Contested statehood, complex sovereignty and the European Union's role in Kosovo

ABSTRACT

The emergence, longevity and resilience of contested states have redefined the relationship between sovereignty and territoriality. While fully-fledged states uphold the monopoly of authority, contested states seek to rewrite the sovereignty playbook and gain a seat among sovereign equals. This atypical antagonism, propped up by post-Westphalian statehood aspirations, has changed the way sovereignty is perceived and understood nowadays. Approaching sovereignty as multi-faceted, this article discusses contested statehood in the context of the EU's engagement overseas. Drawing on the literature of Europeanisation and complex sovereignty, it accounts for the influence of contested statehood on the EU's role and policies in contested states. Specifically, by delving into Kosovo's complex sovereignty (internal/external), the analysis measures the fluctuating impact of contestedness on the EU's employed policy frameworks and deployed crisis management tools unfolding a paradox that has defined the EU's foreign policy in Kosovo for years.

KEYWORDS:

• Contested statehood
• Kosovo
• contested states
• EULEX
• Europeanization
• complex sovereignty

Acknowledgments

I am most grateful to Professor Marieke de Goede for her constant support, excellent supervision and feedback during the whole process. Special thanks go to EULEX representatives who offered precious insights and helped me get a good grasp on the situation in Kosovo. Lastly, my appreciation is extended to all the interviewees and to my partner Alaa for our extensive brainstorming and thought-provoking discussions throughout.

Disclosure statement

No potential conflict of interest was reported by the author(s).

Notes

1 German Federal Ministry for Economic Cooperation and Development, 2022. Kosovo: on the road to becoming a fully-functioning state. Available from: https://www.bmz.de/en/countries/kosovo [Accessed 4 October 2022]. 117 countries seem to have recognised Kosovo up until today. See more on: https://www.bmz.de/en/countries/kosovo. However, it is certainly hard to indicate the exact number given that (a) Kosovo’s path to international recognition is still an ongoing process, (b) it is heavily countered by anti-recognition campaigns.

2 Bouris and Kyris (2017) employ the threshold of two-thirds of United Nations members as an indicator of conferred external recognition.

3 See reference 1.

4 The Brussels Agreement was the first step towards normalisation and restoration of trust between Serbia and Kosovo. However, it is not considered as international agreement since it was not ratified by the Serbian parliament nor by the EU (2013). See more about the agreement on: https://www.srbija.gov.rs/specijal/en/120394.

5 The asterisk symbol accompanied with a footnote indicates that the status of Kosovo has not been unanimously agreed upon and recognised by EU MS. In particular, the footnote text mentions that “this designation is without prejudice to positions on status and is in line with UN Security Council resolution 1244 and the International Court of Justice Opinion on the Kosovo declaration of independence”.

6 The last JRCB took place in 2018, as the mandate of EULEX was then altered. However, it was considered as a very important step for (a) the coordination of European capabilities in Kosovo, and (b) forging a common understanding on challenges faced by both Kosovo and EULEX. See more on: https://www.eulex-kosovo.eu/?page=2,56.

7 The exchange of letters between President Vjosa Osmani (2021) and the EU High Representative for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy, Josep Borrel Fontelles, takes places biannually. Through these letters, Kosovo’s priorities are duly delivered to the EU. In turn, the EU adjusts policy objectives and action plans to better address Kosovo’s emerging needs. See more on: https://president-ksgov.net/en/news/president-osmani-extends-the-eu-rule-of-law-mission-in-kosovo-technical-mandate.