Beyond the “lowest common denominator”? Mutually binding commitments in European security and defence cooperation: the case of the Nordic states

ABSTRACT

Literature on European security and defence cooperation usually asserts that differences in national security interests and security cultures prevent agreement beyond the “lowest common denominator”. I propose that it is possible for states to agree on mutually binding commitments also in this policy field. Using Nordic security and defence cooperation as a case study, I examine what characterises their mutual commitments and how we might account for them. The article adds to the literature on European security and defence cooperation by suggesting that binding commitments in security and defence would not have come about in the Nordic context without a sense of “Nordic togetherness”. This conclusion is important because it demonstrates that a shared sense of identity and norms is significant for understanding how security and defence cooperation between states is possible.

KEYWORDS:

• European security and defence cooperation
• constructivism
• identity and norms
• Nordic defence cooperation
• Nordic togetherness

Introduction

Literature on security and defence cooperation in the European Union (EU) often points to a lack of integration in this policy field (Howorth 2001, 2019, Menon 2011). Scholars have highlighted vast differences between European states in terms of their security interests (Hoffman 1966, Menon 2009, 2011) and security cultures (Meyer 2005, Biehl et al. 2013), noting that such differences make integration particularly difficult. The argument is that, in the absence of coercion, cooperation in security and defence is unlikely to advance beyond the “lowest common denominator” among states (Sjursen and Rosén 2017). However, security and defence cooperation between European states is changing. Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) became a reality in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy in 2017. Since its establishment, it has grown to consist of 47 projects between 25 different member-states. PESCO marks the first time member states have agreed to cooperate on defence spending, investment and military operability in a binding fashion within the EU framework. In addition, regional and bilateral cooperative arrangements within security and defence are growing across Europe. Indeed, despite their many differences, some states have gone as far as to integrate their national militaries.

Nordic defence cooperation represents a prominent example of close interstate cooperation in Europe. The field of security and defence was traditionally an area in which the Nordic states did not have a tradition of close cooperation (Bengtsson 2020). This changed with the establishment of the Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) in 2009. NORDEFCO involves not only close cooperation but also integrative commitments, meaning commitments in the form of military integration that goes beyond traditional intergovernmental cooperation. Military integration between states involves commitments that in practice restrict national sovereignty. How is it, then, that the Nordic states have agreed to bind themselves so tightly together in the field of security and defence, the epitome of “high politics”?

This article argues that agreement between the Nordic states on commitments within defence cooperation would not have come about without a sense that the Nordic model of defence cooperation is a “safe” choice because of a shared Nordic commonality of values. This finding suggests we may need to employ a constructivist approach if we are to explain the role played by identity and norms in advancing agreement on defence cooperation beyond a minimum compromise. Certainly, both strategic interests and cost-benefit considerations were significant for the development of defence cooperation between Nordic states. However, analyses based solely on such factors fall short in terms of providing a comprehensive account of the commitments within Nordic defence cooperation. The finding that identity and norms play a prominent role in facilitating new cooperative ventures in security and defence policy has significant implications for our understanding of European security and defence cooperation more broadly. In particular, it serves to modify the expectation that state interests and security cultures limit the depth and scope of possible cooperation.

The article is structured as follows. The first section outlines the analytical approach and methodology used to analyse why the Nordic states have chosen to cooperate in security and defence within a Nordic format. Drawing on insights from structural realism (Waltz 1986), liberal institutionalism (Keohane and Nye 1977, Keohane 1984) and constructivism (Katzenstein 1996), the article outlines three theoretical expectations for why the Nordic states have established close and binding cooperation. I then discuss why the Nordic states have established mutually binding commitments in the field of security and defence in the light of each of these three theoretical expectations, focusing in particular on the establishment of integrative commitments and taking into account different constellations of cooperation within the Nordic defence cooperation (bilateral, trilateral or including all the Nordic states). Finally, I present some concluding remarks.

The approach

The prevailing literature on security and defence cooperation often argues that the field of security and defence differs from other fields, such as trade in goods and services, because it involves questions of sovereignty related to national security and survival (Howorth 2019). It is also commonly argued that there are large differences between the security cultures of different European states and that this limits the possibility of cooperation (Meyer 2005). Contrary to such expectations, the Nordic states appear to have succeeded in establishing close defence cooperation, ranging from collaboration to integration. The Nordic region may thus serve as a useful case in which to test the notion that differences in security cultures and security interests constitute insurmountable barriers for cooperation (Hoffman 1966, Howorth 2019). To the extent that Nordic defence cooperation includes deep and mutually binding commitments, it challenges the expectation that cooperation in the field of security and defence is unlikely to move beyond a minimum compromise. Before we may conclude that a more comprehensive approach is required to account for the commitments made between the Nordic states, it will be necessary to unpack and examine those commitments in greater detail. What kinds of commitments have the Nordic states made in the field of security and defence cooperation, and to what extent can such commitments be argued to infringe on national sovereignty?

