, Eklund). As emphasised, the EUMM was a quite impressive, immediate mobilisation of support from the EU to its partner, which could put some barriers up against possible future trouble. According to the former high representative of the EU Javier Solana,

Georgia has been really close to my heart. Georgia had the Russian troops at the borders, and everybody wanted the Russians to leave. We negotiated with Moscow to replace the Russian forces that were at the checking points with European hard police forces.

Additionally, as the first head of the EUMM in Georgia points out,

It was a civilian mission, but not with an institution-building mandate like all the other EU civilian missions, and while it was a civilian mission, a large part of it was de facto a military observer mission without the military status of it. (Hansjörg Haber)

Another vital point in this regard refers to the creation of the EaP. There is a dominant view that, on the one hand, threat perceptions against Georgia, along with Georgia’s growing importance to the EU and the EU’s desire to have stabilised, structured, peaceful neighbourhoods, and on the other hand, the consensus that the EU should do whatever possible to support (Leterme) and stay engaged in the region (Pöttering) sped up the creation of the EaP. As the ambassador for the EaP, Anna Westerholm outlines this partnership was on their minds before 2008, but

there was not a wide enough interest. Then in 2008, the war broke out. With the French EU presidency, Sarkozy had to engage. He wanted to deliver, and the idea of the Eastern Partnership – this comprehensive policy for our six Eastern neighbours – gained momentum. The EaP was also a way to show solidarity with Georgia, to stand up and say, we are your partners. And we heard you.

In the same vein, former Foreign Minister of Sweden Carl Bildt notes that

the August War had a positive effect on the people who thought that EaP is far away; after the war, they came on a board and we got a much speedier approval process for the bottom line than otherwise would have been the case. So the initiative was before the war. But the fact that we got it so speedily approved by the countries was affected by the war.

To sum up, some main observations should be emphasised. First, after the Rose Revolution, Georgia was seen as a country whose clear intention was integration into the EU and whose political and economic capabilities had significantly improved. Second, Georgia’s cultural affinity to the EU became more visible, and EU elites started realising that Georgia has European history. Third, the threat perceptions within and against Georgia moved from internal to external, and Russia was framed as an existential threat to Georgia, with the August 2008 War as a challenge to Europe. Respondents’ views showed that improvement in Georgia’s capabilities, Georgia’s Euro-Atlantic aspirations, August war and French EU presidency influenced EU decisions to lead the negotiations towards a ceasefire agreement, place the EUMM in Georgia, and speedily deliver the EaP.

Phase III: Georgia as a close political and economic partner to the EU

In the last decade, EU elites have looked at Georgia as a progressing democratic country, and the country shows obvious interest in becoming closer to the EU (Danielsson; Pavilionis). In the reflections of EU elites, Georgia’s intentions are very clear: it wants to be perceived as a European country (Jensen; Fule; Ilves), and its “greatest asset lies in its demonstrated commitment to democratic reform and the rule of law” (Tusk 2019). According to the former president of the EU Parliament,

When I say Georgia, I mean ‘freedom’, when I say Georgia, I mean ‘pride’, when I say Georgia, I mean ‘courage’. You are a small country, but a great nation. You have achieved impossible things because you were, despite all the differences, united around a common goal, that was a free, independent and modern state. (Tusk 2019)

Moreover, in the words of former European Commissioner for Enlargement and ENP Stefan Fule,

Georgia’s case is a textbook tale of the country, which runs through the various stages of very delicate development in a region, and which is saying very clearly, give us more; the more you give us, the better we could be European, the better we could be in our region.

There is a dominant view that Georgia has become a very close political and economic partner of the EU in the EU’s neighbourhood (Mogherini 2014, Tusk 2015, 2018, 2019, Borrell 2020, Kaljurand; Jensen).

In terms of capabilities, there is a strong view that Georgia’s capacities were consolidated in the last decade, and its economic, political and strategic role for the EU has increased. First, respondents emphasise that regardless of whether the current Georgian government lives up to all the democratic expectations, Georgia did what was expected of it to quite an extent. It is argued that Georgia now has institutions that people recognise, and people have started demanding that those institutions function properly (Westerholm; Danielsson; Linkevicius). As the current EU ambassador to Georgia mentions,

Georgia’s international image has clearly improved progressively over the past decades, including thanks to strengthened democratic institutions and reforms undertaken in the rule of law. If you go back only to 2008–2010 and were saying that you are going to Georgia, most people in Europe would still say ‘that sounds dangerous’. Now this is no longer the case, as most Europeans would rather associate Georgia with beautiful nature, a rich cultural heritage, skiing, beaches, food or wine. (Carl Hartzell)

In addition to democratic development, in the reflections of EU elites, Georgia has developed a thriving economy, with increased economic capabilities, and has become an important destination for foreign direct investment and tourism (Tusk 2018, Bozell 2020). In economic terms, it is mentioned that Georgia has enormous potential for wine production (Pavilionis; Jensen).

Focusing on Georgia’s cultural status, respondents outline that Georgia is not ready for the EU yet, but culturally, a greater acceptance of Georgia’s European nature has developed. Several important points should be mentioned in this regard; first, there is a dominant view that a mental change of the Georgian people has taken place, and today, Georgians largely identify themselves as very closely culturally related to Europe (Fule; Westerholm; Linkevicius; Pavilionis). Second, due to the frequent travel of Georgians to the EU and Europeans to Georgia, there are strengthened cultural links and advanced cultural understandings between people (Pöttering; Levitte; Cornell; Tusk 2019). Third,

Two years ago, Germany hosted Georgia as the guest of honour of the Frankfurt Book Fair. Many thought, isn’t that too big for a small nation with a difficult language to translate? But then, when you read the cultural pages, it was quite a hit, which in reverse means that before that, we weren’t really so much aware of Georgia’s cultural closeness to the EU. (Hansjörg Haber)

Overall, Georgia’s cultural status as a European country was further strengthened and consolidated (Tusk 2019).

Reflecting on the threats within and against Georgia in the current period, external and internal threats are both significant and very much interlinked in the EU elites’ minds; however, much focus was placed on the internal dimension of the threats (Linkecivius; Kaljurand; Mogherini 2014; Bozell 2020). The dominant view is that the political landscape is fragmented in Georgia, which is a big destabilising factor. EU elites especially mention the lack of ability to cooperate, find compromises among government and opposition, and have ideologically and not personality-based political programmes. Moreover, respondents express their concern about the vulnerabilities coming from the judiciary system and vulnerabilities when the government does not deliver what it has promised to the people, and as a result, the people lose trust in the government. According to this view, because of internal polarisation, unconsolidated society, low levels of trust in the government and an insufficiently functioning judiciary, Georgia is open to manipulation and is an easy target of hybrid warfare from Russia (Jensen; Pavilionis; Westerholm; Hartzell; Ilves). It is widely believed among the EU elites that Russia uses these weaknesses stemming from Georgia’s domestic affairs and disorganisation to try to destabilise Georgia through all the tools in their soft power toolbox, including cyber and disinformation threats. In regards to Russia’s “soft power toolbox”, respondents pointed out that long-living cultural ties, particularly orthodoxy, between the countries, are successfully used by Russia to have Georgia close to its hearts, control and implement its agenda towards the country (Eklund; Bildt; Talvitie). Findings also reveal EU elite worries about the fact that 20% of Georgia’s territories are still occupied by Russia, and they emphasise that it is undeniable that what has been occurring and continues to occur in Abkhazia and South Ossetia is an apparent threat to Georgia’s stability and sovereignty (Hartzell; Semneby).