To better understand the types of commitments states agree to in security and defence cooperation, I propose a distinction between two different forms of intergovernmental commitments: cooperation and integration. Drawing on Keohane (1984, p. 51), I define cooperation as occurring “when actors adjust their behaviour to the actual or anticipated preference of others through a process of policy coordination”. Security and defence cooperation between states may be mutually binding, but does not significantly alter national military practices or national defence structures and therefore has a limited impact on sovereignty. Examples of such cooperative commitments include joint military training, security information exchanges between states, capability development and joint military procurement. Commitments of this kind are found in Permanent Structured Cooperation (PESCO) in the EU, as well as in different bilateral and regional formats in Europe, such as the 2010 Lancaster House Treaty agreement between France and Britain. Integration, on the other hand, involves mutually binding commitments between states that place constraints on national sovereignty. Haas (1970, p. 610) defines integration as “ … concerned with explaining how and why states cease to be wholly sovereign, how and why they voluntarily mingle, merge and mix with their neighbours so as to lose the factual attributes of sovereignty … ”. Commitments between states that restrict states’ ability to act alone constitutes integration. When states agree to certain levels of security and defence commitments, they create practical changes in national institutions, procedures, access and use of technology, short and long-term fiscal and military planning that may serve to restrict individual states’ capacity to act alone in security and defence matters. Agreement on a merger between states in the structures, organisation and practices of national militaries that create permanent changes to national militaries may therefore constitute integration. The case of Benelux security and defence commitments represents one such example of intergovernmental integration in security and defence matters. In 2015, Belgium, the Netherlands and Luxembourg agreed to joint surveillance of their airspace, whereby Dutch and Belgian forces take turns monitoring the airspace above the three countries (Maurice 2015). The Benelux case involves significant changes to military practices and national defence. In this example, there has been a devolution of previously strictly national defence responsibilities to a shared responsibility involving other states. In the Nordic case examined in this article, while it is true that Nordic security and defence commitments have predominantly involved cooperation, there are parts of the framework that extend beyond cooperation to integration. Since 2014, Sweden and Finland have taken a series of steps to form partly integrated armed forces. By 2018, it was noted that the “Swedish-Finnish Naval Task Group has reached initial operational capability, the two air forces are interoperable, and the land forces are methodically building the ability to conduct high-end operations together at brigade strength” (Salonius-Pasternak 2018). In 2020, the Swedish parliament granted the government extended rights to receive and provide military support in case of territorial violation of Sweden or Finland (albeit subject to parliamentary approval in case of an armed invasion of Finland) (Swedish Armed Forces 2020 n.d.). What enabled such commitments between Nordic states?

The literature on Nordic security and defence cooperation offers a range of different accounts and perspectives. Saxi (2019), for example, has argued that Nordic defence cooperation has gone through different phases, the first being the inception of NORDEFCO in 2009. The beginning of the Nordic defence cooperation was argued to be driven by domestic interests in Norway and Sweden, where Nordic cooperation was believed to be one way of achieving a greater individual military capability (Saxi 2019). The next phase of Nordic defence cooperation identified takes place from 2014 onwards and is described as being driven by external threats, the Russian annexation of Crimea being cited as a catalyst for this change (Saxi 2019). However, the commitments made by the Nordic states at the outset of the Nordic security and defence cooperation were not abandoned at this point. Instead, Nordic security and defence cooperation has continued to develop following a cost-benefit logic while also diversifying through different paths. There is, however, little in the literature to explain what in fact triggered the deepening cooperation between the Nordic states. And while Bengtsson (2020) has argued that Nordic defence cooperation is a case of differentiated integration it is not clear why Nordic defence cooperation became differentiated.

Other scholars have argued that we must combine an examination of material factors with a focus on identity if we are to understand cooperation on security and defence within the Nordic region (Græger 2018, Ojanen and Raunio 2018, Thorhallsson 2018, Wivel 2018, Brommesson 2018b). The Nordic Defence Cooperation (NORDEFCO) has been described as a novel development in Nordic security and defence affairs, exemplifying the emergence of “Nordicness” or a common Nordic identity (Forsberg 2013, Hyde-Price 2018). While the concept of “Nordicness” does seem to hold promise as an explanatory factor in this context, it remains underspecified and requires further unpacking. If we are to substantiate the claim that this sense of a common Nordic identity might help explain the depth of the Nordic security and defence cooperation, it will be necessary to specify how such an identity helped to trigger the agreement by the Nordic states to the relevant commitments. Furthermore, despite the identification of “Nordicness”, scholars continue to emphasise that there are considerable differences between the Nordic states in the importance they place upon Nordic cooperation on security and defence (Brommesson 2018a). Exploring the differences between the Nordic states may serve to inform a discussion on how significant Nordic cooperation is in relation to NATO, or on the significance of Nordic cooperation in the domestic policies of the Nordic states (Græger 2018, Ojanen and Raunio 2018, Thorhallsson 2018, Wivel 2018, Brommesson 2018b). However, a focus on the differences between the Nordic states is of limited help in understanding what has driven Nordic security and defence cooperation and why the Nordic states agreed to such extensive cooperation in the first place. In fact, such a focus makes it even harder to understand how such commitments came about.

In order to examine the claim that identity and norms played an important role in the development of Nordic security and defence cooperation, a two-step approach will be applied. First, the article outlines three sets of expectations – derived from structural realism, liberal institutionalism and constructivist approaches, respectively – regarding why the Nordic states have intensified their security and defence cooperation. Subsequently, I discuss to what extent these different a priori expectations can be substantiated.