EU interviewees emphasise that in the last decade, Georgia’s cultural affinity to Europe has increased, and the country has shown further dedication to the EU and has been trying to strengthen its political and economic institutions. However, when highlighting the threats, the shared view is that Georgia is still very vulnerable, as domestic institutions are not strong enough; thus, it becomes an easy target for threats from Russia. According to EU respondents, for these reasons, they see increased importance of further strengthening Georgia’s capabilities and establishing additional frameworks for EU–Georgia cooperation, such as AAs and visa liberalisation (Jensen; Kaljurand; Pöttering; Fule; Hartzell; Westerholm). As results reveal, those policies symbolise showing support for Georgia and strengthening its economic and democratic resilience. According to this view, an AA was created for convergence in economic development and Georgia’s rapprochement to the EU’s internal market (Danielsson; Linkevičius; Tusk 2015; Mogherini and Hahn 2016). Furthermore, EU officials started realising that the country made very strong efforts to establish close relations with the EU; this is why they stepped up a visa liberalisation process and offered a concrete result to Georgia. As the former prime minister of Belgium mentions, “Visa liberalization is a merit-based process, and it has always been a merit-based process. It’s fair to say that the Georgian authorities and administration have done a good job” (Yves Leterme).

Discussion

The findings from the novel interview data with EU political elites and primary documents and focusing on the 30-year period allowed me to trace variations in EU perceptions of Georgia’s intentions, capabilities, threats and cultural status. Those insights also shed light on the changing nature of EU actorness and its policies in Georgia. Starting with the intentions of Georgia, results indicated that in the first decade of Georgia’s independence, the EU looked at Georgia as a country that had a friendly intention vis-à-vis Europe and that, from the very beginning, showed aspirations to become part of the Euro-Atlantic structures. Georgia was framed as a candidate partner country to the EU. The real impetus of change in the EU’s image of Georgia came after the Rose Revolution. EU elites perceived Georgia’s intentions as being to campaign for greater EU involvement and work towards deeper relations with the EU. Georgia at that time started to be featured as a political partner country to the EU. In the current period, Georgia is seen as a country that has done a good job in democratic development. In its European intentions, it is best in class in the region. As a result, EU elites started to feature Georgia as an economic and political partner to the EU.

Variations have also been observed in the EU’s perceptions of Georgia’s capabilities. In the first decade, Georgia’s capabilities were seen as miserable. EU elites looked at Georgia as a country that was unable to cope with its statehood. The country’s only strength with regard to capabilities was its leadership: the president of Georgia was positively viewed in the West and was counted on as Georgia’s key asset in the eyes of EU respondents. A sharp change in the views of the EU elites regarding capabilities came after the Rose Revolution; Georgia was seen as a great example of economic and social reform, where a democratic institution was built very quickly. As a result, the strength of the country’s capabilities was seen in relation to its democratic reforms. In the last decade, Georgia became a country that demonstrated democratic and economic development and resilience in the eyes of EU political elites. However, this view might have changed in 2021, as there are emerging critical views about Georgia’s democratic backsliding, but as mentioned in the limitations, the current period is out of the limited scope of this study. While discussing reflections on Georgia’s capabilities, it is worth mentioning that geopolitical importance and material interests are not dominant in the minds of EU political elites. They have not looked at Georgia from a hard realism perspective, but rather from the perspective of the EU’s peaceful and stabilised neighbourhoods.

Perceptions of threats within and against Georgia have also varied. The first decade accounts for internal threats to Georgia in the minds of EU elites. Internal conflicts between different ethnic groups, civil war, fragile institutions, corruption and political instability were seen as the main threats to Georgia. The change in the trajectory of threat perceptions came after the Rose Revolution and external threats to Georgia coming from Russia, which clearly became visible during the August War of 2008, which occupied EU elites’ minds. Evidence showed that those threats were also seen as a challenge to multilateral rules-based order that the EU created. In the third decade of Georgia’s independence, threats to Georgia are seen more internally, but not with the same quality or intensity of the internal threats before. The main internal threat relates to political polarisation and political party division in Georgia, which opens the stage for hybrid threats coming from Russia in the eyes of EU elites. As a result, in the third phase, two trends have been identified that contradict each other. On the one hand, Georgia is perceived to demonstrate democratic development and resilience; on the other hand, the country’s domestic politics are permeated with polarisation and party divisions in EU political elites’ minds.

There has also been a shift in EU elites’ mindset in terms of perceptions of Georgia’s cultural affinity to Europe. In the beginning, Georgia was seen as a Christian country, but EU elites had no further knowledge about the country. Therefore, Georgia was not understood as being close to the EU. This perception of Georgia’s cultural status as part of the European family changed after the Rose Revolution. Georgia came closer to a European common cultural understanding and has been seen as a country with strong historical links to Europe. In the last decade, there has been a greater acceptance of Georgia’s European nature compared with where it was when it first gained independence. Now, Georgia is seen as very closely culturally related to Europe. There should be emphasised a vital observation, responses coming from the EU elites did not show any significant diverged views; instead, they converge in their opinions in all phases.

Findings also exposed respondents’ views on the drivers of EU policies towards Georgia from 1991 to 2020. First, when Georgia gained independence from the Soviet Union, Georgia was seen as a Christian country, with a lack of statehood and internal threats, but with friendly intentions vis-à-vis the EU. Results showed that the EU wanted to respond to Georgia’s intentions and help it overcome the internal threats the country was facing. Those views led to the EU–Georgia partnership and cooperation agreement. Second, when the Rose Revolution happened in Georgia in 2003, it became obvious to the EU elites that Georgia had started implementing democratic reforms. The country was striving for much closer relations with Europe. As the respondents argue, the EU wanted to help Georgia with its EU aspirations through incorporating Georgia in the ENP. From that time, Georgia started to be seen as a political partner to the EU. Then, during the August 2008 War between Russia and Georgia in 2008, concerns about national sovereignty came into play in the EU elites’ eyes. Georgia was seen as a pro-European country that was facing external existential threats coming from Russia, and those threats were also seen as a challenge to the EU. As I mentioned in the theoretical chapter, perceptions of common threats frequently lead to enhanced coordination. It has been argued that the August 2008 War was seen as a challenge, if not a threat, to the EU post-Cold War order. It was the first time that military troops had been used in the EU’s neighbourhood since the dissolution of the Soviet Union. Therefore, EU elites wanted to take responsibility for control of the borders and ensure that this would not happen again. Findings exposed that this common understanding of common threats and the EU French presidency meant that France could relatively easily gain everyone’s cooperation impacted to the fastest-ever deployed EUMM to Georgia and sped up the creation of the EaP. In the last decade, Georgia started to be perceived as a country that delivered on the EU promises; strengthened its political, economic and economic capacities; and became close to the EU. Altogether this gave Georgia merits in EU elites’ eyes, which led to the EU–Georgia AA, and after which Georgia was featured as a close political and economic partner. That positive development in the EU–Georgia relations continued in the visa-free regime with Georgia in 2017.

Conclusion

This article contributes to the literature on EU–Georgia relations through the prism of perceptions of Georgia among EU and EU member states leaders. This is an overlooked perspective in the studies of perceptions in the scholarship of the EU and its foreign policy, and the article tackles this scholarly deficit. With a long-term approach on perceptions and images and based on the empirical evidence provided in this article, variations have been identified among the EU political elite images of Georgia from 1991 to 2020.

In particular, three main images have emerged and developed over time according to the findings:

1. Georgia as a willing partner to the EU.

2. Georgia as a political partner to the EU.

3. Georgia as a close political and economic partner to the EU.

The first image refers to the fact that the EU saw Georgia’s intentions as favourable to the EU. The second image indicates that the EU’s trust towards Georgia’s European intentions increased. The third image suggests that this trust in Georgia has been further strengthened and consolidated. As the quality of Georgia’s image as a partner to the EU has increased, the intensity and nature of the policies the EU has adopted towards Georgia have also changed over time. Technical and economic assistance from the EU to Georgia in the late ‘90s transferred first into bilateral political and then economic and trade policies and relations.