Method and data

The research presented here is qualitative and draws on the case study method (George and Bennett 2005). The case study approach involves a detailed investigation of a historical event to either develop or test past explanations in order to ascertain whether findings may be generalised to other events (George and Bennett 2005, p. 5). The aim is to provide an account of what characterises the binding commitments made between the Nordic states in relation to Nordic defence cooperation and to explain why the states have made these commitments. I draw on a structural-realist perspective, a liberal-institutionalist perspective and a constructivist perspective and develop three expectations, one for each of the three perspectives. The focus of the study is on identifying what may have triggered the establishment of binding commitments in the Nordic model of security and defence cooperation, which contains both cooperative and integrative elements. Identifying the particular mechanisms that lead states to agree to specific obligations is central for any attempt to understand why different formats of European security and defence cooperation emerge in different contexts. The findings from the present study may allow for theoretical generalisations of relevance for other cases in which states have made similar commitments in European security and defence cooperation.

The analysis draws on three main sources of data: secondary literature, official primary documents and semi-structured interviews with government officials. This use and combination of data constitutes triangulation – a way of ensuring data reliability by cross-validating different data sources and data-collection techniques to verify consistency in research findings (Bennett and Checkel 2015). Qualitative research is subject to bias in different ways. Most relevant for this study is bias from interview participants as well as bias that may exist in official documents. While some level of bias is unavoidable, I have cross-checked all data by analysing documents across time and by interviewing multiple government officials from different states. I have ensured that a variety of Nordic perspectives were included, endeavouring to increase the validity and reliability of the research through the particular combination of data sources and collection techniques employed.

Specifically, I analysed the publicly available NORDEFCO documents from the inception of NORDEFCO in 2009 until 2020. I also systematically searched the governmental databases of Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland and analysed over 200 documents related to Nordic security and defence cooperation. I collected strategy documents from the official databases of both the EU and NATO. I gathered official strategy documents from governmental databases in France and Britain. I also conducted 10 semi-structured interviews with government officials from Norway, Sweden, Denmark and Finland, as well as NATO and EU officials, between September 2015 and May 2016. The interviewees were officials that worked directly with Nordic security and defence cooperation, thus providing additional insight into the negotiations and meetings surrounding the establishment and continued development of Nordic defence cooperation. Interviewees were given anonymity and have been numbered from one to ten to make it possible to distinguish between them.

Turning now to the analysis, I begin by specifying the different expectations derived from the three theoretical expectations employed in this study.

Analytical expectations

Structural realism

As noted above, the existing literature on European security and defence cooperation often stresses the significance of national strategic interests in determining states’ foreign and security policies (Menon 2008, 2011). The classical-realist literature asserts that states seek security and survival above all else (Morgenthau 1993). Structural realism rests on the same core, namely, classical-realist assumptions concerning power and national survival. According to structural realism, the international system is characterised by anarchy, which leads states to seek security and survival above all else (Mearsheimer 1994/1995). The main actors within the international system are the so-called great powers, whose pre-eminence is largely due to their military capability and who are locked in a zero-sum game of “balancing” their power vis-a-vis other “great powers” (Waltz 1986).

In the past, Nordic security and defence policy has been described as constituting a “Nordic balance” (Brundtland 1966, 1981). The notion of a “Nordic balance” refers to three distinct geopolitical security strategies in the Nordic region. According to Brundtland (1966, p. 30), these strategies were:

1. membership of an alliance with one superpower,

2. well-armed neutrality, and

3. neutrality with “arms control” in the framework of a friendship treaty with the other superpower.

Taken together, these strategies were described as aiming to create a geopolitical balance in the Nordic region within an international system comprised of two superpowers – namely, the United States and the Soviet Union (Brundtland 1966). The end of the Cold War and the fall of the Soviet Union led to changes within the international system, thereby altering the Nordic geopolitical context.

Against the backdrop of the geopolitical changes since the end of the Cold War, a different set of strategic interests now needs to be considered. A structural-realist understanding of Nordic security and defence cooperation would emphasise that the Nordic states have made commitments to cooperate in this field in an effort to maximise their security within the context of the current international system. Such an analysis would focus on investigating the individual states’ strategic geopolitical interests and national security strategies. Security strategies refers to the policies these states outline for addressing what they officially identify as the most prominent threats to their national security. The expectation is that the commitments made by the Nordic states in relation to Nordic security and defence cooperation are the result of states acting in line with their own security interests and seeking to maximise their individual security. Indicators that would substantiate this expectation include commitments to cooperation based on geopolitical issues related to Russia or similar strategic issues.

An examination of the merits of the structural-realist perspective is certainly warranted in any attempt to account for the cooperative commitments within the Nordic defence cooperation. However, such a perspective also has its limitations. While the geopolitical realities facing the individual Nordic countries are similar, there are also important differences between the Nordic states with respect to NATO membership and whether or not they share a border with Russia. Furthermore, the commitments between states within the Nordic format go beyond cooperation to agreements on military integration, and the latter are more difficult to square with fundamental structural-realist assumptions regarding the kinds of commitments states make. It is therefore necessary to employ another theoretical perspective, one that takes into consideration the possibility that a state’s interests may extend beyond concerns about its own security. The second set of expectations for Nordic security and defence commitments is thus derived from another rationalist approach, one that proposes cost-benefit calculations as the main driver for cooperation.

Liberal institutionalism

The notion that states seek to cooperate out of economic self-interest is well established in the literature on European integration (Moravcsik 1993, 1998, Schimmelfennig 2018). States are considered rational actors that make decisions on the basis of cost-benefit calculations (Elster 1986). Cooperation is the result of states seeking to advance their own interests in the context of economic interdependence (Keohane 1984)). A core principle of liberal institutionalism is that cooperation can lead to integration (Keohane and Nye 1977).