What is novel in this thesis? This article adds knowledge to the EU’s perceptions of the external actors, which is an under-researched topic in the scholarship of images and perceptions in EU external relations. By focusing on 30-year historical period, it shows the perceptions and images of Georgia in the eyes of EU political elites and how they develop over time, extends the literature on EU–Georgia relations, and enriches the scholarship on EU external relations.

Acknowledgements

The author is grateful to Daniel Silander and Bo Peterson for their helpful comments and criticisms on the multiple drafts of the article. She would also like to extend her sincere thanks to Ole Elgström for useful suggestions. In addition, the author thanks and is indebted to the editor and anonymous reviewers for their useful comments, which helped sharpen the arguments and vastly improved the manuscript. The author is immensely grateful to all the interviewees involved in this project, without whom this research would not have been possible.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Correction Statement

This article has been republished with minor changes. These changes do not impact the academic content of the article.

Additional information

Funding

This work was supported by the Linnéuniversitetet.

Notes

1 “EU perceptions” also include the member states’ perceptions.

2 Due to the pandemic, in-person access to the respondents was limited. The author was only able to conduct the in-person interviews with the respondents who were in the same or bordering country, respectively, in Sweden and Denmark.

3 Those are the author’s original interviews with the respondents. Where there is a name with a year, it refers to the source of primary documents, and where a name appears without a year, the source is the author’s interview with the respondent. Details about the interviews and primary documents are provided at the end of the article.

Appendices

Below is a list of the respondents involved in this research. The interviews were held from September 2020 to January 2021.

Appendix 1

Respondents, Interview details:

1. Toomas Hendrik Ilves, President of Estonia 2006–2016; Zoom Interview, 15 November 2020.

2. Vaira Vīķe Freiberga, President of Latvia 1999–2007; Zoom Interview, Sweden, 15 January 2021.

3. Valdas Adamkus, President of Lithuania 1998–2003; 2004–2009; Telephone Interview, 5 November 2020.

4. Javier Solana, High Representative for Common Foreign and Security Policy 1999–2009; Zoom Interview, 29 September 2020.

5. Carl Bildt, Prime Minister of Sweden 1991–1994; Foreign Minister of Sweden 2006–2014, In-person Interview, Stockholm, Sweden, 9 October 2020.

6. Yves Leterme, Prime Minister of Belgium 2009–2011; Zoom Interview, 18 September 2020.

7. Hans-Gert Pöttering, President of the European Parliament 2007–2009; Answers provided in a written form, by email, 6 November 2020.

8. Štefan Füle, European Commissioner for Enlargement and European Neighbourhood Policy 2010–2014; Zoom Interview, 16 October 2020.

9. Per Stig Moller, Foreign Minister of Denmark 2001–2010; Zoom Interview, 27 October 2020.

10. Marina Kaljurand, Foreign Minister of Estonia 2015–2016; Member of the European Parliament 2019–present; Zoom Interview, 26 October 2020.

11. Jean-David Levitte, Adviser to the President of France, Nicolas Sarkozy 2007–2012; Zoom Interview, 24 October 2020.

12. Mogens Lykketoft, Foreign Minister of Denmark 2000-2001; Zoom Interview, 25 October 2020.

13. Linas Antanas Linkevičius, Foreign Minister of Lithuania, 2012–2020; Zoom Interview, 4 December 2020.

14. Christian Danielsson, Directorate – General for Neighbourhood Policy and Enlargement Negotiations 2013–2020; Skype Interview, 26 November 2020.

15. Anna Westerholm, Sweden's Ambassador for the Eastern Partnership 1991–2001; In-person Interview, Stockholm, 8 October 2020.