It is therefore important to consider the extent to which cost-benefit calculations can account for the establishment of integrative commitments in Nordic security and defence cooperation. The potential for economic benefits from security and defence cooperation is typically found in the contexts of defence procurement, capability development, military training, operational efficiency and military integration. Within a cost-benefit perspective, the expectation is that the Nordic states established binding commitments on the basis of cost-benefit calculations. The indicator that might substantiate such an account would be evidence that states have accelerated their cooperation through binding commitments in order to minimise national defence expenditures and maximise the use of resources through pooling, sharing and joint procurement.

Importantly, the liberal-institutional perspective provides a theoretical avenue in which integration can be accounted for and may therefore cover a prominent gap in the strategic-interests account of Nordic defence cooperation. However, this perspective also has limitations of its own. Most importantly, some scholars have argued that multilateral agreements are seen as more inefficient than bilateral agreements, and therefore the cost-benefit explanation might struggle to account for certain parts of the Nordic format of cooperation (Hartley 2011). There is also uncertainty regarding whether it is truly possible to calculate the actual economic benefits of cooperative arrangements of this kind. In addition, scholars have suggested that security and defence cooperation in NORDEFCO is marked by a certain degree of “Nordicness” (Forsberg 2013, Hyde-Price 2018). However, it is unclear what such “Nordicness” might consist of and exactly how it might trigger cooperation in security and defence. The third expectation will therefore aim to provide further theoretical specification regarding the question of “Nordicness” and will consider whether this often-mentioned sense of commonality between the Nordic states might be able to fill some of the gaps left by other attempts to account for the nature of the commitments these states have made in the field of defence and security.

Constructivism

Constructivist literature on European foreign and security policy has argued that identity and norms are crucial for understanding developments in European foreign affairs (Aggestam 2006, Elgström and Smith 2006, Sjursen 2006a). Norms and identity influence foreign policy decision-makers and the decisions they make (Holsti 1970, Aggestam 2006, 2018, Elgström and Smith 2006). Accordingly, this article will make use of an analytical perspective that stresses the significance of identity and norms in the formation of national security and defence policy (Katzenstein 1996, Checkel and Katzenstein 2009). This will involve considering the extent to which Nordic security and defence cooperation is driven by a sense of commonality between the Nordic states that makes cooperation with other Nordic states a “natural” choice.

It could be argued that the constructivist perspective is particularly relevant in the Nordic context. The logic of appropriateness asserts that “action involves evoking an identity or role and matching the obligations of that identity or role to a specific situation” (March and Olsen 1998, p. 951). Within such a perspective, social norms are seen not just as working to constrain actors but also as constitutive (Soysal 1994, Checkel 1997). The logic of appropriateness is argued to be more prevalent in situations where outcomes are difficult to predict (March and Olsen 1998, pp. 952–953). In the case under consideration here, we should note that it is difficult to calculate the strategic and material benefit of Nordic security and defence cooperation from the perspectives of each state. Furthermore, the Nordic states are broadly similar in terms of size, wealth and military capability (noting that Sweden has a larger population) and therefore there is no significant asymmetry of power between them. Thus, following March and Olsen (1998, p. 953), it may be that Nordic actors have relied more heavily on the obligations that result from a particular identity or role.

A focus on how identity entails corresponding obligations may make it possible to further specify what has previously been identified as “Nordicness”. This approach understands identity and norms as entailing corresponding obligations. It may be that there are certain “Nordic” norms of solidarity that evoke a sense of corresponding obligations in the field of security and defence. It is therefore important to investigate the extent to which commitments may be driven by a sense of obligation to a specific “Nordic” role or identity. The expectation is thus that there are specific obligations that encourage the Nordic states to pursue cooperation within a Nordic format. The indicator for this is whether the Nordic states decided to cooperate in a Nordic format because they believe that Nordic cooperation is a “safer” choice owing to a sense that “we are alike” in the Nordic region. Insofar as this expectation holds, it may be possible to account for the commitments between Nordic states on the basis of a common sense of “Nordicness”, as well as to add more theoretical and empirical specificity regarding what such “Nordicness” might entail.

Nordic security interests?

There exist strong traditions of cooperation both within the Nordic states and between them (Forsberg 2013). The Nordic Council was formed in the aftermath of World War II, for example, and a passport union allows citizens of Nordic countries to move freely across borders within the region (NORDEFCO n.d.). However, prior to the establishment of NORDEFCO, there were only limited formal arenas for security and defence cooperation between the Nordic states at the regional level. NORDEFCO was established in 2009 through (1) the merger of three previously self-standing cooperative arrangements between the Nordic states: Peace Support Education and Training (NORDCAPS), Armament Cooperation (NORDARC) and Enhanced Cooperation (NORDSUP), and (2) the expansion of their scope based on “a political ambition of a comprehensive, enhanced and long-term approach to defence related issues” and the desire to “establish a comprehensive framework for all Nordic Defence Cooperation activities within the areas of policy, capabilities and operations” (NORDEFCO MoU 2009). Since the formation of NORDEFCO, both the level of activity within and the political priority granted to Nordic cooperation have increased, as evidenced by the adoption in 2018 of a NORDEFCO Vision 2025 which introduced language on improving “defence capability and cooperation in peace, crisis and conflict” as well as “the ability to act together” (see NORDEFCO 2020).

There is evidence for the suggestion that the Nordic states sharing similar security interests was significant for the establishment of Nordic defence cooperation. During interviews, government officials made several comments that spoke to the significance of having both similar strategic interests and comparable geopolitical contexts. One interviewee commented that “there are shared geopolitical interests in the Nordic region. Geography drives interests in security and defence policy” (Interview 2). Subjects also noted the significance of the fact that Finland, Sweden and Norway all share a border with Russia (Interviews 1 and 10). There are also several references in official documents to the idea that the Nordic states share similar security strategies and geopolitical interests (Norwegian official documents 1 and 2). This evidence is in line with the expectation regarding similar geopolitical interests as a trigger of security and defence cooperation. However, a number of important caveats should be noted.

First, it is not clear how the security interests in all of the Nordic states are more homogenous than central allies in the EU and NATO. A commonly held view among interviewees was that national security was becoming increasingly complex and security threats more differentiated, while the importance of retaining a certain level of national military capability was also acknowledged (Interviews 1, 4, 5 and 9). These security interests are not only shared by the Nordic states but also consistent with the perspective held by other (certainly not all) European allied states in NATO and the EU. For example, the official British and French security strategy papers (white papers) from 2008 highlight the same priorities (Republic of France 2008, Government of the United Kingdom 2010). These documents are dated a year prior to the establishment of NORDEFCO. Furthermore, the retention of national military capability in Europe is a strategic ambition within both the EU and NATO (see NATO 2010, European Union 2016). The security priorities in the different national and institutional security strategies therefore provide little evidence for the existence of uniform “Nordic” security interest that can be distinguished from the interests of key allied European states with which Nordic states have a history of collaboration. It thus seems less likely that shared security interests alone can account for the establishment of defence commitments in the Nordic region. We therefore need to take additional factors into account if we are to understand the patterns of cooperation that have developed in the Nordic region. We note, therefore, that while the security interests identified in the post-Cold War era do not seem to hinder Nordic security and defence cooperation, security interests alone cannot provide a comprehensive account of what has triggered cooperation between the Nordic states.

Furthermore, there is an important difference in the geopolitical realities facing different Nordic states in that Iceland and Denmark do not share a border with Russia. One interviewee noted that Denmark did not initially want to join NORDEFCO, in large part because of its different geopolitical situation (Interview 1). Denmark was also concerned that Nordic cooperation on security and defence could weaken cooperation with the United States (Saxi 2019). A similar dynamic may also be at play in cases of bilateral cooperation within the Nordic region. Sweden and Finland face similar geopolitical realities, and the two countries have established close military integration. However, there is also bilateral cooperation between Sweden and Denmark in spite of their different geopolitical contexts, as well as trilateral cooperation between Norway, Finland and Sweden (Government Offices of Sweden 2020). It would thus seem that such bilateral and trilateral patterns of cooperation between the Nordic states are also driven by something other than strategic geopolitical interests.

Finally, the need to explore additional ways of accounting for the Nordic cooperation is underlined by the fact that the Swedish–Finnish cooperation evolved into de facto military integration. Such a degree of interdependence – based on the planning, coordination and operationalisation of bi-national defence capabilities – cannot be accounted for by structural realism, as it conflicts with the latter’s assumption that the ultimate objective of state policy to is to preserve the integrity and sovereignty of the state. Therefore, while there is evidence that strategic interests and geopolitics played a part in the development of Nordic security and defence cooperation, particularly since the Russian annexation of Crimea in 2014, it seems clear that commitments were also triggered by considerations that lie outside the theoretical scope of structural realism. In order to explore and fill these gaps in the account, our focus will now shift to the potential role of cost-benefit calculations.

Nordic defence cooperation alongside bilateral military integration: why?

The significance of the possibility that increased cooperation may lead to material benefits is reflected in official documents related to the establishment of NORDEFCO, in which it is stated that the main objective of NORDEFCO is to increase defence capability by exploiting “common synergies and creating efficient solutions” (NORDEFCO 2018). Accordingly, the first official document related to NORDEFCO indicates a cost-benefit rationale for Nordic cooperation.

A high degree of military systems compatibility between individual Nordic states would appear to correlate with the establishment of integrative commitments. Increased Swedish and Finnish military cooperation was due to a sense that it would be efficient because the cooperation involved only two states that had a high degree of compatibility in their military equipment and procedures (Interview 7). The high degree of military systems compatibility thus corresponds to a perceived increase in the material benefits of security and defence cooperation. Swedish and Finnish military cooperation is partially integrated in the case of their respective air forces, and the Finnish and Swedish navies have also undergone partial military integration (Sweden/Finland n.d.). The expectation among the Swedish and Finnish authorities is that military systems compatibility increases the potential for material benefits from cooperation. It allows states to reduce national investments without having to change existing systems, equipment or military practices. Thus, the establishment of integrative commitments in the case of Sweden and Finland correlates with a high degree of military systems compatibility.

However, both cooperative and integrative commitments to bilateral cooperation between the Nordic states seem to co-exist with a push towards commitments within a broader, multilateral Nordic cooperation. Sweden and Denmark’s commitment to cooperation within the Nordic framework provides a relevant example. This is a case of bilateral cooperation within the Nordic framework in NORDEFCO between non-NATO member Sweden and NATO member Denmark. With respect to cooperation between Sweden and Denmark, one interviewee noted the following: “Swedish and Danish cooperation is not formally connected to NORDEFCO, but it is connected to what is going on in NORDEFCO. Having a similar agreement between all the Nordic states is the ultimate goal” (Interview 4). While the initial agreement is bilateral, the interviewee declares that the ultimate goal is cooperation between all of the Nordic partners. Recently, Norway, Sweden and Finland signed a trilateral military cooperation agreement to increase military and strategic cooperation (Government Offices of Sweden 2020). In addition, while the first NORDEFCO documents were signed in 2009, the five member-states renewed and reaffirmed their commitment to Nordic cooperation in the field of security and defence in 2018 (NORDEFCO 2020).