16. Hansjörg Haber, Head of the EUMM mission in Georgia 2008–2011; Zoom Interview, 17 September 2020.

17. Heikki Talvitie, EU’s special representative for the South Caucasus 2003–2006; Zoom Interview, 9 September 2020.

18. Philip Dimitrov, Prime Minister of Bulgaria 1991–1992; Head of Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Georgia 2010–2014; Zoom Interview, 28 October 2020.

19. Carl Hartzell, Head of Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Georgia 2018–present; Webez Interview, 17 December 2020.

20. Peter Semneby, EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus 2006–2011; In-person Interview, Stockholm, Sweden, 8 October 2020.

21. Per Eklund, Head of Delegation of the European Union to the Republic of Georgia 2006–2010; In-person Interview, Stockholm, Sweden, 9 October 2020.

22. Žygimantas Pavilionis, Lithuania’s Head of the Group for Inter-Parliamentary Relations with Georgia; Zoom Interview, 30 October 2020.

23. Michael Aastrup Jensen, Vice Chairman of the Foreign Policy Committee in the Danish Parliament; In-person Interview, Copenhagen, Denmark, 29 October 2020.

24. Svante Cornell, Director of the Institute for Security and Development Policy; Zoom Interview, 19 October 2020.

25. Terhi Hakala, Head of the OSCE Mission in Georgia 2008–2011; Rotating ambassador to the South Caucasus 2002–2005; Zoom Interview, 25 January 2021.

Appendix 2

Primary Documents:

Government of Sweden, Statement by Anna Lindh in Tbilisi, 21 February 2001, https://reliefweb.int/report/georgia/statement-anna-lindh-tbilisi.

European Commission, Fourth meeting of the Cooperation Council between the European Union and Georgia, C/02/296 Brussels, 1 October 2002, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/PRES_02_296.

Chris Patten, European Commission, Speech on the Gahrton Report, SPEECH/04/98 Brussels, 26 February 2004, https://ec.europa.eu/commission/presscorner/detail/en/SPEECH_04_98.

EU: Solana Says Membership for Caucasus “A Different Story”, 15 November 2006, https://www.rferl.org/a/1072738.html.

Council of the European Union, Council Joint Action 2003/496/CFSP of 7 July 2003 concerning the appointment of an EU Special Representative for the South Caucasus, 7 July 2003, https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=uriserv:OJ.L_.2003.169.01.0074.01.ENG

Bernard Kouchner, European Parliament, Debate, situation in Georgia, 1 September 2008, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/sides/getDoc.do?pubRef=-//EP//TEXT+CRE+20080901+ITEM-020+DOC+XML+V0//EN&language=EN.

The Council of the European Union, EU High Representative for the CFSP, confirms the withdrawal of Russian forces from the zones adjacent to South Ossetia and Abkhazia, S332/08 Brussels, 10 October 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/solana.

The Council of the European Union, Summary of remarks by Javier Solana, S289/08 Brussels, 1 September 2008, http://www.consilium.europa.eu/solana.

European Union, Statement by Javier Solana, EU High Representative for the CFSP, on the situation in Georgia, S198/09 Brussels, 7 August 2009, https://reliefweb.int/report/georgia/statement-javier-solana-eu-high-representative-cfsp-situation-georgia.

European Union, Remarks by HRVP Catherine Ashton at the press point with President Saakashvili, Brussels, 17 November 2011, https://www.avrupa.info.tr/en/eeas-news/remarks-hrvp-catherine-ashton-press-point-president-saakashvili-georgia-tbilisi-3618.

European Union External Action Service, Remarks by High Representative Federica Mogherini following the 1st EU-Georgia Association Council, Brussels, 17 November 2014, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/6738/node/6738_en.