In sum, it is difficult to fully account for the push towards a Nordic framework for defence cooperation solely by reference to the existence of shared strategic or material interests. Denmark, for example, wanted to be part of a Nordic programme of cooperation even though it did not share the same strategic interests as Norway and Sweden in 2009 (Saxi 2019). Furthermore, integrative commitments to cooperation are seemingly correlated with military systems compatibility, which varies in and between the Nordic states. In the past, Finland has had a strong tradition of cooperation with the Baltic states, more so than with other Nordic states (Männik 2002). Similarly, one informant noted that the Norwegian military in some respects has greater compatibility with the Dutch military than with other Nordic states (Interview 2). However, there are clearly parts of the Nordic defence cooperation that seem to follow from decision-making that is in large part driven by a cost-benefit logic, as can be seen in NORDEFCO’s official documents as well and in other account of Nordic defence cooperation (NORDEFCO 2018, Saxi 2019). Evidence of a cost-benefit logic can also be seen in the emphasis placed by authorities within the different Nordic states on the importance of the perceived economic benefits of military cooperation.

It seems evident, however, that we must look for an additional explanatory factor, one that is not based on security or material interests, if we are to adequately explain the existence of defence cooperation between the Nordic states. Some scholars have pointed to a certain uniformity of norms and identity within the Nordic region as a potentially relevant theoretical lens through which to examine Nordic cooperation in the security field. In what follows, then, this article will explore and further specify the notion of “Nordic togetherness” and consider the extent to which the identity/norm expectation can contribute to a more comprehensive account of the commitments made within the Nordic model for defence cooperation.

Nordic security and defence cooperation: an expression of solidarity?

As we have observed, security and defence cooperation between the Nordic states has evolved over the past decade to reach a level that arguably involves a departure from traditional expectations associated with this policy field. In probing official documents, interviews with government officials and secondary literature for an account that can address gaps in our understanding of this development, I find evidence in all three of these data sources supporting the expectation that a sense of “Nordic togetherness” was important. While cost-benefit considerations, geopolitical and strategic interests are important, evidence suggests that the self-perception among the Nordic states that they share similar values and are in some way distinct from non-Nordic states has been significant for triggering decisions to strengthen cooperation on questions of defence. The sense of like-mindedness has contributed to removing barriers and even served to heighten ambitions in terms of the scope and depth of cooperation. Specifically, I have identified four elements where a sense of commonality and common values has had a major impact on the development of Nordic security and defence cooperation and the establishment of integrative commitments.

The first piece of evidence is the collective expression of solidarity in and between the Nordic states that is integral to their cooperation. There is a sense that the Nordic states are a distinct group of states and that membership in this group is based on a particular set of rights and duties. Forsberg (2013, p. 1175) argues that “a practical manifestation of this tendency is that if two or three Nordic countries are working together, as Norway and Sweden and then Finland did around NORDSUP, it is likely that the fourth or the fifth will want to join in”. This was also a recurring theme in my interviews with government officials. In describing the origins of NORDEFCO, one interviewee noted that the dialogue started out in 2007 as a discussion between the Norwegian and Swedish Chiefs of Defence, based primarily on an economic rationale of cost savings. Seeing this dialogue, Finland wanted to join in. But Denmark was not particularly interested owing to its very different geopolitical realities and priorities:

the Danish Chief of Defence was quite ambivalent about it all. “We are getting rid of submarines, and now Norway and Sweden want to see if we can cooperate on procurement of the next generation of submarines. What do we need this for?” But Denmark’s motivation ultimately was that if there is going to be Nordic cooperation there, then all the Nordic countries need to be a part of it. There is a normative dimension: there is a sense that everyone should be a part of it. (Interview 7)

Commenting on one of the bilateral agreements within the Nordic framework, another interviewee noted that

we call it NORDEFCO cooperation when two NORDEFCO states are cooperating. Danish and Swedish cooperation is an example of that. We are going to continue to develop that cooperative framework. But that does not mean that the Nordic framework is not functioning or developing. But it is easier to start with two partners – it is more efficient – and then the other states can couple on to the framework later. It is easier to define the scope when there are only two partners initially. (Interview 5)

It seems clear that this trajectory is expected to continue – that is, that bi- or trilateral agreements will be gradually expanded to include more Nordic states, as noted by another interviewee: “while bilateral cooperation between Sweden and Denmark is not formally NORDEFCO, it is connected to what is going on in NORDEFCO. Having a similar agreement between all the Nordic countries, that is the direction things are going” (Interview 4). This rhetoric of “all of us” is also clear in official statements, such as the September 2020 statement by the defence ministers of Finland, Norway and Sweden announcing the signing of a trilateral statement of intent to enhance operational cooperation, which noted that “in the spirit of Nordic cooperation, Denmark and Iceland will be informed on a regular basis as the cooperation proceeds” (Government Offices of Sweden 2020). More importantly, the preference for broadening existing agreements to include all of the Nordic states is evident in practice, as in the case of the Alternate Landing Bases agreement that allows Nordic air forces to use each other’s air bases as alternate landing bases. The agreement was originally signed by Denmark, Norway and Sweden in 2017, while Finland and Iceland joined later (NORDEFCO annual report 2017). Similarly, when the agreement was expanded in 2019 to include armed aircraft and advance stockpiling of certain types of equipment, the agreement was first signed by Denmark, Norway, Sweden and Finland, while Iceland joined at a later date (NORDEFCO 2020).

Second, the significance of “Nordic togetherness” relates to how the high level of trust between the Nordic states translates into concrete policy achievements by removing barriers that might otherwise have made such achievements impossible. The Nordic states have been said to hold a “maximalist” level of trust in which they support each other’s values and interests (Ruzika and Keating 2015, p. 18, Røren 2019, p. 6). This kind of maximalist view stands in contrast to the more traditional “minimalist” level of trust where states are more neutral and the baseline is that states do not cause injury towards each other (Ruzika and Keating 2015, p. 18, Røren 2019, p. 6). Drawing on a series of interviews with Nordic diplomats, Røren (2019, p. 14) observed that “the friendship and trust among these countries, their people and their practitioners are institutionalized to a level where it seems like they are sometimes working as one country rather than five”. Similar evidence was found in my interviews with Nordic government officials, with one interviewee noting that “the Nordic states share the same culture; this benefits cooperation and is positive for the development of cooperation” (Interview 5). The significance of trust between the Nordic states and the depth of their commitment to Nordic cooperation is also evident in how the Nordic states have overcome setbacks and even major roadblocks in larger defence procurement projects. While there have been several prominent failures, such as on submarines and the Archer artillery system, the most prominent case was the 2008 discord surrounding fighter-jet procurement. The Swedes were pushing hard for joint procurement between the Nordic states on next-generation military fighter jets, meaning that the Nordic states would purchase the Swedish-made JAS Gripen fighter. Norway ended up purchasing US-made Lockheed Martin F-35 planes instead and there was a perception that Norway had allowed the procurement process to continue for some time after the decision had in fact been made. While this was no shock due to the strategic importance to Norway of relations to the US, the case caused considerable dissension and was the subject of numerous newspaper headlines, highlighting tension and disappointment between Sweden and Norway (Aftenposten 2008). However, despite this momentary contention between the forerunners of Nordic defence cooperation, the Gripen/F-35 case did not end up derailing Nordic defence cooperation. On the contrary, the high level of mutual trust between the Nordic countries seems to make it possible for states to in fact overcome disagreement and setbacks. Twelve years later, in 2020, the defence ministers of Finland, Norway and Sweden announced a trilateral statement of intent to enhance operational cooperation. While the objectives point to common security threats, the like-mindedness and shared values of the Nordic states is highlighted as a critical foundation: “In light of the security situation, cooperation and unity among likeminded nations is paramount. The Nordic region is one of the world’s most integrated” (Trilateral Statement of Intent to Enhance Operational Cooperation 2020, emphasis added).

The third indicator points to the importance of a sense of “Nordic togetherness” for how Nordic defence cooperation is viewed within civil society and the effect this has on political will. In essence, it seems that a sense of “Nordic togetherness” in civil society has provided the necessary political will to prioritise Nordic defence cooperation. As one interviewee pointed out:

there is inherently a lot of institutional resistance towards military cooperation   …  Future systems similarity requires joint long-term planning, which makes it harder to uphold protectionism in national defence industries. It means job cuts, layoffs and competing for the same jobs across countries. To make these types of structural changes requires support from above. It means that political leadership has to support change. Beyond these economic concerns, we have to stand together in the Nordics. It is easier for the political leadership to win backing for this rationale. (Interview 1)

Such a view is echoed by Forsberg (2013, p. 1163), who points out that “the ‘Nordic’ label makes it easier to sell international military cooperation politically to domestic audiences”. He demonstrates the significance of the notion of Nordic commonality by citing the level of support for Nordic cooperation among the general public, before continuing:

Nordic security and defence policy cooperation enjoys strong public support, although exact figures from public opinion polls are not easily available. In 2010, 42 per cent of the Nordic population, for example, regarded the idea of a Nordic Union as positive; 78 per cent of Nordic citizens held positive views of Nordic cooperation in general, while only 4 per cent expressed negative attitudes. In Finland, an amazing 91 per cent of the population supported Nordic defence cooperation in 2012, while only 45 per cent supported military cooperation with NATO. (Forsberg 2013, p. 1177)

Forsberg’s analysis was supported in my own interviews. One informant commented: “It is about political will. Who you would like to cooperate with is a point in itself” (Interview 7). In essence, there is a tangible notion that cooperation in and between Nordic states is perceived as “safe” and “natural” by public audiences.

The fourth indicator suggesting that norms and identity have an impact on Nordic security and defence cooperation relates to the common values that permeate the work culture of the Nordic countries. Sundelius and Wiklund (1979) in Røren (2019, p. 5) write that “the numerous Nordic societal linkages have created official sub-governmental bonds which together make up a net of considerable strength”. He further cites a specific example of how such a Nordic work culture plays out in practice:

As one Swedish diplomat told me, “My Norwegian colleague and I exchange reports before we send them to the ministry, like ‘could you read through this, what do you think about this, and then we send it home.’ Though the reports in question were not highly confidential, sharing diplomatic correspondence that is still in draft is a remarkable practice.” (Røren 2019, p. 9)

Forsberg (2013, p. 1163) makes a similar point, arguing that one of the ways in which “Nordic identity” has played a role in the rise of Nordic defence cooperation is that “it facilitates informal cooperation between politicians and defence officials at various levels”. He further argues that the “closely related languages are often seen as a community-building factor facilitating practical cooperation, even though the common language that is used in military cooperation today is more likely to be English than any of the Scandinavian tongues” (Forsberg 2013, p. 1175). The fact that the common language is English rather than Scandinavian is significant because it demonstrates that this linguistic commonality cannot be seen as just a practical aid to communication.