European Council, Remarks by President Donald Tusk following his meeting with the President of Georgia Giorgi Margvelashvili, Brussels, May 12, 2015, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2015/05/12/tusk-meeting-president-georgia-margvelashvili/

European Union External Action Service, Statement by High Representative/Vice-President Federica Mogherini and Commissioner Johannes Hahn on the parliamentary elections in Georgia, Brussels, 9 October 2016, https://eeas.europa.eu/delegations/bangladesh/11459/statement-by-high-representativevice-president-federica-mogherini-and-commissioner-johannes-hahn-on-the-par … 

European Council, Remarks by President Donald Tusk after his meeting with Prime Minister of Georgia Giorgi Kvirikashvili, 28 March 2017, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2017/03/28/tusk-remarks-prime-minister-georgia-kvirikashvili/.

European Council, Remarks by President Donald Tusk after his meeting with President of Georgia, Giorgi Margvelashvili, 8 March 2018, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2018/03/08/remarks-by-president-donald-tusk-after-his-meeting-with-president-of-georgia-giorgi-marg.

European Council, Speech by President Donald Tusk at the Batumi International Conference, 11 July 2019, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2019/07/11/speech-by-president-donald-tusk-at-the-batumi-international-conference/.

European Union External Action Service, Strong commitment: EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia is the first CSDP Mission to have representation by all 28 Member States, 21 October 2019, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/69151/strong-commitment-eu-monitoring-mission-georgia-first-csdp-mission-have-representation-all-28_en.

European Union External Action Service, Georgia: Remarks by the HR/VP Josep Borrell at the EP Plenary on the report on the implementation of the Association Agreement, Brussels, 14 September 2020, https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/85216/node/85216_km"https://eeas.europa.eu/headquarters/headquarters-homepage/85216/node/85216_km.

First Channel, Both sides play terrible political game, MEP Cramon echoes GD's move, 28 July 2021, https://1tv.ge/en/news/both-sides-play-terrible-political-game-mep-cramon-echoes-gds-move/.

European Council, Statement by President Charles Michel on the political situation in Georgia, 29 July 2021, https://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/press/press-releases/2021/07/29/statement-by-president-charles-michel-on-the-political-situation-in-georgia/.

Appendix 3

Interview questions

• How would you assess (or characterise) Georgia’s intentions in each period 1991–2003; 2003–2012; 2012–present from a European Union perspective?

• How would you assess (or characterise) the main threats within and against Georgia in each period 1991–2003; 2003–2012; 2012–present from a European Union perspective?

• How would you assess Georgia’s capabilities (political, economic, diplomatic)? Where did you see the country’s strengths/benefits and weaknesses in each period 1991–2003; 2003–2012; 2012–2020. How would you assess Georgia’s importance to the European Union from 1991–2003; 2003–2012; 2012–present?

• Could you please elaborate on Georgia’s cultural status? How did you see Georgia in each period, culturally close to European Union or far away?

Period of 1991–2003

• What were EU interests at stake/perceived to be at stake while cooperating with Georgia in this period?

• What importance would you attribute to EU’s Partnership and Cooperation Agreement (PCA) with Georgia, and the appointment of an EU special representative for the South Caucasus in 2003? Why did the EU policymakers decide to support the initiatives? What were EU interests at stake/perceived to be at stake?

Period of 2003–2012

• How would you assess the August War in 2008 between Russia and Georgia from an EU perspective?

• What were EU interests at stake/perceived to be at stake while cooperating with Georgia in this period? What importance would you attribute to the European Neighbourhood Policy (ENP), the EU Monitoring Mission in Georgia (EUMM), and Eastern Partnership in this regard (EaP)? Why did the EU policymakers decide to support the ENP, EUMM, and EaP? What benefits were expected from those initiatives?

Period of 2012–2020

• What importance would you attribute to the Association Agreement (AA) between the EU and Georgia? Why did the EU policymakers decide to support the AA with Georgia? What were EU interests at stake/perceived to be at stake? What benefits were expected from this agreement?