Rather, it is the commonality itself that is the key factor. Indeed, several of those interviewed for this study emphasised how having a sense of “we are alike” in the Nordics was significant for cooperation. One interviewee pointed to the “good mutual understanding of Nordic decision processes” as an important asset in the building of NORDEFCO (Interview 7). Another made it clear that NORDEFCO serves as a forum for coordinating and advancing common Nordic positions within NATO and the EU, through policy discussions and sharing of documents to the greatest possible extent (Interview 4). As this perception of common values turns working together across the Nordics into a natural choice, it is not difficult to see how such processes in turn breed mutual trust. In sum, having common values and cultures in and between the Nordic states creates an environment in which barriers are removed and there is a high level of trust, which makes it possible to establish shared procedures, working conditions, informal connections and lines of communication that serve to enhance the chances of success in formulating and enacting policies.

Taken together, these indications are in line with the expectation that a sense of common identity and values contributed to facilitating Nordic security and defence cooperation, and this must be considered analytically distinct from national security interests and material interests. There is a commitment to a particular group of states, and membership in this group involves a particular set of rights and duties. In the absence of common norms, a common work culture, and a high level of trust and tradition between the Nordic states, security and defence cooperation could more likely be limited to separate and disparate cases of cooperation between states.

Conclusion

The aim of this study has been to account for how the Nordic states have agreed to bind themselves so tightly together in the field of security and defence. In examining this question, evidence suggests that similar strategic interests in and between the Nordic states and cost-benefit calculations have been significant triggers for Nordic security and defence cooperation. Additionally, I have found strong support for the argument that a sense of “Nordic togetherness” has played an important role in the development of Nordic security and defence cooperation.

I first investigated the nature of the commitments made within Nordic defence cooperation, distinguishing between cooperative and integrative commitments, and showed how Nordic security and defence cooperation ranges from cooperation involving joint military training, exchange of security intelligence and information, to commitments involving de facto military integration. In seeking to account for these commitments, I constructed a structural-realist expectation, a cost-benefit expectation and an identity and normative expectation, and subsequently analysed whether and to what extent these expectations can be substantiated. While there are indications that support both the realist and the cost-benefit expectations, there are also clear gaps in the accounts provided by such approaches that are addressed by considering the identity- and norm-based perspective.

The findings of the present study show that cooperation occurred despite differences in strategic and material interests: Denmark initially did not want to be part of Nordic defence cooperation because it was not clear why Nordic cooperation was in line with the country’s own strategic and material interests. Second, Nordic security and defence cooperation provides examples of de facto military integration in the field of security and defence. The most prominent example of this within the Nordic framework is the case of bilateral integration between Sweden and Finland. This refers to the partial integration of parts of the navies and air forces of the two countries. De facto military integration of such kind challenges prevailing assumptions about the depth of commitments states make with respect to cooperation in the field of security and defence. The evidence further suggests that the bilateral military integration that has taken place between Sweden and Finland is in large part rooted in cost-benefit calculations. However, cost-benefit calculations cannot account for the continued push towards a broader, multilateral Nordic agreement. Maximising the cost-benefit balance might dictate fewer participants or seeking non-Nordic partners with greater military systems compatibility.

The sense-of-solidarity dimension that exists between the Nordic states is therefore necessary if we are to understand the depth of commitments the Nordic states have made to defence cooperation. The perception of a shared identity and habits of cooperation between Nordic states were significant for the decisions that led to the establishment of mutually binding commitments, as well as for NORDEFCO’s continued development. Developments in the Nordic framework tend to start with two or three states, with the remaining states joining the process later. Taking into account the sense of “Nordic togetherness” makes it possible to understand the integrative commitments that have been established within this policy field. If cooperation between the Nordic states were driven by strategic and material interests alone, the Nordic defence cooperation would likely not evolve beyond a case-by-case basis.

The case of the Nordic region thus confirms the importance of identity and norms for understanding the nature of mutually binding commitments between states in security and defence cooperation. The potential significance of the identity and normative commitment to cooperation in the field of security and defence extends beyond the Nordic framework. For example, we may wish to investigate the notion of mutually binding commitments with respect to developments in the EU’s Common Security and Defence Policy as well as cases of de facto military integration as exemplified by Benelux defence cooperation. Relevant questions include whether a stronger case for cooperation based on strategic interests or cost-benefit rationales reduces the need for a normative and identity-based dimension and whether such dimensions may take different forms compared to the “Nordic togetherness” observed in this case. By testing the presence and strength of the types of identity-based and normative indicators seen in the case of the Nordic states, it may be possible to augment our understanding of the development of these cases as well as to inform ongoing discussion on patterns of European security and defence cooperation.

Acknowledgements

I would like to thank the two anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. I am grateful to Helene Sjursen for her help and encouragement. Thank you to the Norwegian Ministry of Defence for financing this research. The article is part of the research project “The legitimacy of EU foreign and security policy in the age of global contestation” (288707) at ARENA, financed by the Research Council of Norway research initiative “Europe in Transition” (EUROPA).

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).